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This study examines journalistic strategies in terms of the appropriation of media logics in the 
conflict frame building process. Relying on three models: objectivity, mediatisation and news 
framing; the research interrogates the role orientations and performance of journalists who 
reported the conflict involving the ‘indigenous’ Christians and Hausa Fulani Muslim 
‘settlers’ of Jos - a city in North Central Nigeria inhabited by approximately one million 
people. It provides empirical evidence of the strategies and the representations of ethnic and 
religious identities in the conflict narratives focusing on the most cited and vicious conflict in 
Jos which occurred in 2001, 2008 and 2010.  
Drawing on in-depth individual interviews with print and broadcast journalists 
resident in Jos (to understand their role orientations/conceptions), and the qualitative content 
analysis of two Nigerian newspapers of ‘Christian South’ and ‘Muslim North’ (to know their 
role performance in terms of linguistic choices), the study makes two major contributions that 
demonstrate the ‘strategic’ role of journalists in the conflict. First, it establishes that a number 
of strategies were used: their choice of words to ‘moderate’ or ‘water down’ conflict: the 
implanting, reinforcement, community-aided strategies, among others. Importantly, it 
discovers the Neutral-to-goal-focused/pyramid strategy which presents a systematic frame 
building process that alters the nuanced inverted pyramid news structure. This evolving 
strategy advances an understanding of journalists’ framing of ethnic and religious identities. 
Second, it establishes that journalists share membership of their ethnic and/or religious 
community influenced by residential segregation of the city, internal and external pressure 
and exposure to violence. The study demonstrates large scale participation by journalists in 
the conflict resulting in the escalation of violence. Thus, mediatised conflict research is 
revisited – placing media logics at the heart of the conflict. The research proposes a 
Solutions-Review Journalism (SRJ) as a framework for conflict reporting and argues that a 
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Introduction to the Thesis 
1.1 Chapter Overview 
This chapter provides a guide to the thesis highlighting the knowledge gap and the 
phenomenon being investigated. At a glance, it discusses the study’s theoretical and 
methodological contexts; summarises the contributions of the research and defines some 
concepts used in the thesis. 
1.2 Background   
The study builds on existing efforts aimed at understanding journalists’ framing of ethnic and 
religious identities which constitutes news, and how it escalates and/or de-escalates violence. 
Alubo (2009, p. 9) has defined identity as ‘a combination of socio-cultural characteristics 
which individuals share, or are presumed to share, with others on the basis of which one 
group may be distinguished from others’. It is the perception of people about themselves and 
how they view others with whom they live and interact in their social environment. Whether 
it involves social groups within local communities or people living outside their home 
country – the diaspora community, the struggle for social identity remains a subject which 
draws the attention of many scholars across disciplines. Ogunyemi (2007, p. 17) argues that 
‘one of the dimensions of representation is identity. The efforts by minority groups to take 
ownership of their representation in the public sphere are a form of exercise in identity 
formation and production’. This assumption suggests that people want to be recognised by 
their social status (e.g., control of ancestry, political or religious association) which 
distinguishes them from others in a given community. Thus, it often leads to social 
inequality. The handling of social identities in the media has received considerable attention 
in scholarship because the journalists have the capacity to construct realities and shape 
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attitudes (Mano, 2015; Tenenboim-Weinblatt, Hanitzsch, & Nagar, 2016). Studies have 
revealed that many journalists in Nigeria often align with conflict actors within their ethnic 
and religious community by using enemy frames in their narratives (Gambo & Hassan, 2011; 
A. O. Musa & Ferguson, 2013; Oso, 2011; Umechukwu, 2001).   
This research examines the strategies of print and broadcast journalists who are 
behind the story of the protracted conflict in Jos. A number of factors (such as constant 
witness to violence, editorial policies, access to conflict areas, intimidation and trauma) 
accounts for this unprofessional conduct (L. Adamu, 2008). As such, literature on the 
coverage of the conflict suggests a robust journalistic reawakening that draws the attention of 
reporters, editors and news producers to the danger such action portends for co-habitation in 
the city (J. D. Galadima, 2010; A. O. Musa & Ferguson, 2013; Rasaq, 2012). 
As a major step, the study highlights the antecedents of Jos which descended from a 
city of tranquillity to war (Gofwen & Ishaku, 2006; Lar & Embu, 2012; Mangvwat, 2013). Its 
people have turned violent – with journalists bearing witness to the ‘extreme brutality’ that 
has led to many deaths (Krause, 2011, p. 10). The study examines journalistic strategies 
under this circumstance given that conflict reporting portends danger for the journalists who 
engage in it (Allan, 2013; Behrman, Canonge, Purcell, & Schiffrin, 2012). Since the eruption 
of violence in the area, journalists have consistently reported it thereby attracting global 
attention. Recognising that previous studies have ignored the influence of journalists’ 
exposure to violence on news reporting of the Jos conflict, and drawing from the 
Constructivist epistemology, the current research has focused on the most vicious conflict in 





Ethnicity, religion, conflict 
Ethnicity and religion are among the major causal factors of conflict across the globe; others 
being racism, cultural pluralism and xenophobia. These represent a diverse community in 
which social groups struggle for identity – a sense of being and belonging. Not only do these 
groups want to be recognised in their own rights; they often resort to conflict, or even 
violence, when their expectations are not met (Shorkey & Crocker, 1981; Young, 2009). 
The debate on the multidimensionality of conflict has been sustained over the years. 
While ethnic-racial determinists (e.g., Mano, 2015; Neuberger, 2001) have identified 
ethnicity and racism as a major trigger to conflict, the multidimensional determinists (e.g., 
Kaigama, 2012; Hae S. Kim, 2009) argue that a number of factors account for this. But 
conflict in Nigeria revolves around ethnicity and religion because there exists an ethnic 
majority and minority consciousness and a seeming religious fundamentalism (Dowd, 2014; 
Gbilekaa, 2012; Pate, 2011). Studies reveal that ethnicity and religion are inseparable 
(Appleby, 2000; Fox, 2004). This is because ‘religion is more than just a set of beliefs; it also 
encompasses community practices, socialisation functions, organisational structures, and a 
range of other features’ (Neuberg et al., 2014, p. 199). 
Nigeria is among the 55 conflict-stricken Third World countries where factors such as 
ethnicity and religion have influenced the behaviours of social groups leading to perpetual 
conflict (H. S. Galadima, 2011; Hae S. Kim, 2009). Its multi-ethnic groups are tied to various 
religious organisations with Muslims and Christians constituting the majority. Some 
Nigerians got converted to Islam since 1804 - most of them from the north, while Christianity 
was introduced in the southern part of the country in 1842 (Agbiboa, 2013b). Both religious 
groups have had a large following across the country although each still dominates the region 
of its birth. When people are engrossed in religiosity – the extent to which religion is 
engrained in their lives, as it is in Nigeria (Dowd, 2014), it can ‘contribute substantially to 
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intergroup conflict’ because there is ‘incompatibility of values and competition over tangible 
resources’ (Neuberg et al., 2014, pp. 198-199). 
Over a century ago, the colonial administration of Lord Luggard formed Nigeria from 
two distinct constituents – southern and northern regions, which was a programme that failed 
to put the country on the path of progress. This arrangement, arguably, accounts for the 
country’s ethnic and religious conflicts as the people had been, and still are, separated along 
these lines (Agbiboa, 2013a; Danfulani, 2006; Gbilekaa, 2012). The same is said of Nigeria’s 
neighbours in sub Saharan Africa where conflicts of ethnicity, religion, racism and other 
social identities have ravaged many communities and destroyed their institutions (Mano, 
2015; McCauley, 2014; Nyamnjob, 2015). Research indicates that ‘people of Africa have 
known histories, geographies, ethnic groups, languages, gender, skin colours and continental 
identities’ (Mano, 2015, p. 7) – which means that a variety of social groups exists on the 
continent. Hence, ‘as long as people have different values and beliefs, they will see things 
differently’ (Hamelink, 2011, p. 11). 
Like many Nigerian cities with diverse inhabitants, Jos has a history of violent 
conflict.  There was an outbreak of violence in the city on September 7, 2001 as a result of 
the clash between two rival groups – the ‘indigenous’ communities: Afizere, Anaguta and 
Berom, and the Hausa Fulani ‘settlers’. The political space had been tense because the 
‘indigenes’ resisted the purported subversion of their customary land by the Hausa Fulani 
who were said to have ‘settled’ in their land during the mining activities and trade (Ambe-
Uva, 2010; Danfulani, 2006; Mangvwat, 2013). Both groups resorted to violence as an 
expression of their frustrations over the prolonged dispute leading to the death of over 1,000 
people and the loss of huge material resources (HumanRightsWatch., 2001). Another round 
of violence occurred in 2008 killing 700 people. Between January and March, 2010, about 
350 and 500 people had been killed (Ajaero & Phillips, 2010; Obayiuwana, 2010). Although 
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there was intermittent violence in the city which spread to its neighbouring communities 
claiming several lives, it was less vicious compared to the spates of attacks in 2001, 2008 and 
2010 (Ishaku, 2012; Krause, 2011; Taft & Haken, 2015). 
The ‘indigenous’ communities of Jos are predominantly Christians while the Hausa 
Fulani ‘settlers’ are mainly Muslims (Danfulani, 2006). Thus, whenever there was conflict 
between the ‘indigenes’ and ‘settlers’ it was perceived as a religious conflict. Both groups 
took advantage of their affiliations with religious communities to mobilise the adherents by 
implanting in them the notion that it was a religious war in which they were expected to 
participate in ‘defence’ of the faith. Orji (2011) explains that while the Jos conflict originated 
from the struggle for identity between the ‘indigenes’ and Hausa Fulani ‘settlers’, it assumed 
a religious dimension because both parties recognised the divide: the Christian ‘indigenes’ 
and the Muslim ‘settlers’. He maintains that 
[…] the principal actors are adherents of the two dominant or rival religions in 
Nigeria. The introduction of faith into the Jos conflict has widened the conflict, 
making it possible for the conflicting parties to attract sympathy from a wider 
community than if the crisis had solely played out as an ethnic conflict (Orji, 2011, p. 
488). 
 
Recent research has revealed that once an ethnic conflict has assumed a religious character, 
the parties involved become more violent and efforts to broker peace between them do not 
yield much results (Isaacs, 2017). The research argues that it is because there is ‘an ethnically 
divided society in which religious boundaries overlap with ethnic boundaries. To be a 
member of one ethnic group, one must also profess a particular religious affiliation’ (Isaacs, 
2017, p. 204). 
A body of research shows that journalists play a significant role in intrastate, interstate 
and global conflicts and the narratives they produce are inflated (Backholm & Björkqvist, 
2010; Fahmy & Johnson, 2005; Gilboa, 2002; Novak & Davidson, 2013; Rodgers, 2012, 
2013; Seib, 2013). Many conflicts in human history: the World War II, Yugoslavian conflict, 
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the Cold War (Saleem & Hanan, 2014), the Rwandan genocide (McNulty, 1999; Rasaq, 
2012),  the Bosnian conflicts (Banks & Murray, 1999), Ugandan war (Leopold, 1999) and the 
Russian-Georgian war of 2008 (Hummel, 2013; Nitsch & Lichtenstein, 2013) were either 
incited or aggravated by journalists. 
For journalists to exert such influence on society, their strategies to ‘put pictures in 
our heads’ (Lippmann, 1922, p. 3) must be well thought out and implemented. Although D. 
Barker (2007, p. 2) recognises that ‘the essence of good journalism is to […]‘tell it as it is’ 
without editorialising and sensationalising, in news columns […]’, such strategies prevail due 
to pressures on the journalists, and because their ‘habit of ‘telling it as it is’ has been 
compromised’ (p.25). The journalists often ‘devise a means’ of reporting violence because 
they are ‘required to communicate potentially distressing events in great detail to their 
audiences’ (Novak & Davidson, 2013, p. 313). Therefore, to ‘devise a means’ suggests a 
strategy necessary for communicating distressing events. 
 
1.3 Rationale for the Study 
Shank, Brown, and Pringle (2014) have identified five types of rationales which describe the 
role of research in the context of a broader scholarship. In their view, a phenomenon that is 
worth studying should address any, or all of these conditions: crisis – the need to change the 
status quo for better results; importance – the essence of a given condition that cannot be 
ignored; gap-filling – to provide what was lacking; depth – giving a broader picture by way 
of analysis, and commitment – explaining the unique attribute of the enquiry and justifying 
its essence in the study. The current research has met all these criteria. 
The researcher’s experience of news reporting in Jos during the early years of 
conflict, and his subsequent engagement in journalism teaching at the University of Jos, 
where he conducted research and supervised undergraduate projects on media and conflict, 
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were the motivations that heralded the current study. He had once covered conflict/disaster 
beat from where he reported the killings of some residents and the destruction of property. At 
that time he realised that, for example, reports of one incident by many journalists did not 
reflect the actual violence; they were rarely reliable in terms of statistics of casualties and 
identification of victims and aggressors. This was a common practice among conflict 
journalists who soon came under attack by their critics, especially human rights groups. Like 
other intrastate, interstate and global conflicts, most of which have been blamed on the media 
(Cottle, 2006; Hamelink, 2011; Seethaler, Karmasin, Melischek, & Wohlert, 2013; Stauber, 
2013), journalists have been accused of inciting and aggravating the Jos conflict (L. Adamu, 
2008; J. D. Galadima, 2010; Gofwen & Ishaku, 2006; Plateau Indigenous Development 
Association Network, 2010).  
These scholars have argued that journalists often take sides in conflict based on pre-
existing ties to warring parties, among other unethical practices. In that sense, crisis had been 
established in conflict reporting which required an immediate remedy.  There was the need 
for a journalistic rebirth or reorientation that would make journalists responsible and 
accountable. Drawing from the researcher’s example that ‘reports of one incident by many 
journalists did not reflect the actual violence’; it implied that some conflict journalists simply 
‘made-up’ their narratives based on their imaginations rather than facts. Unlike the ritual of 
framing that looks at a story angle on which emphasis is laid without necessarily interfering 
with the facts (Phillips, 2015), journalistic strategies suggest that truth is distorted (Knoppers 
& Elling, 2004; Perrin, 2011). This practice portended danger for journalism as a whole, and 
it needed to be checked so that the ‘crisis’ of hit-or-miss reporting could be minimised.  
Prompted by this myriad of journalistic flaws, the researcher set out to examine the 
circumstances in which bias or sensational reporting is conceived and actualised, especially 
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in relation to ‘indigenes’ and ‘settlers’ as well as Muslims and Christians within a sustained 
conflict space.  
The researcher also drew inspiration from the writings of former Guardian and BBC 
reporter Dennis Barker. For instance, his 200-page book, Tricks journalists play: How the 
truth is massaged, distorted, glamorized and glossed over, reveals the strategies employed by 
journalists in news framing. In it he admits that ‘journalists have tricks of the trade’ (Barker, 
p.1). But there is no research effort that examines these strategies by journalists reporting the 
Jos conflict. These journalistic practices aroused the interest of the researcher who sought to 
know the strategies conflict journalists had adopted in their work and the interests they 
served, aimed at filling the gap in literature.  For D. Barker (2007), his experience in 
journalism has enabled him to understand the way news is produced – which may be likened 
to the culture of making up stories, or the journalists’ framing of fictitious figures of victims 
of the Jos conflict as the researcher earlier observed. That journalists employ certain 
strategies in news production underscores the importance of the subject which cannot be 
ignored. An understanding of these strategies in the context of the Jos conflict was necessary.  
The study also emerged to examine the media coverage of small-scale violence (Jos 
conflict - although it has been labelled as ‘genocide’, ‘massacre’, ‘bloodbath’) (see 
Danfulani, 2006; J. D. Galadima, 2010; Golwa, 2011; Krause, 2011) with the aim of 
controlling media instigation that prevailed in large–scale, well-known wars in places such as 
Syria, Afghanistan, Palestine/Israel, Sudan, Rwanda and  Iraq. The focus on the coverage of 
the Jos conflict was not only borne out of the researcher’s desire to investigate the process of 
reporting by journalists in the protracted conflict but to understand the nature of conflict that 
has been perceived ‘out of the ordinary’ (based on media accounts and literature), and to 
further establish its influence on the journalists. For example, Krause (2011, p.10) observes 
that Jos has experienced ‘years of violent confrontations and extreme brutality [....] Despite 
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numerous peace efforts, tensions on the Plateau are at their worst today [....] The situation is 
so tense that residents fear that any minor incident could set the town ablaze again’. Given 
this scenario which implies that many journalists may have been caught up in this dilemma of 
reporting the conflict – witnessing the ‘extreme brutality’ and employing different strategies 
in the process - the research was worth undertaking. This commitment was appropriate in the 
prevailing circumstance.  
Furthermore, like other small and large-scales conflicts on which volumes of literature 
abound, this study was initiated to support research efforts, in relation to media and conflicts. 
Having taught related courses at the undergraduate level the researcher’s interest in this 
evolving discipline has spurred him to conduct this study in greater depth, aimed at 
mentoring younger scholars and developing a module for advancing media and conflict 
studies in Nigerian universities.    
1.4 Statement of the Problem 
Studies that point to the media‘s poor handling of the Jos conflict are numerous (e.g., L. 
Adamu, 2008; Ambe-Uva, 2010; J. D. Galadima, 2010; Gofwen & Ishaku, 2006; Golwa, 
2011; A. O. Musa & Ferguson, 2013; Rasaq, 2012; Zeng & Akinro, 2013), but all of them 
leave a great deal of the strategies employed by journalists in the conflict frame building 
process unexplained. The current study attempts to fill this gap in literature thereby providing 
empirical evidence on these strategies and the representations of ethnic and religious 
identities in the conflict narratives.  
Research on journalistic strategies suggests that ‘behind-the-scene’ practices exist in 
journalism; that is, the unique approaches to the manufacture of news (Knoppers & Elling, 
2004; Magen, 2015; Perrin, 2011; Rampazzo Gambarato & Tárcia, 2016; Robinson, 2015). 
Journalists use different strategies to manipulate the audiences at whom their news contents 
are targeted in order to achieve certain goals (Carvalho, 2008; R. Coleman, 2010). Former 
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Guardian and BBC reporter Dennis Barker argues that these journalistic strategies exist 
because the doctrine of ‘‘telling it as it is’ has gone out of fashion’ (D. Barker, 2007, p. 87). 
He implies that many journalists have come to believe that the universal principle of 
reporting which suggested that they report events ‘as they see them’ without interpreting or 
ascribing meanings to them is unattainable. He claims that journalists want their audiences to 
understand the angles from which subjects are identified in their reports hence they devise 
different ways of communicating these.  
While studies conducted by J. D. Galadima (2010), A. O. Musa and Ferguson (2013) 
and Rasaq (2012) deserve acknowledgement because they focus on identity politics and 
enemy framing of conflict in Nigeria (which include the Jos conflict), they have not produced 
any evidence on the strategies journalists adopted  in reporting the conflict between the 
Christian ‘indigenes’ and Muslim ‘settlers’ in Jos. This research recognises that ‘journalists 
utilise a number of tactics […] so as to minimise possible risks to their proclaimed reportorial 
integrity’ (Allan, 2013, p. 14). Rather than investigate how these strategies of framing 
‘reality’ of the Jos conflict evolved, scholars have ignored this important frame building 
process in which the ‘strategists’ (journalists) are participants. Exploring this phenomenon 
would go a long way in filling this gap and advancing conflict reporting research. 
1.5 Research Questions 
The following questions shall guide this study: 
1. What factors influenced the practices of journalists who reported the violent conflict 
in Jos? 
2. How have journalists’ experiences of violence affected their framing of news on the 
conflict? 
3. What strategies did journalists employ in reporting the Jos conflict?  
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1.6 Aim of the Study 
The aim of this research is to understand the strategies journalists employed in news framing 
of the Jos conflict and the circumstances under which they made on-the-spot reporting 
decisions. 
1.7 Objectives of the Study 
The objectives of this research include: 
• To examine the factors that influenced the practices of journalists who reported the 
violent conflict in Jos; 
• To establish the extent to which journalists’ exposure to violence influenced their 
framing of news on the conflict; 
• To explore the strategies journalists employed in the framing of news on the conflict; 
• To recommend ways by which journalists can contribute to peacebuilding efforts in 
Jos. 
1.8 Theoretical Framework 
1.8.1 The Frustration-Aggression and Peace Journalism theories 
The Frustration-Aggression (FA) theory and the Peace Journalism (PJ) theory were examined 
to provide the foundation for understanding the nature of violent conflict involving rival 
social groups (the Christian ‘indigenes’ and the Hausa Fulani ‘settlers’) on the one hand, and 
the non-objective journalistic practice that offers alternative to war journalism as propounded 
by Johan Galtung (1973) on the other. Both the FA and PJ were used to establish the context 




1.8.2 Objectivity, Mediatisation and News Framing theories  
This study was, therefore, anchored on three journalistic models: objectivity, mediatisation 
and news framing, all of which examined the topic from the constructivist worldview 
situating conflict reporting in the realm of the making of meaning (see Chapter 4 for detailed 
discussion).  
Although journalistic objectivity has long been criticised by constructivists because 
the act of reporting is patterned on subjectivity – selecting and interpreting codes (Crotty, 
1998; Poerksen, 2008), it is revisited in this research to discover the extent of ‘distance’ 
journalists maintained from the Jos conflict which they reported, or what, otherwise, 
prevailed in the circumstances.  The controversy that defined objectivity discourse in the last 
decades is unresolved: ‘journalists position ourselves as being outside the news while also 
situating ourselves at its centre’ (Kitch, 1999, p. 116). Thus, there is a seeming ambiguity in 
this two-phase scenario of ‘being outside’ the story being reported and ‘at its centre’ 
simultaneously. Previous research has probed this assumption: ‘How do journalistic realities 
arise? Do journalists simply record events, or are they inevitably involved participants?’ 
(Poerksen, 2008, p. 295).These questions were further probed in this research.  
The mediatisation theory, which is still being debated because of the absence of a 
unified definition, is understood in this study in terms of journalistic strategies – the logics 
that define news frames (Deacon & Stanyer, 2014; Hepp, Hjarvard, & Lundby, 2015; Hepp & 
Krotz, 2014; Livingstone & Lunt, 2014; Lundby, 2014; Nie, Kee, & Ahmad, 2014). It holds 
that in every human endeavour, there is media involvement (Ekström, Fornäs, Jansson, & 
Jerslev, 2016). The logics employed in the reporting of the Jos conflict were examined.  
News framing theory was also utilised in this research because it explains how 
journalists make reporting decisions (based on their strategies) to produce realities. The 
theory emerged from anthropology and sociology and it is ‘a critical activity in the 
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construction of social reality because it helps shape the perspectives through which people 
see the world’ (Hallahan, 1999, p. 207). The process involves an action to implant ideas in 
the audience, or put ‘pictures in our heads’ using a series of strategies (Lippmann, 1922, p. 
3). Its adoption in this research was crucial as the journalists’ strategies were identified in the 
frames that made up the conflict narratives. It was used to examine valence framing – the 
direction of news (positive or negative angles to conflict narratives), semantic framing – the 
choice of phrases or words to achieve a certain goal; and story framing – the central idea of 
the story (Hallahan, 1999).  
The frameworks of these models have helped to explain the study from a 
constructivist point of view showing how journalists deployed a number of strategies in 
reporting the Jos conflict.  
1.9 Methodology 
The qualitative research method was adopted using two data collection tools: In-depth 
individual interviews (III), made up of 26 participants, and the qualitative content analysis 
(QCA) comprising 30 editions of newspapers. The choice of the research strategy and 
methods was to address the research problem appropriately given the nature of the 
investigation (Goldberg & Allen, 2015; Shin, Kim, & Chung, 2009). The first method probed 
the role conceptions of the journalists while the second examined their role performance in 
the conflict. 
Two data sets emerged from this exercise and the analysis focused on the variety of 
strategies used in framing (including the types of frames) and the journalists’ linguistic 
choices. The research design, process and methodology are explained in connected sequence 
in Chapter 5.  
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1.10 Research Philosophy 
The study is a constructivist analysis of journalistic strategies. The social constructivist 
epistemology holds that human beings ascribe meanings to objects, or construct their reality 
as they experience their world (S. Coleman, Morrison, & Anthony, 2012; Crotty, 1998; 
Hutton, 2011; Kukla, 2000). It is described thus: 
Meaning and our perceptions of ‘reality’ are socially constructed; our ideas about the 
real, in turn, influence our behaviour, including how we communicate with others. 
Through this process we define objects, enabling them to exist in a social context 
(Keaton & Bodie, 2011, p. 195). 
 
It means that individuals derive meanings from their everyday interactions with social groups 
which could produce a variety of truths – largely based on experiences, beliefs and situations 
(Creswell, 2014). The journalists whose strategies were investigated shared their experiences 
of conflict to which they attached meanings. Also, the reports which were analysed were a 
construction of the journalists.  
Apart from the epistemology, this study also discussed other essential components of 
the research philosophy – ontology and axiology, the former being the idealist logic and the 
latter value-laden tradition (Johnson & Duberley, 2000; Pathirage, Amaratunga, & Haigh, 
2008). The ontology describes knowledge while axiology refers to the values attached to 
knowledge. The philosophical stances underpinning this research have been discussed in 
Chapter 5 (see 5.3).  
1.11 Contribution to Knowledge 
The contributions of this study are summarised as follow: 
• First empirical work 
This thesis is a standalone resource material which provides evidence on the strategies of 
journalists in reporting the Jos conflict. Not only has the study made discoveries on the 
journalists’ ‘strategic’ role in the conflict which had been in the realm of conjecture; it makes 
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comparison of frames emerging from journalists working for the media of both sides of the 
divide. Anchored on constructivist reasoning which would help potential readers to decipher 
the meanings derived from the findings, the study promises to aid teaching and learning 
among conflict journalism educators and students who, before this exploit, had to grapple 
with the non-existence of empirical work on the topic.  
• Expansion of ‘mediatised conflict’ literature: Neutral-to-goal-focused/pyramid 
strategy 
The discovery of the Neutral-to-goal-focused/pyramid strategy by this research provides 
another dimension to understanding the utilisation of media logics in conflict reporting. It is a 
systematic approach to the framing of news in which the substance of the story is embedded 
in a pyramid structure (ascending order) (see Figure 9.3). The evolving strategy of framing 
provides evidence which supports the orientation of key thinkers in the ongoing debate on 
mediatisation that media logics are at the heart of its scholarship (Lunt & Livingstone, 2016, 
p. 466; Nie et al., 2014, p. 363).  
• Towards a solutions-review journalism (SRJ) 
This research proposes the solutions-review journalism (SRJ) that would improve Johan 
Galtung’s peace journalism and provide a roadmap for journalists who report violent conflict. 
This brand of journalism is emerging when the Solution Journalism Network (SJN) is 
exploring ways of strengthening solutions journalism through the introduction of solutions 
journalism courses in US universities (Thier, 2016).  
The SRJ framework developed by this research (see 9.3.2.2), emphasises a review 
process to strengthen the SJ practice as the attention of conflict scholars has shifted towards 




1.12 Definition of Key Concepts 
Mass Media/ Journalism 
The terms are used interchangeably to refer to media organisations that disseminate 
information to the public (mass media) and the art of reporting or writing for newspaper, 
magazine, radio and television – and online media – (journalism). In most intellectual 
discourses, both concepts are used synonymously.  
Mass media concept is also understood in terms of mass communication but connotes 
the institution of mass communication which includes the new media platform. The 
underlying distinction - as adopted in this study and used by scholars as well as those 
engaged in this art – is that journalism is the practice which places responsibility on 
journalists (writers, reporters, editors, photographers, news presenters, producers etc.) to 
process and disseminate information in the right form and quality. 
Indigenes/Settlers 
‘Indigenes’ and ‘settlers’ are concepts that have been socially constructed (in many parts of 
Nigeria) to demonstrate the horizontal inequalities between two groups that have distinct 
ethnic cleavages - the former being the ‘natives’ with customary rights and privileges, while 
the latter are classified as ‘foreign migrants’ who are denied such rights (Aliyu, Kasim, 
Martin, Diah, & Ali, 2012; Alubo, 2009; Ambe-Uva, 2010; Egwu, 2001, 2015; Esman, 
2004). In this study, the ‘indigenes’ of Jos comprise of the ethnic groups of Afizere, Anaguta 
and Berom (AAB), while the ‘settlers’ are the Hausa-Fulani ethnic group (in the context of 







In Nigeria (and Jos in particular), the adoption of ‘ethno-religious’ conflict emerged from the 
experience of conflict across the country which establishes the relationship between ethnicity 
and religion. The conflict is interpreted as dynamic and sensitive because the actors are 
divided on ethnic and religious lines. In typically diverse communities, ‘people can be 
grouped according to many characteristics, and most people are members of multiple groups 
or have multiple identities’ (Stewart, 2014, p. 47). This convergence of distinctiveness is also 
recognised as ‘hyphenated, conglomerate and hybrid’ identity (Ogunyemi, 2012, p. 15). For 
ease of presentation, scholars often hyphenate both elements of conflict (ethnicity and 
religion) and merge them into a compound noun which describes the scenario of Jos (S. G. 
Best & Hoomlong, 2011; Shedrack Gaya Best & Rakodi, 2011). 
It is not a mere experience of arguments between two opposing groups – Christian 
‘indigenes’ and Muslim ‘settlers’ -  but that of the use of small arms and weapons which has 
degenerated into crisis. What was regarded as conflict is today described by the media as the 
‘Jos Crisis’. In this sense, both concepts are used interchangeably in this study to situate it in 
context. 
Aggressors/Victims 
Aggressors are conflict actors who instigate others while victims refer to people of innocent 
disposition who suffer from the attacks of aggressors. In this study, the ‘indigenes’ and 
‘settlers’, who are predominantly Christians and Muslims have been labelled as the 
aggressors and victims of the Jos conflict. Journalists are also believed to have instigated 
conflict actors against each other through inflammatory reports (H. S. Galadima, 2011; J. D. 
Galadima, 2010; Golwa, 2011; Pate, 2011). Some of them have become victims of the 
conflict they cover (E. Ojo, 2003; Pate, 2011). These terms are used in many contexts 




This study situates peace building in the context of media role in the peace process. It 
emphasises journalists’ social responsibility which confers on them the sacred duty of 
reporting ‘freely’ but ‘responsibly’ to attain the peace being yearned for. In conflict of 
identity and religion which this represents, peace journalism (Johan Galtung’s concept) is 
adopted to prevent or manage conflict and restore the structures that guarantee peace and 
stability (Golwa, 2011; Hamelink, 2011; Okidu, 2011; Shinar, 2009). 
Fundamentalists/Extremists/Fanatics 
These terms are frequently used to describe people who are strong-willed and whose 
profession of faith demonstrates outward religiosity that is capable of inciting others of 
opposing faith. They are used by Nigerian Christians and Muslims to express their 
frustrations in the conflict in which they are actors. Its usage creates an impression that the 
action of the aggressor is intense and brutal.  
1.13 Thesis Overview 
This thesis is organised in nine connected chapters as follow:  
Chapter One: Introduction to the Thesis 
The first chapter is a lead-in chapter which highlights the motivation for the research; 
establishes the gap in literature and the current effort to advance knowledge in journalistic 
strategies research. It also summarises the contributions of the study to show its relevance at 
the outset.  
Chapter Two: The Challenging Perspectives of Conflict and Journalism 
This chapter explains the dynamics of conflict and journalism; their relationships and the role 
journalists performed in conflicts, drawing examples from European conflicts, the US and the 
‘Third World’ Africa. 
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Chapter Three: Nigeria and the Dimensions of the Jos Conflict 
Chapter 3 discusses the complexity of the Nigerian state which has given rise to ethnic and 
religious conflicts in many communities (including Jos). It explains these social identities and 
media interventions in the Jos conflict thereby providing the context of the research.  
Chapter Four: Objectivity, Mediatisation and News Framing: Theoretical Framework 
In Chapter 4, three theories which underpin the research have been examined as a framework 
for understanding the strategies of journalists in reporting the Jos conflict. They include 
objectivity, mediatisation and news framing.  
Chapter Five: Research Design, Process and Methodology 
Chapter 5 outlines the research process propounded by Saunders, Lewis, and Thornhill 
(2012) in which the methodology, the research philosophy, approach and strategy as well as 
the methods of data collection and analysis have been discussed.  
Chapter Six: Presentation and Analysis of Interview Data  
The interview data set is presented and analysed in Chapter 6. The Nivo Word Cloud and 
Word Tree have been used for illustration. 
Chapter Seven: Qualitative Content Analysis: The 2001 Conflict 
This chapter examines the contents of the newspapers selected for the study. It focuses on the 
2001 conflict. 
Chapter Eight: Qualitative Content Analysis: The 2008 and 2010 Conflicts 
Chapter 8 concludes the newspaper content analysis focusing on the 2008 and 2010 conflicts 
Chapter Nine: Discussion of the Findings, Conclusion and Recommendations 
This is the final chapter of the thesis. It correlates the findings from the interviews and 
qualitative content analysis data sets; draws conclusion on the thesis and proposes a roadmap 




The first chapter has provided insights into the journalistic framing of conflict in Jos 
focussing on the 2001, 2008 and 2010 episodes – which have recorded the highest deaths and 
are regarded as the most violent in history (Ishaku, 2012; Krause, 2011; Taft & Haken, 2015). 
The chapter has demonstrated that ethnicity and religion are the major social identities upon 
which journalistic frames on the Jos conflict have been built (J. D. Galadima, 2010; A. O. 
Musa & Ferguson, 2013; Rasaq, 2012). Both identities have triggered most conflicts in 
Nigeria resulting from the 1914 amalgamation of the northern and southern protectorates 
(Agbiboa, 2013a; Danfulani, 2006; Gbilekaa, 2012). 
Drawing on literature on journalists’ role in the Jos conflict (e.g., L. Adamu, 2008; 
Ambe-Uva, 2010; Zeng & Akinro, 2013), this chapter has argued that the strategies used by 
the journalists to show how they inflated the conflict have been ignored. In order to examine 
these strategies in the frame building process, three questions have been posed in this chapter 
to guide the research: What factors influenced the practices of journalists who reported the 
violent conflict in Jos? How have journalists’ experiences of violence affected their framing 
of news on the conflict? What strategies did journalists employ in reporting the conflict? 
These questions have focused on the strategies of print and broadcast journalists in Jos who 
‘manufactured’ the news on the conflict. The questions have been introduced in this chapter 
to guide the process of data collection and analysis as shown in chapters 5, 6, 7 and 8. 
This chapter has also discussed the motivation for the research which includes the 
researcher’s experience as a journalist and teacher of journalism. In all this, the research 
aimed to address a crisis (the exaggeration of conflict narratives emerging from journalistic 
strategies); demonstrate the importance of the research (journalistic strategies in the Jos 
conflict which had been ignored); fill the gap in literature (due to the lack of empirical work 
on journalistic strategies in relation to the Jos conflict); explore the topic with greater depth 
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(through a qualitative process) and show some commitment that the current effort at 
exploring journalistic strategies in the Jos conflict is of essence. This rationale for conducting 
research as explained by Shank et al. (2014), was discussed in detail in this chapter.  
The chapter has summarised the theories upon which the research is anchored, and the 
contributions of the study to demonstrate how the current research has advanced knowledge. 
This introductory chapter has established the foundation on which the research is built. It has 
problematized journalistic strategies in conflict reporting and shown how the component 
chapters of the thesis are structured in connected sequence. 
In the next chapter (chapter 2), a review of the relationship between violent conflict 
and journalism – which is key to understanding the role of journalists in global conflicts – is 
undertaken. The transition from Chapter 1 (the introduction to the thesis) to Chapter 2 was to, 
first, define the research problem and, second, explain the nature of conflict in which the 





The Changing Perspectives of Conflict and Journalism 
 
2.1 Introduction 
This chapter examines an array of literature on journalism and violent conflict to articulate 
the outcomes of related studies as a framework upon which the empirical research emerged. 
A literature review is an important component of the research process. It is ‘a written 
document that presents a logically argued case founded on a comprehensive understanding of 
the current state of knowledge about a topic of study. This case establishes a convincing 
thesis to answer the study’s question’ (Machi & McEvoy, 2016, p. 5). It is aimed at exploring 
the influence of exposure to conflict on the reporting decisions of Journalists in Jos. In this 
chapter, the concept of violent conflict in the context of this research is explained drawing on 
previous studies (e.g., Allen, 1999; Allen & Seaton, 1999; Shedrack Gaya Best & Rakodi, 
2011; Esman, 2004; Hamelink, 2011; Ikpah, 2008). The study therefore equates ‘violent 
conflict’ to war characterised by bloodshed. 
2.2 When Conflict turns Violent 
Conflict is a phenomenon of many contradictions because its impact on people is both 
positive and negative. Attempts have been made to demystify the concept in this study. Some 
explanations cast light on how it has helped in transforming the society; others describe it as 
evil (Weisel, 2015). Central to the discourse on conflict is that it is inevitable and emanates 
from the disparity of views, values and interests among individuals or social groups (Bashir, 
2008; Esman, 2004; Galtung, 1973; Gilboa, 2002; Hamelink, 2011; Seethaler et al., 2013; 
23 
 
Shinar, 2009; Wilke, 2013). It involves human actors who are engaged in ‘productive’ and/or 
‘non-productive’ dispute over a cause that is relevant to them. It is productive and desirable 
when it serves as an agent of transformation. It generates ideas that lead to positive change. It 
gives birth to new life. It is a platform on which a community thrives in every human activity. 
Hamelink (2011) argues that ‘without conflict, there are no innovations in arts and 
technology [....] The basis for scientific investigation is that scientists disagree on almost 
everything [....] If there had been no innovations about the validity of theoretical constructs, 
science would have never moved beyond Aristotelian insights’ (p.12).  
Scholars have also argued that conflict could turn violent thereby creating suspicion 
among the actors and making people of shared identity warriors within or outside the territory 
of their habitation (e.g., Allen, 1999; Allen & Seaton, 1999; Shedrack Gaya Best & Rakodi, 
2011; Esman, 2004; Francis, 2006; Hamelink, 2011; Ikpah, 2008). This description of 
conflict captures the thrust of this study as it upholds the position of these scholars and 
articulates the logic that violence in a conflict is unhealthy because it leads to destruction of 
human lives and material resources. In contrast to ‘healthy conflict’, as earlier discussed, 
which connotes a competition among individuals and groups through a peaceful process, 
violent conflict threatens domestic and global peace. It destroys human lives and structures. 
In this sense, violent conflict is conceptualised in terms of crisis and it is equated to war 
because it substitutes peace with violence. As Olsson and Nord (2015) explain that the 
definition of conflict depends on the research interest, the violence inherent in a crisis or war 
situation is implicative of ‘violent conflict’ conceived in this thesis. This apparent absence of 
peace in a social environment – a departure from a tranquil, stable society to a hostile one 
where the actors are bent on ‘winning’ a battle – has now received global attention. The 
Carnegie Corporation of New York, in 1994, inaugurated the Carnegie Commission on 
Preventing Deadly Conflict (italics researcher’s emphasis) to intervene in violent conflicts 
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that were widespread. Provoked by these hostilities meted out to people by fellow humans, 
Oppenheimer (2005), in a twenty-eight paragraph prologue to his The Hate Handbook, 
wonders why such horrifying things occur. He writes that the human society is characterised 
by hate, bigotry, prejudice, racism, mass murder and other atrocities, the premise upon which 
many people say the world is at war. 
Having examined the nature of war and how it has consumed many nations, Lawrence 
Freedman, a professor of War Studies at Kings College, London, predicted that ‘stability is 
no more than a fond hope. Things will never settle down, and that is why we are unlikely to 
be able to stop worrying about war’  (Freeman, 1994, cited in Allen, 1999, p. 5). He saw the 
world as a theatre of war because conflict which was a mere expression of opposing views 
that often led to peaceful resolution thereby stimulating development, became a violent social 
action. People resorted to organised violence over territorial borders, political and religious 
interests and other factors. Some accounts of global wars suggest that bloodshed became the 
norm among social groups during the colonialism and nationalism struggles of the nineteenth 
and twentieth centuries (S. G. Best & Hoomlong, 2011; J. D. Galadima, 2010; Lazzarich, 
2013; Seaton, 1999; Seethaler et al., 2013; Strong, 2017). War was no longer feared by those 
who engaged in it. It permeated into the social life of people. They had a favourable 
perception of war as they were always ‘exalting its mortiferous nature and heroic dimension’  
(Lazzarich, 2013, p. 39).  Lazzarich maintains that it ‘was transformed into a hymn of life 
[....] Thus the way was paved for war to be transformed from being a feared and fearful event 
to becoming a welcome, sought-after and desired event’ (2013, p.43). At that time, a radical 
ideology was in vogue; that a society had to undergo ‘radical transformation’ before it could 
gain its worth. According to Papini, cited in Lazzarich (2013, p. 42), ‘only when every faith 
will have been destroyed, a new culture will be born; only when chaos will be perfect, then 
the new order will be formed, and, with it, a new balance’. This account indicates that many 
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people nurtured the culture of war as a phase in the renewal process as there were agitations 
for autonomy, power and resources which were characterised by physical violence that had 
become an accepted social reality. It claims that even the sound of war was the people’s 
delight – because they loved war and celebrated it. This suggests that war provided relief and 
glamour. For instance, Marinetti demonstrates a cheering war scenario: ‘We shall go to the 
war dancing and singing’ (cited in Lazzarich, 2013, p. 42).  
On the basis of these accounts (see also, Hausken, 2016; King, 2001), this study 
argues that the emerging perception of war as event of entertainment, notwithstanding its 
horror and casualty narratives, soon became the attraction of global media, thus accounts for 
news framing on contemporary conflicts. Conscious of media role of surveillance (Chambers, 
2016), and granted that ‘organised violence attracts attention from mass media...because it 
threatens the lives, the security, and the livelihoods of large numbers of innocent people [...]’ 
(Esman, 2004, p. 7),  journalists have assumed this role paying attention to conflicts no 
matter the intensity. They have coined various terms to describe violent conflict such as 
‘genocide’, ‘ethnic cleansing’, ‘bloodbath’ which people now adopt in their day-to-day 
interactions on violence. Some headlines of newspapers on conflict (See, for example, figures 
2.1 & 2.2) reflect these metaphors which are not only sensational but tend to radicalise the 
audience who sees violence as a normal human engagement. 
2.3 Journalism in the World of Conflict 
The critical discourse on the world’s conflicts in which social scientists – psychologists, 
anthropologists, sociologists – are engaged, is increasingly becoming complex as the 
dimensions of such conflicts and the strategies of engagement by the actors are changing by 
the day. As it has been observed in this study, there is a shift from the once perceived 
peaceful world to a world of wars causing colossal damage to humanity. In the mass media, 
the society was, and still is, bombarded with tales of war. For example, much was reported 
26 
 
about the European conflicts –the Seven Years’ War, Crimean War, Franco-Prussian War; 
the war in the Middle East – Arab/Israeli conflict, Afghanistan, Sri Lanka, Iraq and Africa’s 
multidimensional wars – Sudan, Liberia, Uganda, Rwanda, Nigeria, Central African 
Republic, etc. These wars that occur in varying degrees in many countries are relayed to the 
audience through the mainstream and social media.  
According to Webster (2003, p. 58), ‘war is dramatic, attention-grabbing [...] as such, 
it is a top priority for news makers’. He maintains that ‘during conflict, combatants desire to 
have the media on board, so that what happens in the war is presented in ways that are 
acceptable to the wider public’ (2003,p.64). The mass media, therefore, beam their 
searchlights on communities where these acts of terror prevail. People are now aware of the 
recurring violence in the world because reporters give account of them. The mass media 
make the production of news their business  (Putnam, 2002); as such, they ‘have become so 
concerned about the presumed delicacy of their audience that one must turn to contemporary 
motion pictures’ (Seib, 2013, p. 11). The social, political and economic life of people has 
been transformed by Johannes Gothenburg’s letter press of the nineteenth century (and other 
mass media that emerged thereafter) (Wikström, 2014). One of the favourite subjects of the 
mass media is war (Seethaler et al., 2013), because ‘news during wartime can be described as 
hyper-news, where the conflict is infinitely larger than any day-to-day discord the audience 
might encounter’ (Ruigrok, 2008, p. 295). People are interested in the intensity of human 
violence. They want to know the actors of the conflict – those who oppress and the ones who 
suffer loss (aggressors and victims). They are curious about the circumstances in which the 
actors have been involved. They want to know the strategic implications of the war on their 
lives. Seib (2013) argues that if the mass media were absent war would be less attractive 










Figure 2: 2 Arkansas Democrat Gazette.  Source: https//www.wgal.com/national/911 
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The above rhetoric headline of Arkansas Democrat Gazette’s story on 9/11in Figure 
2.2 is designed to call attention to the imaginative population of the world that perished in the 
terror attack on America. Of all the studies examined, media role in conflict is said to be 
crucial. If the media do not ‘celebrate’ violent conflict, as Seib (2013) has noted, the mind of 
the audience would not be tailored towards violence. Celebration, in this context, entails the 
emphasis on events of conflict rather than issues that promote common good which may not 
have attracted media attention. However, when the media fail to provide information on 
conflict in order ‘not to celebrate’ violence, the audience whose right it is to know, may be 
denied.  
In a conflict situation, media role is twofold: the mobilization of public support for 
negotiations and peace building, and the promotion of violence among social groups (Åkebo, 
2015; Joseph, 2014). The media can engage communities in sustained dialogue on peace in 
that individuals within the social groups may embrace one another. When this is achieved, 
they are said to play a pivotal role of mediation thereby becoming peace building agents. In 
contrast, they also serve as agents of war when their machinery is manipulated to trigger 
social disorder (Edy & Meirick, 2007; H. S. Galadima, 2011; Seaton, 1999), or when the 
journalists become ‘manipulative servants of their owners’ (Slavtcheva-Petkova, 2016, p. 68) 
by using their media to incite individuals or communities against others – which means that 
propaganda as a media technique is employed to promote violence.  
Research on the role of media in social conflict has described the media institution as 
vibrant in controlling conflict which makes it an influential actor in warfare (Putnam, 2002). 
The parties in conflict use this instrument to advance their cause and as a consequence, the 
media are subjected to the powers-that be; who, in turn, determine the news narratives that 
are framed for the audience to consume (Terzis, 2008). These become the ‘reality’ of war. 
The ‘reality’ they portray is translated in the selection of items and the relevance attached to 
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them which are further constructed in specific ways to suit certain interests (Frame, 2013; 
Kuypers, 2010). Arguably, when the media report conflict, they tend to instigate one party 
against the other because of factors such as social, religious and political affiliations 
(Hummel, 2013; Stauber, 2013). In the prevailing circumstances, journalists would report the 
news their organisations will publish or broadcast. That is why when acts of terror are 
inflicted on people and the journalists report them, doing so requires some tact (Seaton, 
1999). The nature of journalism under these conditions is critical. Interestingly, not all 
journalists embellish war stories to serve the interests of particular actors. Webster (2003) 
agrees that some journalists reporting conflict show ethical commitment and have a 
reputation for upholding the ‘truth’. They are not ready to satisfy powerful interests. 
Between these arguments lies the assumption that the audience is fed with narratives 
of social constructs rather than reality of war. Thus, there are both ‘sensitive’ and 
‘insensitive’ media that attempt to ‘construct’ and ‘deconstruct’ the social environment in 
which conflict occurs between actors, implying that media framing in conflict, whether aimed 
at mediating between warring groups or inciting them against each other, is dictated by 
reporters’ prejudices that distort reality (Siraj, 2010). Reality, therefore, becomes a 
journalistic interpretation of conflict which, in turn, is the perception of the audience about 
such conflict. 
2.4 The Journalist Reporting Conflict 
Reporting of conflict is another subject that constitutes ambiguity in scholarly debates, 
essentially because the circumstances under which journalists perform their duty are difficult. 
It is a challenging terrain in journalism. The journalists on this beat are aware that in the era 
of sophisticated wars and information technology as well as multi-channels, ‘news dies faster 
now than ever before’  (Gowing, 1995, cited in Seaton, 1999, p. 58). The traditional deadlines 
which they try to beat for their catchy headlines and breaking news on war to sell, sometimes, 
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make them disregard ethical standards because such pressure would make them receive news 
ingredients from easily accessible sources.  
A reasonable amount of literature is available on conflict reporting across the world. 
What is evident in the accounts is that journalists’ experiences of conflict influence their 
reporting decisions (Backholm & Björkqvist, 2010; Fahmy & Johnson, 2005; Novak & 
Davidson, 2013; Seib, 2013). H. Tumber and Prentoulis (2003) claim that while all 
journalists experience physical and psychological challenges, those who report conflict face 
the most severe conditions as their assignment, which demands diligence and the ability to 
withstand social isolation, stress and other conditions, poses greater risks. When they survive 
the physical attacks which could result from organised violence by the actors, they may be 
infected with diseases or, in many cases, they are traumatized. Research also reveals that 
people who witness acute violence are likely to experience trauma (Declercq, Vanheule, 
Markey, & Willemsen, 2007; Obilom & Thacher, 2008), as a result of ‘exposure to an event 
that provokes fear, helplessness, or terror in response to the threat of injury or death’ (Obilom 
& Thacher, 2008, p. 1108; see also American Psychiatric Association, 1994 ). In their study, 
Keats and Buchanan (2013, p. 221), (see also B. Zelizer & Allan, 2011), assert that since their 
work exposes them to risk and are often physically close to victims  and survivors of conflict, 
‘ the cumulative effects of witnessing the trauma of others can potentially put the observer at 
risk for developing traumatic stress symptoms’. The effect of this exposure to violence on the 
traumatised journalists is a possible adoption of a series of strategies in reporting the conflict 
as a way of overcoming the trauma. This implies that the way and manner in which the 
violence may be reported could be influenced by that exposure. Also, their sentiments – 
based on the traumatic conditions (for example, seeing how their ‘fellow’ Muslims or 
Christians are killed) – can make them come up with new ways of reporting the violence.   
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For journalists reporting conflict, theirs is to communicate the distressing details to 
their audience (Novak & Davidson, 2013); as such, they make observation a yardstick for 
framing the news in the right form and quality. This is crucial if they must succeed on the 
job; yet it contradicts the principle that being distant from those gory scenes is a defence 
mechanism against distress (Rose et al., 2004, cited in Novak & Davidson, 2013). The news 
on war is heart-piercing and once it occurs, journalism demands that the public should know. 
Advocates of ‘ideal’ journalistic principle argue that reporting the war about what you see 
without putting it in context to aid understanding of the audience constitutes bad journalism  
(Novak & Davidson, 2013; Seib, 2013). They believe that both the what (observed at 
warfare) and why (an insight into the war or personal interpretation of the scene of war) 
would make much meaning. 
Further studies support the incorporation of ideas into war stories by the journalists. 
They admit that ‘objectivity’ is a good principle but it is unattainable in the journalistic 
process (Mothes, 2016; Post, 2014). While objectivity demands some degree of detachment 
from the subject being reported, the practice itself is influenced by personal bias which means 
that it is difficult to be objective (H. Tumber & Prentoulis, 2003). The implication is that the 
process of selecting and constructing the news is subjective. There is no single pathway to 
explaining journalistic objectivity as scholars vary in their evaluation of the concept. Some 
scholars have argued that embedding journalism, a practice in which journalists were 
integrated in the events they covered in order to provide perspectives about their subjects, 
followed the criticisms that trailed objectivity theory (Russ-Mohl, 2013; Seib, 2013; Wilke, 
2013). They believe that the bias of the journalists must prevail in the framing process.  
Embedded reporting pertained to inclusion of journalists in the invasion of Iraq in 
2003 by the United States military troops  (Ganey, 2004; Hun Shik Kim, 2012). They worked 
and travelled with the military and were embedded in combat units for a long time. As 
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‘embeds’ emerged during the war, there existed unilateral or non-embedded reporters who 
covered the war independently and never sought the protection of the military (Hun Shik 
Kim, 2012; Pfau et al., 2004) . Embedding journalism was a new strategy by the US at 
winning the war which required the coverage of war by the journalists and reporting it as the 
military would like the audience to receive it. Journalists relied on the military for news as a 
result of which they refrained from carrying stories on the war that were ‘injurious’ to their 
emerging military masters. It allowed first-hand information on the war which meant quality 
news for the audience (Fahmy & Johnson, 2005; Howard Tumber, 2006). Studies have not 
clearly revealed the reason for embedding journalists in the military operations of the US. 
However, it was believed to be a strategy that enabled journalists to report the war from the 
point of view of the US troops so that the misleading information purportedly peddled about 
the US action could be dispelled (Pfau et al., 2004). A statement credited to Bryan Whitman, 
deputy assistant secretary of defence for media operations, cited in Pfau et al. (2004), said: 
‘We recognised early on that we needed to make truth an issue should there be a military 
campaign because Saddam Hussein was a practiced liar, a master of deception’, and in order 
that people may know about the US operation, there was the need for ‘objective third-party 
accounts from professional observers’ (p.75). 
Ironically, media critics have been engaged in debate on the performance of 
embedded journalists, some of whom insist that the practice undermined the integrity and 
autonomy of journalists reporting war (Brandenburg, 2007; Hun Shik Kim, 2012; Howard 
Tumber, 2006). According to them, during the embedding regime, censorship of news by the 
military prevailed and only a portion of the occurrences was reported while other 
perspectives were ignored thereby denying the public the information it deserved.  Some 
journalists observed that it was dangerous for reporters to be close to the subjects they were 
covering because truth about the war for which embedding was initiated would be 
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economised (Pfau et al., 2004). Seib (2013) expresses concern that if the news media become 
an arm of the military then the public would not have an alternative viewpoint. The 
embedded system meant that the media were hijacked by the military as they took sides and 
remained ‘patriotic’ to the American state against the much acclaimed journalistic principle. 
They could no longer report the real war in Iraq because the military determined what they 
covered. For example, there were rules that governed media coverage of the war which were 
revised at reasonable intervals. The embedded journalists were barred from identifying fallen 
US military soldiers by their names and other labels until permission was granted by the 
families of the deceased soldiers. The rule also forbade embedded journalists from using 
videos, photographs and images of wounded soldiers at war (Brandenburg, 2007; Hun Shik 
Kim, 2012; H.  Tumber, 2004). In the circumstance where they violated the media ground 
rules, they faced sanctions from the troops that integrated them  (Kamber & Arango, 2008, 
cited in Hun Shik Kim, 2012). In a comparative study on journalists’ perceptions of 
embedded and unilateral reporting in Iraq warfare,  Hun Shik Kim (2012) reveals that while 
personal judgment of reporters prevailed during the war, both reporting approaches – 
embedded and unilateral – should compensate each other because of their capacity to offer 
the audience different perspectives of reality. 
B. Zelizer and Allan (2011) argue that journalists who report conflict – whether 
embedded or unilateral – experience trauma which necessarily influences their framing of 
news. Once they observe human’s cruelty, the trauma inherent in it hardly varnishes because 
it ‘does not disappear lightly. It lingers, seems to fade, and then re-emerges when least 
expected’ (2011, p.2). When these war observers construct the news that depicts violence and 
the audience consumes this reality, it is said to traumatise the consumer who, in devastation, 
may switch over to another medium or turn off the medium that produced such violence. If 
the consuming audience is traumatised by listening, viewing or reading, what would become 
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of the journalists whose experience of the war is translated into reality of the consumer? 
Some journalists who were traumatised by the attacks on the World Trade Centre in America 
soon became patriotic by framing media contents that expressed nationalistic sentiments 
which implied that the terrorist attacks they witnessed were horrifying (Waisbord, 2011). 
They saw America as ‘their’ nation and as a part of the cultural community, they used their 
media to ‘sing a unity song’ in their editorial columns and on the airwaves.  
In the aftermath of the 9/11 attacks, some articles in the newspapers articulated the 
journalists’ sentiments: ‘One nation indivisible’, ‘God bless America’, ‘We gather together’ 
(Waisbord, 2011, p. 278). This emerging journalistic patriotism was necessitated by the 
attacks. The journalists did not report the attacks ‘objectively’ but immersed themselves 
‘subjectively’ to chart an American nationalistic cause – ‘we’, and condemn the evil done to 
America.  Waisbord (2011) maintains that ‘journalists who eschewed professional rules and 
acted like any other citizen, full of patriotism and emotion, showed allegiance to the values of 
the community at large’ (p.280). 
It is commonplace to say that in reporting conflict, truth is framed as a result of 
reporters’ selection, representation and translation of reality which in turn influence the 
perceptions of the audience (Silverstone, 2011). In many countries of the world where violent 
conflicts have erupted, the reporters have displayed this act in a variety of ways. The more 
they frame the conflicts, the more people perceive this reality. People know about conflicts 
and experience them through the media and their perceptions are determined by the nature of 
coverage of such conflicts (Joseph, 2014). The strategies of framing make a difference in the 
way and manner a particular conflict is understood – its intensity, for instance, could be 
horrific to an audience or mild and tolerable to another, yet the same conflict. During the war, 
reporters are generally concerned with balancing freedom with social responsibility because 
of consciousness of the ideology of national security (G. G. Barker, 2012). But since news 
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itself is a product of choice and determined by an array of interests, most reports about 
conflicts are flawed by certain elements that stir up violence (Joseph, 2014; Rolston, 2007). 
The authors argue that throughout world history the media have helped in the spread of 
violence and paid less attention to issues that unite social groups, prevent and/or manage 
conflict. Reporters who work for established media organisations – whether privately owned 
or state controlled – have allowed the ideologies of their owners to influence their coverage 
of conflict (Gilboa, 2002; Hummel, 2013). A few examples in which social, political and 
other factors have manifested in conflict reporting across the world suffice. 
2.5 The Four European Wars 
Journalists who covered the early European conflicts – especially what was later known as 
the four European wars (Seven years’ war, Crimean war, Franco–Prussian war and World 
War I) -  engaged, to a large extent, in propaganda reporting (Barber, 2014; Ciupei, 2012; 
Richardson, 2008; Roshwald, 2012; Stauber, 2013). During the seven years’ war, newspapers 
depended on field journals and war diaries to frame the news about Austria, France and 
conjuring up images of Prussia as the enemy. Strangely, however, a new style of reporting 
emerged during the Crimean war because the journalists reported the war from the battlefield  
(Stauber, 2013). This on-the-spot witnessing popularised The Times’ William Russell as the 
first war correspondent (Seethaler et al., 2013). In the era of Franco-Prussian war, journalists 
threw their weights behind the war against France and, in principle, disregarded the policy of 
national unification. The World War I witnessed the involvement of war reporters in the 
patriotic mission serving as ‘additional weapon in the generals’ hands’ (Stauber, 2013, p. 28; 
see also Roshwald, 2012 ). They acted the script of the military and only the ‘facts’ from the 
point of view of the soldiers became news, as a result of which ‘neutrality, objectivity and 
detachment are suspended [....]’  (H. Tumber & Prentoulis, 2003, p. 225). 
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British journalists were embedded in the war between Britain and Argentina over the 
Falklands islands in the South Atlantic (Joseph, 2014; Pfau et al., 2004). The reporters were 
selected and attached to the British armed forces; took instructions from the military on 
‘newsworthy’ items and reported them as they were handed down. Again, the news was 
spiced with military narratives which in turn became the audience perception of the war. 
2.6. The Northern Ireland Conflict  
 
Northern Ireland is one of Europe’s war-torn societies because of the sustained struggle 
between its ‘settler’ Protestant population that preferred the region to remain in the United 
Kingdom and the ‘native’ Catholic population that desired to leave the UK and be reunited 
with the Republic of Ireland. As a result, the two factions raised strong military groups to 
achieve their respective goals through the use of force. For several decades, the Protestants 
used the Ulster Volunteer Force (UVF) while the Catholics were defended by the Irish 
Republican Army (IRA) leading to large scale violence with devastating consequences 
(Cairns & Darby, 1988; Coakley & Todd, 2014; Ruane, 1996; Trew, Muldoon, McKeown, & 
McLaughlin, 2009).  Previous research has claimed that ‘in this ‘war’ over 3,000 people have 
died out of a population of 1.5 million in a part of Ireland about the same size as Wales. The 
conflict costs in excess of £2 billion a year and has dragged on for over a quarter of a century. 
Millions of words have been spoken and written about it. Yet Northern Ireland has been very 
low on the political agenda’ (Miller, 1994, p. 3). The Northern Ireland ‘Troubles’ have been 
linked to the occupation of the Northern Irish territory by the English during the Protestant 
Reformation in Western Europe in the 16th Century. Northern Ireland suddenly witnessed the 
influx of ‘foreigners […] who spoke a different language and most of whom were Protestant 
in contrast to the native Irish who were Catholics’(Cairns & Darby, 1988, p. 755). The 
authors above used two concepts: ‘foreigners’ and ‘native’ to distinguish between the English 
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Protestants who had invaded the North of Ireland, on the one hand and the Irish Catholics 
who had occupied the island before the 16th century on the other. Both the ‘foreigners’ and 
‘natives’ had been differentiated by their religious identities: Protestanism and Catholism. In 
some iteration, the foreigners and natives are described as ‘Protestant settlers and the Irish’ 
(Szczecinska-Musielak, 2016, p. 124). The foreigners took possessions of the Northern Irish 
territory as they occupied ‘95% of the land, which they had confiscated from the natives’ 
(Cairns & Darby, 1988, p. 755) thereby forming a majority in the region. This oppression was 
resisted by the native Irish Catholics resulting in the separation of the North and South – the 
former being dominated by Protestants and recognised as a region of the United Kingdom, 
and the latter a Catholic-dominated territory which became the Republic of Ireland (Cairns & 
Darby, 1988; Coakley & Todd, 2014; McVea, 2012). With this demarcation, the native Irish 
Catholics formed the minority in Northern Ireland constituting 38% compared to the 
Protestant population of 50% (Cairns & Darby, 1988). As a consequence, the natives lost grip 
of the region and became victims of injustice and social isolation which were perpetrated by 
the Protestant ‘foreigners’ (Trew et al., 2009). In terms of unemployment, housing and 
education in particular, Cairns and Darby (1988, p. 755) make this comparison: 
23% of Catholic men are unemployed versus 9% of Protestant men […] more than 
twice as many Catholic households are dependent on social security, and there are 
fewer Catholic home owners. More Catholic children (12%) than Protestant (8%) 
leave school lacking any formal education, and fewer Catholic children (35%) attend 
grammar schools (the most likely route to a university education) than Protestant 
children (42%). 
This statistics shows a slant in the distribution of resources and the provision of social 
security as a result of which Catholic revolutionists challenged the existent order in the 
1920s, 1940s and 1950s. The campaign for liberation continued until the 1960s when 
violence broke out in the region between the Protestants and Catholics which lasted for 
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several decades. Szczecinska-Musielak (2016, p. 122)  explains that during this period, ‘the 
Catholic community was pushed to the margins of social life’ hence the protests.  
               Journalists were on hand to report the violence in Northern Ireland. Some of them 
performed their role as mediators by reporting ‘both sides’ while highlighting issues that 
bordered on their general wellbeing rather than their differences – a strategy which helped in 
achieving the Belfast peace agreement (Gadi  Wolfsfeld, 2004). But Rolston (2007) argues 
that journalists who reported the conflict failed to explain the facts emerging from the 
violence as their reports ‘served less to enlighten or encourage dialogue which might lead to 
political resolution’ (p.347). Another angle to this argument is that a considerable number of 
the journalists shared community membership with the conflicting parties and helped in 
articulating the ideologies of the Protestant unionism on the one hand and Catholic 
reunification on the other (Ruane, 1996). For example, Armoudian (2016), in a recent study 
on the Northern Ireland conflict, discovered that journalists who worked for the Belfast 
Telegraph and the Ulster/Belfast News Letter chose to align with the Protestants who 
believed in unionism (Northern Ireland under Great Britain) while journalists who reported 
for the Irish News showed solidarity with the Irish Catholics (who preferred the reunification 
of Northern Ireland). Even the British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC)  and the Independent 
Television (ITV) were accused of bias during the conflict (Rolston, 2007). The journalists of 
these broadcast organisations occasionally became ‘anti- republican and anti-loyalist’ (2007, 
p.347), as a result of which their credibility was challenged. In that sense, media audiences 
perceived the conflict in Northern Ireland as violent – a ‘war’ that seemed unresolved – 
which means that the media provided ‘an arena in which such battles are fought’ (Miller, 
1994, p. 12). Furthermore, L. Curtis (1998, pp. 1-2) explains how the media covered the 
Northern Ireland conflict:  
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Media coverage of the conflict reaches the people of the North and people of Britain 
very differently. The population of the North is daily inundated with news. Local 
papers, hourly radio bulletins, regular local TV news broadcasts supplemented by the 
early evening magazine programmes all put out a stream of information about 
bombings and shootings, arrests and trials, the manoeuvrings of political groups [….] 
People in Britain, by contrast, receive only a dribble of news from the North, except 
when the crisis hijacks the headlines. They have no direct experience of the conflict. 
There are two dimensions to understanding the relationship between the Northern Ireland 
conflict and the Jos conflict. First, the controversies revolve around ethnic and religious 
identities - ‘foreigners/settlers’ or ‘natives/indigenes’ and Protestants/ Catholics or 
Christians/Muslims (see, for example, Ambe-Uva, 2010; Cairns & Darby, 1988; Coakley & 
Todd, 2014; Danfulani, 2006) - which culminated in large scale violence. The territory which 
the natives were believed to have occupied for many centuries or decades, were being 
controlled by the foreigners whose religious orientations and cultures were different from 
theirs. Second, some journalists performed a divisive role in both conflicts by using frames 
that dehumanised ‘the other’ while others attempted to contribute to the peace process 
(Armoudian, 2016; J. D. Galadima, 2010; A. O. Musa & Ferguson, 2013; Gadi  Wolfsfeld, 
2004). Although the contexts of both conflicts are different, the struggle for social identity is 
the underlying factor.  
2.7 Covering the Kashmir Conflict 
 
An array of revelations has consistently emerged on the news framing of the conflict –ridden 
Kashmir. The conflict is widely portrayed by the media, especially Indian-based newspapers, 
radio and television, as a mild territorial dispute between India and Pakistan. The invasion of 
Kashmir by over 700,000 Indian troops which was a reaction to an internal security rife and 
contributed to its escalation was underreported (Ahmed, 2010; Mathur, 2014). 
             The Indian media helped to popularise the country’s political ideology on Kashmir 
and ignored the dehumanized conditions of the Kashmiri community resulting from the 
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nefarious activities of the Indian troops (Nazakat, 2012). In the pursuit of the so-called 
‘national interest’, the reporters failed to pinpoint the troops’ human rights abuses. Worse 
still, whenever civil society groups and the civilian population protested these, they were 
either not reported or given less prominence. The journalists relied on government sources for 
their reports on conflict thereby reinforcing the belief that Pakistan was the aggressor. 
Although Nazakat (2012) acknowledges Pakistan’s role in ‘arming the insurgents and 
promoting a separatist movement in the Kashmir valley, the situation was not entirely created 
by Pakistan. India has its share of the blame [....] Indian press is painting a rosy picture of 
normalcy, which is absolutely false’ (p.69).  
             Based on these, it is pertinent that the hazardous nature of violent conflict and 
journalists’ participation in it determine news frames. The journalists are not likely to be 
objective in reporting the conflict in which they have been imbedded. They would not report 
the ‘other side’ for fear of sanctions that may be meted out to them by intersecting social 
forces such as the troops that embedded them and the owners of their media. 
2.8 American Journalists in International Conflicts 
The US as a world power has been concerned with international conflicts portraying itself as 
a mediator that initiates and promotes global peace. Arguably this position is perceived by 
some nations and critics as a strategy for sustained global reckoning rather than peace 
promotion. The US is involved in propaganda activities to which it commits huge resources 
(Al-Rawi, 2013; Gorman & Seguin, 2015; Gura, 2015). It thrives on this because it integrates 
its journalists into the national agenda programme which places the America ‘us’ above 
‘them’ thereby translating the ideology of a united America (G. G. Barker, 2012). Baker cites 
an anonymous journalist as admitting that: ‘When we’re at war, we’re Americans first and 
journalists second’ (2012, p.6). This profound patriotic spirit is passed unto generations in 
that journalists, as Americans, set agenda anchored on the philosophy of the government. 
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American journalists hardly ask questions about official ‘facts’ because of allegiance to the 
state (Leavy, 2007). They sacrifice conscience and journalistic integrity for patriotic 
ideology; even the leading media in the country – the New York Times and Washington Post – 
are not without blame (Seib, 2013). Particularly, ‘some of the New York Times coverage was 
credulous and much of it was inappropriately italicised by lavish front page display and 
heavy-breathing headlines’ (Okrent, 2004, cited in Seib, 2013, p. 5). 
A study on the cultural influences on the portrayal of Iraq war in the American and 
Swedish media, reveals that American media interpreted the war from the perspective of the 
military, which was a make-belief that US invasion of Iraq was a justifiable mission while 
Swedish media exposed the suffering of Iraqi citizens as a consequence of the invasion (G. G. 
Barker, 2012; Joseph, 2014). The Pentagon decision to embed journalists into the US armed 
forces suggests, in one part the provision of access to ‘truth’ (as claimed by the defence for 
media operations)  (Pfau et al., 2004; Seib, 2013), and in part, a ploy to frame the news in its 
favour (Joseph, 2014). Research reveals that the embedded journalists established personal 
relationships with the soldiers with whom they worked and whose operations the journalists 
covered.  Pfau et al. (2004) assert that some embeds often used the pronoun ‘we’ in their 
narratives to refer to the soldiers and journalists, implying that they were part of the troops. 
As such, the tendency for the journalists to be self-censored is evident because, as an 
embedded reporter puts it: ‘You are sleeping next to the people you are covering; your 
survival is based on them’ (2004, p.79). Thus, Cortell, Eisinger, and Althaus (2009) frown at 
the military-media relationship which the embedding programme upholds. They argue that 
both institutions are hostile to each other. The media serve as a check on government – 
including its military institution – which suggests that if the relationship between them is 
strengthened on any platform, the public would not derive benefit from it. They maintain that 
the idea of embedding journalists in warfare as George Bush’s government launched on Iraq 
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is inappropriate because new technologies which provide journalists with sophisticated 
devices – mobile phones, remote-area network data systems, etc., would make them 
independent of military control. They may not be physically alert on the battlefield to capture 
the scenes of war. 
Within the Southwest Asia, the US journalists also covered the Persian Gulf War in 
1991 and America’s invasion of Afghanistan in 2001. Particularly, when the government of 
George Bush hijacked Afghanistan airlines, the media portrayed it as a mere disaster rather 
than a deliberate military action waged by America (Griffin, 2004). In all this, the 
fundamental social condition which guides journalistic practice, whether at wartime or when 
society is enjoying relative peace is truth - the presentation of facts to an audience yearning 
for undiluted information. In mainstream journalism, facts are separated from opinions 
because the former are sacred and cannot be altered by the latter (Schulz, Hartung, & 
Fiordelli, 2012). The dilemma of reporters in conflict zones often emanates from their craft of 
news framing in which choices are made on reality. This process is complex given that the 
sacredness of facts may be compromised when reporters’ personal interests prevail, or when 
they are involved with the subjects about whom they are reporting. A number of factors also 
accounts for this – allegiance to political and conflict actors, media owners, among other 
pressures (Kovach & Rosenstiel, 2003; Pintak, 2014). In his view,  Pintak (2014) maintains 
that many journalists desire to translate this ‘sacredness of facts’ in their work but are, 
sometimes, distracted by the prevailing socio-political environment. For example, he argues, 
if journalists working for different news media report on an event, their framing of truth will 
vary; as such, ‘[....] you can share the same information , but not the same truth’(2014, 
p.489). 
However, this analysis demonstrates that the hazardous nature of violent conflict and 
journalists’ engrossment in it determine news frames. The embedded journalists are not likely 
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to be objective in reporting conflict in which their subjects become their masters. They would 
not report the ‘other side’ of conflict involving those who embedded them – dictators of the 
tone of news – for fear of sanctions that may be meted out to them. 
2.9   Mirroring Conflicts of the ‘Third World’ Africa 
Africa as a ‘Third World’ community – somewhat derogatory classification for ‘developing’ 
or ‘less developed’ world – has been a victim of Western colonialism and imperialism in 
which the ideology of the West influences its social, economic and political life. This order 
has been problematic as there are a variety of ‘ineffective development paradigms designed 
in the West and inappropriately translated to Africa’ (Mano, 2011, p. 203). Apparently, there 
are two dimensions to understanding Western imperialism – the international media framing 
and domestic media involvement.  
In the first scenario, the Western media portrayal of Africa and the rest of the Third 
World is dehumanizing and an absolute disregard for social justice which the West is 
purportedly championing (Mbeki, 2010). It tells the African story negatively and reports 
about the continent all that borders on its interest while paying little or no attention to the 
cultures and values of the people (Adade, 1993; Hawkins, 2015; Joseph, 2014). During the 
colonial era, it became a strategy of power and the international media have not departed 
from it. One of the measures deployed to neutralise this Western-centric media regime is the 
adoption of the Black popular press by the ethnic minority, especially the diaspora 
communities that have claimed that the mainstream media have failed to represent their 
interests (Ogunyemi, 2007; Poindexter, Smith, & Heider, 2003). These communities have 
maintained that ‘the mainstream press is not committed to content diversity in its pandering 
to a homogenised populist taste and set of preferences’ (Ogunyemi, 2007, p. 19). Now there 
is a wide range of ethnic press in White-dominated communities across the world. The 
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second condition is the indoctrination of the ‘Third World’ Africa on the assimilation of 
Western culture and shaping audience perception through local media. 
As powerful infrastructure for mobilization, cultural and social integration, the media 
of Africa provide the platform for translating this ideology, thus are dependent on the West. 
This study follows the argument by Shepperson and Tomaselli (2009) that ‘ the Third World 
cannot hope to develop a media system that is somehow detached from the West until such 
time as Third World people can independently build, maintain, extend, innovate within and 
sustainably operate these structures’ (pp. 483-484). They conclude that if this part of the 
world is to attain media independence, it must develop its human resources and infrastructure 
suitable for it and which can translate its ideology in the right form and quality. In a sense, 
the picture painted here is that the media of the Third World are a shadow of the West and, 
though ‘controlled’ by the powerful indigenous agents, have contributed to impoverished 
conditions of such communities.  Shepperson and Tomaselli (2009) maintain that ‘for media 
to make their non-western mark outside the powers of the West, non-western nations must 
develop their social realms’ (2009, p.485). They imply that the media should not celebrate the 
misery of people impoverished by disease, hunger and conflict and isolate their cultures and 
values. For instance, in Africa, they maintain that the media have become praise singers 
creating a divide between the West and the rest of the world, and reinforcing the belief that 
the all-powerful West is ‘mightier’ and ‘wiser’ than the Third World that is prone to anarchy 
and war. Furthermore, as Mano (2012, p. 3) argues, ‘wars, acts of violence and deadly 
conflicts in Africa seem to get covered by the mass media especially when global powers’ 
interests are at stake’. He maintains that the acts of violence meted out to Africans by 
external forces have been given scant attention by most global media brands. A famous 
African author, Ngugi wa Thiong’o, writes that imperialism, which these media propagate, 
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has turned reality upside down: the abnormal is viewed as normal and the 
normal is viewed as abnormal. Africa actually enriches Europe; but Africa is 
made to believe that it needs Europe to rescue it from poverty. Africa’s natural 
and human resources continue to develop Europe and America; but Africa is 
made to feel grateful for aid from the same quarters that still sit on the back of 
the continent. Africa even produces intellectuals who now rationalise this 
upside-down way of looking at Africa [....] Unfortunately, some African 
intellectuals have fallen victims – a few incurably so – to that scheme and they 
are unable to see the divide-and-rule [.... ] (Ngugi wa Thiang' o, cited in Francis, 
2006, p. 15). 
Ngugi wa Thiong’o is faced with disappointment about how Africans, including the elites, 
are persuaded to think that their endowments are low-grade hence they have resorted to 
Western alternatives. He implores fellow Africans to urgently restore their dignity realising 
that their poverty profile is not a curse but should spur them towards development. African 
diaspora media scholar Ola Ogunyemi (2012) concurs that there is a greater commitment by 
the diaspora media to ‘change the dominant ‘mind-set’ that Africa is a lost continent 
beleaguered by intractable problems of Aids, development and conflict’ (p.21). He maintains 
that the Black African Diasporas’ quest for information which focuses on their cultures and 
values has considerably increased. Although Ngugi wa Thiong’o is critical of Western 
influence on Africa resulting from the former’s strategy of imperialism (Francis, 2006), as 
evident in media framing of the conflict on the continent (Adade, 1993; Joseph, 2014), this 
study argues that Africa’s prevailing conflicts – ethnic, political, religious – constitute news 
hence should be reported. The violence involves human lives, and its devastation is, sadly, 
‘hot’ for the audience. News is a narrative of any occurrence in a given society and its 
positive and/or negative colorations suit all shades of the audience.  
In contrast, Shaw (2009) criticises studies that presuppose that African media are 
patterned on Western ideology. He faults the assumption that ‘African journalism lacks both 
the power of self-determination and the power to shape the universal concepts that are ‘deaf-
and-dump’ to the peculiarities of journalism in and on Africa’ (2009, p.492). He argues that 
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although there were a handful of post-colonial African journalists who inherited the culture of 
propaganda journalism of the West, they developed a unique African journalism – the oral 
discourse style that tells the African story. According to Shaw, ‘most African 
journalists...quickly reverted to their watchdog role in calling for national conferences to 
determine their collective political destiny. Thus, their use of the typical African journalism 
model of oral discourse in engaging their subjects and audience in their reports and 
editorials...was very much evident’ (2009, p.500). 
In comparison, the logic in the studies by Shepperson and Tomaselli (2009), and 
Shaw (2009) reveal a Western influenced African media system for the former and an 
African culture-media for the latter. Shepperson’s and Tomaselli’s argument is of essence in 
this research. The current study ascribes to their findings, primarily, because some scholars 
follow the argument in relation to international media bias against Africa which reflects the 
African media contents; that is, issues of conflict and disease rather than development form 
media agenda (H. S. Galadima, 2011; Golwa & Ochogwu, 2011; Mbeki, 2010; Skjerdal, 
2012). This has prompted Skjerdal (2012) to propose three models – journalism for social 
change, communal journalism and journalism inspired by oral discourse to serve as 
normative African journalism framework. He acknowledges that studies on African media 
history have not documented models which define African journalism that distinguishes it 
from Western practice. These three models share basic characteristics which, invariably, may 
constitute a single paradigm. He proposes journalism for social change which identifies the 
journalist as an agent of transformation – change that is desired to develop the continent and 
its people. Its philosophy reflects the revolutionary standpoint of one of Africa’s leaders, 
Kwame Nkrumah and other veteran journalists on the continent that the approach to 
journalism is one that the journalist gives honour to Africa by highlighting its potentials and 
promoting its values. It means that the journalist should have the African mind of change 
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utilising the media to promote human dignity and social conditions of the people who have 
endured human suffering.  It does not agree with the Western ‘rule of objectivity’ that bluntly 
identifies right from wrong.  
This model demands that African journalists should champion the cause of 
emancipation in their newsrooms given their acrimonious experience of slavery resulting 
from colonialism. Despite this new thinking, a recent study has revealed that China, like the 
West, is massively investing in the media of Africa to a level that it would be ‘mutually 
beneficial, rather than asymmetrical [….] It has aligned with African countries not only for 
economic reasons, but also to gain Africa’s support for its domestic and foreign agendas’ 
(Zhang, Wasserman, & Mano, 2016, pp. 17-18) . The research argues that the establishment 
of China’s media channels in many parts of Africa and its provision of infrastructure and 
human capital development in the sector would increase the country’s influence in Africa.     
The second level of African journalism – communal journalism – according to 
Skjerdal, points to the fact that the journalist’s advocacy should translate the values of 
solidarity, respect for human life, unity and hospitality for which Africa is known. He 
concludes his theory of African journalism with emphasis on oral discourse; that is, human 
communication emanating from African culture and tradition. It upholds the system of oral 
discourse that solidifies relationships typical of the pre-colonial Africa – story telling, town 
crying, community rallies, poetry, music etc., which showcased the continent to the rest of 
the world and preserved its identity. In like manner, Shaw (2009) lends support to the oral 
discourse journalism in his critique of Nyamnjoh’s study. These postulations, if integrated 
into an African journalism paradigm, Skjerdal argues, can redefine the practice without 
recourse to the Western journalism.  
49 
 
Conflicts involving ethnic, political and religious groups in Africa occupy significant 
local and international media space (Ankomah, 2001; Hae S. Kim, 2009). As dramatic and 
tragic as they may be, the audience sees in them horror, amusement and some bit of relief. 
Media narratives of the conflicts determine the audience’s perception of reality. Thus, the 
media are in competition to appeal to the audience by their news contents. In his study on the 
relationship between media, conflict and development,  H. S. Galadima (2011, p. 18) claims 
that, to date, the media have portrayed Africans as people who prefer violence to peace.  The 
same could be said of other Third World communities such as the Middle East where a 
seeming crisis is prevalent (Seaton, 1999). The media coverage of Africa should focus on 
development issues including how to prevent and/or manage conflict ravaging the continent 
as a contribution to peace.  As Hamelink (2011) explains, when the media instigate people to 
take up arms against one another; that is, ‘collective conflict’, it would lead to ‘collective 
evil’. The Rwandan and Bosnian conflicts were two of many kinds in which radio and 
television stirred up hostilities that led to many deaths (Bloch & Lehman-Wilzig, 2002; H. S. 
Galadima, 2011; Kellow & Steeves, 2006; Rolston, 2007). 
Unarguably, many countries of Africa have witnessed one form of conflict or the 
other – ethnic, political, religious – which accounts for the massive destruction of their 
national infrastructures (Ajakaiye & Ncube, 2010; Collier & Cust, 2015). For many war torn 
countries, among which are the world’s poor, huge resources have been committed to 
reconstruction programmes, especially the maintenance of internal security, thereby denying 
the population good education, health care and improved standard of living (Adetula, 2006). 
The standard of life of the people has continued to dwindle while many have fled their homes 




Given that events of war attract the media (H. S. Galadima, 2011; Seib, 2013; 
Webster, 2003), the continent of Africa, part of which is ravaged by violence, has become a 
subject of media framing locally and internationally (Mano, 2012).  Adetula (2006) explains 
that studies on civil wars in the world since the 1960s have identified poverty and low 
economic growth as the main causes, all of which are inherent in Africa. Some of these 
include political strife in Liberia and Somalia, ethnic conflict in Sudan, Rwanda and Cote 
d’Ivoire, religious and identity violence in Nigeria and some parts of the continent. Adetula 
names Angola, Congo, Burundi, Congo-Brazzaville, Central African Republic, Cote d’Ivoire, 
Ethiopia, Liberia, Sierra Leone, Somalia, Sudan and Uganda as having experienced major 
conflicts in Africa in which many lives have been lost (2006, pp. 390-391).   
2.10 Africa: Drawing Example from the Rwandan Conflict  
 
Journalists reported one of Africa’s deadliest conflicts in history – the 1994 Rwandan 
Genocide in which two ethnic groups: the Hutu majority and Tutsi minority were 
participants. The journalists’ narrative focused on ‘Hutus killing Tutsis and Tutsis killing 
Hutus’ (Karnik, 1998, p. 614) which portrayed both factions as rebellious. The country’s 
political environment had been tense and was characterised by horizontal inequalities. Karnik 
(1998) argues that such narrative lacked depth as ‘journalists unaware of the history or 
politics of the region, who dropped into Rwanda for the few months of the conflict, were 
unlikely to uncover any deeper stories’ (p. 614). He explains that a number of factors – such 
as the Belgian colonial system on which Rwanda had been structured – also triggered the 
conflict beyond ethnicity.  
              The post independent Rwandan conflict dates back to 1960s when the Hutus became 
the ruling elite displacing the Tutsis who – despite their minority status – had been prominent 
in the political realm. Tutsis constituted about 10 per cent of the country’s population as a 
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result of which they endured social exclusion (Yanagizawa-Drott, 2014). This led to ethnic 
clashes between the Hutus and Tutsis. The latter feared that they would be overpowered 
hence many of them fled to neighbouring countries where they sought refuge and formed a 
rebel group – the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) that later conquered the Rwandan army and 
the Hutus militia groups (Abimbola & Dominic, 2013; Ingelaere, 2009). 
              The Rwandan Genocide, as it is generally known, was a media-induced conflict 
which led to about 1 million deaths and the displacement of 2.2 million people, most of 
whom were the Tutsis (D. E. A. Curtis, 2000; Yanagizawa-Drott, 2014). The Hutu-led 
government used the radio being the foremost news medium for the transmission of hate 
messages that encouraged the majority Hutu audiences to maim and kill the Tutsis wherever 
they were found.  Both the state-owned Radio Rwanda and the Radio Television Libre des 
Mille Collines (RTLM) – a broadcast station established in 1993 by the Hutu Power (a 
government-aided group of powerful Hutu militias) helped in heightening the already tense 
political system and sustaining the campaign against the Tutsis. Although Radio Rwanda was 
not indicted by the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda for its role in the conflict 
compared to RTLM which engineered the genocide, the state-owned radio was neither on the 
side of the Tutsis (Ingelaere, 2009). Particularly, the RTLM 
[…] led the propaganda efforts by broadcasting inflammatory messages calling for the 
extermination of the Tutsi minority [….] The broadcasts contained not only strong 
anti-Tutsi rhetoric that may have increased pro-violence preferences, but also 
information about relevant trade-offs: they made it clear that the government would 
not punish participation in the killing of Tutsi citizens or the appropriation of their 
property, but instead encouraged or even mandated such behaviour (Yanagizawa-
Drott, 2014, pp. 2-3). 
In RTLM broadcasts, journalists and some members of the Hutu Power used language and 
metaphors which described the Tutsis as mere cockroaches – the extent of abuse of their 
humanity. They said in the aftermath of the genocide that the new government – which 
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emerged after the assassination of President Juvenal Habyarimana by the RPF – would not 
protect the Tutsis from attacks by the Hutus (Abimbola & Dominic, 2013; Yanagizawa-Drott, 
2014). In this sense, the journalists were implicated as they ‘prepared the Rwandan 
population for genocide and legitimised the final extermination’ (D. E. A. Curtis, 2000, p. 
156). This journalistic role in the Rwandan conflict confirms existing literature that the media 
can ‘perform’ and ‘re-enact’ conflict (Cottle, 2006, p. 9). This role in the Jos conflict is 
understood in that context – how journalists used their media to portray the two rival groups. 
2.11 The Journalist’s Profession and Membership of a Conflict Community 
There is a considerable amount of work that interrogates the professional role of the 
journalists in matters in which they have vested interests, especially when they are members 
of certain ethnic or religious groups in conflict (Berganza-Conde, Oller-Alonso, & Meier, 
2010; T. Hanitzsch & Mellado, 2011; Hellmueller & Mellado, 2015; Zandberg & Neiger, 
2005). This has also attracted much public interest because journalists have long imposed a 
self-image which suggests that their reports are objective even if they know that attaining this 
standard is almost impossible (Muñoz-Torres, 2012; Skovsgaard, Albæk, Bro, & de Vreese, 
2013; Wahl-Jorgensen, 2013; Weidmann, 2015). As previous research argues, a number of 
journalists believe that adopting the objectivity principle is a subtle way to earn public trust 
(Zandberg & Neiger, 2005). They see themselves as trusted members of the society who feed 
their audiences with undiluted news because their profession requires them to tell the story as 
it is. They try to detach themselves from the subjects they cover and claim to be acting in the 
public interest (Carey, 2002; Morton & Aroney, 2016). 
But who defines public interest is a question that has generated wide criticisms (Chin, 
2012; O’Flynn, 2010). In situations of violent conflict involving social groups of which 
journalists are a part, whose interests in the public sphere do these journalists serve? Does the 
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norm of objectivity prevail in such circumstances? Studies have shown that violent conflict 
attracts a large number of audience, as such, many journalists construct conflict narratives 
that tend to pitch warring groups against others (Staub, 2011; Tenenboim-Weinblatt et al., 
2016; Weidmann, 2015; Gadi Wolfsfeld, Frosh, & Awabdy, 2008). It is further argued that 
the selection of news frames and the notion that what is reported may not be accurate, the 
audience tends to cast doubt on the integrity of the news media and the journalists 
(Weidmann, 2015).  Amidst this uncertainty, journalism is still regarded by those who 
practice it as a profession that is noble, and remains relevant in shaping attitudes despite the 
ongoing digital transformations in the world (Areal, 2010). They believe that the interactive 
media platforms cannot replace the mainstream media for which the journalists work, 
because people have confidence in the latter in terms of the veracity of reporting. 
The question posed at the outset on who determines public interest in the frame 
building process is manifesting. Bartholomé, Lecheler, and de Vreese (2015, p. 439) observe 
that journalists ‘manufacture conflict frames’ with a specific audience in mind – the process 
which involves coding of words in a particular way for the purpose of achieving a desired 
goal. These scholars argue that the news framing process occurs at three levels – the 
individual level, routines level and external level. They pertain to the role conceptions and 
values of the ‘individual’ journalists, their ‘routines’ of news production and pressure from 
‘external’ news sources. Bartholomé et al. (2015) developed their framework from the 
‘hierarchy of influences model’ propounded by Shoemaker and Reese (2013).  
Like Hellmueller and Mellado (2015) who used this model to explain the professional 
roles of journalists, Bartholomé et al. (2015) recognise that what the journalists think they 
should do (their role conceptions), or ‘role orientations’,  according to Thomas Hanitzsch and 
Vos (2017, p. 1); and where their interests lie can affect news production. Bartholomé et al. 
(2015) argue that conflict framing often emerges from journalists’ role conceptions and their 
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attitudes and beliefs. Their framework also suggests that journalistic norms and practices 
such as objective reporting, storytelling styles and reliance on other media as sources of 
information for their news reports can influence the framing of conflict. In the third level, the 
authors identify external news sources such as conflict actors, pressure groups and 
communities as having some degree of influence on conflict reporting. 
Where there are ethnic and religious communities with conflicting ideologies craving 
for media attention like Jos, Zandberg and Neiger (2005) explain that the journalists – being 
members of the respective communities – are faced with the challenge of upholding 
professional honour while being loyal to their communities. The scholars make this 
distinction: 
The professional community calls upon the journalists to tell a story that will be, or 
will appear to be, factual, objective and balanced […,] the national – cultural 
community calls upon the journalists to take part in the conflict, to be its 
representative and its weapon, in the battle of images and sound bites – to tell an 
unbalanced, un-objective story (2005, p. 131). 
The above view suggests that the journalists are caught between their profession – which 
requires self-detachment from the conflict – and allegiance to ethnic/religious groups – a 
goal-centred reporting that supports ‘ours’ against ‘theirs’. This demonstrates a journalistic 
role crisis, that is, the journalists’ desire for balanced and fair reports (profession) and the 
one-sided reports tailored towards advancing a cause (community solidarity). 
Typical of this practice is the assumption that journalists who reported the Jos conflict 
might have been confronted with this condition. Research shows that a number of them failed 
to report the conflict objectively because of their attempt to serve ethnic/religious groups 
interests (J. D. Galadima, 2010; A. O. Musa & Ferguson, 2013; Rasaq, 2012), or what 
Zandberg and Neiger (2005) call journalists’ desire to ‘privilege one of their identities’ (p. 
133). The effect of this solidarity is likely to be the reinforcement rather than de-escalation of 
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the conflict. Although peace journalism scholars (e.g., Bar-Tal, 2013; Cobb, 2013; Lynch, 
2008, 2013b; Lynch & Galtung, 2010; Lynch & McGoldrick, 2013) have consistently 
advocated for a non-objective, peace-oriented journalism to promote and sustain 
peacebuilding efforts, it is susceptible to abuse. That goal might inflate rather than reduce 
conflict.  
2.12 Conclusion 
This chapter has examined conflict, journalism and the character of the journalist reporting 
conflict. Although scholars have ascribed meanings to conflict, and argued that it cannot be 
avoided in the social environment, the concept in this research refers to the struggle for 
identity by individuals or groups through violent means. In it, peace is substituted with 
violence. 
The relationship between violent conflict and journalism has been established in the 
sense that conflict – as a news value, attracts both the journalists (who construct reality) and 
their audiences (who think in terms of how society is affected by conflict) (Seib, 2013; 
Webster, 2003). As illustrated in Figures 2.1 and 2.2, the media and journalists do not only 
report violence as an incident but they try to influence their audiences by their linguistic 
choices.  
The chapter sheds light on the debates on conflict reporting which draw attention to 
objective journalism, journalism of attachment, embedding journalism and propaganda 
journalism. Having examined the role of journalists in some of the most cited conflicts across 
Europe (especially the four European wars and the Northern Ireland conflict), Kashmir, 
America and Africa (drawing example from the Rwandan conflict), this chapter argues, like 
in previous studies (e.g., Silverstone, 2011; H. Tumber & Prentoulis, 2003), that objectivity is 
unattainable. For example, it demonstrates how the British and American journalists were 
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integrated into their national agendas through the embedding programme which attached 
them to the subjects they covered. The non-objective character of journalists has also been 
established in the reporting of the Third World Africa as those from the West disregarded 
objectivity by portraying Africa as a continent that is ravaged by violence, hunger and 
disease. Thus, the chapter recounts the efforts by African scholars (e.g., Shaw, 2009; 
Shepperson & Tomaselli, 2009; Skjerdal, 2012) to suggest alternative models for a 
journalistic rebranding of Africa.   
The topics reviewed in this chapter transit from global conflict to the conflict of the 
Third World Africa, both of which have attracted the attention of journalists. In the next 
chapter of this thesis, the discussion focuses on Nigeria, one of Africa’s countries with a 
history of ethnic and religious conflicts. It analyses the context in which these social 













Nigeria and the Dimensions of the Jos Conflict 
 
3.1 Introduction 
This chapter discusses the emergence of the Nigerian state, its cultural, ethnic, religious and 
linguistic diversities; and relates these to the Jos conflict between rival social groups. The 
ethnic and religious conflicts in many parts of the country (which include Jos), are linked to 
these diversities. The Nigerian media and journalists are separated along these divides, and 
are believed to have contributed to the escalation of conflict. 
3.2 Nigeria’s Diversity: The Origin of Conflict 
Nigeria is situated on the west coast of Africa occupying a land mass of 923,768.sq.km. It has 
a population of 168 million people comprising 250 ethnic groups (Okidu, 2011; The 
Centenary Diary, 2014, p. 131). With over 500 linguistic dialects (Danfulani, 2006; 
Harnischfeger, 2004), the country is comprised of 36 states and the Federal Capital Territory 
(Abuja). Its endowments include human and natural resources ranging from skilled workforce 
to mineral deposits such as crude oil, iron ore, limestone, tantalite and coal. 
The country had been separated on regional lines of North, East and West with each 
region pursuing its policies and programmes until 1914 when the Lord Luggard-led British 
colonial government brought them together into one country (Udogu, 2009). The Hausa-
Fulani occupied the North; the Igbo dominated the East while the Yoruba controlled the 
West. The eastern and western regions were generally recognised as southern Nigeria and the 
northern region was known as northern Nigeria. Both the southern and northern protectorates 
were merged to become a single state under the British amalgamation programme. This was 
described as a synthetic project that was conceived without recourse to the endemic ethnic, 
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regional and religious tensions that resulted from divergence between the social groups 
(Afinotan & Ojakorotu, 2014; Agbiboa, 2013a; Okidu, 2011).The Nigerian state comprised 
of many rival ethnic groups which suggested that the merger of the regions was not feasible 
(Sircar, 1968).  The people pursued divergent interests, spoke different languages, had 
different regional agendas, political and cultural ideologies and yet they were fused into a 
single state (Albert, 2002; Pate, 2011).  
The arrangement fell short  of the criteria for establishing a country, one  of which is 
to share a common language, culture and tradition (Carens,1988, cited in Afinotan & 
Ojakorotu, 2014). Apparently, since the various social groups that existed at regional levels 
neither shared these commonalities nor demonstrated mutual cooperation that bound them 
together, the amalgamation was perceived as hasty, ill-conceived, insensitive and illogical. It 
means that a merger of this sort was unnecessary as it ‘laid the immediate foundation upon 
which the country’s ethno-religious identity movement is built; more so that the situation had 
led to the emergence of a pronounced ethno-religious gulf between the Hausa-Fulani Muslim 




Figure 3: 1 Map of Nigeria showing the 36 states, regions and borders. 
Source: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/File:Nigeria_political.png. 
 
A dominant feature of Nigeria is its plurality of ethnic, regional and religious identities which 
the colonial administration took for granted during the 1914 amalgamation of the country’s 
northern and southern protectorates (Udogu, 2009). The colonial government paid scant 
attention to the complex issues bordering on ideology, such as the protracted rivalry among 
ethnic groups (Agbiboa, 2013a; Alabi, 2002; Albert, 2002; Alubo, 2009; Kukah, 1994; 
Okidu, 2011). As many social groups struggled for identity, each of which found expressions 
in the post amalgamation regime, conflict of varying dimensions – especially organised 
ethnic and religious violence - took the centre stage. The diverse ethnic groups that exist in 
Nigeria are almost evenly split between the adherents of Islam and Christianity (Agbiboa, 
2013b; Dowd, 2014; Egwu, 2015; M. A. Ojo & Lateju, 2010).  
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Previous research has claimed that the three major ethnic groups of northern Hausa 
Fulani, the western Yoruba and eastern Igbo constitute 30%, 20% and 17% of the country’s 
population in that order, apart from other minority groups (Jinadu, 1985; see also Agbiboa & 
Okem, 2011). Over the years the political elites have exploited these identities which later 
stirred up agitations for state power and control of resources by the social groups that were 
once silenced (Davis & Kalu-Nwiwu, 2001). The initial regional structure – North, East and 
West which served as the political organ for strengthening federal character (a national policy 
that aims to provide equal representation of all ethnic groups) – was further split into six geo-
political zones (Osaghae, 1988). Although this arrangement was not backed by any 
legislation, it tended to douse the already heated social tension in the country.  
However, these agitations continued in the last decades as minority ethnic groups in 
the regions (now geo-political regions) have decried the gross oppression by the ethnic 
majority and, sometimes, opted for sovereignty which separated them from the Nigerian 
state. For example, the Middle Belt Forum was formed by the Christian minorities in the 
north central geo-political zone because they claimed that the Arewa Consultative Forum 
(ACF) was only serving the interests of the core north or the Hausa Fulani Muslims (Barnes, 
2007) . In the South South, the Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta (MEND) 
emerged to chart the cause of the oil rich region for which it impressed on the Nigerian 
government to allocate a portion of the national oil revenues to oil producing states to 
enhance the development of the region (Omoyefa, 2010). In the South West, there exists the 
Oodua People’s Congress that serves as a political organ of the Yoruba ethnic group 
(Guichaoua, 2009). In the South East, the Movement for the Sovereignty and Actualisation of 
Biafra (MASOB) is agitating for a state of Biafra alleging that the Igbos have been edged out 
of state power (Smith, 2014). This portends danger for the country, as Egwu (2015) argues, 
‘the tendency for state power to be controlled by one dominant ethnic fraction of the ruling 
61 
 
class or another provokes a sense of alienation on the part of groups that do not control 
power. The consequence is for such groups to arrange for their own security by withdrawing 
into ethno-religious networks and solidarities’ (p.30).   
Nigeria’s ethnic identity crisis deepened over the years and the citizens have become 
more conscious of what they consider to be their heritage. There is a distinction between 
‘natives’ and ‘foreigners’ or ‘indigenes’ and ‘settlers’ across the length and breadth of the 
country. This tradition empowers some citizens to take possessions of ancestral lands and 
assume the status of ‘indigenes’ while those who arrive at such locations afterwards are 
classified as ‘settlers’. The latter are denied certain privileges for their ‘late settlement’, as 
such, they become ‘guests’ to their ‘hosts’. Harnischfeger (2004, p. 436) also sheds light on 
this. He says: 
 […] the call for autonomy and control over one’s land can be heard all over the 
country. In a social environment pervaded by mutual fear, it has become important to 
possess some space from which potential enemies can be excluded. The wish to ban 
members of other ethnic groups from one’s territory is intense among peasant 
communities fighting for access to arable land. 
The irony of this exclusion is that the country is governed by the constitution which provides 
that it shall ‘secure full residence rights for every citizen in all parts of the Federation’ (The 
Constitution, 1999, Section 15 (3) (b)). The political institution and agencies of government 
have consistently flawed this provision of the law by adopting the ‘indigeneship’ template for 
appointments, awards of scholarships, schools and jobs placements as well as elections into 
public offices (Davis & Kalu-Nwiwu, 2001). In its 2002 report, the World Organisation 
Against Torture illustrates this tradition of ethnic distinction. It states: 
In terms of access to resources and opportunities in the day-to-day life, the distinction 
between ‘indigenes’ and ‘non-indigenes’ is critical. In practice, the two groups 
effectively have different rights, resulting in discrimination and inequalities of access 
in many fundamental areas of life and human wellbeing. The impact was and remains 
particularly felt in education and employment, where an informal two-tier system 
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operates. For example, ‘non-indigenes’ have to pay higher fees to enter good schools. 
While paying the same taxes as ‘indigenes’, ‘non-indigenes’ complain of 
discrimination and harassment in their search for employment especially in the civil 
service and federal institutions, where many senior positions are seen as effectively 
reserved for ‘indigenes’ (World Organisation Against Turture, 2002, cited inAlubo, 
2009, pp. 144-145). 
The report cited above summarises the polarisation of the entity called Nigeria – which 
suggests what conflict scholars have often regarded as ‘horizontal inequalities’ - HIs (Côté, 
2015; Ostby, 2008; Stewart, 2014; Tesfay & Malmberg, 2014). The concept is used to 
describe social groups that feel a sense of alienation or discrimination on account of 
differentiated identity. Such identity could be ethnicity, religion, race or other indicators of 
social diversity. Horizontal inequalities occur in a social environment ‘when power and 
resources are unequally distributed between groups that are also differentiated in other ways 
[…] when one of them feels it is being discriminated against, or another enjoys privileges 
which it fears to lose’ (Ostby, 2008, p. 143). Furthermore, ‘horizontal inequalities may also 
have social dimensions, such as when governments and dominant ethnic groups use 
discriminatory educational policies to oppress minorities [….] Discriminatory barriers to 
minority recruitment restrict the economic opportunities and help perpetuate material 
disadvantages of certain groups’ (p. 148). This demonstrates how ‘settler’ groups are silenced 
in territories believed to have been inhabited by ‘indigenous’ groups in Nigeria. 
Going a step further, research evidence has indicated that most Nigerians are 
identified by their ethnic and religious communities rather than other considerations 
(Danfulani, 2006; Gbilekaa, 2012). In their view, Agbiboa and Okem (2011) also argue that 
these factors define the Nigerian national identity which suggests that they have devastating 
consequences on the nation and the citizenry. Thus, there is a relationship between ethnicity 
and religion from which the hyphenated ‘ethno-religious’ term evolved. While many conflicts 
in the Third World occur due to the oppression of the ethnic minorities or struggle for state 
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power among the majority ethnic groups, nearly all the members of each group uphold and 
practice one form of religion or the other, who share a common ethnic ideology (Hae S. Kim, 
2009). For example, it is widely speculated, in the last decades, that the Nigerian northern 
Hausa Fulani ethnic group is advancing an Islamic cause whereas the ethnic groups in the 
South are pursuing the Christian agenda. This notion, however, is built on a simplified rather 
than systematic methodology because empirical evidence which demonstrates Muslim North 
and Christian South agendas is non-existent.  But Egwu (2015, p. 17) remarks that, ‘the 
congruence between ethnicity and religion and their mutually reinforcing relationships in the 
political process is recognised by the notion of ethno-religious identity.  As the situation has 
been well captured, sometimes religious identity becomes part of an ethnic group’s identity or 
vice versa, and presents a volatile social mixture coupled with the power of the ethnic group’s 
myth of common descent’. This means that ethno-religious conflict has become a national 
dilemma in that the culture, which separates the Hausa Fulani Muslim ‘us’ from the 
Igbo/Yoruba Christian ‘them’, has beclouded the citizens’ reasoning. It is worse in the 
present democratic dispensation. For example, if a political appointee is Hausa Fulani or 
Ijaw, it translates to a slot for the Muslim or Christian bloc. The logic is that if that 
appointment is ‘favourable’ to the Hausa Fulani or vice versa, the religious group to which 
the appointee is affiliated will count its gains because its interest will be protected even at the 
expense of national interest. 
Religious issues are generally treated with caution. Some adherents of the world’s 
religions tend to promote values that honour the supernatural being in whom they believe. 
For others, religion means ‘defence of the faith’ which undermines respect for religious 
freedom and the sanctity of human life (Maiangwa, 2013). They are often not tolerant of 
others with differing religious ideologies. Scholars have explained that some religions are 
more tolerant than others because their orientations vary (see Huntington, 1996; Kedourie, 
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1994). Research also reveals that the manner in which people interpret and apply religious 
teachings in everyday life can promote or impede religious freedom  (Stepan, 2000).  
In Nigeria, as discussed at the outset, Christians and Muslims are almost equal in 
number and each has claimed that its traditions encourage religious freedom. But the country 
has a history of religious violence involving mainly Christians and Muslims across the 
northern and Middle Belt regions (Dowd, 2014; Harnischfeger, 2004; Meagher, 2013). In 
these areas, ethnicity and religion are intertwined resulting in ethnic and religious violence. 
The actors are identified as ‘natives’ or ‘settlers’, on one level, and ‘Muslims or ‘Christians’ 
on another level. Dowd has observed with profundity that ‘where religious differences 
overlap with ‘settler’ and ‘native’ or ‘indigene’ distinctions [...], episodes of deadly violence 
have been particularly frequent […]. Where religious identities do not overlap with ethnic 
identities and indigene-settler status, we find interreligious violence much less frequent and 
deadly’ (2014, p.8). Some of the violent conflicts that resulted from ‘settler-indigene’ and 
‘Muslim-Christian’ divide include the 1980 Maitatsine riots, Kano State Shite attacks of 1996 
and 1987, Zagon Kataf riots, Bauchi riots and the Jos conflicts (Alabi, 2002; Meagher, 2013) 
Also, there is ongoing conflict between Fulani herdsmen and farmers over  cattle grazing 
(Siollun, 2016). The violence left in its wake devastating consequences on the citizenry, as 
they now live in perpetual fear wherever it occurred. At present, there is intermittent violence 
in some communities where these social groups live. 
Scholars such as Agbiboa (2013a), Alubo (2009), Alabi (2002) and Kukah (1994) 
have also blamed the incessant religious and ethnic conflicts in the country on the colonial 
construction that undermined the rival ethnic groups that have been engrossed in religion and 
politics. The majority ethnic groups of northern Hausa Fulani, the western Yoruba and 
eastern Igbo have been bound by the ideology of ‘One Nigeria’. None of these groups has 
transcended primordial differences in relation to state affairs. The majority ethnic groups’ 
65 
 
domineering posture has triggered minority agitations for recognition and representation in 
national politics and other key sectors (Arowosegbe, 2016). The diverse people of Nigeria 
soon realised that identity struggle had deepened group conflict among them because their 
interests were incompatible; as such, they pursued them through violent means. As Okidu 
(2011, p. 50) has pointed out, ‘most Nigerians irrespective of their nationalist claims have the 
tendency to first identify with their ethnic roots before identifying themselves as Nigerians’. 
Furthermore, ‘identity is defined by affiliation to religious and ethnic groups rather than the 
Nigerian state’ (Agbiboa, 2013b).  
 Another factor that follows ethnicity is religion – which is believed to surpass the 
former given its misconstrued values among actors in the current political space. It is an 
institution that has wielded a great influence on Nigerians because it is used to mobilise 
people who uphold certain beliefs and practices (Agbiboa, 2013a). In that sense, the ‘warring 
ethno-religious groups in Nigeria subscribe to a model of conduct that elevates ethnicity and 
religion over and above the broader interests of the nation’ (Agbiboa, 2013a, p. 4). This view 
suggests that no matter the status of Nigerians and the circumstance within which they 




Figure 3: 2 Nigeria’s former nationalists who represented the three major ethnic groups of Yoruba (Chief 
Obafemi Awolowo – South West), Igbo (Dr. Nnamdi Azikiwe – South East) and Hausa (Sir Ahmadu Bello – 
North) Source: Naijavibe.net 
The country’s ethnic and religious pluralism has manifested in the conflict ravaging 
many communities today. It has given rise to the adoption of geo-political zoning system 
consisting of south-south, south-east, south-west, north-central, north-west and north-east for 
the purpose of achieving equity in national polity. Although no one openly raises questions 
about the ethnic and religious portfolios of citizens when appointments are made and/or 
during elections – for fear of being accused of usurping the national unity programme and 
acting on the basis of merit - these factors determine the pathway (Alubo, 2009). For 
example, if a northern Muslim picks the presidential ticket of a political party, that party 
would announce a southern Christian running mate to gain acceptance of the north and south 
as well as the Muslim and Christian electorate, and vice versa. This is where ethnicity and 
religion have established a confluence. It touches on the sensibilities of actors that dominate 
the political landscape of the Nigerian society. 
Aware of this ethno-religious divide, each group that upholds common beliefs and 
interests has been instigated against the other to the extent that they claim citizenship status 
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that excludes ‘them’ from ‘others’ thereby becoming custodians of their religious doctrines.  
For most people, their homeland is any community in which their ancestors had settled, lived 
and died for several decades and centuries (Esman, 2004). These, among other criteria, 
distinguish the ‘natives’ from the ‘foreigners’ and the rivalry between both groups constitutes 
conflict with devastating consequences. 
As it has been argued, studies (e.g. Adebanwi, 2004; Okidu, 2011; Sircar, 1968) have 
maintained that tensions arising from political, ethnic and religious conflicts in the country 
were created by the colonial administration. The colonial policy in part favoured some ethnic 
nationalities that identified with certain religions at the end of which they manipulated others 
believed to be out of favour. This oppression of the minority groups, or what  Adebanwi 
(2004, p. 764) calls ‘marginal voices’ because ‘they are defined by their subordination in 
political, social and economic power structures’ has dominated national affairs. For example, 
Sircar (1968) writes that the north under the British administration gained special identity. He 
notes that the colonial administration had made a commitment to northern emirs on religious 
autonomy that it would ‘sedulously refrain from any action which will interfere with the 
exercise of the Mohammedian religion by its adherents, or which will demand of them action 
that is opposed to its precepts’ (1968, p.247). This pact with the colonial administration 
meant to the north a support for its Islamic religion, and that attempts at advancing the cause 
of other religions in the region – especially Christianity which had been introduced in the 
south with the British system of education - would be resisted. In some way, Boko Haram (a 
terror group which forbids western education) is a threat to religious freedom in the country, 
and it is linked to that resistance (Egiegba Agbiboa, 2013). Perhaps, the north (presumably 
backed by the colonial regime) is determined to achieve its goal of a mono-religious region 
through an Islamic jihad. As it has been analysed, the status which the north has assumed 
today resulting in its strategic programme of exclusion and the pursuit of an Islamic cause is 
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built upon the British colonialism. Alabi (2002) argues that the colonial government betrayed 
the later formed Nigerian state by conceding to northern agenda because of its parochial 
interests. Furthermore, Kukah (1994) explains the reason for the British action: 
The colonial administration denied missionaries access into the area of the 
caliphate, not because they love Islam, but because the ideological focus of the 
emirate coincided with the aspirations of an impoverished colonial state. The 
system of labour, slavery, taxation that was prevalent in the caliphate became a 
boost to the British. These policies gave Islam an added advantage and served to 
widen the gap between the Muslims and the non- Muslims in the region. The idea 
of the Muslim North was sworn in the minds of the people, with non- Muslims 
being seen and projected as outsiders and strangers (p.449).  
In Kukah’s view, the British gimmick sustained the northern ideology that separated the 
Muslims from non-Muslims, natives from foreigners and changed the orientations of the 
citizens from civility to hostility. Since then, ethnicity and religion have generated much 
controversy that often leads to organised violence between Muslims and Christians or 
northerners and southerners. This exclusive regime forced non-Muslims (especially 
Christians from the south) to relocate to Sabon Gari, a Hausa phrase which means new 
settlement for foreigners within the northern territories (Alabi, 2002; Kukah, 1994; Sircar, 
1968). The Sabon Gari concept later evolved in almost all parts of the north where those 
classified as infidels or outcasts lived. 
The North’s outright rejection of western education which was necessitated by its 
disapproval of foreign religions in the region gave the southerners – Yoruba, Igbo and 
minority tribes – an advantage of exploring education with which they gained administrative 
and economic authority over the north. The south became an enlightened community 
consisting of people with skills and expertise who gained employment as teachers, nurses, 
and clerks, etc., many of whom were deployed to the north because that region lacked 
qualified personnel (Alabi, 2002; Sircar, 1968). As a result of this, the people of the south 
gained supremacy over their northern counterparts and most northern towns were infiltrated 
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by the southerners who occupied various professional positions (Alabi, 2002). But when the 
north realised that its regional civil service was dominated by the south, it introduced the 
Northernization policy in 1954 which allowed only the ‘indigenes’ of the north to occupy 
such positions. This led to the massive retrenchment of the people of the south who had 
become ‘foreigners’ in the north (Harnischfeger, 2004). This marked the beginning of the 
‘indigene’ and ‘settler’ dichotomy in Nigeria. Beyond the withdrawal of the foreigners from 
the northern regional civil service, the policy also denied foreign artisans the patronage of 
northern clients. According to the Premier of the northern region, Sir Ahmadu Bello (cited in 
Harnischfeger, 2004, p. 443), 
The Northernization policy does not only apply to Clerks, Administrative Officers, 
Doctors and others. We do not want to go to [Lake] Chad and meet strangers [i.e. 
southern Nigerians] catching our fish in the water, and taking them away to leave us 
with nothing. We do not want to go to Sokoto and find a carpenter who is a stranger 
nailing our houses. I do not want to go to the Sabon-gari Kano and find strangers 
making the body of a lorry, or go to the market and see butchers who are not 
Northerners. 
Currently, there is an increase in the migration of citizens in the last three decades due to 
economic recession and civil unrests. People have fled their homelands and sought refuge in 
surrounding ‘safe’ areas. They live in fear and the tense environment has remained unstable 
as many lose their lives in the seeming endless attacks. 
3.3 The Jos Conflict     
Jos is the administrative headquarter of Plateau State. It is a cosmopolitan city of ancient tin 
mines that occupied a niche as Nigeria’s most peaceful city because its mining industry 
attracted a legion of ethnic groups and foreigners who also found its weather conducive, rock 
formations captivating and people receptive. It covers about 8,600 square kilometres of land, 
much of which is surrounded by hills that serve as resort destinations for tourists (Mangvwat, 
2013; Milligan, 2013). It also serves as the political hub of the Middle Belt – a concept which 
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the colonial government had adapted to describe the southern segment of northern Nigeria 
(Crisis Group Africa Report, 2012), or what is also known as a region consisting of ‘the states 
between northern and southern Nigeria’ (Cline, 2011, p. 279). The region is often separated 
from the ‘core’ north, or Muslim Hausa-Fulani dominated north, because most of the 
minority ethnic groups of the Middle Belt had been converted to Christianity after their 
encounter with the British colonial administrators hence their quest for ethno-religious 
identity (Cline, 2011).   
The scenic beauty of the city of Jos and its temperate climate are comparable to 
Europe thereby making tourism a viable sector of the Plateau State economy. It has attracted 
many foreign and local tourists as well as international and national events (Krause, 2011). 
Jos was founded in 1915 as a camp for tin mining and later grew into a cosmopolitan city 
with a population of about 1,000,000 people (Danfulani, 2006; Krause, 2011), but it was 
preceded by two settlements – Naraguta and Guash. The indigenous ethnic groups of Afizere, 
Anaguta and Berom (AAB) were joined by migrants from the south who found the city 
attractive for trade as it had become the most important tin mining centre in the world 
(Shedrack Gaya Best & Rakodi, 2011). 
The name ‘Jos’ emerged from a mispronunciation of ‘Guash’ by the Hausa traders 
who also migrated to the area. Since the new migrants took to trade and commerce, and 
Hausa language dominated commercial interactions because other ethnic groups including the 
AAB engaged with the traders, the name of this settlement changed to ‘Jos’. It replaced 
‘Guash’, and the non-speakers of indigenous languages – the Igbo, Urhobo, Yoruba and the 
Hausa ethnic groups found it most convenient. Recent research has quoted a European 
document on this development as follows: ‘[….] A small hill village called Guash, occupied 
the present location of Jos. Hausa traders who arrived supposedly mispronounced Guash for 




           
Figure 3: 3 Map of Nigeria showing Jos, Plateau State Figure 3: 4 Rock formations of Jos 
  Source: www.slideshare.net                                       Source: www.nytimes.com 
The notion that Jos is ‘home for all’ stemmed from the communality of its inhabitants – the 
indigenous groups coexisting with the migrant groups, which, until 2001 when the first armed 
conflict erupted, had earned the city (and the state) a national recognition of ‘home of peace 
and tourism’ (Danfulani, 2006, p. 2). Nyam and Ayuba (2016, p. 364) give an account of how 
the city recorded an unprecedented influx of people across diverse cultures: 
Since the imposition of the colonial rule and following the development of the tin 
industry, commerce and administration, Jos has continued to be populated by people 
of diverse cultural, linguistic, religious and other traditions, in a wave of endless 
migration from various parts of Nigeria and beyond. 
 
Jos also became a ‘safe haven’ for victims of the Nigerian civil war who fled their homes for 
fear of further attacks. They joined other citizens from various parts of the country whose 
interest in tin mines, commerce and the railway industry had attracted them to the area. While 
the city of Jos remained peaceful under this arrangement, the struggle for group identity 
emerged, and the people began to pitch camps. There was contestation over the ownership of 
Jos between the AAB and the Hausa-Fulani ‘settlers’, a situation that further raised the issue 
about who a citizen or an indigene is among the diverse ethnic groups that had ‘settled’ in the 
area. It transited to the struggle for power as those who qualified as ‘indigenes’ had the right 
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of governance while the ‘settlers’ were excluded (Ambe-Uva, 2010; Ojukwu & Onifade, 
2010). Religion also became a big issue. The ethnic groups in conflict were also identified by 
their profound expression of faith, either as Muslims or Christians; and this identity had great 
influence on them. These factors manifested in the conflict for over two decades and have not 
changed. 
Generally, the preoccupation of the people of Plateau State is farming and many of 
them are public servants who profess Christianity. Other ethnic groups that coexist with them 
include Hausa farmers and traders, Fulani herdsmen as well as traders from the south. 
Danfulani (2006, p. 3) explains this composition explicitly:   
Majority of Plateau State indigenes are Christians tied to the land as peasant farmers 
or workers in the civil service, while the Muslim minorities are Hausa dry-season 
farmers and cattle rearing Fulani, with the Igbo, Urhobo, Yoruba and Hausa 
dominating the business life of the metropolis. 
 
The major conflict that occurred in Jos after the 1945 civil unrest was on April 12, 1994 
(Matawal, 2012). Residents had lived in fear as there were signs of impending attacks on 
communities. The major trigger was the tension arising from the creation of Jos North Local 
Government Area by the military government. The creation was widely criticised by the 
Afizere, Anaguta and Berom ethnic groups which alleged that it was a grand plan by the 
Hausa-Fulani to edge them out by confining them to smaller settlements thereby paving way 
for the ‘settlers’ to claim their land (Ishaku, 2012; Plateau Indigenous Development 
Association Network, 2010). The AAB claimed that,  
they were not consulted in the exercise […] the local government boundaries were 
arbitrarily fixed to their disadvantage [….] The creation of wards favoured the 
Hausa/Jasawa dominated areas as those areas had more wards but which were small 
in population while the indigenes had fewer but larger populated wards (Nyam & 
Ayuba, 2016, p. 367). 
 
The animosity between the two camps deepened over time. On September 7, 2001 the first 
violent conflict erupted in which many people were killed and churches and mosques were 
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burnt. In November 2008, the cancellation of Jos North Local Government election led to 
another armed conflict in the city. By 2010, the conflict had assumed another dimension – the 
bombing of Christian dominated areas (Kabong and Angwan Rukuba) and recreation centres 
on Christmas Eve, among others. While this conflict still occurs intermittently, the 2001, 
2008 and 2010 episodes are considered to be the most violent in the history of the city 
(Krause, 2011; Taft & Haken, 2015). 
3.3.1 The Years of Violent Conflict: 2001, 2008 and 2010 
Although Jos has a history of conflict which dates back to 1945 and 1966 (Milligan, 2013), 
its ‘major crises occurred in 2001, 2008 and 2010 giving the region a reputation of instability’ 
(Taft & Haken, 2015, pp. 63-64). The three years were characterised by intense violence as 
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Table 3.1: Overview of major waves of conflict in Jos: 2001, 2008 and 2010  (Sources:  Ajaero & Phillips, 
2010; HumanRightsWatch., 2001; Krause, 2011; Milligan, 2013; Nyam & Ayuba, 2016; Obayiuwana, 2010; 
Orji, 2011; Taft & Haken, 2015) 
2001 conflict 
Violence erupted in Jos on September 7 after politics of identity reigned among the 
indigenous communities and those regarded as settlers. Both groups clashed during the 
Juma’at prayer along the Congo Rusia area. A Christian woman, an ‘indigene’, was said to 
have crossed over a barricade mounted by a throng of Muslim worshipers at the Congo Rusia 
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mosque demanding her right of way. But the underlying cause of the clash was the contention 
between the Christian ‘indigenes’ and Muslim ‘settlers’ over the political control of Jos. 
Before the September 7 Christian-Muslim clash, the ‘indigenes’ had protested the 
appointment of a ‘settler’, Mukhtar Mohammed as the coordinator of the National Poverty 
Eradication Programme (NAPEP) for Jos North Local Government Area (R. Ibrahim, 2001; 
Offi & Adeyi, 2001; Ogunwale, Ladigbolu, & Daniel, 2001; Owete & Madu-West, 2001). 
The Hausa Fulani community (to which Mukhtar belonged) threatened to resist any attempt 
by the Federal Government to reverse the appointment. This contention signalled an 
impending conflict between both groups. The residents envisaged that at the slightest 
provocation, the ‘indigenes’ and ‘settlers’ would express their frustrations by resorting to 
violence. Thus, it manifested in the purported crossing of the barricade where Muslim 
worshippers at the Juma’at prayer denied the Christian woman her right of way. A 
government statement after the September 2001 conflict which was credited to the former 
deputy governor, Chief Michael Botmang, said  
We started receiving threat letters from Hausa community and the local community. 
The Hausa people were saying, we belong to this place, we have no place else to go, 
this appointment has to be given to us. We said government is for everybody and if 
we have this and there is a problem we all sit down and resolve this. Then the local 
people were saying if you give this to the Hausa people, there would be no peace 
(Milligan, 2013, p. 325). 
Given this background to the 2001 conflict, the contention over the control of Jos, or the 
indigene-settler dichotomy triggered the September 7 violence. It became the first organised 
armed conflict in the history of Jos which claimed the lives of an estimated 1000 people. 
2008 conflict 
Another conflict occurred on November 28 as two rival political parties: the Christian-
dominated People’s Democratic Party (PDP) and the Muslim-dominated All Nigeria People’s 
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Party (ANPP) clashed over the contentious local government chairmanship elections in which 
they fielded candidates. The conflict showed ‘a clear party affiliation along identity lines at 
the LGA (and state) level with Muslim support for ANPP  and Christian support for the PDP’ 
(Milligan, 2013, p. 326). The supporters of PDP’s Timothy Gyang Buba (a Berom 
‘indigene’) and ANPP’s Aminu Baba (a Hausa Fulani ‘settler’) rose in defence of their 
candidates who were awaiting the announcement of the election results by the Plateau State 
Independent Electoral Commission (PLASIEC). The ANPP had alleged that the electoral 
process was characterised by massive rigging in favour of the PDP as a result of which it 
(ANPP) took to the streets in protest.  The PDP supporters, on the other hand,  claimed that 
their candidate was heading for victory and insisted that the process had been transparent and 
that they would not be intimidated by the action of their opponents (Ishaku, 2012). This 
dispute culminated into violence that killed between 500 and 700 people (Nyam & Ayuba, 
2016; Obayiuwana, 2010). It was the second armed conflict in the city characterised by 
bloodshed.  
2010 conflict 
In 2010, conflict between the two ethno-religious factions occurred in three parts. The first 
was on January 17 which was linked to the reconstruction of a building in Dutse Uku area; 
the disagreement at the football match between rival youth groups, and the purported attack 
on worshippers at St. Michael’s Catholic church, Nassarawa Gwong (Lalo, 2010; Lalo & 
Bashir, 2010; Owuamanam, 2010a; Owuamanam, Sobiye, & Ibrahym, 2010). Second, there 
were attacks on Dogon Nahawa, Zat and Ratsat communities (village areas of Jos) in March 
(Ishaku, 2012). Third, it was the bombing of Christian-dominated areas of Gada-biyu and 
Angwan Rukuba on Christmas Eve. During the first and second incidents (January 17- March 
7), between 350 and 500 people were killed (Ajaero & Phillips, 2010) while the Christmas 
Eve explosions killed 80 people (Ishaku, 2012). This research focused on the first incident in 
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2010 (the January 17 violence) because of the spates of attacks on many communities and the 
fatalities that were recorded. It was a major incident compared to the ones that followed. 
3.3.2 Contestation over the Political Control of Jos 
Conflict ensued between the ‘indigenes’ and ‘settlers’ over the political control of Jos, and 
the city had been battled by storms of war. It is a struggle for identity.  Alubo (2009) argues 
that in the whole of the Middle Belt, conflict of identity between ethnic groups is prevalent. 
He recalls that, recently, the region has witnessed the most violent ethnic conflict in the 
country because its people had long been dominated by the Hausa Fulani and needed to be 
liberated (see also, Gbilekaa, 2012). In Jos, being the hub of the Middle Belt region,  
contestations have emerged over who the ‘indigenes’ or the ‘natives’ and the ‘settlers’ or 
‘foreigners’ are, given its antecedents. Studies have revealed that the indigenous groups of 
Afizere, Anaguta and Berom are the original inhabitants of the city (Ambe-Uva, 2010; 
Shedrack Gaya Best & Rakodi, 2011; Danfulani, 2006; Krause, 2011; Ostien, 2009). The 
Crisis Group Africa Report (2012, p. 1) recognises that ‘ the main indigenous ethnic groups – 
the Berom, Anaguta and Afizere (BAA) - are aggrieved that mining, as well as colonialism, 
disposed them of much of their customary land’. They were said to have embraced all who 
settled in their domains including tourists who visited the city. Putting it simply, their 
hospitality was uncommon.  Ambe-Uva (2010, p. 43) has described the city as a, 
[…] home to several ethnic groups, which fall into two broad categories: those 
who consider themselves ‘indigenes’ or original inhabitants of the area- among 
them the Berom, the Afizere and the Anaguta and those who are termed ‘non-
indigenes’ or ‘settlers’, composed in large part of Hausa (the majority ethnic 
group in Northern Nigeria), but also of southern Igbo, Yoruba and other ethnic 
groups. 
 
Nigeria’s minority ethnic groups have, in the last decades, claimed that they have been 
marginalised by their majority counterparts who have taken over their possessions including 
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the lands and territories they inherited from their ancestors thereby denying them of their 
rights and privileges (Egwu, 2001, 2015; Scully, 1996). Consequently, a minority 
consciousness has emerged to stop the minority onslaught (Harnischfeger, 2004). It is often 
argued that if Jos is captured by the Hausa-Fulani ethnic group, the Middle Belt region would 
pull to pieces and Christians would become victims of religious attacks because the city plays 
a crucial role in the political, social and religious life of the region (Barnes, 2007). That is 
why the ‘who owns Jos?’ phenomenon is the concern of the region. 
Krause (2011, p. 16) writes that the ownership of Jos is still in contention because ‘the 
Berom and other indigene groups argue that the city was founded on land that belonged to 
them as the native people of the state. The Hausa-Fulani contest this claim and hold that the 
city was established on ‘virgin land’ that belonged to nobody’. The three indigenous ethnic 
groups have had a history of reception and solidarity with people of other extractions which 
could also be said of the entire citizens of the state. Unarguably, some ‘indigenes’ sold their 
lands (in some cases, gave out free) to the ‘settlers’ on which they built houses and expanded 
their businesses. Shedrack Gaya Best and Rakodi (2011) have noted that while the 
‘indigenes’ still occupy most parts of the city, they have, nonetheless, sold significant 
portions to the ‘settlers’, especially the Hausa Fulani who now claim ownership of the land 
without recognising the place of the ‘indigenes’. As such, they (Hausa Fulani) maintain that 
Jos was a virgin land on which their ancestors settled for several centuries. Despite the crisis 
of September 7, 2001 which signalled the emergence of war between rival ‘indigenes’ and 
‘settlers’, the AAB continued the brisk business of sale of their ancestral lands. This action 
was largely condemned by other ethnic groups as they swiftly took over the battle in 
solidarity with fellow ‘indigenes’ in Jos (Gofwen & Ishaku, 2006). They also waged attacks 
on the Hausa-Fulani ‘settlers’ in their midst and turned them into refugees where they had 
long settled. Ostien (2009, pp. 2-3) explains how this has played out: 
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The conflict situation in Jos arises primarily out of ethnic difference, pitting Hausa 
‘settlers’ vs. the Plateau ‘indigene’ tribes of Afizere, Anaguta and Berom. Jos is the 
capital of Plateau State, and the local indigene tribes, backed by other indigene 
tribes elsewhere in the state, feel they have a right to control it; that is, its local 
government, by force if necessary. In other parts of Plateau State the other indigene 
tribes have been fighting back against other incursions as well. 
 
This ethnic identity crisis is not only faced in Jos as a result of the seeming ‘trouble’ of the 
people but the entire country because the citizens have realised that ethnic identity is crucial 
in participating in national affairs.  The Federal Character policy recognises citizens by their 
ethnic origins and seeks to satisfy ethnic interests in terms of employments/appointments, 
admission slots in public institutions etc. The process of ethnic identity begins with the 
issuance of ‘indigene certificates’ to the ‘indigenes’ by the 774 local government councils, 
through the traditional institutions, to identify and affirm the legitimacy of a person regarded 
as indigene who, on account of this, gains access to state resources (Arowosegbe, 2016) . 
That is why people struggle to obtain this document and those regarded as ‘settlers’ are 
denied certain privileges until they retrace their roots to communities believed to be theirs. 
Ostien (2009) notes that, ‘other groups living there, even groups that settled there for scores 
or hundreds of years are excluded. They are told to ‘go back where you come from’ if they 
want the benefits of indigeneship’ (p.3). 
However, the 1999 Constitution of Nigeria (as amended) confers on every citizen the 
right of residency in all parts of the country in line with its policy on national integration. It 
states: ‘[...] it shall be the role of the State to secure full residence rights for every citizen in 
all parts of the Federation’ (Section 15(3)(b), see also Crisis Group Africa Report, 2012, p. 3; 
Danfulani, 2006, p. 7).This provision is not complied with given the principle of indigeneship 
which the State (Nigeria) and its agencies, directly or indirectly, recognise. It is a national 
dilemma and the Jos conflict is linked to it. 
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3.3.3 Influence of Religion on ‘indigenes’ and ‘settlers’  
The cosmopolitan city of Jos presented itself unique as people of all races and faiths 
fraternised and worked for the common good. There were no barriers of religion and ethnicity 
and every citizen embraced good neighbourliness (Lar & Embu, 2012; Nyam & Ayuba, 
2016; Ojukwu & Onifade, 2010). There were Igbo, Yoruba, Hausa-Fulani, Urhobo, Efik, Tiv, 
Idoma, Eggon ethnic groups and many others; as well as Indians, Americans, Irish, Britons 
and other foreign nationals, who either belonged to Islam, Christianity, Hinduism, African 
traditional religions or professed no faith. The scenario is further captured thus: 
Those familiar with Plateau State before its protracted crises began will recall the 
days when people of all ethnic extractions coexisted peacefully with their host 
communities, whose character of accommodation attracted Muslims, Christians, 
Hindus, Buddhists and non-believers to the land. Their desire was to remain 
united and chart a common cause. Unfortunately, violence erupted, resulting in 
renewed hostilities which lasted for a decade (Naanlang Godfrey Danaan, 2012, 
p. 1). 
 
According to Human Rights Watch, 2001, cited in Shedrack Gaya Best and Rakodi (2011, p. 
57), ‘because of its geographical location and economic history, Jos became one of the most 
religiously plural cities in Nigeria, and a particularly significant meeting point for 
Christianity and  Islam, although until the 1990s, its diverse communities lived together in 
peace’. These two religions are practiced by the greater population of Nigerians as it is the 
case with Jos. They observe their religious rights regularly and often express these in great 
proportion; to the extent that they turn aggressive or become confrontational to each other at 
the slightest provocation.  
Some scholars (e.g., Alabi, 2002; Shedrack Gaya Best & Rakodi, 2011; Danfulani, 
2006) ascribe to the claim that Islam spread in the country through trade but was linked to 
violence which many Christians regarded as a systematic Jihad.  Attempts were made to 
capture Jos by the jihadists but the indigenous ethnic groups defended their territory. The 
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jihad failed because the indigenes resisted it and they ensured that their area was protected 
from further attacks (Nyam & Ayuba, 2016; Ostien, 2009). Based on this account, the 
indigenous ethnic groups of Afizere, Anaguta and Berom whose identity is anchored on 
Christianity have nurtured this suspicion that the Hausa-Fulani (regarded as the Muslim 
North) wanted to conquer them by all means (Danfulani, 2006; Ishaku, 2012). The 
implication is that the rivalry between the ‘indigene Christians’ and ‘settler Muslims’ 
assumed a dangerous dimension. The identity struggle became religious in which Christians 
and Muslims pitched camps fighting each other for many years. Each time a religious 
festivity (such as Eidle-Fitri or Christmas) is observed by Muslims or Christians, heavily 
armed security operatives are mobilised to protect lives and property in the event of the 
breach of the peace by either of the rival groups. Once violent conflict erupts, whether it is 
politically or ethnically motivated, Christians and Muslims are the major actors and often 
become victims. However, Kaigama (2012) argues that the Jos conflict is multidimensional. 
He maintains that a number of factors accounts for the unrest which implies that it is closely 
linked to ethnicity and religion but not limited to them.  
Given that Muslims and Christians are perceived ‘enemies’ in the identity struggle, 
they often instigate each other, and use derogatory labels such as ‘settler’, ‘native’, ‘non-
indigene’, ‘host community’, ‘foreigner’ to vent their anger and express their frustrations 
with each other (Danfulani, 2006, p. 1). In all this, the emerging complexity about the Jos 
conflict is its ethno-religious and socio-political coloration that has many pathways (Ambe-
Uva, 2010; J. D. Galadima, 2010; Gofwen & Ishaku, 2006; Kaigama, 2012; Ostien, 2009).  
The 1952 census figures, cited in Danfulani (2006, p. 2) indicate that ‘Christians formed 84.5 
per cent of the population of Jos town, with Muslims making 12 per cent and adherents of 
traditional religions the remaining 3.5 per cent’. Furthermore, ‘today, Plateau State enjoys a 
majority Christian population of about 95 per cent, while Jos town is overwhelmingly 
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Christian’ (Danfulani, 2006, p. 2). In contrast, this position has been contested by the 
Muslims who also claim that their number outweighs the population of the Christians, as a 
result of which they recognise their political influence in Jos North Local Government Area 
and vow not to leave anything to chance (Krause, 2011). They believe that they have a stake 
in the politics of the land which is the ideology of the Hausa-Fulani or the ‘core’ North 
(Kukah, 1994). 
A segment of the indigenous ethnic groups had claimed that the Muslim community 
had planned a jihad to attack Christians and take over their possessions as well as install the 
‘Sarkin Jos’ (Emir of Jos) with the aim of reclaiming the city (Gofwen & Ishaku, 2006; 
Plateau Indigenous Development Association Network, 2010). For example, Punch reporter 
Jude Owuamanam had published a purported text message ascribed to the Jos North Muslim 
Ummah. It read: 
To all Muslims: we must reclaim Kaduna, install a Muslim governor in Taraba, 
plant a deputy governor in Benue, install a woman as governor (which is Haram 
but she’s a necessary weapon of change) in Plateau. We must capture Central 
Nigeria, Council of Ulama, Northern Nigeria (Owuamanam, 2011, cited in 
Krause, 2011, p. 32). 
 
The rivalry between Muslims and Christians deepened when, on September 7, 2001; three 
days before the attack on the Twin Towers in New York, they engaged in bloodshed that tore 
them apart. It was this hostility that turned into organised violence involving Muslims on the 
one hand and Christians on the other. The circumstances that led to this violence are still 
being contested. However, a report alleged that before the violence broke out, the Muslim 
community in Jos had circulated leaflets among its members instigating them against non-
Muslims and asking them to ‘defend’ Islam at all cost (Asaju, 2001). Since then, rather than 
situate the Jos crisis within the realm of ethnicity which produced the seeming religious 
coloration, the latter is widely perceived as a major trigger. The September 7 scenario was an 
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upsurge of a longstanding rivalry between the Christian ‘indigenes’ and the Hausa-Fulani 
‘settlers’  (Danfulani, 2006; Krause, 2011).  
Today, those who read about Jos conflict on pages of newspapers, especially the 
reprisal attacks on communities dominated by Christians and/or Muslims, have formed the 
impression of a religious war. Krause (2011, p. 12) maintains that ‘the struggle between 
predominantly Christian indigenes and the mostly Muslim Hausa-Fulani soon took a strong 
religious dimension, pitching Muslims against Christians’. The degree of impression is such 
that triggers international reckoning in which countries now identify with the rival religious 
groups and, to an extent, aid their war tactics on their perceived enemies. For example, when 
a person leaves the shores of Nigeria, a citizen of that visiting country may ask his/her 
Nigerian guest: ‘How are ‘our people’ over there?’, ‘I heard ‘they’ are killing ‘us’’, ‘Are ‘we’ 
not more than ‘them’?’, ‘What are ‘our people’ doing about the massacre?’, ‘Do ‘you’ not 
own Nigeria?’, ‘Must you allow ‘them’ to wipe away ‘our’ people?’. These are some 
questions which the visiting Nigerian may be confronted with. The effects of this encounter 
may be manifested in the ‘fight back’ or we- no- go-gree (we won’t agree) guerrilla war 
being experienced in the city. 
The Afizere, Anaguta and Berom people and other ethnic groups as well as a fraction 
of the Middle Belt region believe that the Hausa-Fulani have an agenda that, if not checked 
with tact, will manifest in the take-over of Jos by the settlers (Ambe-Uva, 2010). For them, 
Jos is crucial to the Middle Belt cause, thus, it must be protected for the region and the entire 
country to survive. A survey conducted among the ethnic groups of the Middle Belt reveals 
that they believe that ‘if the Muslims have Jos, they have Nigeria. And if they have Nigeria, 
they have Africa’ (Krause, 2011, p. 31). This perspective is, therefore, linked to the 
September 7 conflict as reported by Offi and Adeyi (2001, p. 24):  
                   On Friday, September 7 at about 12.55pm, what has been described as a bottled 
anger exposed at a small mosque along Congo Russia area of Jos. And for the 
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next several days, it was killing, burning of houses, churches, mosques and 
vehicles. So far, two reasons have been given for the violence – one being a mere 
trigger to the other. It was not sudden as it appeared, but a fall-out of long 
intrigues and political rivalry over the ownership of the city. The intrigues are 
between the natives of Berom, Anaguta and the Afizere ethnic extraction and the 
Hausa-Fulani migrants into the city. 
 
Another account presents the conflict in three folds: ‘struggle over political appointments, 
blockage of street for purposes of praying and the expansion of Shari’ah law...in twelve 
northern states of Nigeria’ (Danfulani, 2006, p. 5).The implication of this narrative is that; 
first, a settler appointee had been imposed on the indigenes as coordinator of a poverty 
alleviation programme by the Federal Government in 1994 which was protested and bottled 
up; second, the unauthorised blockage of streets for Jumma’at prayer which led to the 
harassment of a Christian woman; and third, the emerging campaign for the adoption of 
Shari’ah law in Plateau State by some Islamic extremists to destabilise the state, especially 
the citizens who had taken refuge in the state after the law was legalised in twelve northern 
states. The conflict, which appeared mild because the people of the state had neither 
witnessed any spate of violence nor anticipated a further breakdown of law and order, later 
metamorphosed into what is labelled today as ‘the Jos crisis’. It has remained devastating and 
uncommonly inhuman as Okoro and Chukwuma (2012, p. 43) aptly capture: ‘Jos crisis has 
continued to the present day and it has gone sophisticated’. 
Various judicial commissions of enquiry and committees to broker peace between 
warring groups - about 10 from 2001-2004 (Danfulani, 2006; J. D. Galadima, 2010) were set 
up by the government but the culprits who are said to have masterminded the carnage have 
not been brought to justice. But most of these reports reveal that the three ethnic groups 
regarded as ‘indigenes’ own the city of Jos. The Crisis Group Africa Report (2012, p. 7) 
states: ‘virtually all commissions of enquiry into the Jos crisis since April 1994 concluded 
that the city of Jos is ‘owned’ not by the Hausa-Fulani, but  by the BAA – Berom, Afizere 
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and Anaguta [....] Only these communities were judged to have proof of ancestral land of 
Jos’. 
        
Some of the attackers carrying weapons                       Residents mourning their loss 
       
Bodies of persons killed in one of the attacks                  Women and children were the most affected 
  Figure 3: 5 Victims of Jos conflict    Source: www.nytimes.com 
 
3.4 Handling Ethnic and Religious Conflict in Nigerian Media 
While it is understood that Nigeria’s ethnic and religious pluralism is, in part, a source of 
conflict – as previously discussed - further analysis of journalistic strategies of framing these 
narratives in the diverse environment is of essence. The Nigerian media, as expected, have 
contributed to nation building beginning with the 1859 press revolution which produced 
Henry Townsend’s Iwe Irohin, Africa’s first vernacular newspaper that helped to propagate 
the missionary vision and ideals of Christianity  (Ralph Afolabi Akinfeleye, 1985; R.A.  
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Akinfeleye, 1987; Lai Oso, D. Odunlami, & T Adaja, 2011; Ukonu, 2005).This press regime 
transited from a single platform - that focused on doctrinal issues, religious news such as 
announcements about converts and the baptised - to a multiplatform that served the general 
interests including socio-political, cultural and economic dynamics, commerce and industry 
(Gambo & Hassan, 2011; J. Jimoh, 2011; Tejumaiye & Adelabu, 2011). Furthermore, the 
nationalists struggle which led to the nation’s independence; enlightenment and mobilisation 
of the citizenry; support for development programme, especially the protection of the 
marginalized groups; the enthronement and stability of democracy, surveillance of the 
environment, among other programmes, are some of the positive influence of the media 
(Adebanwi, 2004; Tejumaiye & Adelabu, 2011). 
A large volume of literature (e.g. Ralph Afolabi Akinfeleye, 2003; J. D. Galadima, 
2010; Golwa, 2011; Tejumaiye & Adelabu, 2011) has described the media as the country’s 
mirror which reflects the occurrences in the society, even though they serve the interests of 
their owners and the elites. As Tejumaiye and Adelabu (2011) have noted, the media are a 
‘mixed blessing’ because they do not only perform their role of surveillance but also 
compromise journalistic integrity in many ways. Given that they operate under harsh 
economic, political and social conditions such as poor living wage, ownership pressure and 
threat to life, their observance of professional ethics cannot be said to be absolute. The 
complexity of the Nigerian environment – its multicultural, multi-ethnic and multi-religious 
orientations – makes journalists vulnerable as there are conflicting interests of actors to serve 
(Ojebode, 2009). From the pre-independence era to post-independent Nigeria, the media have 
been grappling with episodic sectarian conflict and other national threats. 
Contemporary scholarship has reinforced the view that the media have failed to 
manage diversity in ethnic and/or religious conflict (Albert, 2002; Egwu, 2001; H. S. 
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Galadima, 2011; J. D. Galadima, 2010; Golwa, 2011; Institute for Peace and Conflict 
Resolution, 2007; Tejumaiye & Adelabu, 2011). This argument is predicated on the empirical 
evidence that the media institution is closely linked to politics in the country (Golwa, 2011; 
Umechukwu, 2001); as such, ethnicity and religion have been polarised giving perception of 
reality a different meaning.  The polarisation of the media started during the 1914 
amalgamation regime because some of them believed in the merger and advanced its cause 
while others did not (Adebanwi, 2004). Furthermore, Tejumaiye and Adelabu (2011) have 
explained that the media have turned deaf ears to the yearnings of citizens that they should 
maintain professional honour especially in handling ethno-religious conflict. They argue that 
‘there exists now a feeling of distrust between the mass media and citizens. Rather than [to] 
mirror truth and national integration,  Nigerian mass media have allowed ethnicity, colouring 
of facts, parochialism, ownership influence, incompetence, bribery and corruption, 
brotherhood, etc., influence their professional judgment’ (p.70). Critics are agitated that the 
Nigerian media may be leading the country into another round of civil war as they predict an 
ethnocentric media regime that creates borders (Olukotun, 2002).  
As political structures were erected and parties formed, the regional/ethnic divides 
surfaced. Every region was closely tied to a religion and the orientations of the people 
developed on this premise as a result of which the Nigerian national project was dismantled. 
The resistance by the north that its identity and religion should not be diluted by western 
culture and education led to underdevelopment of the region and paved way for the growth of 
the south (Kukah, 1994; Sircar, 1968).This was also the pathway for the media in Nigeria. 
There was the southern – northern media dichotomy that engaged the practitioners in ‘pen 
shooting’ as contents became delicacies of ethnic and religious ideologies. The media fed 
their audiences with tales of ‘bad news’ on the rival regions; as such, their analysis of issues 
was subjective. The regional and central governments as well as politicians (who later 
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became journalists) found the media useful in achieving their goals bearing in mind that 
journalists who worked for these media were incapable of biting the fingers that fed them 
(Aliagan, 2005; Duyile, 1987; Ukonu, 2005). 
There was media concentration in the south compared to the north. Media 
consciousness was associated with the south that had been exposed to western literacy which 
the north had opposed. Although newspapers and other media later sprang up in the north – 
especially during the deregulation of broadcasting, the south still controls the industry having 
most of the media in its region. This mass media terrain in which ‘the South towers over the 
North’  (A. O. Musa & Ferguson, 2013, p. 9), provides another perspective to managing 
media contents on the diversity of the country and its ethnic and religious pluralism. 
Beginning with Iwe Irohin, the South has dominated the media landscape and the proprietors 
of these media reside within the Lagos –Ibadan south –western territory (Duyile, 1979; 
Kukah, 1994; A. O. Musa & Ferguson, 2013; E. Ojo, 2003; Okidu, 2011). The North has 
tried to level up by establishing its media network but this effort has not yielded any result 
compared to the South. This has created unhealthy competition between the southern and 
northern media serving as ‘pliant, puppets’ to achieve regional goals (Ekpu, 1990, cited in E. 
Ojo, 2003, p. 836). It is against this parochialism, especially in handling sensitive issues of 
diversity that Kurt Leudike writes about the mass media: 
                  You are the mechanisms of reward and punishment, the arbiter of right and 
wrong, the roving eye of daily judgment. You are capricious and unpredictable, 
you are fearsome and you are feared because there is never any way to know 
whether this time, you will be fair and accurate or whether you will not  (Leudike, 
1984, cited in Tejumaiye & Adelabu, 2011, p. 71). 
  In Leudike’s view, the ‘unpredictable media’, especially in handling conflict, implies that 
what the media choose to report about conflict and how they are reported cannot be predicted 
by the audience. As third party in conflict, they may contribute to the escalation or de-
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escalation of the conflict depending on which side they choose to align with. As a 
consequence, the Nigerian media, rather than contribute to peace building by being fair and 
accurate, do more harm in conflict situations (Albert, 2002; H. S. Galadima, 2011). While 
these scholars have acknowledged the contributions of the media to national cooperation and 
integration by highlighting the gains inherent in diversity, they seem to concur with the 
findings by Albert (2002) that the media emphasise citizens’ ethnic and religious differences 
more than their similarities. Furthermore, Pate (2011) summarises some challenges which 
characterise conflict reporting research, and argues that many journalists present false 
information about conflict and the groups involved. Thus, there is a litany of journalistic 
flaws that can trigger resentment among social groups.  It means that journalists’ ethnic, 
political and religious orientations often influence their conduct as manifested in their choice 
of inflammatory language and the manipulation of facts. These form much of media contents 
on conflict in Jos. 
Based on the Nigerian media’s handling of conflict and diversity which suggests that 
they lay    emphasis on issues that divide rather than unite social groups (Albert, 2002), this 
study draws example from the works of J. D. Galadima (2010), A. O. Musa and Ferguson 
(2013) and Rasaq (2012). Apart from contributing significantly to contemporary scholarship 
on conflict reporting and Nigeria’s diversity, their studies are a major effort that reinforces the 
southern and northern dichotomy reflecting the complexity of ethnic and religious pluralism in 
the north, and Jos in particular.  
3.5 Jos Conflict in the Media 
  There is no clear distinction between the coverage of the Jos conflict and the rest of the north 
or the entire country where the media purportedly demonstrated professional incompetence 
and have become insensitive to the collective cause of a united Nigeria. The media beamed 
their searchlights on the city in 1994 when violence that consumed several lives and property 
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erupted; and in 2001 when Jos became a troubled spot as it recorded its first organised armed 
conflict (Krause, 2011; Nyam & Ayuba, 2016; Zeng & Akinro, 2013). This coverage has 
continued to the present day, and is influenced by group/individual interests – largely based 
on primordial sentiments. The coverage is, therefore, adequate and intensive but polarised (J. 
D. Galadima, 2010; A. O. Musa & Ferguson, 2013; Rasaq, 2012). 
  Figure 3: 6 Advocates of peace in the aftermath of the Jos conflict  
 
Journalists were partisan in reporting the Jos conflict. Their reports and analyses on the conflict 
have reflected parochial ideology that served ethnic and religious interests – the Christian 
south and the Muslim north agendas. This prevailing media bias which has resulted from 
Nigeria’s diversity and the quest for group identity has made the citizens to lose faith in the 
media. As such, the audience shops for news that suits his/her interest since ‘truth’ is defined 




This chapter has introduced the dynamics and complexities of conflict in the diverse Nigerian 
society which have been linked to ethnicity and religion. Both identities are among the causal 
factors of conflict in Africa (Francis, 2006). The chapter revisits Nigeria’s amalgamation 
programme by the British colonial administration which ignited conflict in the country 
because the merger of the northern and southern protectorates into a single entity was 
arguably faulty.  
The chapter also provides insights into the Jos conflict involving the ‘indigenous’ 
ethnic groups of Afizere, Anaguta and Berom (AAB) and the Hausa Fulani ‘settler’ 
community.  While the Christian-dominated ‘indigenes’ have claimed control of their 
customary land –Jos, and tried to exclude the ‘settlers’ from political governance of the local 
council, their Hausa Fulani counterparts have maintained that Jos belongs to them, and that 
they would resist any form of exclusion (Ambe-Uva, 2010; Krause, 2011; Orji, 2011). 
The chapter argues that amidst this controversy, the journalists have played a divisive 
role rather than advance the cause of peace in communities (Albert, 2002; Pate, 2011; 
Udoakah, 2015). Thus, the media structure in Nigeria represents the country’s regional, 
ethnic and religious divides. The journalists’ use of inflammatory language has dominated 
media contents which in turn ignited conflict. The discussion in this chapter is followed by an 













This study utilises three mass media models to examine journalists’ approaches to handling 
conflict in Jos. They include the journalistic objectivity model, the theory of mediatisation 
and news framing theory. Each of these frameworks gives an insight into the practices of 
conflict journalists thereby providing logical support to the empirical process.  
The objectivity model is a standard of practice for most journalists across the globe 
(Blaagaard, 2013; Lesage & Hackett, 2014; Muñoz-Torres, 2012; Stenvall, 2014; Wahl-
Jorgensen, 2013), which encourages them to report the story without any form of attachment 
to their subjects, or as D. Barker (2007) notes that they are required to ‘tell it as it is’. Having 
been criticised by a growing body of scholars, the objectivity model has occupied much 
debate in contemporary studies. In this research, it is examined to gain an understanding 
about its adoption in conflict reporting. The researcher interrogates the ‘trouble’ with this 
model and looks at the emerging brands of journalism around it. 
The study is also understood from the mediatisation theory and news framing theory 
lenses. While the former describes media logic in news production, the latter suggests the 
way the narratives which constitute news are constructed. Both theories explain journalistic 
practices in many respects. For instance, understanding media logic is the first step in 
identifying journalists’ role in the Jos conflict which in turn determines the brand of 
journalism being adopted. The angle from which a story is developed explains the news 
framing process (Kapuściński & Richards, 2016; Phillips, 2015). The journalists’ choice of 
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frames invariably shapes the perceptions of their audiences, especially the portrayal of 
‘indigenes’ as victims and ‘settlers’ as aggressors of conflict or vice versa. 
In this chapter, the Frustration-Aggression (FA) theory of conflict and the Peace 
Journalism (PJ) theory precede the three media theories employed in this research. The FA 
explains the context of conflict in which social groups express their frustration through 
aggressive means when their expectations are not met. This is typical of the Jos conflict 
involving a ‘settler’ group craving for recognition and legitimacy on the one hand, and a 
group of ‘indigenes’ that insists the territory is its inheritance on the other. While this theory 
is located in conflict research, it provides the foundation for understanding the nature of 
conflict in which journalists have played a role. The PJ is a brand of journalism committed to 
peace. 
4.2 The Frustration–Aggression Theory 
The theory of Frustration-Aggression holds that people whose needs or expectations are not 
met feel a sense of frustration leading to behaviour change. Maier describes it as ‘frustration 
–instigated behaviour’ (Maier, 1961, cited in Shorkey & Crocker, 1981, p. 376; Young, 2009) 
because exhibiting this new behaviour stems from frustration. The individual who is 
frustrated tries to depart from his/her state by taking an action that may offer him/her some 
relief. Sigmund Freud was said to have used the concept ‘frustration’ to explain the external 
and internal factors that inhibit needs satisfaction (Shorkey & Crocker, 1981). He noted that 
there were obstacles to attaining satisfaction which results in the change in behaviour that is 
being translated in aggression, regression, fixation and resignation (Norman & Ryan, 2008; 
Shorkey & Crocker, 1981; Young, 2009). Young maintains that ‘each of the four 
characteristics illustrates a continued state of experienced interpersonal conflict, and none of 
the feelings associated with the characteristics directly helps an individual to attain a goal or 
meet a need’ (2009, p.286). 
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The Frustration – Aggression theory was adapted by John Dollard and his colleagues 
in 1939 to explain the violent behaviour – aggression – that emerges from frustration 
(Ademola, 2006). Scholars such as Young (2009), Hornik (1977), Anifowose (1982) and 
Feierabends (1969) have distinguished what people desire and what they get in the long run. 
According to Ademola (2006, p. 47),  
                  Where expectation does not meet attainment, the tendency is for people to 
confront those they hold responsible for frustrating their ambitions [....] It is the 
outcome of frustration and [...] in a situation where the legitimate desires of an 
individual is denied either directly or by the indirect consequence of the way the 
society is structured, the feeling of disappointment may lead such a person to 
express his anger through violence that will be directed at those he holds 
responsible or people who are directly or indirectly related to them. 
This theory suggests a terrain of hostility, conflict, violence, disorder and despair; all of 
which are rooted in frustration and aggression. This study presents the same scenario, a 
society characterized by ethnic and religious divides – where ‘natives’ and ‘foreigners’, 
‘Muslim North’ and ‘Christian South’, ‘majority and minority’ ethnic groups have expressed 
their frustrations on account of alienation and denial of legitimacy. Their Frustration – 
Aggression antecedents have led to organised violence that has consumed the warring groups 
and other casualties. Lerner (1958) had predicted that the mass media, as definers of the 
Frustration – Aggression model would create expectations that would not be met, as they 
make people ‘imagine themselves as strange persons in strange situations, places and times’ 
(p.52). In other words, Lerner maintains that the media’s portrayal of events (in this 
circumstance – conflict) can trigger a desire (want) which may not be achieved and could 
lead to frustration and fierce action - aggression. 
The criticisms that have followed the media coverage of the Jos conflict – that they 
have instigated groups against one another rather than support peace initiatives aimed at 
uniting them (H. S. Galadima, 2011; J. D. Galadima, 2010; Golwa, 2011; A. O. Musa & 
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Ferguson, 2013), hinged on Lerner’s argument. The media have planted a seed of discord 
among the people who now feel that their ideologies, beliefs and cultures are at variance and 
cannot blend. 
4.3 Peace Journalism Theory: An Alternative to War Journalism 
Peace journalism (PJ) and war journalism (WJ) were first used by Swedish scholar Johan 
Galtung (1973) to make a distinction between reporting that promotes non-violence in the 
society and the one that instigates conflict actors towards violence. He argued that peace 
journalism is an alternative to war journalism. This logic has guided most conflict journalism 
studies in the last decades. The goal of PJ was to counter the norm of objectivity which 
defined professional journalism in the US and, indeed, most parts of the world (Boudana, 
2011; Maras, 2013; McMeel, 2003). Journalistic objectivity entailed working towards 
achieving neutrality, fairness and balance by those who report events (Berganza-Conde et al., 
2010). However, while objectivity emerged as an ideal, with many journalists striving to 
pursue it, attaining it is difficult because it requires journalists to be disinterested observers of 
their subjects rather than participants in the events they report.  
Johan Galtung believed that peace journalism would enable journalists to report 
conflict in a holistic manner – identifying the causes of the conflict and the actors, and 
providing a platform that would restore and sustain solidarity among the social groups in 
conflict as a means to reduce human suffering (Rukhsana, 2011; Tenenboim-Weinblatt et al., 
2016). In contrast to war reporting, PJ is people-oriented and concerned with how to make a 
contribution to peacebuilding efforts in society ravaged by violence (Shinar, 2009), so that 
‘positive peace’ may be achieved (Galtung, 1996, cited in Lynch, 2013a, p. 50). It is a 
reporting strategy aimed at enlightening media audiences on the imperative of peace thereby 
influencing their attitudes towards achieving peace.  
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Peace journalism is further expanded by a growing body of scholars (e.g., Howard, 
2009, 2015; S. T. Lee, 2010; Lynch, 2008; Lynch & McGoldrick, 2005, 2013; Lynch, 
McGoldrick, & Heathers, 2015; Rukhsana, 2011; Singh, 2013; Tenenboim-Weinblatt et al., 
2016) that used Johan Galtung’s framework to produce a variety of concepts which are 
recognised in contemporary peace journalism research as ‘solutions journalism’ (Thier, 2016; 
Wenzel, Gerson, & Moreno, 2016). In some iterations, it is regarded as ‘journalism of 
attachment’ (Bell, 1996, 1997), ‘responsible conflict reporting’ (Singh, 2013), ‘human rights 
journalism’ (Shaw, 2016) – and in others, it suggests ‘caring journalism’, ‘reliable 
journalism’, ‘innovative journalism’, and so on (Rukhsana, 2011). These concepts attempt to 
define the role of journalists in violent situations – namely, peace advocacy. In all this, there 
is an effort to educate the public on the sanctity of human life and all forms of non-violence 
so as to prevent and/or manage conflict. 
Recent peace journalism research has argued that a review of the PJ model would 
provide a framework for adoption by journalists across national frontiers because the variety 
of brands associated with PJ ‘are more individual projects than coordinated and organised 
reforms, and they are scattered geographically and do not have a global scope’ (Nohrstedt & 
Ottosen, 2015, p. 221). Thus, the study proposed what it termed as the ‘consequence-ethical 
reflexivity, which […] expresses the kernel of the PJ programme’ (p. 232). But like others, it 
is drawn on Johan Galtung’s model which provides alternative to war journalism whereby 
journalists are expected to report conflict in the manner that would shape the attitudes of their 
audiences towards peace. It is a solution-oriented practice – a departure from the norm of 




Peace journalism is when editors and reporters make choices – of what to report and 
how to report it – that create opportunities for society at large to consider and value 
nonviolent responses to conflict (p.5). 
In their view, it would offer people whom the mass media message is targeted at, and the 
community, options for peace and dialogue among social groups. Ten years after they viewed 
this process as solution-oriented (because of the proactive and reactive responses to 
violence), one of the authors - Lynch (2015) – has not shifted from this standpoint. In a 
separate study, Lynch (2013a) maintained that peace journalism has a ‘solution orientation, 
highlighting peace initiatives and, in the aftermath of violence, efforts to promote resolution, 
reconstruction and reconciliation’ (p. 39).  
The Solutions Journalism Network (SJN) has described solutions journalism as a 
‘rigorous and compelling reporting on responses to social problems’ (Wenzel et al., 2016, p. 
8). Solutions journalists often provide a ‘yes’ response to the following questions which form 
the framework for their practice (Curry & Hammonds, 2014, p. 6):  
• Does the story explain the causes of a social problem? 
• Does the story present an associated response to the problem? 
• Does the story refer to problem solving and how-to details? 
• Is the problem solving process central to the story’s narrative? 
• Does the story present evidence of results linked to the response? 
• Does the story explain the limitations of the response? 
• Does the story contain an insight or teachable lesson? 
• Does the story avoid reading like a puff piece? 
• Does the story draw on sources that have ground-level expertise, not just a 300,000 
foot understanding? 
• Does the story give greater attention to the response than to a leader, innovator, or do- 
gooder? 
Solutions journalism scholarship recognises two brands of journalism – the first being peace 
journalism, and the second, the civic/public journalism which focuses on social problems 
with a view to creating public awareness on the remedies to such problems (Bornstein, 2011; 
Wenzel et al., 2016). But the current research is concerned with how PJ offers solutions to 
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conflict issues. Although some news contents in the 1990s were constructed in order to 
encourage media audiences to fashion out ways of solving social problems, the practice was 
not popular until 2013 when the Solutions Journalism Network (SJN) was inaugurated (Thier, 
2016; Wenzel et al., 2016).  At the time of writing (2016), solutions journalism had begun to 
gain acceptance among scholars in the US as solutions journalism courses had been 
developed and earmarked to run in US universities in the 2015/2016 academic year (Thier, 
2016). This is expected to transcend the US borders in the next couple of years.  
 
4.4 Journalistic Objectivity 
 
A good reporter who is well-steeped in his subject matter and who isn’t out to prove his 
cleverness, but rather is sweating out a detailed understanding of a topic worth exploring, 
will probably develop intelligent opinions that will inform and perhaps be expressed in his 
journalism  
                                                         – Timothy Noah, 1999, cited in Cunningham (2003, p.9). 
Journalism blossomed in the 19th century largely because it was recognised as a practice that 
upheld truth – a reflection of the real world. Journalists believed that they had the moral 
obligation to the society by being non-partisan in their framing of the news to guarantee good 
reporting (Barger & Barney, 2004). They wanted their stories to be trusted and to serve as 
authoritative sources upon which narratives of the real world could evolve.  
In adopting this ‘ideal’ practice which describes the world ‘the way it is’ (Blaagaard, 
2013; Cunningham, 2003; Marken, 2007; Pan & Chan, 2003), they tried to overcome 
partiality by embracing ‘objective’ journalism that could create a sense of transparency  
(Kaplan, 2002; Mindich, 1998; Schiller, 1981; Thorsen, 2008). Objectivity, therefore, became 
a standard embedded in journalism. As the challenges of this standard continue to manifest in 
the routines of journalism, the concept – which is centred on accuracy, fairness, balance, 
impartiality (Hackett & Zhao, 1996) or detachment, non-bias (H. Tumber & Prentoulis, 2003; 
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Ward, 2008) – has been redefined by professionals across all segments of the society 
including journalists and consumers of mass media contents. The definition of objectivity by 
Michael Bugeja is quite concise. He asserts that ‘objectivity is seeing the world as it is, not 
how you wish it were’ (Bugeja, cited in Cunningham, 2003, p. 2). This provides a foundation 
on which the concept is contested. The belief is that the desires and interests of the journalist 
should not prevail in the news narratives in order to earn the trust of the audience. As an 
observer of events involving social groups, the journalist is expected to stand aloof or be 
neutral in reporting the news. 
The urge to embrace objectivity in journalism stemmed from the ‘objective’ empirical 
studies in the natural sciences believed to follow scientific process which often generated 
realistic data – truth (Blaagaard, 2013; Post, 2014). Social scientists envisioned a standard in 
their disciplines that would detach them from the subjects they were studying in order to earn 
credibility. When journalism embedded it in its codes of ethics handbooks in the 1920s with 
the aim of injecting the scientific objectivity (Streckfuss, 1990) that guaranteed ‘factuality, 
non-bias, independence, non-interpretation, neutrality and detachment’ (Ward, 2008, p. 19) , 
it seemed a lofty idea that focused on moral principle. 
Objectivity is the widely accepted standard associated with journalism – the norm 
that has remained fashionable. It is central to this research because many journalists the world 
over believe it is at the heart of journalistic practice (Schudson, 2001; Tong, 2015).  
Cunningham (2003) acknowledges that ‘plenty of good journalists believe it, at least as a 
necessary goal. Objectivity, or the pursuit of it, separates us from the unbridled partisanship 
[....] It helps us make decisions quickly – we are disinterested observers after all – and it 
protects us from the consequences of what we write’ (p.2). The interpretation of journalistic 
objectivity varies from one scholar to another. For example, Tuchman (1972) refers to it as a 
ritual; Boudana (2011) and Ward (2008) say it is a set of practices while  Cunningham 
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(2003), Hackett and Zhao (1996) describe it as a myth. But importantly, the underlying 
consensus is that it is a standard of journalism that requires moral responsibility. 
4.4.1 The ‘trouble’ with objectivity 
In this study, the ensuing debate on journalistic objectivity is examined. Critics of objectivity 
call for a shift from detachment to attachment, objectivity to subjectivity (Blaagaard, 2013; 
Boudana, 2011; Bowman, 2006; Cunningham, 2003; Hackett & Zhao, 1996; Rosen, 1993; 
Streckfuss, 1990; Thorsen, 2008; H. Tumber & Prentoulis, 2003). This body of scholars 
suggests reformulating, rethinking, reconceptualising and redefining objectivity because its 
standard is no longer attainable in contemporary journalistic practice. It argues that those who 
adopted it have sought an escape from their convictions of doubt. They targeted a wide range 
of audience by presenting the two sides of the story even when the truth is said to be 
emanating from one side. Some frontline critics of objectivity (e.g., Greenwald, 2014; Seib, 
2013) have reasoned that the process of traditional gate keeping – which translates in the 
selection of ‘newsworthy’ items that are structured on the inverted pyramid paradigm, is a 
departure from objective to subjective process. The argument follows the logic that if the 
reporters/editors determine who, what, where, why, when and how of a story and place the 
items in their ‘order of relevance’, with the most to the least important appearing in  
descending order, the norm of objectivity is compromised. It nullifies the objective principle 
that emphasises non-bias, non-partisanship, impartiality, fairness, balance, truth, detachment 
and neutrality. Fundamentally, the framing of ‘reality’ is, by design, an exercise that 
demonstrates bias (Seib, 2013) because journalists – being humans and have affiliations with 
family, ethnic or religious group, class or gender – may be influenced by these factors.                                             
Particularly, some critics (e.g., Gaber, 2011; Hackett & Zhao, 1996) have pointed out 
that the pursuit of objectivity has led to reliance on the elite to call the shots as very little is 
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done to investigate these sources.  Dolan (2005) laments that many journalists are blinded by 
objectivity to the extent that they engage in the ‘he said, she said journalism’ in which 
prominent personalities are glorified while the issues surrounding them are not classified 
newsworthy. Dolan implies that journalism demands interpretation of events being reported 
to enhance audience understanding. She argues that it is not enough for a top – bottom news 
narrative which limits the understanding of the events by the audience. In that sense, it is 
recommended that journalists should paint a bigger picture of the events they report, provide 
perspectives and follow up on the issues credited to news sources (Maras, 2013; Seib, 2013); 
a new phase of journalism which the norm of objectivity, in an attempt to achieve balance, 
cannot guarantee. The devotion to objectivity or what Marken (2007, p. 266) calls the ‘norm 
of disinterestedness’ may have been conceived, accepted and adopted, but not attainable 
because it is argued that where ‘balance’ and ‘impartiality’ – the thrusts of objectivity – seem 
to prevail, the journalists’ reports are marred by prejudices. While balance is ‘an equal – or 
inclusive, fair, harmonious – coverage of different identities and concerns of society’, 
impartiality is ‘a detached or factual dealing with contrasting claims, frames, interpretations, 
problem definitions’ (Raeijmaekers & Maeseele, 2015, p. 7).  Thus, studies have suggested a 
shift from ‘objective’ to ‘subjective’ journalism  (see Blaagaard, 2013; Greenwald, 2014) that 
would provide a platform for partisanship. In this new paradigm, the journalists would not 
shy away from explaining circumstances of events and tilting to the path of truth rather than 
covering it under the guise of ‘balancing both sides’ – objectivity. 
Cunningham (2003) insists that journalists only claim to be objective because the 
manner of selecting and presenting the story clearly demonstrates one-sided narrative of what 
constitutes news for the audience. He asks who defines objectivity in the circumstance of 
news framing – where the journalist is the judge who passes a verdict on content and gives 
the impression that what the audience consumes is a ‘balanced’, ‘fair’ and ‘true’ reflection of 
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the event? He believes that since journalists are imperfect beings and have the tendency to be 
influenced by this human frailty, they cannot be objective. Thus, ‘letting them write what 
they know and encouraging them to dig toward some deeper understanding of things is not 
biased, it is essential’ (2003, p.10). Central to this debate is that the limits of objectivity have 
necessitated the reformulation of the concept to allow journalists analyse and interpret the 
news thereby helping the audience to understand its context. 
Furthermore, as Cunningham has explained that human nature is subjective and this 
innate character permeates all human life, journalists of ‘objective’ orientation cannot be 
doing their job outside this realm of nature. Applying this rationale which is opposed to the 
orthodoxy of objectivity, Greenwald (2014) maintains that journalists who uphold this 
principle pretend , no matter the degree of reverence of the rule or restraint, as their reports 
are garnished with ‘facts’ that only serve certain interests – often those who control affairs of 
state or authorities that marginalize the minority. He argues explicitly that: 
                 Every news article is the product of all sorts of highly subjective cultural, 
nationalistic, and political assumptions. And journalism serves one faction’s 
interest or another’s [....] The relevant distinction is not between journalists who 
have opinions and those who have none [...], it is between journalists who 
candidly reveal their opinions and those who conceal them, pretending they have 
none (2014, p.231). 
Like other critics, Greenwald situates journalism in the domain of synthesising ‘truth’ rather 
than presenting ‘both sides’ with the aim of ‘balancing’ the report simply to adopt the 
template of objectivity.  
4.4.2 Emerging brands of journalistic practices beyond objectivity 
Like the embedding strategy in the war on Iraq in which journalists were active participants 
because they worked with the soldiers whom they covered at the warfare, some reporters 
have been entangled in conflict across the world. Embeds were associated with military 
troops but there were other war reporters (outside the troops) whose interests in defending the 
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rights of war victims influenced their coverage (Ruigrok, 2008; Russ-Mohl, 2013). This 
struggle to revolutionise journalism and establish an alternative framework on which 
contemporary practice could thrive continued in the 1990s with the emergence of another 
brand of journalism – journalism of attachment. It evolved because the myth of objectivity 
had been dismissed. 
When former BBC reporter Martin Bell wrote his book, In Harm’s Way – an 
engaging narrative of war reporting reflecting, in particular, the ‘shading of truth’ that 
characterised the coverage of the Bosnian war, he declared: ‘we were hardly main players 
ourselves, but not mere bystanders either. Our role, in the theatre of Bosnian war, was partly 
that of messengers, and partly lamplighters, for we tried to cast some light on those dark 
places’ (Bell, 1996, p. 141). He implied that the journalists had a clear goal; they attached 
themselves to the war they were covering by influencing a military action in favour of the 
victims. In another article titled, ‘TV news: How far should we go?’ Bell sheds light on this 
brand of journalism: 
In place of the dispassionate practices of the past I now believe in what I call 
journalism of attachment. By this I mean a journalism that cares as well as knows; 
that is aware of its responsibilities; and will not stand neutrally between good and 
evil, right and wrong, the victim and the aggressor. This is not to back one side or 
faction or people against another; it is to make the point that we in the press […] do 
not stand apart from the world. We are a part of it (Bell, 1997, p. 8).  
Bell argues that journalism demands morality driven by a high sense of duty that engages the 
reporter in the event he or she is covering. He maintains that in conflict situation, reporters 
should transcend the routine of covering the unfolding hostilities by seeking to identify the 
aggressors and victims and the implications of their actions on the community. Bell’s 
argument is that ‘objective’ reporting deepens conflict; as such, evil doers should be exposed. 
Those who uphold this logic maintain that reporters should be motivated by conscience to 
reduce human suffering. This moral disposition of journalists has its consequence – some of 
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them follow the dictates of the editorial hierarchy and their financiers rather than helping, in 
conscience, to bring succour to the suffering population (British Journalism Review, 2003). 
Editors, on their part, determine whether such conscience-centred reports should be published 
or broadcast. In other words, the traditional gate-keeping process has some degree of 
influence on conscience. 
Like Bell whose journalism of attachment distinctively identifies with victims of 
conflict rather than the aggressors, and which separates good from evil, some scholars have 
argued that journalists have the moral responsibility to expose evil by going beyond ‘what 
has happened’ to forming an opinion that aims at resolving ongoing conflict to minimise the 
suffering of victims. For example, Tait (2011, p. 1221) observes that when human suffering is 
portrayed in the media, it is ‘not only morally acceptable, but a moral imperative’ because the 
attention of media audiences is drawn to trigger public sympathy. Wiesslitz and Ashuri 
(2011) have proposed a ‘moral journalist model’ which rejects the claim describing the 
journalist as a bystander who is detached from the events, but regards him as one who 
‘witnesses the suffering of others with the aim of changing the witness reality’ (p.1039). It 
describes the journalist as a social agent who observes this evil and gives its account to those 
who do not have the knowledge. Shaw’s (2016)  human rights journalism model is another 
alternative which seeks to defend the moral rights of victims of conflict. He argues that 
journalists should not shy away from their obligation of exposing the evil meted out to 
defenceless victims by taking a position in favour of such victims. It means that journalism 
should be defensive of human rights in order to alleviate human suffering. These works 
(Shaw, 2016; Tait, 2011; Wiesslitz & Ashuri, 2011) provocatively define the moral journalist 
as a social agent who testifies about conflict in which right and wrong are distinguished; and, 
if necessary, the culprits are implicated. Thus, it rejects the ‘neutral’ ideology of objective 
journalism which has been consistently dismissed in contemporary discourse (e.g., Stenvall, 
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2014; Wahl-Jorgensen, 2013; Barbie Zelizer, 2015) because despite the recognition by 
supporters of this tradition that attaining objectivity is impossible, they have insisted that 
journalists ‘must try ‘their best’ to achieve the ‘highest possible level’ of it’ (Muñoz-Torres, 
2012, p. 575). 
In this study, a number of brands of journalism which suggest both the objective and 
goal-oriented traditions in conflict research have been discussed. These include  objectivity – 
‘bystanders journalism’ (von Oppen, 2009, p. 6), and subjectivity – which demonstrates that 
‘the ‘self’ of the author has a strong influence on the representation of social reality’ (Harbers 
& Broersma, 2014, p. 643). Others are journalism of attachment – ‘that cares […] and will 
not stand neutrally between good and evil [….]’ (Bell, 1997, p. 8) , and journalism of 
morality that seeks to ‘publicize a reality of evil and suffering’ (Wiesslitz & Ashuri, 2011, p. 
1039). They describe journalistic practices in the context of conflict. 
On the merits of these arguments, this study supports the new thinking that objectivity 
should be redefined as a result of its shortcomings and failure to achieve fairness and balance. 
But the danger which this scholarship portends to journalism is that if journalists become 
‘aggressive analysers and explainers’ of news (Cunningham, 2003, p. 1), or are encouraged to 
‘place ‘what you (they) see’ in a broader context’ (Seib, 2013, p. 6), reporting will also be 
marred by prejudices which will only provide the audience with another perspective of world 
view. This controversy has continued to generate debate among journalism scholars as the 
critics of both traditions (objectivity and non-objectivity) have viewed these principles as 
being manifestly defective in attaining journalistic standard. For example, Gaber (2011, p. 
39), a critic of objectivity asserts that, ‘every attempt by journalists to argue that they are able 
to put aside their own beliefs and feelings and become, or aspire to become, genuinely 
‘objective’ strengthens a dangerous canard’. This implies that such ‘beliefs’ and ‘feelings’ 
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would tamper with the analysis/explanation of the news or the attempt at contextualizing the 
news as argued by Cunningham and Seib.  
Objectivity model has been examined in the context of current research because, like 
elsewhere, it is believed to be the guiding principle of journalistic practices in Nigeria 
(Salawu, 2015a, 2015b). However, other forms of journalism emanating from objectivity 
discourse have been analysed in an attempt to locate the brands that fit into the practices of 
journalists who reported the Jos conflict. 
4.5 The Theory of Mediatisation  
‘Mediatisation’ has gained acceptance in communication studies in the last decade as 
researchers have coined it to describe media influence on society – notwithstanding 
grammatical rule of native English. Research has argued that the adoption of certain terms in 
institutionalised disciplines, such as communication, is necessary to provide a framework for 
solving problems across geo-linguistic boundaries (Couldry & Hepp, 2013). This somewhat 
ambiguous concept – like scientific inventions and the modus operandi of many disciplines – 
places the media at the heart of every human endeavour – culture, politics, economy, religion, 
conflict and so on. It suggests that the ongoing transformations in the world have absorbed 
the media into all aspects of human life in that the global community can no longer exist 
outside the media. Many years ago, the media were believed to perform the role of mediation 
which implied that they disseminated information to their audiences objectively without any 
form of attachment to the events they covered (Gilboa, 2005). They simply conveyed or 
transmitted messages but their involvement in this process of ‘conveyance’ or ‘transmission’ 
was not substantially significant. However, the research community has long passed this 
tradition. Rather than situate mediation at the heart of the communication process, scholars 
are now researching media’s capability of constructing issues and events or how they have 
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infiltrated all domains of the society (Cottle, 2006; Livingstone & Lunt, 2014). Looking 
beyond mediation, therefore, translates to mediatisation.   
 
Mediatisation is not easily defined. This explains the absence of a single definition of 
the concept by scholars (Deacon & Stanyer, 2014; Knoblauch, 2013). It also accounts for the 
current debate in which researchers have moved from analysing the mediating potentials of 
the media that make them channels of communication to explaining the complexities which 
characterise their new influential status of ‘a standalone institution with its own logic’(Nie et 
al., 2014, p. 363).  But fundamentally, there is a common ground on the adoption of this 
concept in the purview of communication research; namely, that the media institutions and 
technologies exert some degree of influence on society which may be responsible for the 
changes that take place in the society (Christensen & Jansson, 2014; Deacon & Stanyer, 
2014, 2015; Falasca, 2014; Hepp, 2013; Hepp et al., 2015; Hepp & Krotz, 2014; Knoblauch, 
2013; Krotz, 2014; Landerer, 2013; Livingstone & Lunt, 2014; Lundby, 2014). Going further 
to demonstrate this consensus,  Falasca (2014, p. 583), for instance, refers to mediatisation as 
‘a process in society where media have become increasingly influential’, that is, ‘the process 
of increasing dependency of society upon media and its logic’(Nie et al., 2014, p. 363). 
Again, the issue of media logic expands the debate in mediatisation research. This is because 
there is a growing concern that the society is shaped by media logic and standards, rather than 
other actors and institutions – a notion which has been criticised as there may be other 
variables that lead to change (Deacon & Stanyer, 2014, 2015).  
Mediatisation has a German origin – mediatisierung  (Couldry & Hepp, 2013; 
Livingstone, 2009; Nie et al., 2014) that emphasised the dominance of the media in nearly all 
aspects of life during the 20th century (Hepp, 2013). With evolving media technologies, 
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individuals and institutions have increasingly relied on the media because media offerings 
have become convenient, affordable and dynamic (Nie et al., 2014). There is a robust critique 
of this standpoint – not in terms of the failure to recognise that the media are change agents 
but ‘this media-centric narrative of change’ would require ‘full appreciation of joint 
sufficiency’  (Deacon & Stanyer, 2014, p. 1041). The ‘joint sufficiency’, in their view, 
encompasses the media and other variables that transmit change. Thus, Hepp (2013) 
introduces two traditions of mediatisation – the institutionalist and social constructivist 
traditions. He argues that ‘while the ‘institutionalist tradition’ has until recently mainly been 
interested in traditional mass media, whose influence is described as ‘media logic’, the ‘social 
construtivist tradition’ is more interested in everyday communication practices – especially 
related to digital media and personal communication – and focuses on changing 
communicative construction of culture and society’ (2013, p. 616). This categorization has 
implications. The institutionalist tradition places the media in the capacity of influential 
behaviour driven by ‘media logic’. In the social constructivist tradition, other actors in the 
digital media space contribute to the change.  
There are key thinkers of differing orientations in mediatisation research that are 
crucial to this research. First, Deacon and Stanyer (2014) articulate the view that agents of 
transformation should include non-media actors and that the notion of ‘powerful media 
influence’ advanced in mediatisation literature has been exaggerated (Hepp, 2013; Hjarvard, 
2008, 2009; Stromback & Esser, 2014). The common catchphrases of these authors include 
the ability of the media to ‘exert an influence on culture and society’ (2013, p.615), or ‘how 
media exert influence’ (2014, p.4) and how they ‘mould the way people communicate, act 
and sustain relationships with each other’ (2009, p.175). 
Although Deacon and Stanyer (2014) do not dismiss this potential influence of the 
media, they argue that different causes of change, other than media agents, could be 
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identified. In their view, the notion of mediatisation suggests ‘an account of change that is 
driven by narrow set of causal variables – the mass media and/or ICTs – which are seen as 
powerful enough on their own to bring about change overtime […], there is a tendency to see 
these agents of mediatisation as both necessary and sufficient to bring about change in all 
contexts’ (Deacon & Stanyer, 2014, p. 1041). These scholars insist that since media logic is 
not sufficient to change communicative practice, mediatisation, in which media logic is 
embedded, is incapable of providing a theoretical framework for advancing research on 
cultural changes influenced by the media. In their defence emerging from a critique by Hepp 
et al. (2015), Deacon and Stanyer (2015, p. 655) admit that media ‘role and power may be 
changing in profound and predictable ways’, however, they criticize ‘the rise of a concept 
(mediatisation – the researcher’s emphasis) that claims to provide a ‘holistic’ theoretical 
framework for explaining and analysing such processes’. But whether the argument by 
Deacon and Stanyer is substantive or lacks merit, the mediatisation debate demonstrates 
commitment to scholarship.  
As researchers engage in this debate, and as they gain understanding about media 
involvement in everyday life, there may be consensus in literature on mediatisation research. 
As explained by Knoblauch (2013, p. 297), ‘the notion of mediatisation lacks certainly an 
exact definition […,] there is quite substantial disagreement as to what the word may mean in 
theoretical terms and in terms of empirical research. The disagreement is not so much routed 
in the lack of definition or ambiguity of definition but rather in the lack of a theoretical 
framework in which the two most divergent aspects of its meaning can be understood’. 
Despite the uncertainty emerging from mediatisation discourse with scholars giving this field 
of research labels such as ‘word/term’ (Knoblauch, 2013) or ‘concept’  (Christensen & 
Jansson, 2014; Deacon & Stanyer, 2014; Falasca, 2014; Nie et al., 2014), it is introduced as a 
theory by  Hepp et al. (2015) who argue that ‘the research field’s understanding of 
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mediatisation has matured, theoretically as well as empirically’ (p.315). They maintain that 
there is a growing conceptual and empirical research which explains mediatisation processes 
in different aspects of life - politics, religion, culture, education, commerce, even conflict. 
Thus, it has helped to provide the framework for several empirical studies in mediatisation 
and the efforts at theorizing this field of research are ‘still in the early stages’ (2015, p. 315).  
These scholars argue that if much is being done in this regard; that is, current effort at 
providing conceptual and empirical support to mediatisation research, the emerging ‘concept’ 
or ‘term’ should assume the status of a theory. In their own rights as contributors to the 
debate, they dismiss the claim by Deacon and Stanyer (2014, 2015) and, perhaps, their 
supporters that ‘mediatisation theory’ focuses on media role as sole agents of change. Hepp et 
al. (2015) maintain that Deacon and Stanyer’s critique of mediatisation research has an 
erroneous bearing, as the authors are blind to the fact that ‘media-centric’ and ‘media-
centred’ approaches to understanding mediatisation discourse have differing meanings. As a 
result of this perceived misconception, they offer this explanation: 
Being ‘media-centric’ is a one-sided approach to understanding the underplay 
between media communications, culture and society, whereas being ‘media-centred’ 
involves a holistic understanding of the various intersecting social forces at the same 
time as we allow ourselves to have a particular perspective and emphasize on the role 
of the media in these processes (Hepp et al., 2015, p. 316). 
Hepp et al’s (2015) view suggests that while the media are at the heart of all human 
endeavours, the holistic understanding of these endeavours and how media logic is embedded 
in them underscores this ‘media-centred’ pathway. Perhaps, if this is recognised in 
mediatisation debate, then the standalone (media-centric) notion which excludes the 
intersection of social forces would not be contemplated. Also, while recognising the 
influential position the media occupy in everyday life as documented in communication 
literature (Deacon & Stanyer, 2014) which implies that news about ‘everyday life’ – politics, 
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religion, health etc., is shaped by journalists (Falasca, 2014), it provides a theoretical 
foundation for interdisciplinary engagement in mediatisation since the process involves 
analysis at different levels (Stromback, 2011). Going a step further, scholars from all 
disciplines will find this evolving theory useful for examining media impact on such 
disciplines. This is why Hepp et al. (2015) have recommended that ‘what we can bring to 
such an interdisciplinary dialogue is our experience as experts in researching processes of 
mediated communication (‘mediation’) and their transforming potential (‘mediatisation’)’ 
(p.316). 
Drawing on Hepp et al’s (2015) mediatisation theory, as they recall that 
‘mediatisation has emerged as an important concept and theoretical framework for 
considering the interplay between media, culture and society’ (2015, p.314), the current 
research explores how the intermittent Jos ethnic and religious conflict has been ‘mediatized’. 
First, it recognises the media logic that could influence conflict reporting in the area which 
may involve journalists’ strategies of constructing news frames that reveal the interests they 
serve. Second, it considers other factors such as cumulative exposure to violence, ethnic or 
religious alliance etc., (various intersecting social forces) that may influence journalistic 
practices in that context. Conflict, like any social, political or religious activity in which 
human beings are participants, attracts the media which, in turn, employ their logic to report 
such conflict.  Hoskins and O'Loughlin (2015, p. 1323) have pointed out that war and conflict 
‘are reliant or dependent upon media and, consequently, have been transformed to 
increasingly follow media logics; they are mediatized’. The narratives of the Jos conflict 
presumably conform to media logic and the reality about the conflict which this logic 
produces, most probably, constitutes the reality of the audience. Cottle (2006) has theorised 
mediatised conflict for an engaged discourse drawing attention to how the media have been 
implicated in conflict. He notes: 
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The media are capable of enacting and performing conflicts as well as reporting and 
representing them; that is to say, they are ‘doing something’ over and above 
disseminating ideas, images and information. The media’s relationship to conflict, 
therefore, is often not best thought of in terms of ‘reflection’ or even ‘representation’ 
given its more active performative involvement and constitutive role within them 
(2006, p.9). 
The metaphor of enactment described above suggests the way in which the media portray 
conflict – their active construction of the narratives of conflict because, rather than provide 
the accounts, they align with social groups thereby ‘doing something’ beyond mediation.  
Hoskins and O'Loughlin (2015) have admitted that the media are active participants in 
conflict because their contents tend to ‘emerge from nowhere’ (p.1320) which often leads to 
one social group pitching camp against the other.  
One of Cottle’s (2006) three paradigms that explain mediatised conflict in the context 
of current research is manufacturing consent. It emphasises the overarching political 
economy orientation being examined by media and communication scholars. It holds that the 
media have vested interests in the subjects they cover, as a result of which the views of the 
political class dominate their contents while other social groups are marginalised. This, 
unarguably, is a departure from the perceived tradition of the media as an institution that 
serves common interests. Herman and Chomsky (1988) have postulated a propaganda model 
which aptly illustrates this scenario. They argue that the media resort to propaganda when 
they carry out their functions in the society where wealth and conflict of class interest take 
the centre stage. They explain the model as follows: 
A propaganda model focuses on this inequality of wealth and power and its multilevel 
effects on mass media interests and choices. It traces the routes by which money and 
power are able to filter out the news to print, marginalize dissent, and allow the 
government and dominant private interests to get their messages across to the public 
(1988, p.2). 
Herman and Chomsky identify five ‘news filters’ that propel the propaganda model. 
Although this model explains US media report on ‘worthy’ and ‘unworthy’ victims of war  
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(Cottle, 2006), it implies that news materials pass through filters that are structured on 
political economy. First, the large media companies that withstand the harsh economic reality 
of society are profit driven, owned and controlled by those with enormous wealth. Second, 
the media rely on advertising revenues generated from wealthy individuals and their 
corporations. Third, the media rely on the information provided by the political class and the 
business community. Fourth, the ‘flak’ regime, which the authors describe as negative 
comments on media contents (e.g., phone calls, law suits, emails, petitions), largely emerges 
from people with great financial influence. Fifth, their analogy of ‘anticommunism as a 
national religion and control mechanism’ which was geared toward weakening the ruling 
class during communism established the struggle against ‘the enemy’. In that sense, the 
media helped in enacting this ideology. These filters define news worthy contents of the 
media because ‘the news material must pass through successful filters, leaving only the 
cleansed residue fit to print’ (Herman & Chomsky, 1988, p. 2). 
Apparently, the theory of mediatised conflict, in which the propaganda model is 
embedded, will enhance researchers’ understanding about how media ‘do things’ with 
conflict. This theory provides logical support to the current research in which journalists’ 
reporting of violence in Jos is examined. The  prolonged ethnic and religious conflicts border 
on the struggle for identity involving the perceived ‘indigenes’ and ‘settlers’ as well as 
‘Christians’ and ‘Muslims’. The study is also premised on Cottle’s (2006, p. 168) prediction 
that ‘when media representations enter into fields of conflict structured by deep-seated 
inequalities and entrenched identities, they can become inextricably fused within them, 
exacerbating intensities and contributing to destructive impacts’ This demonstrates the 
mediatisation logic advanced in this research. 
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4.6 News Framing Theory 
Framing is at the heart of this study. It describes the journalistic process of communicating 
perspectives of reality to consumers of news and making them think and act in a particular 
way. Its classification as a theory  (e.g., D’Angelo & Kuypers, 2010; Scheufele, 1999), an 
approach (e.g., Pan & Kosicki, 1993) or a paradigm (e.g.,Entman, 1993) is a subject of debate 
in communication studies.  
The narratives of events are constructed or coded to serve a purpose beginning with 
selection from a plurality of ‘newsworthy’ elements. This demonstrates the alteration of a 
portion of the perceived reality which gives way to the manipulation of the audience.  For 
example, at the heart of a large body of research on media coverage of international affairs is 
the creation of a negative worldview about the developing world, especially the Middle East 
and Africa that have long been thought to have high conflict prevalence in the last decades 
(Wallensteen & Sollenberg, 1996, 1997). As a result of this ‘predominantly negative 
coverage of the developing world’ which demonstrates that ‘international news coverage is 
Western-centric’ (Beaudoin & Thorson, 2002, p. 48), the Western media are said to be 
flawed. The reason for this criticism is that the media of the West consistently choose to 
emphasise the negative and exclude the positive elements of the news on developing world 
which, in turn, influence the perceptions of their audiences. The choice to include and 
exclude the variety of media contents constitutes framing. 
 
Research has recognised that Walter Lippmann’s postulation about the power of the 
media to ‘put pictures in our heads’ provided the platform for scholarship on news framing 
(Lippmann, 1922, p. 3). Further studies (e.g., D’Angelo & Kuypers, 2010) have maintained 
that framing is the most utilised theory and ‘a rapidly growing area of study in 
communication studies’ (2010, p.1), even though it has been criticised for lack of 
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standardised system of analysis which is synonymous with science research (Giles, 2010). A 
common definition of news framing which runs through a number of studies is by Robert 
Entman (see, for example, Archetti, 2007; Brewer & Gross, 2010; R. Coleman, 2010; 
Houston, Pfefferbaum, & Rosenholtz, 2012; Kuypers, 2010; Scheufele, 1999). It states that 
framing is to ‘select some aspects of a perceived reality and make them more salient in a 
communication text, in such a way to provide a particular problem definition, causal 
interpretation, moral evaluation, and/or treatment recommendation’ (Entman, 1993, p. 52). 
The theory of framing was developed by social psychologist Goffman who discovered 
that public perception about social reality is influenced by media frames (Falkheimer & 
Olsson, 2015). This explanation is taken a step further. For example, two media sociologists 
have described this news making process as a ‘strategic action involving a conscious choice 
of words and other devices to achieve desired effects’ (Vincze, 2014, p. 568); ‘rhetorical and 
stylistic choices, reliably identified in news, that offer the interpretations of the topics treated 
and are a consistent part of the news environment’ (Cappella & Jamieson, 1997, pp. 39-40). 
Their views echo the view of Yoon and Gwangho (2002, p. 92) that ‘news making is not 
random but patterned activities of reporters’, which implies that frames ‘are conscious or 
unconscious sets of journalists’ perceived opinions on issues’ (Hong, 2013, p. 89). In this 
sense, the construction of reality rests squarely with the journalists whose actions define their 
audiences’ perceptions of reality.  
 
As noted at the outset about Western media frames ‘against’ the developing world, 
journalists tend to be economical with truth; as such, news making process is flawed because 
it does not reflect reality of the world as it is often presumed (Hong, 2013; Schudson, 2011). 
Their work entails making ‘hard’ decisions by choosing from a plethora of ideas or facts 
about the conditions of the world and assembling them in a certain manner that they become 
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the narratives of the real world (Phillips, 2015; M. S. Reed, 2016; S. K. Reed & Pease, 2017). 
This inclusion and exclusion strategy employed by the journalists is geared toward making 
their audiences to think in a particular way – their own way. Scholars of decision making 
discipline tend to agree that good decisions evolve from logic and objectivity whereas bad 
ones are as a result of the decision maker’s emotional involvement (Frame, 2013). However, 
Frame is opposed to this tradition and proposes a new paradigm that transcends logic and 
objectivity. He argues that detaching oneself from decision making is itself illogical because 
of the human and social elements of the process.  
 
This argument seems relevant to news framing discourse which provides a theoretical 
base for the current research. The reason is that in journalism what constitutes news is a 
matter of choice by the news makers. Journalists prioritise alternatives by constructing texts 
‘suitable’ for their audiences which their decisions have gained. They immerse themselves in 
the events they cover  (Seib, 2013) - a paradigm shift from traditional good decision making. 
News, therefore, ‘is not a mirror of reality. It is a representation of the world, and all 
representations are selective’ (Schudson, 2011, p. 26). This statement echoes the argument by 
Greenwald (2014). This explanation lies at the heart of Frame’s (2013) idea of decision 
making. He rejects the rationality of decision making or its objective coloration. As 
journalists’ news construction emerges from decision making – a social activity, Frame 
argues that such cannot be detached from human influence because people are naturally 
selfish.  
 
This view supports the reasoning that journalists make framing decisions based on 
human subjectivity (Ewart & McLean, 2015; Fuller, 2010; Giles, 2010). The assertion is 
further hinged on the reality that ‘people [journalists –the researcher’s emphasis] have 
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personal perspectives and agendas and possess dramatic variations and capabilities. Quite 
often a decision is made by one set of people, executed by another set, is beneficial to yet 
another set, and is resisted by still another set’ (Frame, 2013, p. 8).  For journalists, the 
inclusion and exclusion criteria upon which news frames are coded suggest that their actions 
are well thought-out, and aimed at achieving a goal. They weigh the prevailing options and 
decide on the portions that meet these criteria – what they want their audiences to know at a 
given time and the impact it would have on them. They determine news tastes by formulating 
words, catchphrases and sentences that advertise the news to make it meaningful to their 
audiences. This journalistic tradition is synonymous with Frame’s (2013) concept of making 
mindful decisions that are deliberate and consequential. For him, anyone who engages in this 
decision making has an aim – in the context of current research – it is to pacify media 
audiences. 
Frames could be ‘issue-specific’ – coded in specific contexts – or ‘generic’ which 
deals with general contexts (Hong, 2013). Research has revealed that many media frames 
focus on general issues and are representative of journalists’ reality which influences the 
perceptions of the audience (Shahin, 2015) . Shahin discovers that in these frames, human 
actors are identified as being responsible for the actions in which they are mentioned. In other 
words, the frames emphasise identification of subjects. For example, in his study of the 
coverage of terrorism, victims and aggressors were identified in the frames, ascribing to his 
Blame Frame and Explain Frame paradigm. The criteria postulated above are significant to 
the current research. Drawing from Shahin’s (2015) model, the strategies of journalists who 
reported the Jos conflict and the reports about the conflict have been examined in terms of 
who is responsible for the conflict (Blame Frame) and what the journalists or their reports 
conveyed (Explain Frame).  
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These conditions under which current investigation is undertaken point to framing 
analysis. As Giles and Shaw (2009)  have noted that analysing media frames entails 
identifying the story and its character, examining its narrative form and language use as well 
as making generalisations and final analysis, the strategies of reporting the conflict have been 
established through this process. The authors, here, have articulated Shahin’s (2015) Blame 
Frame – Explain Frame model in great detail. Meanings of the different frames have been 
derived from the components embedded in this model. The strategies of reporting (how 
journalists construct news) and the function of that construction (the role each 
communication plays in a given context) have been analysed in this study.  In that sense, this 
research suggests that the perceived reality of the violent conflict in Jos emerges from the 
framing of news by journalists who reported the conflict. How they assembled and reported 
‘facts’ about the conflict to their audiences constitutes framing. Thus, the theory is utilised in 
this research to test this journalistic process. 
4.7 Conclusion 
This research has been analysed from three theoretical lenses: Objectivity, mediatisation and 
news framing. Journalistic objectivity evolved as a standard that ensures transparency, 
fairness, impartiality and balance in reporting (Hackett & Zhao, 1996; Kaplan, 2002; 
Thorsen, 2008). The criticisms that followed this standard have been articulated in this 
chapter as a growing body of research has claimed that it is unattainable (Blaagaard, 2013; 
Greenwald, 2014; H. Tumber & Prentoulis, 2003).  
Despite its limitations, objectivity is recognised by many Nigerian journalists as their 
guiding principle (Salawu, 2015a) – thereby necessitating its adoption in this study aimed at 
understanding how it is translated in the conflict frame building process. While the current 
study invites scholars to rethink journalistic objectivity, it has argued that non-objective 
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reporting – that is, when journalists become ‘aggressive analysers and explainers’ of news 
(Cunningham, 2003, p. 1) - would be influenced by parochialism.  
The mediatisation theory describes media involvement in all facets of society beyond 
the role of mediation – which includes the appropriation of media logic (Cottle, 2006; 
Livingstone & Lunt, 2014). In this chapter, media logics and journalistic strategies suggest 
the unique ways by which conflict narratives are constructed to shape the attitudes of the 
audience. In the context of this research, mediatisation is understood as ‘the process of 
increasing dependency of society upon media and its logic’ (Nie et al., 2014, p. 363). This 
has been explained to demonstrate the influential media system in conflict reporting and how 
its logic defines reality. The third theory – News framing – which is the process of 
constructing reality that entails the inclusion and exclusion of frames has provided the 
framework upon which these choices are made. The three models used in this research have 
helped explain journalistic strategies in the Jos conflict. However, the Frustration-Aggression 
theory and Peace Journalism theory have been introduced to explain the nature of violent 
conflict and the role of the peace journalist.  
The discussion on these theories precedes the chapter on methodology which 
describes how the research was conducted. Thus, the theories underpinning the research have 
been explained in this chapter because the choice of methodology (in Chapter 5) is influenced 










Research Design, Process and Methodology 
 
5.1 Introduction 
This chapter discusses the methodological paradigms on which scientific enquiries are 
conducted to advance knowledge. It describes the research process, outlines the criteria for 
analysing data obtained from 26 interview participants and 30 editions of Nigeria’s Punch 
and Daily Trust newspapers.   
5.2 Research Process 
The study adopted the metaphor of ‘Research Onion’ developed by Saunders et al. (2012) to 
describe the research process. It follows the logic that the research journey begins with the 
observation of human behaviour in the natural environment (Crano, Brewer, & Lac, 2015; 
Wadsworth, 2011) which defines philosophies, approaches, methodological choices, 
strategies, time horizon and techniques of data collection. Each of these elements depicts a 
layer of an onion fused into another layer – the interrelationship that drives the research 
process. Saunders and colleagues believe that a coherent research process demonstrates the 
‘onion’ paradigm shown in Figure 5.1. In this sense, the current study describes the research 




Figure 5: 1 The Research 'onion' process developed by Saunders, Lewis, and Thornhill, (2011), cited in 
Saunders, et al, 2012). 
5.3 Research Philosophy 
The first layer of the research ‘onion’ presents the philosophical worldview that guides this 
study. Crucial as philosophical context is to social research, it is often ignored in many 
studies (Creswell, 2014). Easterby-Smith, Thorpe, and Lowe (2002) have argued that studies 
that are conducted through philosophical lenses have quality. A growing body of research 
(e.g., Blaikie, 2010; Crotty, 1998; May, 2011) states that the orientation about the world 
which is brought to a study provides perspectives that influence the research. The 
understanding of these perspectives, according to May, ‘is important for the actual practice of 
research to enable the practitioner to understand the influence of wider social forces on the 
process of research, as well as the arguments and the assumptions that are made about the 
world [....] (2011, p.7). 
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Research philosophy broadly describes the understanding about the nature of the 
world which guides any enquiry on three levels: epistemology, ontology and axiology 
(Pathirage et al., 2008). The first level explains the researcher’s knowledge about reality and 
the assumptions about the way and manner of acquiring knowledge (how reality is perceived 
and how knowledge is acquired). The second – ontology - is the understanding of, and 
assumptions about knowledge (what knowledge is) and the third level – axiology -explains 
the values attached to knowledge (value system). In their analysis, Pathirage et al. (2008) 
argued that these components of the research philosophy influence the choice of research 
approach and methods (see also, May, 2011). Each component is explored in this study to 
demonstrate the appropriateness of the research approach and methods selection process. 
The epistemological component is twofold: positivism and social constructivism, and 
both schools of thought uphold contrasting reasoning (Blaikie, 2010; Crotty, 1998; Easterby-
Smith et al., 2002; Mackenzie, 2011). Positivism exists in the natural sciences and follows the 
logic that every enquiry ‘should be measured through objective measures, where observer 
must be independent from what is being observed’ (Pathirage et al., 2008, p. 6). It believes 
that meaning resides in objects outside the human mind. On the other hand, social 
constructivism believes that the perception of worldview is socially constructed and that 
people attach meaning to things around them. In other words, social constructivism is 
opposed to the logic that reality is independent of human construction. 
Based on the contrasting implications of these epistemological stances which have the 
potential to influence the current research approach and methods (Dresch, Lacerda, & 
Antunes, 2015; Pathirage et al., 2008), these explanations have sufficed. First, the current 
research examined participants’ strategies of reporting violent conflict aimed at obtaining 
information based on their perceptions of reality and their linguistic choices. Rather than 
perceive reality ‘objectively’ or ‘outside-the-mind’ (positivism/objectivism), they constructed 
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meaning about their experiences of reporting conflict (social constructivism/subjectivism). 
Second, the deductive research approach, which moves from theory to data is synonymous 
with positivism while the inductive approach, which transits from data to theory –as adopted 
in the current study because of the meanings people [journalists] attached to an event 
[conflict], is grounded in social constructivism (Gill & Johnson, 2002).  
From the foregoing, while positivism is appropriate for scientific enquiry which 
upholds objective measurement, the epistemology orientation of this research is drawn on 
social constructivism in which interpretivism (the theoretical perspective of constructivism 
outlined in the first layer of the research ‘onion’) is embedded (Creswell, 2014; Robson, 
2011). Constructivism, as Gunter (2000) has described, is interpretative social science in that 
communication which may include conversation of text is examined ‘to discover embedded 
meaning’ (Neuman,1994, cited in Gunter, 2000, p. 5). The ‘common sense’ each 
communication conveys is not necessarily common once it is subjected to interpretation. 
Thus, constructivist researchers have become interested in ‘making sense of the subjective 
and socially constructed meanings expressed about the phenomenon being studied’ (Saunders 
et al., 2012, p. 163). Furthermore, ‘meaning does not exist in its own right; it is constructed 
by human beings as they interact and engage in interpretation’ (Robson, 2011, p. 24).  
This logic suggests that the world is structured by human beings who make meaning 
of it. It means individuals interpret their reality independently as they experience phenomena 
– the premise which nullifies the principle of journalistic objectivity. Thus, it is a philosophy 
which describes the conditions of qualitative enquiry (Creswell, 2014; Denzin & Lincoln, 
2005; Saunders et al., 2012).  Its ideals – although interpreted in a variety of ways (Avenier, 
2010), and on the basis of professional relevance – presuppose that ‘individuals develop 
subjective meanings of their experiences – meanings directed toward certain objects and 
things [....] The goal of the research is to rely as much as possible on the participants’ views 
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of the situation being studied’ (Creswell, 2014, p. 8). Constructivist researchers believe that 
discussions and interactions with participants – when samples are carefully selected – could 
generate relevant data on the subject being studied because the participants are well informed 
and the researcher would be able to interpret their views based on individual characteristics 
and disposition (Crotty, 1998; Mertens, 2010). 
Crotty (1998, pp. 42-43) enumerates some Constructivist assumptions: 
• Meaning is not discovered but constructed. Meaning does not inhere in the object 
merely waiting for someone to come upon. 
• Meanings are constructed by human beings as they engage with the world they are 
interpreting. 
• They may be pregnant with the potential meaning, but actual meaning emerges only 
when consciousness engages with them. 
 
Constructivism suggests that human beings interact on issues that affect them and when they 
are studied, they can express themselves about their experiences, anxieties, fears and hopes 
which the researcher would find useful. This study is located in constructivism as the 
journalists were interviewed in their work environment on how their news narratives on the 
Jos conflict were being framed. The researcher, in this approach, chose to ‘focus on the 
specific contexts in which people (journalists – italics researcher’s addition for the purpose of 
explanation) live and work in order to understand the historical and cultural settings of the 
participants’ (Creswell, 2014, p. 8). The process enabled the researcher to derive meaning of 
the situation; how contents of the news were being constructed in the circumstance of conflict 
and how the journalists were, themselves, influenced by the outcomes of their actions. The 
researcher observed the severity of their encounters as they took turns to recall this ‘witness 
to violence’ which, perhaps, produced the news narratives that invariably formed the 




Another component of the research philosophy – ontology – presents two assumptions 
commonly referred to as realist and idealist (Johnson & Duberley, 2000; Pathirage et al., 
2008), or realism and pragmatism [shown in the first ‘onion’ layer]  (Saunders et al., 2012). 
Realists believe that their worldview is structured on objective orientation which aligns with 
positivism. For idealists, people hold various views about the things they observe or share, 
implying that reality is subjective – a key feature of social constructivism. In this sense, 
realists may be classified as positivists while idealists are social constructivists. Axiology, as 
a third component, describes reality as value-free or value laden (Pathirage et al., 2008). The 
research that is value free adopts the objective paradigm while a value-laden study takes into 
account that reality is shaped by people’s experiences and beliefs. Thus, the implication is 
that value free researchers share the positivists’ ‘common sense’ as opposed to value laden 
researchers who support social constructivism. 
These philosophical stances have shown that the researcher’s goal to examine 
strategies of reporting conflict – which involved journalists’ shared experiences and the 
stories they reported in two selected Nigerian newspapers – could lead to theory inductive 
research. 
5.4 Research Approach 
There are two research approaches: deductive and inductive research (Creswell, 2014; Gray, 
2014; Pathirage et al., 2008; Saunders et al., 2012). Both are at variance (see Table 3). Dresch 
et al. (2015) have made this distinction; ‘from the inductivist’s perspective […], the 
researcher starts building conjectures that can contribute both to the solution to the problem 
and to supporting new theories [….] The deductive method starts from the proposition of 
laws and theories that encompass some given phenomenon, and knowledge is built from the 
definition of the premises and the analysis of the relationships between them’ (pp.17-18).  In 
deductive research, a theory is identified in literature through analysis and synthesising of 
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concepts. The researcher, primarily, develops a theoretical paradigm upon which a 
phenomenon is tested to establish its validity through observation. This sequence – theory, 
method, data, findings  (Pathirage et al., 2008) , is a rigid procedure which entails the 
application of a set of rules by researchers, especially in the natural sciences (Collis & 
Hussey, 2003), to explain phenomena. The theory comes first (evaluating assertions or set of 
hypotheses in existing literature); a method is adopted for data gathering and analysis then the 
results are drawn (findings).  
In contrast, the inductive research is grounded in observation and the shared 
understanding of phenomena – the process which produces theory. The orientation of this 
research is drawn on method, data, findings and potential theory. The theory of induction 
suggests that methods are chosen, data are obtained and analysed, and then theories are 
generated from the findings. The researcher has a reasonably open mind to deal with the data 
which may generate a theory. However, the debate between researchers of deductive and 
inductive orientations, as argued by Pathirage et al. (2008, p. 4), lies in the logic that 
deductive researchers are ‘enslaved normal scientists’ – who deduce hypotheses from 
theories, while inductive researchers are ‘paradigm – breaking revolutionaries’ – whose 
approach to social enquiry is predicated on observation and experience. 
The current research is concerned with inductive reasoning which proceeds from data 
to theory as opposed to deductive approach. It is best suited for qualitative studies (Creswell, 
2014; Gray, 2014; Saunders et al., 2012). It involves design of methods for collecting and 






Moving from theory to data Moving from data to theory 
Common with natural sciences Common with social sciences 
A highly structured approach Flexible structure to permit changes 
Explain causal relationships between 
variables 
Understanding of meanings humans attach to 
events 
Select samples of sufficient size to generalize 
conclusions 
Less concern with the need to generalize 
 
Table 5. 1 Major differences between deductive and inductive research approaches (Adopted and modified 
from Saunders et al, 2007, cited in Pathirage, et al, 2008). 
5.5 Research Strategy 
The selection of the research strategy was based on the inductive logic that emphasises data 
gathering and analysis from which theory on the subject is generated. Strategy, in Robson’s 
view, is a broad theoretical orientation that seeks answers to the research questions. In this 
‘broad’ sense, the current research strategy is Phenomenology which is suitable for 
understanding phenomena – factors that influenced the practices of journalists reporting 
conflict. Since this effort was aimed at setting in motion a mechanism of exploring the 
somewhat hidden ‘factors that influenced their practices’, in order that phenomena may 
‘speak for themselves, unadulterated by our preconceptions’, it gained ‘new meaning, fuller 
meaning or renewed meaning’ (Gray, 2014, p. 24). This means that phenomenology 
examines critically human experiences that are overlooked or taken for granted yet they are 
significant in real life (Finlay, 2012; Song, 2017). In phenomenology, researchers ascribe 
value to ‘ordinary’ situations that could be interpreted ‘beyond the ordinary’ in order that 
people may understand their world. 
Phenomenological enquiry emerged from Philosophy and Psychology (Creswell, 
2014) to offer the investigator the opportunity of interpreting the ‘facts’ generated from the 
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participants who have experienced a phenomenon. The relevance of this strategy to the 
current research is further explained by O'Leary (2014, pp. 138-139): 
• Phenomenological studies are highly dependent on individuals. Individuals, either 
through interviews or their cultural products – what they write, paint, etc., are used to 
draw out the experience of a particular phenomenon [....] 
• Phenomenological studies are also highly dependent on constructs. Constructs such as 
displacement, victory or power are central to the phenomenological experience being 
explored [....] 
• Phenomena, which are the focus of phenomenology, actually sit at the interaction of 
people and objects, and centre on an individual’s lived experience of these objects. 
Rather than ask what causes X, or what is X, phenomenology explores the experience 
of X. In other words, phenomenology is the study of the experience of the relationship 
between the individual and the object [....] 
These explanations by O’Leary provided the criteria for analysing journalists’ strategies of 
reporting the Jos conflict. The ‘individuals’ described in the first criterion were the conflict 
journalists – the interview participants – who shared their experiences on ‘what they write’ 
(wrote) about, and how they reported the conflict in an interaction with the researcher. In the 
context of current research, O’Leary’s description of constructs and ‘exploring the experience 
of X’, in the second and third criteria, included the fears, anxieties, motivations and concerns 
of the journalists resulting from witness to violence. 
5.6 Time Horizon  
The choice of time in every study, that is, the period covering the investigation, is paramount. 
Pettigrew (1990, p. 271) writes that ‘time sets a frame of reference for what changes are seen 
and how these changes are explained’. This study was designed on the longitudinal research 
that aimed at investigating new working practices and attitudes of groups or individuals over 
a period of time. It examined journalistic practices during the intermittent conflict in Jos 
which had come to be known as the ‘Jos crisis’. The years covered were 2001, 2008 and 2010 
(because these were periods believed to be the most violent in the history of Jos) (Taft & 
Haken, 2015, pp. 63-64). The 2001 civil unrest was said to be the first organised armed 
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conflict in the city (Nyam & Ayuba, 2016). This was to understand the changes in the 
attitudes of the journalists – their strategies of reporting the conflict. As there had been 
renewed hostilities, it was likely that the journalists’ patterns of news framing may have 
changed. Thus, the capacity of the longitudinal research to investigate change and 
development (Pettigrew, 1990; Saunders et al., 2012) was recognised by the researcher. As 
Gray (2014) has pointed out, ‘a longitudinal study of working practices might examine 
changes in staff (journalists’ – italics researcher’s emphasis) attitudes over time, looking at 
attitudes before the introduction of new working practices, and then at various periods 
afterwards’ (p, 35). Given this assumption that journalists’ exposure to violence may have 
influenced their sense of neutrality – a departure from fairly responsible reporting to new 
forms of the craft – the researcher examined these changes over the three years’ conflict. 
5.7 Research Questions 
In the light of current effort to build on existing knowledge, this study poses the       following 
research questions: 
RQ 1.What factors influenced the practices of journalists who reported the violent conflict in 
Jos? 
RQ 2.How have journalists’ experiences of violence affected their framing of news on the 
conflict? 
RQ 3.What strategies did journalists employ in reporting the Jos conflict? 
The three research questions emerged from the topic under study to generate data 
relevant for achieving the research objectives (Creswell, 2014; Goldberg & Allen, 2015). RQ 
1 examines the factors which influence the practices of journalists reporting conflict in Jos. 
The ‘experiences of violence’ and the ‘framing of news’ coded in RQ 2 describe journalists’ 
exposure to violent conflict and how it has influenced their coverage and writing of news 
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about the conflict. It includes bearing witness to conflict, constructing frames or news 
representations about the warring groups and their implications, their adoption of the standard 
of objectivity in news framing and the circumstances that could lead to compromise of the 
practice. RQ 3 is a build-up on the preceding questions, but it borders on the sensibility of the 
journalists’ ‘crafts’ which are understood in this study as the strategies of reporting conflict. 
It means that journalists employ different strategies to engage with their audiences. This 
research question was posed to gain an understanding of these journalistic strategies in the 
Jos conflict and the interests they have tended to serve. 
5.8 Methodology 
Given that research methods are drawn on philosophical stances earlier discussed in this 
chapter (see, M. M. Davies & Mosdell, 2006; May, 2011; Pathirage et al., 2008), Gill and 
Johnson (2002) have reasoned that nomothetic (realist) or ideographic (idealist) ontology – 
component of the philosophy – should be the basis for choice of methods. They explained 
that nomothetic approach is synonymous with quantitative (objective) data processing that is 
typical of the natural sciences while ideographic approach is concerned with generating and 
analysing qualitative (subjective) data employed in social sciences and the liberal arts. The 
nomothetic approach involves deductive and structured data analysis while the ideographic 
ontology is inductive and allows researchers to analyse subjective accounts that provide 
perspectives of reality. The understanding that research philosophy is crucial to determining 
methods helps the researcher ‘to take a more informed decision about the research design 
[…,] understand which design will work and crucially […,] adapt research designs according 





Table 5. 2 Nomothetic and Ideographic methods (Adopted and modified from Gill and Johnson, 2002; 
Pathirage, et al, 2008) 
Nomothetic methods emphasise Ideographic methods emphasise 
Deduction Induction 
Explanation via analysis of causal 
relationship 
Explanation of subjective meaning systems 
Generation and use of quantitative data Generation and use of qualitative data 
Testing hypothesis Commitment to research in everyday settings 
Highly structured Minimum structure 
Experiments          Surveys          Case study          Action Research              Ethnography 
Methodological continuum 
 
To align with epistemological, ontological and axiological philosophy on which methods are 
formed (positivism/social constructivism, realist/idealist, and value-free/value laden), this 
study employed the qualitative research method. This was because the researcher recognised 
that the orientations of social constructivism, idealist and value laden research as well as 
inductive approach are synonymous with qualitative studies. 
The qualitative research method was employed in this study to gain an understanding about 
the strategies utilised by conflict journalists to produce news narratives of the conflict and the 
factors that could influence these strategies. This was a necessary first step because ‘the way 
journalists define their relationship with society helps them give meaning to their work and 
enables them to justify and emphasise the importance of their work to themselves and others’ 
(Thomas Hanitzsch & Vos, 2017, p. 1). The qualitative research method was also used to 
examine the reports of the conflict in two Nigerian newspapers to know how these strategies 
manifested in both publications and the ideologies they portrayed or the interests they served. 
While research is generally concerned with obtaining and analysing data in a systematic way 
to contribute to knowledge (Crano et al., 2015; Guthrie, 2010; Wadsworth, 2011), the 
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qualitative approach, in particular, provides an overarching framework for understanding 
human phenomena in their contexts (Twining, Heller, Nussbaum, & Tsai, 2017). It 
interrogates human behaviour extensively to gain an understanding of such behaviour in the 
natural environment. Qualitative studies are developing and increasingly attracting scholars 
as the numerous methods with which they are identified – interviews, observations, focus 
groups etc. – have helped to create a richer description and interpretation of data (Shank et 
al., 2014). Polit and Beck (2010, p. 1452) have explained that the ‘the goal of most 
qualitative studies is to provide a rich, contextualized understanding of human experience 
through the intensive study of particular cases’. Shin et al. (2009) have also maintained that 
these methods ‘help us understand what a world means to us by adopting and utilizing certain 
perspectives’ (p.850).  Robson (2011, p. 19) explicitly outlines some features of qualitative 
study: 
Accounts and findings are presented verbally or in other non-numerical form. 
There is little or no use of numerical data or statistical analysis; an inductive 
logic is used starting with data collection from which theoretical ideas and 
concepts emerge; a focus on meanings; contexts are seen as important […,] 
situations are described from the perspective of those involved; the design of 
the research emerges as the research is carried out and is flexible throughout 
the whole process; the existence and importance of the values of researchers 
and others involved is accepted; objectivity is not valued. It is seen as 
distancing the researcher from participants […,] generalizability of findings is 
not a major concern […,] social world is viewed as a creation of the people 
involved. 
Drawing from these reservoirs of thought, the qualitative research entails an interpretation 
that would make the ‘understanding of what a world means’ a reality; that is, providing 
meaning of a phenomenon. The study of the strategies of journalists reporting the conflict in 
Jos was believed to be ‘intensive’ and a ‘particular case’ that would entail the sharing of 
‘experience’ (see, Polit & Beck, 2010). Thus, interviews – as method of qualitative data 
collection – were conducted among the conflict journalists in their environment. But while 
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this data gathering method was considered appropriate for the current research because of its 
ability to probe the experiences of the participants, the Qualitative Content Analysis was 
employed to understand the direction of news texts through their linguistic choices. This 
followed the logic that information shared does not necessarily convey its meaning (Waite, 
2013). Thus, it required further investigation; in this case, the QCA to measure and interpret 
the use of language in the narratives of the conflict. 
Qualitative research has been employed to study social phenomena in various 
disciplines including journalism. In this investigation, a number of strategies for data 
collection and interpretation were adopted to achieve the research objectives. Based upon the 
phenomenon under investigation – assessing the strategies of journalists reporting conflict – 
this research paradigm guaranteed investigator involvement both as the data collection 
instrument and the interpreter of data (Creswell, 2014; Tetnowski & Damico, 2001). The 
strength of qualitative research is its ability to study phenomena in particular contexts 
(Silverman, 2007; Twining et al., 2017). As such, this study was conducted in the journalists’ 
natural settings in order to obtain and analyse the data within that context. Furthermore, the 
qualitative methodology required a detailed interpretation of journalistic strategies to 
understand the extent of framing from participants’ perspective (interview) and their output 
(texts). 
Qualitative studies have postulated that the qualitative methodology is appropriate for 
investigating social phenomena (Goldberg & Allen, 2015; Harding, 2013; Lofland, Snow, 
Anderson, & Lofland, 2006; Miles, Huberman, & Saldana, 2014; Patton, 2015; Polit & Beck, 
2010; Saldana, 2015; Shin et al., 2009; Twining et al., 2017; Waite, 2013). They outlined, 
among other advantages, that qualitative data help to establish how and why phenomena 
occur; its approach is useful for describing complex phenomena; can help people to 
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understand local situations and conditions; make meaning of a situation. While these 
strengths of qualitative methodology are not contested, its weaknesses are also obvious. 
Tetnowski and Damico (2001) argue that it is labour intensive because data collection and 
analysis are time consuming. Another fundamental challenge is that the results could be 
influenced by the researcher’s personal biases. They believe that the entire process may be 
marred by prejudices emerging from researcher’s beliefs. Apart from this open-to- abuse 
tendency, the results may not be generalized as they deal with phenomena in particular 
contexts. 
It was understood, however, that research methodologies are designed to answer 
questions that prompted certain investigations. Their applications vary; as such, each is 
characterised by strengths and weaknesses (Frost et al., 2010; Goldberg & Allen, 2015; 
Waite, 2013). These studies suggest that researchers must understand their research 
objectives and choose methodologies that systematically respond to their research questions. 
For example, Shin et al. (2009, p. 850), in their review of research methods and strategies, 
have argued that ‘even studies that present analysis methodology appear to differ somewhat 
in analysis procedures and description styles, depending on the author(s) of the studies, which 
brings serious confusion and frustration to [...] researchers’. Also, Crotty (1998, p. 12) 
claimed that ‘any of the theoretical perspectives could make use of any of the methodologies, 
and any of the methodologies could make use of any of the methods’. Since this controversy 
apparently constitutes much research debates, the consideration should be the rationale for 
the choice of research methodologies.  
Notwithstanding the laborious process of data collection and analysis, the tendency of 
manipulation of data through under and/or over interpretation by the researcher, this study 
relied on the participants’ antecedents and what their strategies of reporting conflict had 
produced. It means that the qualitative approach could generate authentic data about the 
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journalists’ strategies of news framing and the meaning they conveyed. Although there is no 
consensus on how qualitative research should be adopted and analysed because of its flexible 
meaning making (J. Lee, 2013), the researcher endeavoured to translate the data transparently 
and examine the conceptual variables that described the phenomena under investigation. 
5.8.1 Data Collection Method: Interviews 
Interviews typically involve interaction between investigators of social phenomena and the 
people believed to be knowledgeable about what is being studied. The investigators 
(interviewers) attempt to probe the experiences of those they are studying (interviewees) by 
asking them questions about their behaviours, beliefs, attitudes, conditions, anxieties and 
general wellbeing relating to the subjects under investigation. This process entails ‘face-to-
face exchanges in which one person, the interviewer, attempts to acquire information from 
and gain understanding of another person, the interviewee’ (Rowley, 2012b, p. 260). 
Although this effort has helped researchers to obtain ‘facts’ about what people genuinely feel 
given that the information they share is first-hand (O'Leary, 2014; Seidman, 2013), the 
validity of that information is being contested by a growing body of scholars (e.g., Creswell, 
2014; Robson, 2011). For instance, its lack of standardization has been criticised because it is 
susceptible to bias (Robson, 2011).  
Notwithstanding this argument which tends to undermine the interview process, its 
elements, as O'Leary (2014) outlines, are useful in obtaining first-hand information from 
conflict journalists about their strategies of news framing and the factors that have influenced 
their reporting of the protracted ethno-religious conflict in Jos. For instance, O'Leary (2014, 
p. 217) states that interviews: 
• allow you to develop rapport and trust; 
• provide you with rich, in-depth qualitative data; 
• allow for non-verbal as well as verbal data; 
• are flexible enough to allow you to explore tangents; 
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• are structured enough to generate standardized, quantifiable data. 
  
Aware of journalists’ intense workload – reporting conflict in great detail especially in high 
risk areas and the pressure of deadline as well as the desire to ‘break the news’ – the 
flexibility of the interview process which guarantees rich data and establishes trust between 
the investigator and participants was considered relevant to this research. The researcher 
conducted an In-depth Individual Interview (III) by asking the participants questions about 
their experiences of the conflict which included their attitudes, beliefs and the way in which 
they made decisions on the narratives of the conflict. Some scholars (e.g.,Gray, 2014; May, 
2011; Seidman, 2013; Silverman, 2007, 2013) have explained that interviews provide rich 
insights into people’s attitudes, beliefs and experiences. This is because the interviewees have 
the competence to speak, and are often knowledgeable about the subject being investigated 
(Baker & Gilbride, 2015; Gubrium & Holstein, 2012).  
 
In order that the participants may be stimulated by a series of open questions which 
were followed up by probing questions to enable them answer in their own view and freely 
provide contexts, the semi-structured interview was employed. May (2011, pp. 134-135) 
explains that this type of interview enables the investigator to ‘probe beyond the answers and 
thus enter into dialogue with the interviewee [...]’, and it ‘represents an opening up of the 
interview method to an understanding of how interviewees generate and deploy meaning in 
social life’. With this latitude to ‘answer in their own view’, the participants found this 
method appropriate to explain phenomena in great detail, and to illustrate the contexts – the 
elements which were lacking in the structured (standardized) interview method. 
 
For the purpose of this study, a series of steps were taken by the researcher to avoid 
failure and demonstrate his competence in conducting the interview. This involved planning 
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– having a grasp of the subject under investigation, constructing the interview themes and 
getting the participants informed about the research and their involvement as well as 
identifying appropriate location for the interview (Miles et al., 2014; Morris, 2015; Saunders 
et al., 2012).The  researcher’s experience of reporting of the Jos conflict and his knowledge 
of the context enabled him to identify the participants whose views about the conflict and 
their reporting experiences would constitute the research data. For example, the researcher 
was aware that in Jos environment, the ‘yes’ response by an interview participant may only 
indicate that he/she understands the question which may not mean consent. The implication is 
that the verbal and nonverbal cues that emerged from the interviews were interpreted in that 
context. 
In the second step, interview themes were carefully constructed which constituted the 
interview guide (interview questions). In addition, relevant information about the research as 
contained in the participant information sheet, participant/organisation consent forms were 
supplied to enable the participants prepare for the interview and provide relevant data for the 
research. In the end, consideration was given to the environment where the interviews were 
conducted. Since Jos was the work environment of the participants, because they lived in the 
area and were constantly reporting the conflict, they could share their experiences and explain 
the strategies they employed in their news framing. The appropriate locations included the 
participants’ offices, houses (as some journalists preferred) and the Nigerian Union of 
Journalists Press Centre (where they often assembled to share information about their work).  
5.8.1.1 Interviewing professional peers 
The researcher was not unaware that having worked as a journalist during the early years of 
the conflict before he ascended to academia – from newsroom to classroom within the Jos 
area – his relationship with professional peers whom he would interview could pose a 
challenge to the process. In such circumstance, as some researchers have reported (see, for 
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example, Coar & Sim, 2006; Lofland et al., 2006; Platt, 1981; Seidman, 2013), a number of 
the interview participants may not freely reveal information about themselves or their 
colleagues whom the researcher may have come in contact with. This is largely because this 
category of respondents tends to feel embarrassed once there is a continuing relationship with 
the researcher. Some may tactically decline to respond to important questions that could have 
formed the desired data if they were answered. For instance, in their study, Coar and Sim 
(2006) revealed that ‘familiarity of the ‘insider’ with the area of study may dominate the 
process of data analysis and prevent novel insights [….] Informants who feel they are being 
judged will be particularly cautious in conversations with a fellow professional’ (p. 254). 
While these factors may potentially influence the interview data, substantial evidence 
which supports the rationale for conducting interviews with peers in this study sufficed. 
Granted that the researcher’s field experience as a journalist could imply an inclusion of the 
shared community membership, his identity – as captured in the ethical approval documents 
(see appendices) – was, first, that of a researcher in an academic environment desirous of 
contributing to knowledge. The understanding about this mission by peers that the journalist-
cum-researcher was supported by the academic community to undertake the study apparently 
led to participants’ endorsement and freedom to express. Second, the assurance to uphold 
academic honour by ensuring that their confidentiality was secure, in addition to data 
protection, the researcher was able to obtain data in the right quality and form. Third, where 
the researcher’s professional identity reigned supreme over scholarly status, the participants 
were favourably disposed to the study because ‘a fellow professional can harness prior 
understanding of the topic and the professional culture, and may be able to pursue issues 
more thoroughly by virtue of not having to seek explanations of basic terminology and 
concepts’ (Coar & Sim, 2006, p. 254). In this argument by Coar and Sim (2006), they noted  
that the participants would recognise that they ‘can enlist feelings of professional cooperation 
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and solidarity to encourage disclosure, and gain informants’ confidence more readily than a 
non-practitioner’ (2006, p. 254). 
Holliday (2016) argues that when the participants recognise the researcher as a 
member of their professional or cultural community they would provide the information the 
researcher needs because he/she is one of them.  He illustrates this by drawing experience 
from previous study (Herrera, 1992, cited in Holliday, 2016) which relied on the researcher’s 
relationship with the participants for data collection. Herrera had noted: ‘It was only after I 
started using culturally acceptable ways of gaining access as a friend of a friend of a friend 
that I was able to dispel the fears of the teachers and begin to be accepted as one of them’ 
(cited in Holliday, 2016, p. 160). This suggests that the researcher lacked the cooperation of 
those she was studying until she took on an informal role. Holliday (2016) rationalises this 
researcher-participant relationship when he points out that 
The researcher’s experience of her relations with people in the research setting is an 
important source of data, not just within the ongoing process of improving her own 
relations, but to increase understanding of the culture generally, thus contributing to 
the whole investigation (p. 165).  
 
The analogy of ‘a friend of a friend’ or, in the context of current study, the researcher’s 
relations with professional colleagues – journalists, was a great opportunity to explore the 
numerous strategies of reporting violent conflict. From the foregoing, the researcher took into 
account that his professional background may not allow him to establish some degree of 
distance from his study. He therefore, took advantage of the ‘researcher-colleague’ 
relationship to understand the context from which he served as a journalist by noting all 
verbal and nonverbal cues that emerged from the interviews. In the end, there was an 
intriguing outcome as the participants’ notion about the researcher being ‘one-of-us’ brought 




5.8.1.2 Interview Participants 
There were 7 commercial radio and television stations in Jos, and about 16 national, regional, 
local and faith-based newspapers/magazines were in circulation at the time of this research 
(Gobum, 2015). A purposive sampling procedure was used to select conflict journalists from 
these segments of the media who had reported the most violent conflict which occurred in Jos 
in 2001, 2008 and 2010.  
The purposive sampling technique, or as O'Leary (2014, p. 190) termed ‘hand-
picked sampling’, which ‘involves the selection of a sample in mind’, is mainly used in 
qualitative research (Harding, 2013; Teddlie & Yu, 2007) to ensure that samples considered 
to be relevant to a study are included with the aim of achieving the research objective. 
Teddlie and Yu (2007) have recommended that in critical scenario, which could be 
understood in the context of current study – that is, the sensitivity of news framing of conflict 
involving religious and ethnic groups, purposive sampling would be appropriate.  
This approach was aimed at obtaining data from those who had knowledge 
about the three years’ conflict to enable the researcher understand its antecedents, 
and to know if there were changes in reporting of the conflict, and whether these 
changes had influenced the way they worked. For most national and regional 
newspapers, their correspondents did not meet these criteria as many of them had 
been posted to Jos out of Jos in the last five years (after the 2010 conflict). Based on 
the journalists’ profile assessment, 14 reporters were picked (7 comprised of radio 
and TV journalists who represented Jos-based broadcast stations; 7 national, local, 
faith-based and ‘ethnic-oriented’ papers that met the selection criteria).  
The researcher selected the national and regional journalists from a list of leading 
newspapers in the country believed to be ‘credible’ and having a wider reach (African Media 
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Development Initiative, 2005). All the 7 broadcast journalists had been involved in conflict 
reporting since 2001 and, incidentally, the broadcast media have the largest audiences in Jos 
because radio and television are affordable and accessible (Gobum, 2015). The popular faith-
based magazines/newspapers were being circulated among the rival Christian and Muslim 
communities. Other participants included 8 editors (distributed across 4 print media, 3 
broadcast media and 1 News Agency of Nigeria); and 4 television cameramen (2 each from 
private and public television stations) whose camera lenses had captured images of the 
conflict. The total number of participants was 26. Each participant had a coded prefix of IP 
(Interview Participant), followed by his/her number (e.g. IP 1, IP 2, IP 3).   
Based on audience perception among residents of some cities in Nigeria that the 
media have been polarised along ethnic and religious lines (J. D. Galadima, 2010; A. O. 
Musa & Ferguson, 2013), 4 journalists whose media were believed to serve these interests 
were identified. They include IP 3 –IEG, IP 8 – FBC, IP 12 – HFS and IP 20 – FBM. The 
researcher had a purpose for which they were selected – that journalists who understood the 
Jos terrain, its conflict actors and media representations were included in the study. The 
interview questions were the same because they applied to their role of news framing and 
gatekeeping. The researcher envisaged that the responses would vary in terms of their 
experiences and strategies. 
At the outset, the researcher recognised that conflict reporting is a specialised news 
beat and, in most organisations in Nigeria, only a reporter is assigned to the beat (except in 
the case where there are sporadic attacks and reporters of other beats are assigned to cover). 
Therefore, only conflict journalists of the selected media organisations were studied. The 
editors’ selection was necessitated by the desire of the researcher to know how the framing of 
news by the reporters was further shaped in the newsroom. Although editors are the final gate 
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keepers in the news production process, the strategy of news construction resulting from 
internal and/or external influences - the focus of this research - rests on the reporters. The 
television cameramen are those who capture the images at warfare but, in this study, they 
constituted a minority group because reporters often do their job unless such reporters are 
unable to combine their functions with those of the cameramen. 
Table 5. 3 Interview participants’ distribution 
PARTICIPANT CODE DESIGNATION MEDIUM 
    
Participant 1 IP 1 Reporter Newspaper 
Participant 2 IP 2 Reporter Newspaper 
Participant 3 IP 3 – IEG Reporter Newspaper 
Participant 4 IP 4 Editor Radio/TV 
Participant 5 IP 5 Reporter Newspaper 
Participant 6 IP 6 Reporter Television 
Participant 7 IP 7 Editor Newspaper 
Participant 8 IP 8 – FBC Editor Magazine/Newspaper 
Participant 9 IP 9 Reporter Newspaper 
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IE G – Indigenous Ethnic   
 Groups   
FBC – Faith-Based 
Christian 
HFS – Hausa-Fulani 
Settlers 
FBM – Faith-Based 
Muslim 
 
5.8.1.3 Data Analysis 
Given that data obtained from interviews are generally complex because the researcher is 
confronted with a volume of ‘facts’ from which he selects relevant portions for analysis, this 
study explored the steps recommended by Rowley (2012b, p. 268) in analysing the data. 
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These include: organising the data set; getting acquainted with the data; classifying, coding 
and interpreting data; presenting and writing up the data.  
• Organising the data set 
The transcripts of IP 1- IP26 (Interview Participant 1-26) were organised in sequence. In it, 
the participants’ responses to a specific interview question were assembled in one place to 
understand the context of their shared experiences. In other words, all answers to the 
questions were distinguished by their themes and the coded names of participants ascribed to 
such answers. The essence of identifying the participants was to establish the source and 
present their thoughts in logical manner. 
• Getting acquainted with the data 
The researcher read the data thoroughly to understand the underlying themes that would build 
the body of research. It entailed an evaluation or post-interview review that enabled the 
researcher to note details of the observations that emerged from the exercise (Creswell, 2014; 
Fowler, 2009; Gray, 2014). It was done immediately after the conduct of interview because 
the experience was fresh. This helped in the actual interpretation of the data and guaranteed 
its quality. It is believed in qualitative studies that when the researcher becomes familiar with 
the data and observes salient points that would form the research report, the easier it would 
become to interpret the data (Seidman, 2013; Silverman, 2013). Each interview question was 
a key theme for analysis and the answers ascribed to it were studied to recognise the 
strategies of news framing that were common and the ones that were peculiar to them. 
• Classifying, coding and interpreting the data 
The researcher classified the codes (texts which describe the conditions of the interview 
questions) and explained them in the context of the themes. The researcher envisaged that 
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more sub-themes would emerge from existing literature if the participants’ responses were 
not adequately captured in the main themes. Rowley (2012b, p. 268) describes themes as ‘the 
main areas in which insights have been generated, and will eventually become the basis of the 
narrative in the findings chapter’. In the current research, the themes which were generated 
from the interview questions included: factors that influenced the practices of journalists 
reporting conflict; sources of pressure faced by them; their experiences of reporting conflict; 
how these experiences influenced their work; whether their news framing shaped the 
perceptions of their audiences; how they reported conflict involving ‘indigenes’ and ‘settlers’ 
or Muslims and Christians; how they applied journalistic standard of objectivity in their news 
coverage of conflict; how their work helped to deescalate violence or promote peace building 
initiatives; whether media owners influenced their work, and the level of training they 
attained to engage in journalism. 
After the themes and codes had been drawn, the texts that contained similar themes 
in the interviews were compared to gain an understanding about the participants’ experiences 
of the conflict. The interpretation was done under the main themes as the findings were 
reported. The findings included subjects about which the participants had a common ground 
and their divergent views about the phenomena.  
• Presenting and writing up the data 
The report was written in descriptive form based on the recorded data and observations 
during the interview – careful listening, gestures of participants and their general disposition 
–and the interpretation of the findings by the researcher. Where applicable, the researcher 
used the NVivo software to produce Word Cloud and Word Tree, and other diagrams to 
illustrate the findings (Rowley, 2012). Rather than use the quotations as excerpts, the report 
discussed the themes of the interview in sequence, under each research question, and 
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supported them with relevant quotations to establish actuality and attain credibility. The 
researcher recognised that substantial part of an author’s work should not to be used in the 
form of quotations as that would interfere with the researcher’s originality (Gray, 2014). 
Some photographs of objects taken during the interviews (e.g., the Nigerian Union of 
Journalists Press Centre) were used to supplement the data. 
5.8.2 Data Collection Method: Qualitative Content Analysis 
A number of research designs have been employed in quantitative, qualitative and mixed 
methods studies. Robson (2011) has classified these components as fixed, flexible and multi-
strategy designs which include, among others, experiments and surveys, ethnographic studies 
and focus groups, the quantitative-qualitative incompatibility studies etc. As most of these 
studies are numerically defined which accounts for their adoption in the natural sciences, the 
flexible designs provide a platform for interpretation of coded information. As such, ‘the 
researcher must adopt and conceptualise the research method to the specific investigations to 
be conducted’ (Dresch et al., 2015, p. 27). 
While many techniques of data gathering are utilised in social science and 
interdisciplinary studies (e.g., interviews as used previously), Content Analysis mainly exists 
in media research to examine mass media messages and derive meaning from them  
(Krippendorff, 1989; Lombard, Snyder-Duch, & Bracken, 2002). Its adoption is determined 
by the nature of the research problem, theory and the purpose for which it is designed (Hsieh 
& Shannon, 2005). To achieve the current research objective, the Qualitative Content 
Analysis (QCA) was used to understand the contextual meaning of newspaper reports and 
special features on the conflict that may not be quite obvious. In other words, it focused on 
the content of newspapers. Ogunyemi (2012) explains that content is an important element of 
journalistic process and it is influenced by a number of factors. He notes: 
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Content is the end product of journalistic endeavours. It is the outcome of journalistic 
functions such as newsgathering, news processing and gatekeeping on the one hand; 
and of the application of professional values such as objectivity, news values and 
ethics on the other. Despite the fact that media organisations, irrespective of size and 
orientation, replicate these functions and the fact that journalists speak of similar 
values, there is a wide variation in content. The reason for this could be attributed to 
organisational culture and the social systems within which they operate (p.105).  
 
As argued above that ‘journalists speak of similar values’ – implying that they share a 
common notion about what they should do (e.g., achieving balance, fairness and impartiality) 
– the data on this component emerged from interviews conducted among the journalists. The 
QCA examined the ‘variation in content […] attributed to organisational culture and social 
systems’ to discover how the journalists’ professional values and practices impact on content. 
Therefore, analysing the newspaper content provided insights into the writer’s mind because 
the actual message coded in the text was revealed thereby giving it a new meaning. It implies 
that every communication requires some form of interpretation to establish its essence. As  
Denscombe (2010, p. 282) has noted that ‘the text carries some clues about a deeper rooted 
and possibly unintentional message that is actually being communicated’, it required a critical 
examination of some sort to understand its meaning. In this sense, the current research – apart 
from employing interview method to gain knowledge about journalists’ strategies of 
reporting conflict – focused on the ‘actual’ meaning of the reports and special features 
published in two Nigerian newspapers: The Punch and Daily Trust. It was not enough to 
conduct interviews that would provide first-hand knowledge about their experiences of the 
conflict; it also required understanding the perspectives about what they had produced. This 
combined strategy of ‘learning’ (interviews) and ‘seeing’ (analysing text) is recommended by  
Schreier (2012, p. 4) who has argued that ‘if you have conducted interviews [...], you will 
probably use QCA to decide what your participants have said’. The process was aimed at 
understanding the message beyond its literal meaning because the description of any 
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information, if examined within a context, may carry with it something weightier than it 
would appear.  
A body of research (e.g., Hsieh & Shannon, 2005; Van Dijk, 2012; Weber, 1990) has 
explained that in dealing with QCA, the characteristics of the language of communication 
must be examined to aid the grasp of the context. In this study, this linguistic analysis focused 
on content and form of the Punch and Daily Trust newspapers. Schreier (2012, p. 19) makes 
this distinction: ‘an analysis of content would be about what is being said, whereas an 
analysis of form would be about how something is being said’. This approach enabled the 
researcher to gain knowledge about the manifest content (what is understood at a glance) and 
its ‘other’ meaning (what is not immediately noticed) to understand how the strategies or 
tactics of reporting the conflict by journalists played out. Like previous studies (e.g., George, 
1959) that examined wartime propaganda which entailed an analysis of strategy, the current 
research takes into account the context in which the narratives of the Jos conflict have been 
portrayed. In other words, the strategies used in the framing of the news about the conflict 
cannot be detected at a glance until the text is analysed and interpreted in order to derive its 
connotative meaning – the focus of the QCA. 
While literature on the Jos conflict establishes that journalists’ bias manifests in their 
reports  (J. D. Galadima, 2010; Rasaq, 2012), how this is demonstrated largely depends on 
the interpretation of what constitutes bias. Schreier (2012) recommends that when handling 
meaning that is embedded, such as the current investigation, the researcher should adopt the 
Qualitative Content Analysis because it is appropriate for descriptive and interpretative 
purposes. 
5.8.2.1 Content Category 
 
The study considered language use in examining the contents of the newspapers which 
potentially defined the meaning that the readers attributed to the reports. This use of language 
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was mainly to identify news values in the conflict narratives (Bednarek & Caple, 2014), 
especially the negative aspects which tended to portray some social groups as aggressors.  
There were two dimensions to this analysis: the use of language that expressed the ‘obvious’ 
and the other that revealed the ‘hidden’ elements. Hsieh and Shannon’s coinage of ‘explicit 
communication’ and ‘inferred communication’ (2005, p. 1278) to describe the former and the 
latter was adopted in this research to establish what was ‘obvious’ and that which was 
‘hidden’. This underlying assessment variable helped to explain how journalists’ news 
construction was trivialized or tilted towards charting a cause with a tendency to incite or 
instigate one warring group against the other. Language use was also essential in 
understanding the ‘hidden’ meaning of the writers of the newspaper texts – reporters, editors, 
features writers – whose reports/ commentaries were believed to have excluded minority 
groups and classified them as aggressors (Olofsson, 2011). The basis for this content 
classification was that the linguistic alternatives for constructing reality and words could have 
been formed to achieve certain goals (U. Bello, 2014). 
5.8.2.2 Units of Analysis 
The units of analysis are the elements that are counted by the researcher. They make up the 
body of the text identified by their themes. This research examined news stories (including 
headlines and leads) and features as these constituted ‘news’; newspaper editorials, news and 
commentaries dedicated to the conflict. Other contents of the newspapers such as 
advertisements, opinions, letter to editor, opinion polls, etc., were not included because they 
expressed personal views. 
5.8.2.3  Samples 
The researcher used purposive sampling technique to select 10 editions (5 for each 
newspaper) per year across 5 successive days of the week that carried ‘breaking news’ on the 
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same conflict. This was to ensure a comparative assessment of framing to establish the 
direction of the stories by both newspapers. The years covered were 2001, 2008 and 2010 
because these were periods believed to be the most violent in the history of Jos (Taft & 
Haken, 2015, pp. 63-64). In all, there were 30 editions of the Punch and Daily Trust. 
The Punch and Daily Trust newspapers were selected because a comparative research 
on the news framing of Jos conflict by both publications is non-existent despite their 
seemingly high readership and regional clouts. The Punch represents the dominant southern 
press, or what is generally regarded as the ‘Lagos-Ibadan axis’ (Ralph Afolabi Akinfeleye, 
1985, 2003; Duyile, 1987), while Daily Trust is the ‘voice of the north’ (African Media 
Development Initiative, 2005; A. O. Musa & Ferguson, 2013). Both publications have 
dominated Nigeria’s newspaper industry at different levels. The Punch is not only popular in 
the south where it is located but it has been rated as the country’s most widely read 
newspaper (African Media Development Initiative, 2005, p. 25), with a daily circulation of 
approximately 60,000 to 80,000; and 381, 000 website readers who visit its website monthly 
(Olutokun & Seteolu, 2001; Domain Tools, 2012, cited in Zeng & Akinro, 2013, p. 198). 
The Daily Trust has the largest readership in the north (African Media Development 
Initiative, 2005) – circulating 11,672 copies daily (A. O. Musa & Ferguson, 2013). Although 
its circulation is regional, it is the only strong voice of the region that ‘has increased religious 
coverage of previously neglected ethnic groups [...], helping to break the concentration of 
newspapers in what is derisively referred to as the ‘Lagos-Ibadan axis’’ (African Media 
Development Initiative, 2005, p. 27). Based on the locations of both newspapers – Punch in 
the south (where Christians are dominant) and Daily Trust in the north (a predominantly 
Muslim region), they were assumed to align with the Christian ‘indigenes’ and Muslim 
‘settlers’ of Jos in their identity struggle. 
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The Punch newspaper was established as a limited liability company on March 17, 
1973. The company, known as Punch Nigeria Limited, began its operations with the launch 
of the Sunday Punch which was followed by the introduction of Daily Punch on November 1, 
1976. Both publications contained sensational reports that were said to reflect the Nigerian 
society. Its main goal was to ensure freedom of expression and equal opportunities for all 
Nigerians irrespective of religious, ethnic and political leanings. 
 It was founded by Chief Olu Aboderin, who originated from Ibadan, Oyo State, in 
south-western Nigeria. The newspaper witnessed rapid expansion over the years and has 
attracted wide readership across the country making it one of Nigeria’s leading newspapers 
(African Media Development Initiative, 2005, p. 25). Although it has attained some degree of 
integrity as demonstrated by the high patronage, it is one of the newspapers located in the 
Lagos – Ibadan south-western region believed to be serving the interests of the Christian 
south  (J. D. Galadima, 2010; E. Ojo, 2003; Okidu, 2011). For instance, the major 
gatekeepers in the organisation (e.g Adeyeye Joseph – editor/executive director and Azubuike 
Ishiekwene – managing director/ editor- in-chief) are drawn from the southern region, and 
profess Christianity; as such, they are likely to influence the contents of the newspaper. 
Therefore, in this study, the Punch represents the ‘South-Western Christian’ newspaper.    
The Daily Trust is owned by Media Trust, a limited liability company in Nigeria. The 
publication which made its debut with Weekly Trust in 1998 emerged to give a voice to the 
‘oppressed’ northern Hausa Fulani Muslims who soon realised that there existed a southern-
northern media dichotomy which almost relegated them to the background (A. O. Musa & 
Ferguson, 2013; E. Ojo, 2003). Also, as a strategy to consolidate on its gains of establishing a 
‘northern voice’ (African Media Development Initiative, 2005; J. D. Galadima, 2010), and to 
compete with the south- western press, the Media Trust group introduced Daily Trust in 
January 2001. It had set out its vision to earn a world class media status that would be trusted 
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by all and sundry. However, its composition of a seven- member board of directors and an 
eight-member management/editorial team (e.g., Abdul Mumini Bello and Kabiru Yusuf – 
chairman and editor-in-chief), who are all northern Hausa Fulani Muslims, except Onah Iduh, 
has demonstrated the newspaper’s northern/Islamic agenda as opposed by the south-western 
media. It is a newspaper that has become very popular among, mostly, the northern elites and 
a significant number of the nation’s population because of its perceived credibility. Thus, 
these ‘credible’ south-western and northern newspapers (see appendices 8 and 9) have 
aroused the researcher’s interest towards understanding their approaches to news framing on 
the ethno-religious conflict in Jos.                                                                             
5.8.2.4 Coding the Data 
 
The coding of data is drawn on the Summative Content Analysis (SCA), one of the three 
approaches to QCA developed by Hsieh and Shannon (2005). The three paradigms have 
distinctive application procedures aimed at interpreting text data. In the conventional 
approach, the content categories emerge from data during the analysis. The directed content 
analysis is undertaken by examining a relevant theory upon which a coding scheme is 












Table 5. 4 Major Coding Differences among Three Approaches to Content Analysis 
 
Type of Content Analysis 
 
Study Starts With 
Timing of Defining 
Codes or Keywords 






















Codes are defined 








and during data 
analysis 
 
Codes are derived 
from data 
 
Codes are derived 




derived from interest 
of researcher or 
review of literature 
 
Source: Hsieh & Shannon, 2005.  Qualitative Health Research, 15(9), p.1286. 
 
The Summative Content Analysis enables the researcher to identify and count key words or 
themes in the text and examine their usage to understand the contextual meaning of the text. 
Thus, the analysis ‘goes beyond mere word counts to include latent content analysis [...] the 
process of interpretation of content’ (Hsieh & Shannon, 2005, pp. 1283-1284; Lombard et al., 
2002). It explores the functions of words in the body of text or how words are used in a 
certain context. For example, the use of the word ‘extremist’ in any report on the Jos conflict 
was interpreted by the content analyst as a person prepared to ‘do anything’ in defence of 
religion, even by means of violence. The word, when identified in a text, carries with it the 
image of a person who ‘steps his bounds’ (manifest content), not necessarily in defence of 
faith but any action. However, in Nigeria, it has been used to refer to anyone whose 
expression of faith violates the law, which could incite others to take up arms against their 
perceived enemies. In that sense, the SCA researcher would code the word but subject it to 
interpretation to produce the contextual (latent) meaning.  
Other coding criteria that applied to this research which were embedded in the SCA 
include: use of expression in its intuitive form (communication that is ‘self-evident’) and use 
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of referential element (when an expression is represented; for example, ‘The number one 
citizen’ referring to head of government of a country) (Stemler, 2001). These are common 
expressions associated with linguistic analysis which defined the coding units in this 
research. The text focused on ethnicity, religion, dialogue and reconciliation as well as other 
topics on the conflicts that were reflected in the reports. 
Beyond analysing the manifest contents of the newspapers to understand their inferred 
meanings, the researcher identified the possible gaps in the texts (the ‘important’ elements 
that were excluded) to explain the conditions that suggested the writer’s intent. This process 
helped to reveal the functions of the manifest communication and the implications of the 
omitted communication thereby giving an insight into the writer’s overall mind. It means that 
the writer’s inclusion and exclusion of certain codes implied that he/she desired to achieve a 
goal. In this regard, the researcher adopted the recommendation by Carvalho (2008, p. 171) 
that a content analyst ‘should constantly look for what is present in the text and for what is 
absent’, because ‘silence can be as performative as discourse’. She implied that certain codes 
may be ignored by a writer simply because he/she preferred to deemphasise or exclude 
certain portions of reality while drawing attention to others for the purpose of achieving set 
goals. This approach helped the investigator to understand the way the newspaper journalists 









5.9 The Qualitative Content Analysis Coding Scheme 
 
Coding strategies/Operational definitions  
The key elements analysed include: 
• Samples – Daily/Weekly Trust and The Punch 
• Study period – 2001, 2008, 2010 
• Content category – Language use  
• Units of analysis – Straight news/news feature/commentaries 
• Focus – Manifest and laden contents (Explicit and inferred communication) 
• Sample characteristics – 10 editions (5 each) of both newspapers after outbreak of 
violence 
• Periods sampled - September 8-12/13, 2001; November 29- December 3, 2008;      
January 18-22/23, 2010 
• Approach to coding – Summative Content Analysis 
• Theories/concepts – Objectivity, subjectivity/non-objectivity, mediatisation, news 
framing 
• Direction of news – Positive (favourable) and negative (unfavourable) contents 
• ‘Present’ and ‘absent’ – What is in the text (present) and what is not in the text 
(absent). 
 
Table 5.5: Coding strategies/Operational definitions 




It describes the 
content (what is 
being said) and 
















DT – Content -‘Tears freely flowed on the 
faces of the Muslim community who had 
brought the corpses on a trailer …’ (R. 
Ibrahim, 2001, p. 1). Form – This was 
reported in the manner that would attract 
public sympathy for the Muslim 
community that was purportedly attacked. 
TP – Content – ‘A similar event also 
occurred in Kano where Muslim youths, on 
Tuesday night, touched two churches 
located in Shagari quarters’ (Ogunwale, 
Yakubu, & Daniel, 2001). Form – There 
was another angle to the story which 
suggested that the violence in Kano and Jos 


















TP – Straight news – This conflict was 
‘between mainly minority Muslim ethnic 
Hausa youths and people from the Christian 
Berom indigenous majority’ (Owete & 
Madu-West, 2001, pp. 1-5). The newspaper 









DT – Straight news – ‘The Jama’atu Nasril 
Islam (JNI) has condemned the recent 
killing of Muslims in Jos’ (Dan-Halilu, 



























TP - Explicit – ‘The deputy governor of the 
state , Chief Michael Botmang, also alleged 
that sophisticated firearms were freely used 
during the riots’ (Ogunwale, Ladigbolu, et 
al., 2001).  
DT – Inferred – ‘This time, however, they 
seemed hell bent on finishing what they 
started on November 28, 2008’ (H. 
Mohammed, 2010, p. 64). Meaning: The 
Christian ‘indigenes’ were on a mission to 





editions of both 
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covering the 































the story and 
attaching 
meanings to 
them based on 
intuition 



















DT – Intuition -  ‘One of the most 
pronounced of the victims in Jos was the 
killing of one Alhaji Mohammadu Mai 
Gwanjo and 20 members of his family’ (J. 
N. Musa et al., 2008b, p. 4). 
TP - Referential – ‘…the ANPP supporters 
had allegedly poured onto the streets 
chanting war songs’ (Owuamanam, 2008b, 
p. 7). ANPP represented a ‘Muslim party’ 
because it was dominated by Muslims, an 














TP – ‘The disagreement was said to have 
escalated and attracted rival youth gangs 
[…] Another report said there had been 














refusal of either religious sect to allow each 
other to reconstruct the houses destroyed 
during the November 28 crisis’ 
(Owuamanam & Fabiyi, 2010, p. 2) 
DT – ‘It was not clear as to what caused 
yesterday’s brutal escalation, though some 
sources said it may have been caused by 
some communities’ anger at the losses in 
lives and property that they suffered’ (Lalo 






























TP – Attachment – ‘Christians in the North 
should always defend themselves in the 
event of any unwanted violent attack by 
opponents of the religion’ (Fabiyi & 
Owuamanam, 2010, p. 8) 
DT – Attachment – ‘As at the time of this 
writing hundreds of so-called settlers have 
been murdered in cold blood in many cases 
allegedly by the police who are supposed to 






























TP – ‘[…] almost all mosques, except the 
central mosque, have been burnt by 
Christian youths who were said be 
retaliating the previous day’s attacks on 
churches’ (Madu-West, Murray, & 
Ibrahim, 2001, pp. 1-5) 
DT – ‘The crisis that engulfed the Plateau 
State capital of Jos on Sunday started [..] 
when Christian youths tried to stop a 
Muslim man from renovating his house’ 




















DT – ‘JNI has condemned the recent killing 
of Muslims in Jos’ (Dan-Halilu, 2001) 
 
TP – ‘We were surprised at the way some 
of our churches were attacked and some of 
our faithful and clergy killed’ 




Positive news – 
when a party in 
conflict is 















DT – Favourable to Muslims – ‘the burial 
could not be held immediately because the 
Muslim community was waiting for all the 
corpses of victims to be gathered […] 424 
corpses had been washed, dressed and lined 
up for burial’ (Lalo & Mohammed, 2008c, 
p. 1) 
TP – Favourable to Christians- ‘the ANPP 
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Negative news – 
when conflict 
party is 







supporters had allegedly poured onto the 
streets chanting war songs. In the ensuing 
confusion, churches were burnt around 










What is in the 
text (present) 
and what is 











TP – The first outbreak of violence was not 
reported (Absence of frame in the 
September 8 edition). Why? 
DT – The newspaper did not report the 
number of Christian casualties (Absence of 
frame in the stories sampled). Why? 
 
5.10 Ethical Implications 
 
The researcher applied to the University of Salford Committee on Ethics which granted 
approval for the conduct of the study as specified. The application contained the research 
summary, objectives, approaches and methods, as well as supporting documents that sought 
the consent of the participants and managements of their organisations in which he 
encouraged voluntary participation.  
It was revealed at the outset that the researcher was interested in understanding how 
narratives of the Jos conflict were produced, and the interests they served; which would be a 
modest contribution to the global research community by providing authentic data on this 
journalistic process. The interview, particularly, focused on journalists’ approaches to news 
construction and the strategies they adopted in reporting the conflict involving ‘indigenes’ 
and ‘settlers’ or ‘Muslims and ‘Christians’ in the city of Jos. 
Four documents were distributed: The organisation’s consent form, participant’s 
invitation letter, participant’s information sheet and participant’s consent form (parts 1 & 2 – 
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one sought their consent on participation, anonymity and data protection while the other 
required their consent for the use of their photographs where the interviews were not 
problematic) (see appendices IV, V, VI, VII, & IX). Based on the conditions of anonymity 
and data safety, the participants’ confidentiality remained secure as they were assured that 
they would be identified by coded names: IP 1-26 (Interview Participant 1-26). 
Before taking part in the interview, the participants voluntarily agreed that: 
• the researcher was free to use some portions of the interview transcripts, that is, 
relevant quotes, in his analysis of data to lay emphasis and establish actuality in his 
dissertation being an academic document for the advancement of knowledge.  
• their photographs and other related images in their environment (either full, Ariel or 
rear view), taken during the interview, may be used in the study as evidence of their 
witness.  
On completion of the study, the interview data was protected through preservation in the 
archives (stored electronically via the University of Salford USIR platform) so that only 
authorized researchers could access. Its use would be subject to standard data use policies 
which protect the anonymity of individuals and institutions. 
5.11 Conclusion 
Chapter 5 has focused on the research design, process and methodology which show the 
procedures of investigating journalistic strategies in the Jos conflict. The research process, 
known as the ‘Research Onion’ (Saunders et al., 2012), describes the research philosophy 
(the constructivist epistemology, idealist ontology and value-laden axiology), the inductive 
research approach and phenomenological research strategy. These elements are associated 
with qualitative research – a non-numerical investigation of phenomena in their natural 
settings (O'Leary, 2014; Silverman, 2007, 2011, 2013). 
The chapter has justified the suitability of qualitative research in this study. Thus, 
interview and qualitative content analysis (QCA) tools have been designed to obtain two data 
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sets. The interview method follows the four-step framework for analysing data developed by 
Rowley (2012a) while the QCA is drawn on the Summative Content Analysis proposed by 
Hsieh and Shannon (2005). Chapters 6, 7 and 8 contain the analysis in connected sequence 























Presentation and Analysis of Interview Data 
 
6.1 Introduction 
A large volume of data was generated from 26 conflict journalists in Jos who met the 
selection criteria for the study. Like most qualitative studies in which coding of data occurs 
during and after the actual data collection (Saldana, 2015, 2016; Silverman, 2013), the 
current research proceeded from the recording of conversations and the observation of verbal 
and non-verbal cues during the interview to transcription of data. Coding being at the heart of 
this analysis – the process whereby a researcher describes the functions of words, phrases or 
sentences in a given communication and ascribes meanings to them (Chowdhury, 2015) – is 
focused on the participants’ strategies of reporting the Jos conflict. As Saldana (2016) advises 
that when coding the interview data about the perceptions of participants – how they 
understand their lived experiences (which includes journalistic practices in the context of 
current research) – the researcher should lay emphasis on the ‘participants’ data’ in order to 
achieve the research objectives.  
In this analysis, the researcher recognises that, to date, qualitative research scholars 
have not found a common ground on the amount of data to code. Some (e.g., Lofland et al., 
2006) argue that the entire data generated should be coded to avoid exclusion of relevant 
elements. Others believe that coding the total body of data would amount to repetition of the 
texts rather than reducing contents to their essence (Gray, 2014; Saldana, 2016; Seidman, 
2013). In the light of current research, the analysis followed the logic that only relevant 
portions of the data required coding to stimulate critical examination of the phenomena. As it 
is demonstrated in this chapter, ‘only the most salient portions […] related to the  research 
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questions merit examination […] leaving the remainder for intensive data analysis’ (Saldana, 
2016, p. 17). In that sense, the researcher-generated construct, regarded as the participants’ 
‘salient’ or ‘key’ responses to the research questions, included the direct or embedded codes 
in the interview transcript that addressed journalistic practices in the volatile environment. It 
also pertained to their experiences of violence and how these have impacted the way they 
constructed conflict narratives, as well as their strategies in the news framing process. 
Although there is no universal approach to coding in qualitative studies because of the 
peculiarity of every research (Patton, 2015; Rapley, 2007), the researcher identified the 
corresponding responses which suggested a consensus of ideas among the journalists on their 
experiences and strategies. Simply put, where the majority opinions have been expressed, as 
Harding (2013) argues, it provided the framework for generating the research results. In some 
instances, the participants’ responses were matched with their products (media contents) to 
understand what they claimed and what they actually performed. In other scenarios, the 
coding focused on stand-alone opinions (what may be regarded as participants’ unpopular 
opinions) which generated controversy or contributed to the research results. 
Given that qualitative research data analysis is now supported by digital technology to 
reduce the laborious nature of the exercise, especially when dealing with interview transcripts 
(Paulus, Lester, & Dempster, 2014), the NVivo software was used to identify key words 
and/or phrases coded by the participants. The offerings of this digitised coding platform are 
numerous; but in this study, the software mainly focused on the Text Search Query and Word 
Frequency Query which helped the researcher to obtain results preview and word clouds in 
order to illustrate some codes, direct and inferred, that have emerged from the interviews.  
At a glance, the NVivo diagrams suggest topics coded by the participants, most of 
which have been described extensively. Thus, the use of this qualitative research tool was 
mainly to highlight the frequency of words and other variables such as the phrases connecting 
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key terms (e.g., the Word Tree) rather than organise or interpret the data. The NVivo was not 
a replacement for the researcher’s role of analysing and synthesising data – for it lacked the 
capacity to do so (Friese, 2014, cited in Saldana, 2016, p. 32). Its function was to provide 
some bit of information about the data emerging from the participants that would be useful 
for the researcher’s analysis.  
The interviews focused on specific themes which derived from the three research 
questions outlined in Chapter 5. Seventeen interview questions were formulated to elicit 
responses from the participants who were required to provide information, not specific 
answers, on the topics because of the flexibility of unstructured interviews (Crano et al., 
2015). But it is recommended that every approach to qualitative enquiry, including the 
handling of interview data, should be analysed to attain some level of precision (Goldberg & 
Allen, 2015; Gubrium, Holstein, Marvasti, & McKinney, 2012; Morris, 2015). This 
necessitated the adoption of the descriptive coding – an analytical approach which explained 
these ‘specific themes’ and helped to answer the research questions (Miles et al., 2014). The 
description included the summary of the huge amount of data, some intriguing claims by the 
respondents and the meanings ascribed to them. The essence was to ‘assist the reader to see 
what you saw and to hear what you heard’ in a more transparent manner (Wolcott, 1994, 
cited in Saldana, 2016, p. 102). The results from this effort have shown a high level of 
participant-involvement in the Jos conflict. 
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Figure 6: 1 Offices of some media organisations in Jos. 
6.2 RQ1: What factors influenced the practices of journalists who reported the violent 
conflict in Jos? 
This was the opening enquiry that probed the activities of conflict journalists aimed at 
identifying the elements that have made them to act in a particular way – either as mediators, 
peace advocates or agents of violence. Studies have revealed that social, physical and 
emotional conditions (e.g. trauma, threat to life), and pressure from within and outside media 
organisations (e.g., conflict actors, media owners) are potential factors that influence the 
attitudes of people who are exposed to violence (Keats & Buchanan, 2013; Obilom & 
Thacher, 2008; Rasaq, 2012). Due to the frequent violent conflict in Jos, the researcher 
envisaged other conditions such as residential segregation that inhibits access to conflict 
areas, which could emerge from the participants who were directly reporting the conflict.  
The three succeeding interview questions (1, 2, 3) were geared towards an engagement with 
the participants in which they could identify these factors and explain them in relation to 
reporting of conflict in Jos. These units of questions stemmed from Research Question 1. The 






Figure 6:  2 Word Cloud: Factors influencing practices of conflict journalists 
 
 
Figure 6:  3 Word Tree: Factors influencing practices of conflict journalists 
 
 
The researcher undertook a word search which produced the cloud and tree from the reservoir 
of responses on RQ1. The words /phrases included: factors, influence, practices of journalists, 
and sources of pressure and conflict in Jos; which were the key variables in interview 
questions 1, 2, 3. 
The journalists recognised that the intermittent Jos conflict (or crisis – used 
interchangeably) between Christians and Muslims, or ‘indigenes’ and ‘settlers’ had 
influenced their work (see dominant words in the cloud: conflict, journalist, Muslim, 
Christian, Jos, report, story, religions, pressure, situation, ethnic, interest etc.). The themes 
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outlined above reflect a society where conflict involving social groups has ensued, and the 
activities of journalists who reported the conflict in the mass media for their audiences.  
6.2.1 Residential segregation of Jos 
All the participants viewed the residential segregation of Jos as a major factor that influenced 
their work in the area. The spates of violence in this city have forced many residents to 
relocate to ‘safe areas’ – such as, Angwan Rogo (for Muslims) and Rock Haven (for 
Christians) - where their ethnic or religious groups had gained dominance as documented in 
literature (e.g., Aliyu et al., 2012; Nyam & Ayuba, 2016). A number of respondents said that 
they felt a common goal between communities may have existed in the past since the 
outbreak of violence in the area. In their study on the implication of intangible location 
attributes on residential segregation in Jos, Aliyu et al. (2012) discovered that long before the 
eruption of violence in the city, some communities had pulled more ethnic groups or attracted 
a number of religious events than others. This was due to noticeable and indescribable 
location causes such as access to social amenities, security and commercial activities. Despite 
that, no part of the city had been identified as an enclave of any ethnic or religious group.   
Some of the respondents noted that soon after the September 7, 2001 conflict, the 
residents realised that they could no longer co-exist, and that communities had been split into 
Muslim majority and Christian minority or ‘indigenous’ majority and ‘settler’ minority, or 
vice versa. They said, like other residents, many journalists fled their homes and settled in 
places considered to be safe for habitation. But their work required reporting the emerging 
conflict in both ‘safe’ and ‘unsafe’ areas (IP 5; IP 9; IP 22). Some respondents remarked that 
they saw themselves as Christians or Muslims, ‘indigenes’ or ‘settlers’ and were identified by 




The Muslim journalists relocated to places dominated (and almost entirely occupied) 
by Muslims such as Angwan Rogo, Gangare, Yan Shanu, Bauchi Road, Alikazaure, Sabon 
Layi, Kwararafa,Yan Trailer and Kasuwan Nama. Christian journalists, on the other hand, 
joined other Christians in areas such as Rayfield, Rock Haven, Jenta Adamu, Kabong, 
Lamingo, Apata, Busa Buji, Sabon Barki, and Tudun Wada, among others. This has 
continued to the present day. If John or Mary (identified as a Christian) is said to reside in 
Jos, he/she is likely to be in the midst of Christians in Rayfield, Rock Haven etc., whereas 
Mohammad or Zainab (identified as a Muslim) would be comfortable among his/her Muslim 
community of Angwan Rogo, Gangare etc. Also, ‘indigenes’ like Azi, Dung and Nyam are 
likely to reside in the ancient settlements of Narraguta, Gwong and Dong as well as other 
Christian-dominated areas. The likes of  Kabiru, Sani and Aisha who are regarded as Hausa 
Fulani ‘settlers’ live in Muslim-dominated areas of Angwan Rogo and Gangare, among 
others.  As a result of this residential segregation, journalists have been confined to their 
ethnic and religious boundaries implying that the ‘indigenous journalist’ cannot go to a 
‘settler community’ when there is an attack on that community; or a ‘Muslim journalist’ 
could be attacked if he/she goes to cover any incident in a Christian-dominated area. The 
impact of this on the reports of the journalists was a possible manipulation of facts which 
tended to pitch one group against the other.  
Studies by J. D. Galadima (2010) and Rasaq (2012), for example, have shown that 
journalists’ reports on the Jos conflict  were a trigger to the reprisal attacks that followed. 
Thus, the reality of the conflict was defined by those closed to the journalists or the social 
groups/communities to which they were affiliated. This divide between communities and 
religious groups was described by all the participants as a challenge to their work. For 
example, IP19 comments: 
The way the city is divided into religious and ethnic factions has confined us 
journalists to certain areas. We don’t move freely and cover events in the domains of 
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our perceived enemies. If you are a Muslim, your coverage begins and ends in your 
community and the mosques. If you are a Christian, you are confined to Christian-
dominated areas and the churches. Again, you are either an indigene or a foreigner. 
This is how we have played along. 
 
Others also concur: 
The residential segregation in Jos since the 2001 conflict has been a challenge as 
journalists who are Christians cannot go to Muslim-dominated areas and journalists 
who are Muslims cannot go to Christian-dominated areas (IP12 – HFS). 
 
The Christian/Muslim and indigene/settler divides in Jos have made the work of 
journalists very challenging. Journalists tend to serve the interests of their religious 
and ethnic groups (IP 14). 
 
In Jos, if you go to certain areas, they will tell you they are danger zones because 
there are terrorists there. What they are saying in essence is that there are places that 
you as a journalist cannot go as far as the conflicts here are concerned. Even the 
insurgents don’t respect journalists. In fact, when they see you as a journalist, they 
believe you are coming to expose them and you would be the first target (IP 5). 
 
Jos is divided on religious lines – The Christians on one side and the Muslims on the 
other. The divide also affects most journalists who report this conflict. When there is 
crisis in any part of the city, the journalist must think first about his/her safety – 
whether the place is secure for coverage. If it is a Muslim dominated area, the 
Christian reporter cannot go there, and if the area is dominated by Christians the 
Muslim reporter cannot go as well. It is worse for us who report for television because 
when people of the community under attack see you with a camera (with our logo); 
they may molest or even kill you (IP 13). 
 
The communities in Jos are divided based on religious and ethnic affiliations. This 
makes it difficult for the journalist to go to conflict areas when there is an outbreak of 
violence. The consequence of this is journalists’ reliance on eye-witness accounts or 
rumours which often turn out to be false (IP 26). 
The interviewees have noted that Jos has been split between Christians and Muslims, 
‘indigenes’ and ‘settlers’ – the data which confirms the research conducted by Aliyu et al. 
(2012) that the city had witnessed massive relocation of people as a result of the conflict. The 
interviewees’ concept of ‘challenge’, as emphasised above, describes the difficulty brought 
about by the actions of the rival groups. The journalists have limited access to conflict areas 
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which made their work even more challenging. The response by IP 19 that journalists no 
longer report about events in the territories occupied by their ‘perceived enemies’ for fear of 
attacks, corroborates the statement which suggests that going to such conflict areas means 
endangering their lives. In that context, a reporter is perceived as an enemy of a certain 
conflict actor, especially a religious or ethnic group, when he/she lives in the community of 
the opponent and is believed to share the sentiments of that opponent.  The participant also 
says that the conflict journalist is ‘either an indigene or a foreigner’ to be able to live in the 
community.   
The loyalty of the journalist to his/her community of habitation may have been 
absolute; otherwise he/she could be subjected to social exclusion.  The journalist is literarily 
an ‘indigene’ or a ‘foreigner’ when he/she becomes an active participant in the conflict by 
reporting one side of the story; that is being sympathetic to the ‘indigenes’ or ‘foreigners’ 
with whom he/she is associated. This establishes the inclination of the journalist to ethnicity. 
IP 19 demonstrates this by admitting that apart from having limited access to conflict areas 
(because the journalist is confined to churches and mosques), he/she also operates within an 
area dominated by ‘indigenes’ or ‘settlers’ depending on the journalist’s ethnic status. 
According to IP 5, people generally make the distinction between ‘safe’ and ‘unsafe’ 
areas in Jos, to the extent that they warn journalists against going to areas regarded as 
‘unsafe’. The notion that the journalist covering conflict is an ‘enemy’ of warring groups, as 
earlier discussed, is re-echoed by this participant. He explains that whenever a journalist is 
approaching a conflict scene, the community would be suspicious of him/her because it is 
unsure about the path the reporter would follow.  
The effect of this on the reporting of conflict is that the tense environment 
(characterised by the fear of attacks and molestation) may influence his/her selection of news 
frames which is likely to serve the interest of that community.  If the journalist fails to portray 
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the community in a good light, that is, reporting the conflict as the community wants it, 
he/she may fall prey of attacks and the medium which the journalist represents will not be 
spared. The implication is a possible misrepresentation of facts which would have an adverse 
effect on the audience. This atmosphere of uncertainty has made conflict journalists tread 
with caution so that they do not become victims rather than reporters of conflict.  Therefore, 
journalists’ coverage of the Jos conflict depends on, first, how safe the conflict area is for the 
reporters and, second, whether the inhabitants of the area are ‘our own’ or ‘their own’. This 
explains why the TV reporter (IP 13) says the sighting of the camera by an aggrieved 
community portends danger for the journalist handling the camera. 
If the journalists think about their safety and realise that the conflict areas are not 
accessible because they involve the ‘other’ group, they would resort to other means of getting 
information rather than go to the conflict areas. There are a number of implications. The 
journalists’ reports about the ‘other’ may emerge from their imaginations, and conversations 
with friends and acquaintances that are not authoritative news sources. In other words, what 
they report about the community is not based on concrete evidence due to lack of access to 
that community. For example, a participant recalls that once there was violence in any part of 
the city, ‘the head office would insist that you get the story by all means’ (IP 1); and where 
the area ravaged by violence was considered unsafe for the journalist to access, any member 
of the community whom the journalist chose as a news source was contacted for information 
on the conflict.  
In the same vein, IP 5 remarks that whenever the atmosphere was tense, ‘even the 
security men would advise you; do you want to risk your life? Why don’t you wait and get 
the feedback from us?’ .In that circumstance, the security operatives would become the major 
news sources. They would be eager to supply the raw materials with which the journalist 
would produce the news. A TV reporter also explains that the absence of information during 
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conflict ‘can water down your report’ (IP 6). These observations suggest that the conditions 
under which they performed their role as conflict journalists have not been conducive (see 
Figure 6.3). 
It can be deduced from this data that residential segregation is a major factor 
influencing the work of journalists reporting the Jos conflict. It has limited journalists’ access 
to some conflict areas resulting in the construction of conflict narratives which may not be 
based on facts. 
6.2.2 Pressure from conflict actors, editors and news sources 
Some participants admitted that they were facing a lot of pressure from conflict actors – who 
expected them to report in their ‘favour’ (IP 2; IP 5; IP 12 – HFS), the editors – who were 
interested in the casualty figures of victims of the conflict so that the Jos story may hit the 
front page (IP 3 – IEG; IP 6), and news sources – who often provided false information (IP 
19). According to the participants: 
When you write a story, that story may be faulted or seen as offensive to a certain 
group. Another group may be impressed with what you’ve written because you are 
writing in their ‘favour’ (IP 2). 
 
The different groups in the Jos conflict want our reports to be favourable to them [….] 
If you are a reporter and a Muslim, the Muslim community would want you to do 
something that would project them or serve their interests [….] If you are a Christian, 
it’s the same thing (IP 5). 
 
There is pressure from the ‘indigenous’ ethnic groups on the allegation of bias 
reporting by our newspaper (IP 12 – HFS). 
 
There is pressure from communities and individuals who provide you with false 
information about conflict in the name of eye-witness which, if not verified, can 
escalate violence in the city (IP 19). 
 
If you send any story that has nothing to do with ‘how many died on the Plateau, it’s 




The respondents feel that the merit of a story is measured by its ability to satisfy the interest 
of the audience. As IP 2 explains, one group in conflict may derive satisfaction from a report 
that tends to portray the group as the victim and its opponent as the aggressor. That same 
group may accuse the reporter of bias if it is portrayed as the aggressor in another story.  In 
that sense, there are high expectations on conflict journalists to immerse themselves in their 
stories to be able to construct conflict narratives that meet these expectations – usually from 
the groups that have strong affiliations with the journalists or the media they represent. 
There is pressure from Muslims and Christians, and pressure from ‘indigenes’ and 
‘settlers’. They want the journalists to justify their actions in the conflicts as if they were not 
responsible for them. IP 12 –HFS points out, for instance, that ‘indigenes’ have put pressure 
on her newspaper to report the Jos conflict in the manner that would not undermine their 
integrity as good hosts whose customs, traditions and cultures should be respected by their 
visitors. The journalists have continued to grapple with this pressure from conflict actors and 
the media organisations. But when faced with this pressure, the journalists have fashioned 
ways of overcoming it. Two respondents say: 
The only thing that is key to good conduct is to be objective. I encourage conflict 
journalists not to take sides in any event. Don’t say, ‘Look, this one is a Muslim and I 
am a Muslim, I have to protect him’. There should be no protection there’ (IP 5) 
 
One of the ways to manage the pressure of poor information about the conflict is to 
crosscheck the facts that are emerging. I try as much as possible to confirm from 
different sources and parties in conflict to achieve balance in my stories (IP 6). 
 
The views above express the fundamental journalistic practice. First, the standard of 
objectivity advocated by IP 5 is a guiding principle for journalists and, second, IP 6’s call for 
the crosschecking of facts is also grounded in the ethics of journalism (Chari, 2007; Ward, 
2006). However, given the circumstance under which the journalists operate, because the 
residential segregation in the area has forced them to depend on the communities harbouring 




Also, as a strategy, some journalists have endeavoured to divert the attention of the 
conflict actors and editors to other non-violent events thereby putting new ‘pictures in their 
heads’. In  the circumstances where news managers persisted, some journalists would bow to 
the pressure by quoting fictitious figures of the dead and injured persons in their reports while 
portraying the ‘enemy’ as the aggressor. For some others, they would rather resign (which is 
a decision rarely taken because of the implication that comes with the loss of one’s job) than 
shade the truth (Bell, 1996, 1997). For others still, rather than lose their job – when they have 
failed to produce the casualty figures for their news managers, or  lose their lives –  when 
they have moved into conflict zones unprotected, they would take on the characters of the 
members of that community or change their pattern of coverage so that no one would 
recognise them. IP 13, a TV reporter, explains how this strategy has worked: 
If we have to cover a conflict zone where we don’t feel safe, we often disguise 
ourselves, seal off our newsgathering equipment – camera, microphone, office 
vehicle, etc., so that no one may identify us through our logo, or the media we 
represent. This has greatly helped us to do our work, even if it is done in a hurry. 
 
This kind of strategy is what IP 1 proposes for journalists determined to overcome the 
pressure of reporting conflict in Jos (interview Question 3). He urges them to ‘think fast, 
improvise […,] use your initiative to discharge your duty as a professional journalist’ (IP 1). 
The idea to improvise which IP 1 has put forward may be understood in the light of the 
measures taken by some media organisations to ensure the safety of their reporters who cover 
conflict. For example, IP 12 – HFS, a Muslim reporter, reveals that since her coverage was 
limited to Muslim or Hausa Fulani-dominated areas, the newspaper decided to assign a 
Christian reporter to Jos, to enable both ‘penetrate areas dominated by the two religious 
groups in conflict’. IP 14 refers to this strategy as a means of ‘striking the balance’ to 
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demonstrate the organisation’s commitment to equal representation of the rival groups in the 
news. 
6.2.3 Constant witness to violence 
The participants have acknowledged that constant exposure to violence has made them to 
develop lifelong traumatic conditions. This data confirms the works of Keats and Buchanan 
(2013), and B. Zelizer and Allan (2011) (see 6.3.1 for more on this). Some of them see 
violence as the most attractive news value that is given much attention by most news media. 
This journalist admits that: 
Journalism thrives on conflict because it is the odd thing that becomes the news. 
Anything that is flowery actually does not make news. We always find angles to news 
when conflict occurs (IP 11). 
 
It was necessary to know the factors that have influenced the journalists’ practices. As the 
interviews transited from identification of the ‘factors of influence’ to ‘sources of pressure’, 
and the strategy to ‘overcome pressure’ (Interview Questions 1-3), an understanding of the 
journalists’ circumstances has been gained. They have identified the factors and how these 
have influenced their news coverage, and their strategy of ‘improvisation’ to overcome 




Figure 6:  4 The Nigerian Union of Journalists (NUJ) Press Centre, Jos, where journalists meet regularly 
6.3 RQ 2: How have journalists’ experiences of violence affected their framing of news 
on the conflict? 
Using interview data to address RQ2, the researcher desired a deeper understanding of the 
journalists’ experiences of conflict as further explored in Interview Questions 4-9 (experience 
of conflict; how the experience has influenced reporting; effect of framing on audience 
perception; role of journalists as ‘umpire’; how objectivity is applied and the circumstances 
in which objectivity is compromised). Since the factors which influenced conflict journalists 
have been established in previous analysis, an understanding of how they work – the 
manufacture of news within this system is of essence. Figure 6.5 and Figure 6.6 show the 





Figure 6:  5 Word Cloud: Journalists’ experiences of conflict 
 
   
Figure 6:  6 Word Tree: Journalists’ experiences of conflict 
The researcher assembled the participants’ responses which were relevant to Questions 4-9, 
and undertook a word search. Based on the wide range of themes embedded in RQ2, 10 key 
words/phrases were fed into NVivo. They include: experience, journalists, framing, role, 
indigenes and settlers, Christians and Muslims, objectivity, compromise, Jos conflict and 
audience. The ‘cloudy’ result in Figure 6.5 highlights issues bordering on conflict (most 
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frequently used word), Jos, report, story, crisis, people, Muslim, way, journalist, objectivity, 
dominated, interest, try, Plateau, killed, indigenes, news, groups, victims, ethnic, balance, 
religious, etc. The Word Tree is centred on objectivity – an indication that this tradition is 
still recognised in conflict reporting, even though its application has a seeming complexity. 
For example, from left wing of the Tree to its right, a critical analyst would spot these 
weighty remarks by two participants: ‘I like the idea of objectivity but in terms of […]’ (IP 
6); ‘Therefore, one is just between objectivity and subjectivity’ (IP 7). This complexity of 
journalistic standard of objectivity and other issues emerging from the participants’ 
explanations about their experiences of reporting conflict, as shown in the results preview, 
are further examined in Articles 6.3.1; 6.3.2; 6.3.3; and 6.3.4. 
6.3.1 The experiences of journalists reporting Jos conflict 
In the fourth interview question, the researcher required a vivid description of the journalists’ 
experiences of the conflict. Their ‘experiences’, in the context of this study, included their 
encounter with conflict actors – victims and aggressors, the conflict environment (e.g., burnt 
houses and worship centres, migration of persons) and the potential threat to their lives. But 
the experience of the ‘giving of account’ or ‘constructing the narratives’ of this encounter for 
their news media was most desired. The researcher envisaged that the participants would 
concentrate on the ‘fieldwork’ rather than the ‘newsroom’ experience from which news 
frames on the conflict evolved. This is because ‘experience’ has been synonymous with 
torture, assault, escape from attacks etc., since the first major armed conflict erupted in Jos in 
2001 (Krause, 2011). The question was meant to, first, trigger a common response about the 
fieldwork experience which could be narrated with ease and, second, the unknown strategies 
of reporting the conflict which was peculiar to each interviewee. This was based on the 
understanding that these strategies, in the light of the Jos conflict, were not likely to be 
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revealed in a straight-question-answer approach unless the researcher engaged them with tact. 
In that regard, follow-up questions which dug into these strategies were most appropriate. 
 
 
Figure 6:  7 Word Cloud: Journalists’ experiences of conflict (Component of RQ2) 
The word search was further narrowed to the responses on the participants’ experiences 
which enabled the researcher to identify the variables inherent in their narratives. The 
searched words/phrases were: describe, experience, challenge, write, story, handling conflict, 
influence, way, trauma, safe, favour and interest. The Word Cloud (Figure 6.7) captures a 
variety of the subjects in Figure 6.5. 
As the researcher had anticipated, the interviewees revealed their encounter with 
conflict actors in conflict zones – how some of them were attacked and how they witnessed 
the suffering of victims. They described their experiences as ‘traumatising’ (IP 1; IP 9; IP 
11), ‘terrifying’ (IP 2), ‘not palatable’ (IP 5), ‘challenging’ (IP 16), ‘unpleasant’ (IP 20; IP 
24) and ‘terrible’ (IP 21). The use of these adjectives demonstrates the severity of the 
violence which the journalists have constantly reported. Some of them shed light on this: 
We see how human beings are slaughtered like animals […] how women and children 
are killed; communities are wiped out (IP 11). 
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It has got to a level that would make you hate doing the job because you wake up in 
the morning and all around you are corpses [....] (IP 1). 
Their witness to violence – especially seeing the slaughtering of women and children and the 
scores of bodies all over the place could be traumatising (see Keats & Buchanan, 2013; B. 
Zelizer & Allan, 2011). As noted in Chapter 2, since conflict journalists are required to report 
violence in great detail like other social phenomena (Novak & Davidson, 2013), their work 
has become challenging as revealed by IP 16. Some of the respondents have claimed that 
their witness to the Jos conflict had made them to believe it was no longer a fearful event. 
The respondents said before 2001, violent conflict was alien to the people and had been a 
fearful event for many journalists, but when it became a recurring decimal, they got used to 
it. Their claim supports existing literature on global wars; that violent conflict has moved 
from being a distasteful incident to being something fascinating and tolerable. It ‘was 
transformed into a hymn of life […], a welcome, sought-after and desired event’ (Lazzarich, 
2013, p. 39). This was how some journalists in Jos  perceived it – the argument which has 
been upheld by this study. 
Beyond the fieldwork ‘experience’, the participants have revealed the process of the 
manufacture of news (regarded in this study as newsroom experience). The analysis of this 
component is crucial to the attainment of research objective 2. The participants’ responses to 
Interview Question 5 have been explained in the same context. The question was drawn from 
previous enquiry on their experiences of conflict. The emphasis was on how their ‘fieldwork’ 
experiences had impacted on their ‘newsroom’ experiences – whether, for example, their 
constant witness to violence had made them assume the position of conflict actors by 




Some interviewees have revealed that in-between the conflict zone and the newsroom 
there exists a conspiracy of thought that often influences the structure of news or the 
importance attached to the elements that form the news  (Wheeler, 2005). It also includes the 
interest it would serve – internal and external forces, and how the process would convey the 
intended message. When putting pen to paper, the lead is defined by an interest that is 
sustained throughout the report (IP 15; IP 3 – IEG). Sometimes, the selection of frames is 
influenced by what the journalists see, because, for example, a TV cameraman says he 
captures ‘the killings and the corpses of victims littered all over the place […] the pictures are 
too difficult to behold’ (IP 18), and leaves the reporter or editor to select the ‘important’ 
visuals that would accompany the story. An editor also explains how this newsroom ritual is 
performed: 
I get a lot of stories from reporters out there on the field with respect to what they see, 
what they hear and, of course, process of their interviews with news sources and even 
victims. What we try to do is to edit the stories and be sure that they would help the 
society; particularly, paying attention to making sure that it doesn’t worsen an already 
bad situation (IP 22). 
The editor’s response above is hinged on Johan Galtung’s peace journalism and  Ross 
Howard’s conflict sensitive reporting (Galtung, 1973; Howard, 2009; Lynch & Galtung, 
2010) which require journalists to report conflict with restraint so as to reduce human 
suffering. Recently, Singh (2013) used these frameworks to propose responsible conflict 
reporting that emphasises proactive measures by journalists in presenting conflict and 
promoting peace. Like IP 22 who ensures that the story he moderates (his term for sensitive 
editing) ‘doesn’t worsen an already bad situation’, Singh (2013) recognises that ‘conflict 
should not be treated as any ordinary story, but handled with due care given its potentially-
damaging, long-term effects’ (p. 119). 
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Having been influenced by the residential segregation in Jos which limits the 
journalists’ access to information, what they write about conflict emerges from secondary 
sources such as eye-witnesses (who are not likely to reveal what happened but what they 
want the journalists to know and report), and their colleagues. Some of the respondents 
explained that at critical moments, they sit in the newsrooms and make phone calls to their 
friends and acquaintances, as well as persons from their ethnic or religious blocs; and on the 
basis of this interaction, their stories are formed. They might claim that the information was 
obtained from an ‘authoritative source’ who ‘pleaded anonymity’ so that their audiences 
might accept this constructed reality. While some of the journalists have denied knowledge of 
this practice for fear of blame for ‘shading truth’ (Bell, 1996, 1997), the absence of 
information due to the lack of access to some communities has led to the adoption of 
alternative news source. To demonstrate how the Muslim/Christian and indigene/settler 
divide has influenced news construction, IP 12 – HFS reveals that whenever she shares 
information with her colleagues about an incident she has covered in a Muslim-dominated 
area – because she is a Muslim and can go to that area, she often withholds some information 
that would only be read in her newspaper. She remarks:  
When things happen in Muslim areas, my Christian colleagues will call me to find out 
about the incident [….] but the truth is that if you rely on me I can’t give you 
everything. I can’t just go there, get the information first-hand, or sometimes even risk 
my life, and you expect me to get everything and give it to you and then tomorrow we 
have the same angle of story; I can’t do that. I would want to have an exclusive. Mine 
must be different. 
Based on the above remark, IP 12 –HFS wants to have an exclusive for the story in terms of 
an original angle. However, if she chooses to withhold substantial part of the information, 
and alters the facts that may constitute the news materials for her Christian colleagues, it is 
likely that the reports emerging from Christian reporters would not reflect the reality of that 
incident. Suppose that the Muslim journalist saw how Christian ‘women and children were 
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slaughtered like animals […]’ (IP 11) in that Muslim-dominated area, would this form part of 
the news materials that she would release to her Christian colleagues? This withholding of 
information by the journalist, in another sense, is a strategy to conceal some facts that may 
implicate ‘her community’ – the Muslim-dominated area. Should the need arise for Muslim 
journalists to rely on their Christian counterparts for information on attacks in Christian-
dominated areas; the same withholding interface may occur. Based on this, the information is 
likely to be withheld, or suppressed in worse scenarios where the Christians are identified as 
the aggressors. 
So what version of ‘truth’ do the audiences read, hear or view on the Jos conflict? 
Perhaps, this is why Stolley (2010, p. 267) writes that ‘Truth  comes in layers […] and when 
you excavate – we call it reporting – Truth can change [….] Sometimes Truth comes wrapped 
in rhetoric’. Some editors, for instance, have argued that what they do with reporters’ 
manuscripts does not necessarily amount to changing truth. Rather, it is a form of moderation 
that is most desired. An editor explains this: 
If a reporter talks about somebody of a particular ethnic group killing somebody 
somewhere; what we try to do is to just say: ‘Two young men fought, and one was 
killed’ [….] The reporter may have told the truth, which we uphold in journalism, but 
the profession also envisaged that some things could also be moderated if that would 
help the society (IP 22). 
But do these moderators and reporters who construct news understand the implications of this 
process on the perceptions of their audiences? This question was posed to the participants 
(Interview Question 6) as the researcher sought to know if the journalists understood the 
implications of their reports on the attitudes of their audiences. 
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Figure 6:  8 (Left photo): A mosque vandalised in the Jos conflict   Source:voiceourplight.worldpress.com 
Figure 6:  9 (Right photo); A church bombed in Jos. Source:carmenmccain.com 
6.3.2 Shaping audiences’ perceptions through framing  
This was another dimension to examining journalists’ newsroom experience. Figure 6.10 and 
figure 6.11 show the Word Cloud and Text Results Preview. 
 




Figure 6:  11 Word Tree: Shaping audiences’ perceptions through framing (Component of RQ2) 
The search pertained to participants’ responses to Interview Question 6. The key words were: 
Framing, news, strategy, shapes, perceptions and truth. The Word Cloud shows the 
dominance of words such as audience, people, write, news, interest, stories, crisis, believe, 
look, try, responsibility, reader, sentiments, perception, picture, casualty etc. These words 
suggest the process of news framing in a typical newsroom. 
Like a word puzzle, there are phrase matches in the Word Tree (Figure 6.11) – from left wing 
to the right, which reveal the responses attributed to the participants. For example, the Tree 
captures these statements: 
So what I construct as news in favour of the indigenes forms the perception of my 
readers. Based on that, they have come to know that the settlers are the aggressors (IP 
3 – IEG) 
You know that bad news is good news because it sells (IP 9). 
These participants recognise that what they publish or broadcast to their audiences have 
significant impact on them. In the first scenario, the journalist weighs the options of reporting 
in favour of an ethnic group or against it, and/or taking a neutral position. But he chooses to 
support one group (the indigenes) and leaves the other (the settlers). He understands, perhaps, 
that any reader who reads the news is likely to share his ‘common sense’ reality (his 
perspective of reality) which may portray the ‘indigenes’ as victims of the conflict who have 
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been attacked in their territory by the ‘settlers’. Thus, the story presents an image of 
foreigners who want to take over the heritage of those upon whom nature has bestowed such 
privilege. Again, it suggests to the reader that communities, generally, should beware of 
foreigners in their domains and treat them as such, to avoid loss of their heritage to the 
‘settlers’ as it was being experienced in Jos. 
The analogy of ‘bad news’ is ‘good news’ is a fundamental journalistic tenet which 
follows the logic that people are interested in human conditions that are sorrowful, negative 
and humiliating (Phillips, 2015; Seib, 2013). They want to identify those associated with 
these and how they are affected. Violent conflict is one of such conditions because in it, lives 
and property are lost and gained by those who, for example, loot or achieve territorial control. 
The journalist who reports the ‘bad news’ about rival ethnic and religious groups in Jos is 
quick to ‘break the news’ to the audience who waits anxiously to consume the product. Since 
the audience is thirsting for the news on ‘indigenes’ and ‘settlers’, Muslims and Christians – 
to know those winning the war, it changes its form to ‘good news’. In other words, ‘bad 
news’ becomes ‘good news’ when it appeals to the audience. The implication, however, is 
that this journalist looks for hot spots in the conflict (e.g. persons killed), even when the 
information is not accurate, so that the bad news may sell. This reporter explains the rationale 
for this: 
Your reader wants to see the casualty figures and the extent of damage in the conflict 
because these elements tend to capture his attention. I take my lead/intro from the 
figures and damages then explain the circumstances in subsequent paragraphs to 
sustain that interest […].The order in which I present my report and the importance I 
attach to it will have a deep impression on my reader (IP 9). 
Again, the reporter’s role performance as described above is a standard journalistic practice. 
Communication scholars still regard conflict as a news value (Archetti, 2007; Friend & 
Challenger, 2014; Fuller, 2010). This data supports existing conflict journalism literature 
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which holds that conflict attracts much of media attention than other subjects  (Esman, 2004; 
Wheeler, 2005).  
In contrast, and in the light of the newsroom ritual of moderation, some participants 
believe that their audiences do not deserve ‘bad news’ that turns ‘good’. For them, any 
element of conflict that is capable of inciting the audience must be ignored as a measure 
towards building peace. They follow the doctrine of peace journalism (Hawkins, 2015; Lynch 
& McGoldrick, 2013; Saleem & Hanan, 2014). Most of the participants say they take the 
issue of peace to heart and try to dampen the tension arising from violent conflict. They 
dismiss the idea of quoting figures of the dead and injured which are rarely verified. 
From these responses, the participants clearly know that the framing of news which 
they undertake shapes the perceptions of their audiences. Some take advantage of the bad 
situation – violent conflict, to attract the audience while others ignore the somewhat attractive 
elements in the interest of the same audience.  
6.3.3 Journalists’ role in the Jos conflict in which ‘indigenes’ and ‘settlers’ or Muslims 
and Christians are active participants 
The journalists’ role as ‘umpire’ in the conflict between the rival ethnic and religious groups 
was examined in the context of reporting both sides – the thrust of objectivity (Seth & Matt, 
2015). The understanding of this role was critical to this study because the researcher was 
interested in locating the brand of journalism that would fit into the practices of journalists 
who reported the Jos conflict in view of the volatile environment that has been polarised on 
ethnic and religious lines. This effort was grounded in a recent framing research which re-
echoes that ‘the decision to prefer one frame over another during news coverage depends 
both on internal and external factors that influence the media organisations at all times’ 




While scholarship on media role in conflict points to the direction that media efforts 
should be geared toward preventing and managing conflict or promoting peaceful coexistence 
among individuals and social groups to minimise human suffering (Saleem & Hanan, 2014), 
it has not produced enough clarity on what constitutes the ideal media role. A number of 
societies have frequently advocated the need for a responsible media system in which 
journalists are required to combine ‘patriotic spirit’ with their professional ethics when 
reporting conflict (Morton & Aroney, 2016; Zandberg & Neiger, 2005). These standards of 
patriotism and ethical conduct are neither defined nor translated by those who promote them; 
hence the decision to apply them rests squarely with the journalists (Chari, 2007). In that 
circumstance, the ambiguity of media role in conflict prevention and management is 
established.  
Research has revealed that although journalists tended to support the idea that their 
role entailed contributing to peace building, they had to grapple with how to apply it 
(Berganza-Conde et al., 2010; Howard, 2009; Panickar, 2001; Singh, 2013). Perhaps, this 
role implies an action that translates in the logic to ‘get the facts straight’  (Harbers & 
Broersma, 2014, p. 642), which conforms to mere ‘journalistic conventions for defining and 
reporting stories’ (Lynch & McGoldrick, 2013, p. 1042), and reinforces the Media-Conflict 
Resolution model that urges the media to ‘adopt neutral position in conflict’ (Saleem & 
Hanan, 2014, p. 192). Others may understand it from the standpoint of peace journalism 
research (e.g., Hawkins, 2015; Lynch & McGoldrick, 2013; Saleem & Hanan, 2014) 
committed to conflict resolution through the media.  
This distinction has further compounded the role of the media in conflict because the 
journalist determines how it is performed. This role often manifests in the news the 
journalists construct but the audiences rarely notice it because they are unable to interpret the 
intentions of the journalists and recognise the interests such news stories serve (Howard, 
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2009, 2015; von Oppen, 2009). Often when mass media audiences recognise that certain 
media are credible, they tend to rely on them for their news. As argued by  Harbers and 
Broersma (2014), ‘trust in news stories does not depend that much on their actual 
correspondence with reality, but rather on the formal conventions by which news is 
‘packaged’’ (p.642). That is why critics of journalistic objectivity have maintained that the 
news process is subjective because journalists have a strong influence on their reports which 
implies that truth is a social construction of the journalists. 
 
Figure 6:  12 Word Cloud: Journalists’ role in Jos conflict (Component of RQ2) 
 
Figure 6:  13 Word Tree: Journalists’ role in Jos conflict (Component of RQ2) 
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The word search focused on Muslims, Christians, Jos crisis, role, indigenes and settlers which 
were the key variables in Interview Question 7. The process produced the Word Cloud and 
Word Tree shown in Figure 6.12 and Figure 6.13. The Word Cloud captures Plateau, state, 
Jos, Muslim, Christian, conflict, people, ethnic, crisis, objective, reporting, journalist, 
majority, minority, try, shots, group, interest, Fulani, indigenes, aggressors, write, neutral and 
many others. The participants’ responses revolved around these subjects. The major actors 
have been identified and their roles in the conflict defined. 
A few phrases have been depicted from the Word Tree which derived from the 
responses of the journalists. The word ‘Christians’ was at the heart of the dialogue, but used 
in many contexts by the journalists of the two religious groups. For example, the contexts in 
which the journalists have been quoted in the Word Tree are examined thus: 
I do not manipulate the camera to the advantage of Christians or Muslims or even 
indigenes and settlers (IP 21). 
The statement is credited to a cameraman, a Christian, explaining his ‘neutral ritual’ in the 
conflict between Christians and Muslims or the ‘indigenes’ and ‘settlers’.  He denies ever 
using the camera to portray Muslims as the aggressors. 
I also discovered as a person that the crisis in Plateau State is still a continuation of 
the struggle between the majority and the minority. Because of this line of thinking, I 
have sympathy with the minority Christians (IP 1). 
The above statement is the context in which IP 1 understands the conflict in Jos, that is, the 
minority struggle against their oppression by the majority. He says although he is a Muslim, 
he has sympathy with the Christian minority. In other words, his role is that of an advocate of 
minority rights in Plateau State and the Middle Belt. Interestingly, this action suggests that 
his ethnic or regional alliance is stronger than that of his religion. 
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The Word Tree also captures, in part, the statement made by another Muslim reporter (IP 12 
– HFS) who re-echoes Nigeria’s south-west media concentration (African Media 
Development Initiative, 2005; Oso, 2011), and the fact that the print and broadcast media are 
largely owned by Christians. She notes: 
Nearly all the papers are owned by Christians. Our paper may be the only fish in the 
ocean. 
She says this against the background that her newspaper, which is owned by a Muslim and 
circulated among the predominantly Hausa Fulani in the north, is believed to be performing 
the role of a crusader for the northern Muslims (African Media Development Initiative, 
2005). This explains the orientation of the newspaper in trying to challenge the monopoly of 
the Southern press, known in Nigerian media research as ‘Lagos-Ibadan axis’ – a region 
dominated by Christians (M. A. Ojo & Lateju, 2010; Oso, 2011). According to A. O. Musa 
and Ferguson (2013, p. 9), it is a situation where ‘the South towers over the North’. 
Another reporter also explains his role thus: 
I am a Christian but I do not allow my faith to affect my professional calling [….] I 
have earned the confidence of both Christians and Muslims in Jos through my 
objective reportage (IP 6). 
This reporter, like other participants claiming objectivity, insists that what he reports is a 
reflection of events that occur, which explains why he claims that he earns the confidence of 
the rival religious groups. But a report credited to his paper may not have earned him or his 
medium the confidence of the Muslim ‘settlers’. A portion of the report reads:  
Majority of the casualties are Christians and non-indigenes who were suddenly 
attacked by the Muslim fundamentalists (IP 6 newspaper, September 24, 2001, p. 21).  
In this circumstance, both the reporter and editor who are the main gatekeepers in the news 
production process have decided to publish the story to achieve the goal set by their 
organisation; that is, the Southern-Christian agenda (promoting the interests of indigenous 
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ethnic groups and the Christian South). It suggests that the gatekeepers and their organisation 
have conspired – through their report – to portray the Hausa-Fulani Muslims as the 
aggressors. By mere reading these lines of the story, the reader is able to grasp the message 
that the reporter had intended to convey – that ‘innocent’ Christian indigenes and non-
indigenes (who comprised of Christians from the South) were attacked by the Hausa-Fulani 
Muslims. The consequence of the report could be harmful. This is why IP 22, in the analogy 
of a story (earlier cited) in which a person of an ethnic group is identified as having killed 
somebody of another ethnic group, says he would moderate it in these words: ‘Two young 
men fought, and one was killed […] if that would help the society’. Conflict sensitive 
reporting scholars (e.g., Hoffmann, 2014) have argued that doing so would entrench peace in 
the community. 
Most of the responses of the participants have suggested that their reports are 
objective. Many have claimed that their organisations’ goals define their role in conflict. 
Some of them mediate conflict, while others defend their religions and the rights of social 
groups. But how this role is performed in order to achieve the needed balance and 
disinterestedness, as they have claimed, or the extent of their attachment to subjects or level 
of involvement in conflict, is of essence in this study. This is because a number of journalists 
simply follow the canons of journalism that emphasise the need for objectivity (Tong, 2015). 
Some respondents concur that since they have been trained to detach themselves from their 
subjects, they have tried to do so. 
Furthermore, the purpose for which faith-based and ‘ethnic-oriented’ publications 
were selected was to meet the criteria for analysing their role in reporting the 
Muslim/Christian and ‘settler/indigene’ divides. These publications have tended to serve the 
interests of the Muslim and Christian communities on the one hand, and Muslim-dominated 
Hausa Fulani ‘settlers’ and the Christian-dominated ‘indigenes’ on the other (Aliyu et al., 
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2012, p. 78; Dowd, 2014, p. 8; Taft & Haken, 2015, p. 63). The journalists who were 
identified by these labels have also shown understanding of their role in the Jos conflict. The 
goal of the researcher was to know how this role has been applied in their coverage of the 
conflict – whether their ‘patriotic spirit’ and ethical conduct have prevailed to support 
peacebuilding efforts and reduce human suffering (Saleem & Hanan, 2014). This was drawn 
on studies that argue that journalists recognise their role in conflict resolution but how this 
role is performed constitutes ambiguity given that they share common ideologies, beliefs and 
traditions with the warring social groups (Howard, 2009, 2015; Panickar, 2001; Singh, 2013).  
IP 20 - FBM says this about the Muslim newspaper for which he is both reporter and editor: 
We started the publication as a result of underreporting of Islamic activities by the 
secular media, at least to serve as a voice for the Muslim Ummah […].We advance 
the cause of Islam but we don’t criticise other religions. Rather what we do is to 
emphasise the areas that we have common interests. We have in our paper a portion 
dedicated to comparative religious studies – the way Christians look at things. We 
often realise that there are similarities in most of them. These are things that we 
advance in the paper. The paper does not instigate anyone. We advance only things 
that would unite, not things that would further show a kind of barrier between the two 
religions.  
There is a manifestation of advancing ‘the cause of Islam’ in IP 20 – FBM’s newspaper as the 
reporter has claimed. For example, it published a story which exonerated Muslims from the 
2010 Christmas Eve bombings of Christian-dominated areas of Kabong and Angwan Rukuba, 
and blamed the attacks on the residents of the affected communities. The report reads:  
We can confirm that no Muslim is responsible for the bombings in Kabong and 
Angwan Rukuba for we are law-abiding citizens. The affected communities are 
responsible for these acts. They know their attackers (IP 20 – FBM newspaper, 
January 5, 2011, p.2). 
This report which was credited to Jama’atu Nasir Islam (the umbrella body of Islamic 
organisations in Nigeria) preceded the setting up of the commission of enquiry by the Plateau 
State government to probe the attacks. It was a swift reaction to the wide rumours among 
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many Christians that the two settlements were bombed by their perceived enemies – the 
Hausa-Fulani Muslims. Since no group had been indicted by a judicial commission, or a court 
of competent jurisdiction, ‘the cause of Islam’ was defended before investigation into the 
bombings began, and the newspaper being ‘a voice for the Muslim Ummah’ (IP 20 – FBM), 
did not hesitate to publish it in order to instil in their readers (and those who may rely on their 
readers for information) the belief that the suspected Muslim attackers were innocent. The 
report claimed that the Muslims were ‘law-abiding citizens’ and had no knowledge of the 
bombings which was a proof of their innocence. The defence mechanism provided in this 
data is grounded in Herman and Chomsky’s propaganda model, as discussed in previous 
chapter, which explains ‘journalists’ strategies of prediction […] that try to manage readers’ 
expectations by framing visions (whether real or imagined) of future warfare’ (Plotnick, 
2012, p. 656). It means that whether Muslims were law-abiding as claimed, or law breakers 
as many Christians had alleged, the newspaper was on hand to perform its role of defending 
the Muslim Ummah as it demonstrated by publishing a yet-to-be-established report that 
tended to exonerate the Muslims. 
Although the report cited in this study has not produced any evidence which 
contradicts IP 20 – FBM’s claim that the newspaper does not criticise other religions, its goal 
to ‘advance the cause of Islam’ is hinged on a subjective orientation; that is, taking side with 
the Muslims by giving them a voice. The giving of voice is not unethical in journalism but 
what that voice stands for, especially in critical circumstances where there are differing 
opinions. Furthermore, when the respondent was asked to shed light on the ‘giving of voice’ 
during the interview, he looked up with some bit of guilt, nodded his head and smiled 
suggesting that some meaning had been embedded in the phrase. Since the interview involved 
the recording of verbal and non-verbal cues, the researcher implied that such actions meant 
that ‘voice’ was metaphorically used for ‘positive portrayal of the Muslim Ummah’. This 
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defence falls short of the journalistic standard of ‘telling it as it is’ which the reporter had 
claimed the newspaper stood for. 
IP 20 – FBM’s response also provides an explanation against the perception about 
Islam as a religion associated with violence. He maintains that Islam signifies peace and its 
newspaper propagates this philosophy and serves as a platform for strengthening interfaith 
relations. He explains further how the newspaper performs this role: 
We reach out to the Christian community by covering some of their activities. We 
interview some Christian leaders on some of the burning issues arising from the 
conflict in Jos to provide their perspective about the issues, and when we come back 
we look at them from our perspective so that we will have a common understanding 
[…] I recall that a Reverend Father (Catholic priest) was a columnist in our 
newspaper until he left for further studies abroad. 
IP 20 – FBM’s newspaper has demonstrated this coverage of interfaith issues including the 
activities of the Christian bloc. A front page news titled ‘Bishop leads Christians to Jos 
Central Mosque’ was reported in the monthly newspaper in March 2011. It was the visit of 
the leadership of the Christian Association of Nigeria (CAN) to the mosque in the aftermath 
of the 2010 ethno-religious conflict. Also, the priest being referred to in this newspaper has 
had his article published on the essence of interfaith dialogue in Jos (November, 2012, p.8). It 
was his first and only article in the newspaper contrary to the reporter’s claim that he 
maintained a column to achieve the newspaper’s goal of finding a common ground in terms 
of the teachings and traditions of Islam and Christianity. Due to non-circulation of the 
newspaper on a regular basis, a random selection of three editions of the newspaper (June 
2010, February 2011, April 2015) was undertaken to identify topics of ‘comparative religious 
studies’ as claimed by IP 20 FBM. However, none of the samples contained these topics. 
From the foregoing, the data has confirmed IP 20 FBM newspaper’s commitment to 
the cause of Islam, and that it does not criticise other religions. But the data dismisses the 
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reporter’s claim that the newspaper makes comparison of religious ideologies through critical 
analysis because such platform does not exist. There is a distinction between comparative 
analysis of two traditions or teachings (which, expectedly, the newspaper should undertake) 
and the opinions of individuals in the newspaper which are at the discretion of the audience to 
determine their merits.  
IP 8 - FBC, a reporter and editor of a Christian newspaper, also recounts the role his 
medium has performed in resolving the conflict between Christians and Muslims despite his 
claim that ‘the church, most of the time, is at the receiving end’. He remarks: 
We realised that the church is not given a voice in the media during conflict [….] You 
hardly read about issues that affect the church on the pages of newspapers neither do 
you see them in the mainstream media [….] Our paper therefore, speaks the voice of 
the church. We report the crisis as it affects the church particularly, and the Christian 
community. 
As quoted above, IP 8 - FBC corroborates the concept of ‘voice’ for which his Muslim 
counterpart offered a definition at the outset – this time around, it is the voice of the Christian 
community. IP 8 - FBC maintains that while the newspaper speaks that voice, it ensures that 
it reflects the gospel of Jesus Christ. He continues: 
Our mandate is to explain Christian response to violence. Ours is not about putting up 
a defence. When we need to call a spade, a spade, we have to do it. If the Christians 
trigger violence we tell the whole world that they are the culprits and when the 
Muslims trigger it we say it as it is. This is our witness to the gospel of Christ […] 
But when we write about conflict, we don’t aggravate the situation.  
The denial of ‘voice’ which IP 8 – FBC re-echoes may be understood as the total neglect of 
the activities of Christians or issues pertaining to their general wellbeing, while other social 
groups are reported by the secular media. In that sense, the claim is contestable. While the 
concept of ‘voice’ appears ambiguous in this context, it connotes ‘favourable’ narratives 
about Christians and their wellbeing or the ‘positive’ portrayal of the Christian image in the 
secular media. It does not imply the absence of news on Christianity. This is because the 
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media in Nigeria tend to publish or broadcast information about different issues and events 
including religious groups (Adebanwi, 2004; Ralph Afolabi Akinfeleye, 2003; E. Ojo, 2003; 
Pate, 2011). As the reporter declares that his newspaper now ‘speaks the voice of the church’ 
and reports how the Jos conflict ‘affects the church particularly, and the Christian 
community’, it means the paper may be blind to aspects that affect other groups or 
institutions. It may focus on the plight of Christians in conflict areas and their response to 
conflict. This is what news framing entails; that is, ‘every journalist understands that stories 
need angles’ (Phillips, 2015, p. 8). 
A story published in IP 8 – FBC newspaper (August, 2015, pp. 1-2) demonstrates the 
above news framing. In it the reporter gives account of his visit to some areas of the North-
East which have been reclaimed from the Boko Haram insurgents by the Nigerian military. 
Rather than report about the activities of the insurgents in the affected communities where 
Muslims, Christians and the adherents of other faiths have suffered loss, the newspaper 
framed the story in such a way as to show that Christians were the most hit. It was 
supplemented with pictures of burnt houses which were reportedly owned by Christians and 
the houses of Muslims in the same community which were neither vandalised nor burnt. The 
story was introduced thus: 
Christians in parts of Nigeria’s North-East where Boko Haram insurgents have 
unleashed terror on communities are still mourning the loss of their loved ones and 
property [….] (August 2015, pp. 1-2).  
This is the kind of ‘voice’ that IP 8 – FBC speaks about – a voice that attracts sympathy for 
Christians in the North-East. It is a voice that ignores the suffering of other victims outside 
the Christian bloc because only the plight of Christians ‘affects the church’ (IP 8 – FBC). 
Again, there is some bit of contradiction in IP 8 – FBC’s comments. He claims that ‘if 
the Christians trigger violence we tell the whole world that they are the culprits and when the 
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Muslims trigger it we say it as it is’. But in subsequent response he admits that ‘when it 
comes to the interest of the church; where I feel we are at fault or Christians are at fault, I 
would rather not delve into that (italics- researcher’s emphasis)’. In the first scenario he tries 
to demonstrate an objective culture which treats his Christian community and the Muslims 
equally – a journalistic philosophy of ‘getting both sides’ (Fürsich, 2002, p. 59). He claims 
balance and fairness. In contrast, this culture is compromised when ‘Christians are at fault’ 
because he would ‘not delve into’ the matter in terms of news coverage. Thus, he is likely to 
conceal some information that may implicate Christians or the church. For example, one of 
the newspaper editions (January 2011, p.7) reported that an attack was ‘allegedly 
masterminded by Hausa-Fulani elements’ (who are predominantly Muslims), whereas in the 
entire publication, the ‘indigenous elements’ (who are predominantly Christians) were not 
identified as suspected culprits. In the same paper (p.12), Christian youths were warned by a 
cleric not to take laws into their hands but engage in dialogue with members of other 
religions. 
Both participants’ responses reveal that the media which they represent recognise 
their role – giving a ‘voice’ to Muslims and Christians because the secular media are alleged 
to have underreported their activities. But J. D. Galadima (2010) has described the media 
coverage of the Jos conflict as adequate – that is, conflict actors including Muslims and 
Christians have been reported by all segments of the media. Thus, the research evidence 
contradicts the claim by both religious groups that they have been underreported. 
Two other participants (IP 12 - HFS and IP 3 - IEG) commented on their role in the 
conflict between the ‘indigenes’ and ‘settlers’ which is often linked to religion – chiefly 
because the ‘indigenes’ are predominantly Christians while the ‘settlers’ are predominantly 
Muslims (Dowd, 2014; Taft & Haken, 2015). They represent a segment of the media that is 
widely believed to align with ethnic groups – the Hausa Fulani versus the ‘indigenes’. These 
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perceptions have led to the labelling of the publications as ‘Hausa Fulani paper’ and ‘the 
paper for the natives’ making the people to cast doubt on the integrity of the journalists who 
report for the newspapers. Zeleng (2008, p. 5) writes about the Hausa-Fulani paper which IP 
12 – HFS represents: 
[…], a newspaper that has  continuously maintained strong anti-Plateau and anti-
Christian sentiments […] was joined in the crusade by some Hausa services of the 
BBC, VOA and Deutsche Velle, all of whom totally misrepresented the crisis to the 
outside world. 
This negative image has adversely affected the journalists reporting for the newspaper. IP 12 
– HFS explains its extent: 
At times when you go for an assignment, and you introduce yourself, they look at you 
somehow – with great suspicion. They are sceptical. They are careful. They choose 
their words carefully. And when you go to certain communities, you have to be 
careful – you don’t really have to introduce yourself because you know that you may 
be a target. 
But despite this negative impression about the newspaper among the indigenous ethnic 
groups, IP 12 - HFS claims that the newspaper coverage has not been one-sided in favour of 
the Hausa-Fulani as it was widely acclaimed. What this participant admitted was that some 
columns in the newspaper might have prompted that reaction. 
They said our paper was anti-Plateau. But one thing we came to realise was they were 
more critical about some of the columns than the reports. The truth is that none of 
them could actually accuse us directly of taking sides in our reports. 
However, there are two dimensions to this claim. First, that the newspaper coverage is not 
sympathetic to its owners – the Hausa-Fulani, is a misrepresentation of fact. Second, much of 
what the newspaper is accused of emerged from opinion articles written by commentators 
and columnists rather than reports as the participant has noted. These two scenarios manifest 
in the following story published in the newspaper.  
198 
 
The latest genocidal bloodbath in Plateau State was the fifth. The fourth was the 
Yelwan Shendam massacre which occurred in February 2004 [...] in which Christian 
tribes in Plateau State massacred Muslim men, women and children in their hundreds 
during a two-day orgy of violence (IP 12 – HFS newspaper, December 1, 2008, p.58). 
The story indicts all the ‘Christian tribes’ in Plateau State over the purported plot to wipe out 
Muslims – the Hausa-Fulani, men, women and children who profess Islam. Since these 
allegations against Christians were not verified which is a common practice among many 
journalists (Weaver & McCombs, 1980), they constituted the ‘reality’ of their readers. 
Although IP 12 – HFS’ response suggests an equal representation of reality that is favourable 
to both ethnic groups in conflict, the overwhelming patronage of the newspaper by the Hausa 
Fulani ethnic group, as testified by the interviewee, shows that the paper is sympathetic to the 
ethnic group because it (group) claimed that other media did not grant it access. IP 12 - HFS 
reveals thus: 
I had an interview with the chairman of Miyeti-Allah (a Hausa Fulani group) and he 
said his group had met other reporters several times; and had gone to the Nigerian 
Union of Journalists for coverage and submission of press statements but they did not 
respond. 
The ‘response’ which Miyeti-Allah later got from the interviewee’s newspaper may have been 
favourable because it approached the newspaper that could give it a ‘voice’. The group and 
the newspaper readers were likely to derive satisfaction because, as Phillips (2015, p. 24) 
says, ‘it matters where it (information) comes from because we are forced to take it on trust’. 
Participant IP 3 - IEG was asked about his role in the conflict. He revealed that while 
many journalists found the Jos conflict appealing by daily reporting casualty figures to hit the 
front page, his reports largely focused on developmental issues in which he rebranded the 
state by showcasing its endowments and the hospitality of the people. His goal was to move 
the attention of the audiences away from the much publicized violence. Existing research 
reveals that this strategy worked for many conflict journalists who tried to avoid the 
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imposition of government agenda on them to draw attention of their audiences to other news 
materials (Herman & Chomsky, 1988). However, the participant was not silent on the issues 
involving the visitors and their hosts and used his paper to separate the ‘good guys’ from ‘bad 
guys’ (Ruigrok, 2008) and to identify with the victims (Bell, 1996, 1997). IP 3 - IEG offers 
reasons for his action: 
I am a middle-belter (the geopolitical zone where Jos – Plateau State is situated) and I 
have a stake in this state. You don’t operate as a journalist in a vacuum; you operate 
within a society and the interest of that state must be protected. Therefore, issues that 
have to do with the interest of Plateau, sometimes I downplay them. The three major 
ethnic groups in this country want to swallow this state; I won’t allow that. 
His response evolved from his belief that if he fails to ‘defend’ the interest of the ethnic 
groups in Plateau State – the ‘indigenes’, the ‘settlers’ might take over the state which is the 
political hub of the middle belt, the zone from where he originated. For him, his news frames 
demonstrate this solidarity with the indigenous ethnic groups; and having lived in Jos for over 
18 years and reported the conflict since it began, he was convinced that the Hausa Fulani 
‘settlers’ were the aggressors. He explicitly illustrates this role of separating the ‘good guys’ 
from the ‘bad guys’: 
Whenever I pick a story about killings in Plateau, I always go direct and say: ‘Fulani 
herdsmen […]’ to describe the culprits. Some of my colleagues would rather use the 
phrase, ‘unknown gunmen’ or ‘alleged Fulani herdsmen’, when in reality they know 
the aggressors. I know it is not the natives that are killing themselves. I am on ground 
and I know this is the situation here. 
He continues: 
I don’t pretend about it […] Normally, I try to downplay the issue of the killing of the 
Hausa Fulani in Jos in particular. In 2001, for instance, I downplayed the killings at 
Bauchi Road. I remember the soldiers and the mobile police were drafted in. They 
pursued some of these boys to their fathers’ compounds; brought them out and shot 
them. That story was majorly reported by […paper identity withheld]. For those of us 
who were Christians, that story did not find its way into our papers. Rather, I took my 
own story from the point that the Hausa community in Jos are trying to eliminate the 
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natives to take over their land. So in my writings, I try to defend the interest of the 
natives and Christianity which is my faith. 
IP 3 - IEG’s concept of ‘downplay’ which runs through his narratives connotes a framing in 
which the substance of the news regarded as ‘important’ and which might be a true reflection 
of the conflict is ignored or presented in the manner that it loses its taste. His sympathy with 
fellow minority ethnic groups of the middle belt and his Christian religion has sufficiently 
manifested in his claim. 
A report published in his newspaper on September 10, 2001 points to the same direction. It 
reads: 
                     The conflagration that engulfed Jos [...] raged on [...] with the number of victims 
reaching an astronomical rate. Mutilated bodies littered the streets as students, 
traders many of them Igbos, as well as indigenes grieved over the loss of dear 
ones [...] the proprietors of the crises, described as Muslim fundamentalists 
engaged [...] (pp.1-2). 
Two other papers of this orientation that reported the same conflict give their accounts:  
                     The looted shops are mainly owned by Igbo traders most of them located near the 
Jos Central Mosque. Millions of Naira were also stolen from the shops [....] The 
biggest Catholic Church in Jos. Our Lady of Fatima has been razed down by fire. 
This is in addition to COCIN (Church of Christ in Nigeria) and the Assembly of 
God Church that were razed down on Friday (XXXX, September 10, 2001, p.1). 
                     The Police Commissioner delayed the release of policemen to quill the riot [...] 
the Hausas reportedly had field day killing the natives and southerners because 
there was no police assistance […] The Muslims gained upper hand as they hack 
(ed) down any indigene or Christian on sight while the indigenes were armed 
with sticks only. It is still baffling to many people how the Muslims who were 
praying in the mosque got access to knives, machetes and other dangerous 
weapons (YYYY, September 24, 2001, p.1) 
The underlying role of journalists as defined by the participants is to serve the interests of 
religious groups (IP 20 - FBM, IP 8 - FBC) that claimed to have been underreported by the 
secular media and the Hausa Fulani (as implied in the case of Miyeti-Allah in IP 12 - HFS 
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interview) as well as the cause of the ‘indigenes’ (IP 3 - IEG). This affirms that media role in 
conflict is a social construction of reality by journalists who bear witness to the conflict. 
Journalistic role has received much attention within journalism studies in the last 
decades  because there is no consensus on ‘how journalism ought to be (ie journalistic role 
conception) and how journalism is performed (ie how those roles manifest in practice)’ 
(Hellmueller & Mellado, 2015, p. 1). The journalists’ role, as testified by them and 
manifested in the stories cited, includes ‘neutral reporting’ and ‘active participation’ in the 
Jos conflict. They have demonstrated these conditions in their claims and the reports they 
produced. Previous research on journalistic role conception had predicted that journalists who 
perceived their role in terms of disseminating information would write their stories from the 
onlookers’ point of view, while those who believed their role required interpreting the events 
would give their accounts as stakeholders (Cohen, 1963; Shoemaker & Reese, 1996). Thus, 
this study follows the logic that what constitutes news, or any piece of work produced by 
journalists for their audiences, are a reflection of journalistic roles (T. Hanitzsch & Mellado, 
2011). But beyond that, it examines the role conceptions of the conflict journalists – what 
they say or claim about their roles in the Jos conflict, in the light of their role performance – 
what they do, to understand ‘the relationship between what journalists think they should do 
and what they actually perform within the structure of a newsroom and a particular system’ 
(Hellmueller & Mellado, 2015, p. 2) .  
Among other factors, there are organisational and political systems within the 
journalists’ work environment that have shaped their role conceptions and performance. For 
example, the role of IP 8 –FBC and IP 20 – FBM in the conflict suggest that their goal is to 
‘defend’ Christianity and Islam (the organisations they represent) because their organisational 
‘voice’ has been silenced and therefore, should be heard. While they both claim to be neutral 
(role conception), their actual work manifests what may be regarded as an advancement of 
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the ‘cause’ of their organisations (role performance). Also, IP3 IEG’s affiliation with the 
‘indigenes’, because of the politically-motivated Middle Belt agenda which binds them, has 
defined his role conception. This role is consistent with his role performance. He says he does 
not pretend about taking sides with the ‘indigenes’, the outcome of which manifests in the 
report of September 10, 2001 that blamed the conflict on ‘Muslim fundamentalists’ without 
substantial evidence. 
Drawn on constructivist epistemology that ‘meaning is not discovered but 
constructed’ (Crotty, 1998, p. 42), and given the purpose for conducting the interviews – to 
‘rely as much as possible on the participants’ views’ (Creswell, 2014, p. 8) of the Jos conflict, 
the findings show that their ‘neutral’ role conceptions (claimed by many) do not conform to 
their role performance. They have been participants in the conflict. 
6.3.4 Journalistic objectivity: How has it been applied or compromised? 
The researcher sought to investigate how the participants have applied the standard of 
journalistic objectivity in their coverage of the conflict. They were also asked about the 
critical circumstances of the conflict in which they could compromise journalistic objectivity 
(Interview Question 9). This engagement on objectivity became necessary because it is the 
guiding principle of most journalists (von Oppen, 2009)  – including Nigerian journalists, and 
its advocates have maintained that it should be attained as much as possible (Muñoz-Torres, 
2012). Although objectivity is a universal standard, journalistic role conceptions and 
performance from which this practice emerged, are understood based on cultural contexts 
(Berganza-Conde et al., 2010; Hellmueller & Mellado, 2015). The journalists’ ‘individuality 
and creativity which Hellmueller and Mellado (2015, p. 3) have identified as key variables in 




Figure 6:  14 Word Cloud: Journalists’ objectivity (Component of RQ2) 
 
 
Figure 6:  15 Word Tree: Journalists’ objectivity (Component of RQ2) 
Based on the word search which included objectivity, subjectivity, Jos conflict, applied, and 
journalists; the above Word Cloud and Word Tree emerged. Both results reflect the subject 
under examination – objectivity. A few responses captured in Figure 6.15 suffice: 
I believe in objectivity but not in terms of reporting conflict (IP 4). 
I am an advocate of objectivity [….] Try to strike a balance (IP 5). 
I like the idea of objectivity. However, it is not everything that a journalist sees that 
he/she reports for security reasons (IP 6). 
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I uphold the norm of objectivity but to a large extent; since we are human and have 
our sentiments, there is the tendency that our practices may not be objective (IP 16). 
The remarks of the participants referred to in the above examples are most instructive. By 
their affirmation they have accepted the standard of objectivity which can only apply to 
certain conditions. As a social phenomenon that is sensitive, and which should be reported 
with restraint (S. T. Lee, 2010; Pintak, 2014), conflict is not one of such conditions. They re-
echo Bell’s (1997) argument that objective reporting deepens conflict because when contents 
are not moderated under the guise of reporting both sides, or describing the situation ‘the way 
it is’ (Blaagaard, 2013; Marken, 2007), the conflict may escalate.  
In their attempts to explain how objectivity is achieved in reporting the conflict, 
participants IP8 – FBC, IP12 – HFS and IP 20 – FBM have claimed absolute adherence to the 
standard. However, some of their comments have suggested the contrary. For example, IP 20 
- FBM’s revelation about his newspaper’s engagements with priests of the Christian bloc 
implied an effort to achieve balance (Muslim and Christian perspectives) – which is the key 
driver of objectivity (Stenvall, 2008). But he remarked that as a Muslim, his faith was 
paramount and would not be compromised. It must be defended. In other words, in reporting 
the conflict, he is, first and foremost, a Muslim; and then a journalist. The outcome of his 
‘attachment’ to Islam would be subjective rather than objective. He makes this analogy: 
If you hit my daughter mistakenly with your car and she eventually dies; when you 
ask for forgiveness I will grant it because I believe it was destined to happen. But if 
you blaspheme the faith, the prophet, I won’t forget that. It is the teaching of the 
religion, and I have agreed to submit myself to the religion. It is my duty to defend the 
religion.  
The respondent’s answer above indicates that his faith can inhibit his journalistic standard of 
objectivity. And coming from a highly religious society, because Nigerians were once ranked 
‘the most religious people in the world with 90 per cent believing in God, praying regularly 
and affirming their readiness to die on behalf of their belief’ (Agbiboa & Okem, 2011, p. 
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112), this identity is likely to manifest in the product of the religious journalist. IP 8 - FBC 
admits that despite his Christian faith which he defends, achieving objectivity is almost 
impossible: 
You know we are human beings and honestly sometimes our emotions fail us [….] 
When it comes to the interest of the church; where I feel we are at fault or Christians 
are at fault, I would rather not delve into that. 
IP 12 - HFS also concurs: 
The truth is that we are human. Journalists are human. There are times that I would be 
so eager to do a particular story; I want to give someone a voice. Why? Because I’m 
closed to the person, or the person is from my community, or from my religion. I’m 
eager to give him a voice. It happens. It has happened several times. 
Their responses suggest that personal and organisational interests, as explained by 
Hellmueller and Mellado (2015) have defined their role. They have identified with the 
subjects they reported and failed to ‘allow the facts speak for themselves’. IP 3 - IEG also 
reveals thus: 
I don’t report about the settlers, and I don’t pretend about it. I wonder why people 
who should be in their own homeland came to settle in their (indigenes’) midst and 
have turned their guns against their hosts. 
IP 3 - IEG has demonstrated courage by admitting that his reports have been one-sided, 
driven by an ideology that serves the interest of the ‘indigenes’. This robust subjectivity is 
said to characterize news framing as argued by Greenwald (2014): 
Every news article is the product of all highly subjective cultural, nationalistic, and 
political assumptions. And journalists serve one faction’s interest or another […].The 
relevant distinction is not between journalists who candidly reveal their opinions and 
those who conceal them, pretending they have none (p. 231).  
From the foregoing, a new thinking towards defining the role of journalists in conflict is 
evolving. Journalists have not applied the principle of objectivity in reporting the Jos conflict. 
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6.4 RQ 3: What strategies did journalists employ in reporting the Jos conflict? 
The researcher required journalists’ responses about their unique ways of reporting the 
conflict or their strategies of constructing reality. The Interview Questions 10-14 were 
formulated to elicit response on this. 
Question 10 dwelt on ethics. The concept of an engagement ‘behind the scene’ 
referred to the conduct of journalists which did not conform to global best practices. Since 
factors such as poor remuneration of Nigerian journalists and the absence of insurance policy 
had tended to influence their work (Pratt & McLaughlin, 1990), the researcher wanted to 
know if conflict journalists had received ‘rewards’ from conflict actors in exchange for 
‘favourable’ news against the ‘other’. 
The participants were also asked about peace-building initiatives which journalists 
could promote in Jos to minimise human suffering (Question 11). In it, the participants were 
required to demonstrate this by sharing their experiences if they believed in peace journalism, 
conflict sensitive reporting or human rights journalism (Howard, 2009; S. T. Lee, 2010; 
Rodgers, 2012, 2013; Shaw, 2016). It was also inspired by the new orientation in journalism 
that members of the International Federation of Journalists – the largest organisation of 
journalists in the world – ought to promote peace in their various media (Ellis, 2012, cited in 
Singh, 2013, p. 113). In Question 12, they were required to suggest ways that would improve 
conflict reporting in Jos and guarantee professionalism. 
Question 13 examined the capacity of regulatory agencies to check the conduct of 
journalists who flawed the law by aligning with warring groups in the Jos conflict. The 
National Broadcasting Commission and the Nigerian Press Council were particularly 
identified as the agencies that regulate broadcast and print media contents in the country. 
The researcher, in Question 14, wanted to gain an understanding about the role of media 
owners and gatekeepers in the news production process because they are believed to exert 
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Figure 6:  16 Word Cloud: Journalists’ strategies of news framing 
 
 
Figure 6:  17 Word Tree: Journalists’ strategies of news framing 
The word search focused on: way of reporting, way of writing, strategies, unprofessional 
practices, behind the scene, de-escalate violence, peace building, professional honour, 
regulatory institutions, media owners, and interfere. 
The way they report the conflict varies because their role also differs. Their 
overarching interests have made them to devise a means to express them – either in support 
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of peace through ‘moderation’ (IP 22), or by revealing the facts unadulterated, or instigating 
one party against the other. These are the strategies they have adopted. Those whose role in 
the conflict is geared towards promoting the Christian indigenous cause have consistently 
drawn the attention of their audiences to what may be regarded as the wicked and intolerable 
actions of the Muslim Hausa Fulani ‘settlers’ who want to reap where they have not sown. 
This strategy of portraying the ‘settlers’ as the ‘bad guys’ and ‘indigenes’ as ‘good guys’ 
(Ruigrok, 2008), is revealed in the responses of this category of journalists. 
In my writings, I condemn people who know that this place is not theirs but they are 
still fighting over it. The fact is that you have to respect your host. For instance, I am 
in Plateau, and I know that I am not a Plateau man despite that I was born in Plateau 
State. I know that I am going back one day to my state of origin because I come from 
another state. Why should people forget their roots and then come to fight their hosts? 
I have a quarrel with it; and in all my write-ups, I have insisted that, ‘look, respect 
your host. They are not asking you to leave; all they are telling you is to respect their 
norms, respect their customs [….]’(IP 15).   
IP 23 also puts it succinctly: 
I am fully attached to the story I write […].There is no doubt that I take side with the 
indigenes who have suffered in the hands of their visitors. 
Their strategy includes the writing of news which describes, explains and colours the ‘facts’ 
to tell the story of the ‘indigenes’; and creating sensational headlines that suggest an act of 
violence meted out to ‘indigenes’ by the ‘settlers’ (for most newspaper journalists). Although 
the cameramen claim to be neutral in their representation of visuals, their strategy of 
‘stealing’ the shots of subjects without their consent for their TV stations (IP 17; IP 21) may 
be an expression of indigenous interests. This is not because they are ‘indigenes’ but the 
owners of all the TV stations in Jos (apart from the 2 government owned TV stations which 
are headed by ‘indigenous’ managers), are Christians who can influence the shots.  
The strategies of news framing of the conflict by Muslim journalists are implied. 
While they have consistently argued that they do not take side with any party in conflict, 
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especially the Muslim ‘settlers’, their remarks have pointed to the direction that they defend 
‘their own’. They seem to be unaware of the weights of their responses. For example, IP 12 –
HFS notes that being human, she is  
[….] eager to give someone a voice  [...] because the person is from my community or 
from my religion.  
Likewise, IP 7 claims, ‘I write the way things happen. I don’t insinuate. I don’t editorialise. I 
don’t put in my opinion [….]’, but he acknowledges that he ‘is just between objectivity and 
subjectivity’. It means neither objectivity (which he upholds), nor subjectivity (which he 
dismisses in theory) applies to his work. In that sense, he might have covered his strategies of 
reporting the conflict that serve an interest (perhaps, the Muslim interest because he is a 
Muslim).  
Most of the journalists deny being engaged in practices ‘behind the scene’ but some of them 
have admitted the following: 
There are a lot of officials out there that we have personal relationship with. The 
stories in which their interests are not protected are often stepped down (IP 6) 
IP 5 also recalls that, 
[…] an incident had happened which I covered and was ready to publish it. But when 
a major player in the case came to plead that the story be discarded, I succumbed to 
that pressure. 
These responses have satisfied the curiosity of the researcher who sought to know their 
practices ‘behind the scene’. Both scenarios confirm Howard’s (2009) findings that political 
elites were exploiting the media in societies considered to be vulnerable. Theorists of conflict 
sensitive reporting have therefore, recommended that when faced with this challenge, conflict 
journalists should ensure that they give only ‘none-elite sources voice and space’ (Singh, 
2013, p. 121). 
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The journalists believe that they can support ongoing peace building efforts in Jos by 
detaching themselves from the conflict and avoiding the instigation of social groups. 
At a glance, the Word Tree (Figure 6. 17) shows how media owners interfere, or not 
interfere, with their work. The concept of moderation of content introduced by IP 22 is 
advanced by media owners whose interests the journalists tend to serve. Some reporters have 
revealed that their editors and managers often alter their reports on the conflict while others 
enjoy relative independence. 
6.5 Participants’ level of journalism training and editorial engagements 
In Question 15, 16 and 17, attention was shifted from the thematic discourse to the 
participants. The researcher was interested in the level or type of training they had received 
which earned them the job (journalism) they were undertaking, especially conflict reporting. 
They were also required to identify other editorial responsibilities they had undertaken. The 
essence was to understand their professional backgrounds which could affect their conduct, 
especially their ability to analyse and report conflict. Another factor which was considered 
relevant in determining the quality of news content was the circumstance that led to the 
deployment of the journalists to conflict news beat – whether it was accidental or desired, 
which could also define productivity. The engagement about editorial responsibilities was 




Figure 6:  18 Word Cloud: Participants’ level of journalism training and editorial engagements 
 
Figure 6:  19 Word Tree: Participants’ level of journalism training and editorial engagements 
The word search included: degree, diploma, conflict journalist, editorial responsibilities and 
conflict reporting. Of the 26 participants, 19 have acquired either a master’s degree, 
bachelor’s degree, higher national diploma or a national diploma in Mass Communication or 
Journalism. It means that 7 participants have different academic qualifications ranging from 
English to History, Political Science and Theatre Arts. Based on the minimum standard of a 
diploma in Mass Communication/Journalism for the practice of journalism in Nigeria, most 
of the participants have met this criterion. 
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As may be identified in the Word Cloud, the participants have covered the Jos conflict 
for a minimum of 5 years (not later than 2010) and other news beats. Many of them desired to 
become journalists before they ventured into journalism while a few of them joined the 
profession because there were no preferred employment opportunities to them. 
6.6 Summary of Analysis  
The interview participants (IP 1-26) offered explanations on their lived experiences as 
conflict journalists in the city of Jos. The data obtained from the interview has established 
journalists’ role in the nearly two decades of ethno-religious violence.  
The respondents identified three major factors that have influenced their work – the 
residential segregation of the city; pressure from conflict actors, editors and news sources, 
and their constant witness to violence. These are believed to have affected the way they 
report the conflict due to limited access to information, internal and external influences and 
the cumulative trauma emerging from their encounter with violence. The journalists 
described these as the challenges confronting them but claimed that a number of strategies 
had been adopted to surmount them. These measures include the reporters’ reliance on eye-
witness accounts, and a shift from conflict to development-centred events aimed at diverting 
the attention of editors/conflict actors who demand certain conflict narratives to achieve 
many interests (e.g., casualty figures). They also involve the media organisations’ strategy of 
assigning reporters to conflict areas dominated by the reporters’ religious/ethnic groups to 
ensure their safety, and enable them to obtain first-hand information about the conflict.  
Drawing on this data, the participants have dismissed the ideal of objectivity both in 
practice and principle. Although the journalists desired objectivity, they consistently 
demonstrated some degree of involvement in the conflict by using their media to ‘defend the 
religion (Islam)’ or resist any attempt to ‘blaspheme the faith, the prophet’ (IP 20 - FBM); 
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report attacks on the church while refusing to delve into the issues when ‘Christians are at 
fault’ (IP 8 - FBC); ‘give someone a voice […] because the person is from my community or 
from my religion’ (IP 12 - HFS); deny the ‘settlers’ access to voice their opinion because they 
‘came to settle in their (indigenes’) midst and have turned their guns against their hosts’ (IP 3 
- IEG). This is not a role of mediation but that of advancing a cause which the favoured 
warring party has initiated. The practice neither suggests peace journalism nor human rights 
journalism. It is a brand of journalism evolving from this study. 
The findings show that journalists have employed different strategies at the stages of 
selecting and ‘moderating’ frames (referred to in this study as ‘newsroom experience’) (see 
Chapter 6). Some of the strategies include their choice of words to ‘water down’ or 
‘downplay’ conflict narratives when tension is intense; articulating the views of their affiliate 
groups in conflict while silencing others; writing the intro/lead that attracts sympathy for their 
affiliate social groups; writing about alleged killings of members of their affiliate groups 
without any evidence. The concept of affiliation of the journalists with warring groups is 
established because they have been a part of, and are believed to align with the ethnic and 
religious community. As a consequence, much of what they claim to be objective is 
contradictory. Rather, they have immersed themselves in the conflict to carry on the war on 
behalf of conflict actors – a situation which suggests that they were participants in the 





Qualitative Content Analysis: The 2001 Conflict 
7.1 Introduction 
This chapter examines the contents of two newspapers – the Daily/Weekly Trust and The 
Punch, and compares the strategies employed by the journalists of both publications in the 
framing of the 2001 Jos conflict. The analysis follows the chronology of the conflict believed 
to be the most violent in the history of Jos – the 2001, 2008 and 2010 conflicts (Ishaku, 2012; 
Taft & Haken, 2015) . Although there were several civil disturbances in Jos in the 1940s, 
1990s and after 2010, the three years’ episodes analysed in this study were significant 
because of the spates of violence which resulted in the loss of lives and property during these 
periods  (Krause, 2011). In this chapter, the first conflict is analysed to establish how 
journalists were implicated in it and the role they played.  
In 2001, on September 7, the violence that broke out in the Congo Rusia area of Jos 
spread to nearly all parts of the city. It became the first major armed conflict in Jos in which 
lives were lost (Ishaku, 2012; Nyam & Ayuba, 2016). The accounts of this incident in The 
Punch and Daily/Weekly Trust have been analysed to show how both newspapers 
spontaneously responded to it, and to know whose interests they tended to serve in the 
conflict. Were the journalists objective or goal-oriented at the outset? Did they change their 
reporting patterns as the conflict prevailed? Did their news frames (based on language use) 
implicate certain groups identified in the conflict? This entailed examining five succeeding 
editions of the newspapers that were published after the incident occurred. As U. Bello (2014, 
p. 72) argues that journalists’ reports are largely ‘based on other mediated discourses and 
perspectives from which they create a model of presentation for their audience, conforming to 
their own values’, this analysis focused on how these values and interests were embedded in 
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the texts. This phase of work offered the researcher the knowledge of the journalists’ role 
performance in the conflict – how their narratives were constructed and the goals they 
achieved.  
As explained in Chapter 5 (the methodology, pp.105-107), the choice of these papers 
was based on their ranking in Nigeria’s Christian South and Muslim North, each of which 
represents the ideology of its region (ethnic structure) and religion (Egwu, 2001). The Punch 
is one of the leading papers in the ‘Lagos-Ibadan axis’ – the Christian-dominated South 
(African Media Development Initiative, 2005; Ralph Afolabi Akinfeleye, 2003; L. Oso, D. 
Odunlami, & T. Adaja, 2011), while the Daily/Weekly Trust emerged  in the North to 
challenge the ‘Lagos-Ibadan axis’ press which was believed to have relegated the North 
(comprised of Hausa Fulani Muslim majority) to the background (African Media 
Development Initiative, 2005; A. O. Musa & Ferguson, 2013). Being a leading publication in 
the South and, to some extent, Nigeria’s most widely read newspaper – with approximately 
60,000 to 80,000 daily circulation - The Punch is said to be very popular (Zeng & Akinro, 
2013). Likewise, the Daily/Weekly Trust has gained prominence in the North and it is the 
largest newspaper in the region having a daily circulation figure of 11,672 (A. O. Musa & 
Ferguson, 2013). Based on their relevance in the regions and consequent influence on 
Christianity and Islam – the religions of most Nigerians (Dowd, 2014; Egwu, 2001, 2015), it 
became necessary to examine their contents in relation to the Jos conflict involving the 
Christian ‘indigenes’ and the Muslim Hausa Fulani ‘settler’ community.  
While the interview data set contained the views of conflict journalists about what 
their work entailed, the content analysis data set (obtained from the newspapers) showed how 
they actually performed. This approach to qualitative enquiry, as argued by Schreier (2012), 
was aimed at knowing what was said and how it was said. 
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The analysis followed the logic that the use of language is significant in qualitative 
content analysis (QCA), especially when the data consists of newspaper reports, editorials, 
commentaries, amongst others (González-Carriedo, 2014). Newspaper journalists who are 
often the major language users make choices of words, phrases or sentences from a variety of 
codes to construct reality. Such a construction emanates from the ideology of these journalists 
or their media. It is a process which produces narratives that express a less complex situation 
or a complex one that requires some form of interpretation (Hsieh & Shannon, 2005; Van 
Dijk, 2012). Thus, the qualitative content analyst requires an overarching search lens that can 
systematically identify the properties embedded in the text, to explain them within a given 
context.   
In this analysis of the Daily/Weekly Trust and The Punch, the ‘researcher-generated 
construct’ (Saldana, 2016, p. 4) pertained to the writers’ linguistic choices – how newspaper 
narratives about conflict actors (‘indigenes’ and ‘settlers’, Christians and Muslims) were 
constructed and the meanings ascribed to them. It focused on news headlines, leads and the 
body of news, feature and the editorial because they formed the important portions of the 
newspaper content (U. Bello, 2014). Throughout the exercise, where a word – noun, verb, 
adjective or a given expression – suggested that the journalists were ‘doing something’ 
beyond telling a story,  which may have translated to media logic, the researcher paid 
attention to it to decipher its meaning (Cottle, 2006). In that sense, the researcher examined 
the less obvious but problematic constructs in both publications which described the same 
conflict situation. The essence of this comparative analysis was to understand how the models 
of objectivity, mediatisation and framing manifested in the newspaper contents given that 
both publications had distinct goals.  
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7.2 September 7, 2001 conflict (Samples: September 8/9 – 13, 2001) 
7.2.1 The Daily/Weekly Trust 
Based on the study’s inclusion and exclusion criteria for the selection of samples, 5 editions 
that followed the outbreak of violence were analysed to reveal how the conflict narratives 
were constructed and transmitted, and the likely conditions that tended to ‘put pictures in the 
heads’ of the readers (Lippmann, 1922, p. 3). Both the Daily Trust and Weekly Trust were in 
circulation before and after September 7. In particular, the Weekly Trust of September 7-13 
had been published before the incident occurred hence the exclusion of that edition. The 
Weekly Trust that followed was dated September 14-20. In it, the writers presented the ‘facts’ 
about how and why the conflict began. It met the criterion of inclusion being the first Weekly 
Trust that reported the violence. The second, third, fourth, and fifth samples were the Daily 
Trust of September 10, 11, 12 and 13. The newspaper was not in circulation on September 8 
and 9. Therefore, the editions that followed were sampled. 
Like other newspapers that reported the September 7 Jos violence giving an insight 
into how it erupted to satisfy readers’ curiosity about what had gone wrong in the once ‘home 
of peace’, the Daily/Weekly Trust, expectedly, informed its readers about the causes of the 
conflict; those allegedly responsible for it, and the ones who suffered loss. At the outset, the 
paper drew the attention of its readers to the plight of helpless Hausa Fulani Muslims 
purportedly attacked by Christian ‘indigenes’ because both groups had clashed. A reporter, 
Rabiu Ibrahim (a Hausa Fulani Muslim), in the story entitled ‘Jos carnage: How and why it 
began […]’ (R. Ibrahim, 2001), made an attempt to observe the journalistic standard of 
‘reporting responsibly’ (Howard, 2009, 2015), when he acknowledged that ‘it is near 
impossible to ferret a reasonable casualty figure’ (R. Ibrahim, 2001, p. 1, par.1). He may have 
recognised that there had been sporadic attacks which resulted in many deaths – difficult to 
count and identify the warring groups that suffered the most. He therefore, summarised the 
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incident and provided details in the lead which is a routine in journalism (Harcup, 2015; 
Harcup & O'Neill, 2001; Wheeler, 2005). But the reporter failed to sustain his seeming 
character of neutrality in the conflict narrative.  He adopted the neutral-to-goal-focused 
strategy which is a transition from somewhat ‘neutral’ to a ‘goal-focused’ reporting. Some 
elements of bias began to manifest because, as a Muslim, he identified his fellow Muslims as 
the victims of the attack purportedly launched by the Christian ‘indigenes’.  While he barely 
ended the writing of the lead, he reported in paragraph 2 that, 
Tears freely flowed on the faces of the Muslim community who had brought the 
corpses on a trailer after painstaking hours had been spent washing the dead bodies at 
the Jos Central Mosque (R. Ibrahim, 2001, p. 1, par.2) 
When viewed from an analytical lens, the story above evokes vengeance. It might have 
sparked off reprisal attacks from the Muslim camp that is disgruntled and saddened by the 
loss of its members whose corpses ‘filled up’ a trailer. The bias of the newspaper is imminent 
as it is unreasonable to assume that a trailer containing corpses of Muslims could be brought 
into the central mosque from warfare in which Muslims and Christians were major actors. 
Who identified the corpses before they were loaded on the trailer? Were there traits, such as 
tribal marks or labels that proved the dead were Muslims? 
The reporter further claimed that ‘processions of pick-up vans carrying charred bodies 
of completely burnt humans piled one on top of another, intermittently headed for different 
burial grounds’. This suggested that there was an onslaught on the Muslims.  As such, the 
impression he had created about Muslims being the victims of the conflict resulting in the 
flow of tears on the faces of the Muslim community, suggested that the ‘burnt humans’ may 
not have included Christians who presumably organised and carried out the attacks. 
Some degree of reporter involvement in the conflict is imminent. First, he amplified 
the voice of his ethnic and religious community rather than his professional community. 
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Zandberg and Neiger (2005) had observed that when a journalist belongs to any party in 
conflict, his/her professional conduct would be compromised. This ‘belongingness’ is 
embedded in par. 2, as no conflicting party, other than the Muslim community, was presumed 
to have suffered loss. Second, he reported the incident from an angle that tended to attract 
sympathy for the Muslims in Jos. This choice of angle and its placement in the body of text is 
what media scholars refer to as framing (Entman, 1993; Kuypers, 2010; Phillips, 2015). The 
report silenced the Christian indigenous group as if it never recorded any casualty. The 
reporter’s construction of the Muslim-victim and Christian-aggressor narrative was 
supplemented by a bottom strip distress alert (WeeklyTrust, 2001, p. 9), in which the Jasawa 
Development Association - a Hausa Fulani Muslim group – appealed for financial and 
material support for the victims of the conflict who were taking refuge in various camps 
across the city.  Although the advertorial indicated that the assistance being sought was in aid 
of ‘the needy Nigerians who have suffered untold hardship and deprivation […] as a result of 
the unfortunate ethnic-religious conflagrations that engulfed Jos’, Rabiu Ibrahim’s lead story 
which identified Muslims as the victims suggested that the appeal was to ameliorate the 
suffering of the Muslim victims. In all this, the reporter employed an implanting strategy of 
framing which introduced the readers to a new thinking that the alleged attack on the Hausa 
Fulani Muslim communities was carried out by the Christian ‘indigenes’.   
Having observed the movement of people from areas perceived to be ‘unsafe’ to other 
parts of the city; the reporter envisaged that communities would be separated on religious 
lines. He wrote that ‘what is certain is that very few people will go back to their initial 
residence as the city has been demarcated along religious lines. Muslims are looking to 
relocate to areas they dominate and same for Christians’ (R. Ibrahim, 2001, p. 2, par.3). His 
prediction was not contestable as the renewed hostilities that followed the September 7 
conflict forced the residents to relocate, and in many instances, sell or abandon their houses 
220 
 
(see Aliyu et al., 2012). As a result of this residential segregation, some areas became densely 
populated and were turned into slums (Nyam & Ayuba, 2016). This data supports an earlier 
claim by some interview participants in the previous chapter of this study that communities in 
Jos had been separated by ethnic and religious boundaries – a situation that was said to have 
affected their work. 
The Weekly Trust, in that report, identified news sources it believed were competent 
to explain the root and immediate causes of the September 7 violence. It interviewed them, 
either because of their witness to the violence, or on the basis of their political, religious and 
professional ranks. In one of the interviews, the spokesman of the Gbong Gwom Jos (the 
chief of Jos), Mr. Sunday Yakubu Dung told Weekly Trust that the traditional ruler was 
deeply pained over the violence that engulfed the city in which many of his subjects had been 
killed. He said neither himself nor his principal could ascertain the causes of the violence. 
But he said the public seemed unanimous on the view that the conflict might have sparked off 
when a certain woman allegedly crossed a barricade at a mosque along Congo Rosia area. 
The second factor, he noted, was not unconnected with the appointment of a Hausa Fulani 
Muslim, Muktar Mohammed, as the coordinator of the federal government’s National 
Poverty Eradication Programme (NAPEP) for Jos North Local Government Area where there 
had been contestation over indigeneship status. The NAPEP coordinator’s appointment was 
resisted by the ‘indigenes’ of Jos – the Afizere, Anaguta and Berom (Ambe-Uva, 2010; 
Danfulani, 2006; Krause, 2011) who argued that the political position was their exclusive 
preserve hence no ‘settler’ deserved it. 
The newspaper corroborated Mr. Sunday Yakubu Dung’s position on the ‘indigene’ versus 
‘settler’ tussle over the NAPEP appointment. It stated,  
[…] a group calling itself ‘indigenous Youth Association of Jos North’ issued a press 
statement denouncing the appointment and called on the government for an 
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immediate replacement with what they called a ‘Jos North indigene’. The action 
promptly rose tempers of the Hausa Fulani who consider themselves indigenes of the 
state but who are considered non-indigenes by other ethnic groups, particularly the 
Berom, Anaguta, Jarawa (Afizere) etc. (R. Ibrahim, 2001, p. 2, par.18) 
In literature (e.g., Dowd, 2014; J. D. Galadima, 2010; Rasaq, 2012), the agitation by the 
Hausa Fulani community to be recognised as an indigenous ethnic group in Jos, and to be 
integrated into the political life of Plateau State has been unequivocal. Since the ‘indigenes’ 
had put up resistance to this integration which ‘promptly rose the tempers of the Hausa 
Fulani’ who claimed membership of the area, the controversy was likely to degenerate into 
large scale conflict. 
The Weekly Trust’s lead story emerged largely from eye-witness accounts like other 
reports on conflict because of the hazardous nature of conflict. The reporters adopted a 
community-aided strategy to support their narratives. Their news sources included those with 
whom they shared a religious community. The newspaper, for example, interviewed one 
Sheikh Al-Hassan Sa’id who was identified simply as a Muslim community leader. Sheikh 
Sa’id was the newspaper’s first eye-witness. He was said to be the cleric who led Muslim 
worshippers during the Juma’at prayer at the Congo Rusia mosque where a woman 
purportedly invaded the prayer ground. He held that when the woman attempted to cross over 
the blocked area,  
[…] she was pleaded with to retreat but she insisted. She therefore forced her way and 
was stopped […].When I saw the situation, I took the microphone appealing for calm 
[...]. As the woman ran out raining abuses on us, suddenly stones started hitting us, 
including arrows made of irons. Determined that we must pray, I asked some young 
men to shield us while we prayed. By the time we got through praying, some of us 
had been wounded already. I ordered someone to go and inform the police of the 
attacks on us but the person was instead detained on reaching the police station. This 
is why we believe the action was pre-planned and the attacks premeditated (Sa'id, 
2001, cited in R. Ibrahim, 2001, p. 2, par.13). 
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Another eye-witness, Imam Abdullahi Khalil – a lecturer of Religious Studies at the 
University of Jos, told the Weekly Trust that, 
[…] that girl who was said to have attempted for the past three weeks to pass through 
that place came on that fateful day and wanted to pass, and after having been 
informed, she insisted. But she knew because she lived on the same street that the 
sermon was going on, and she insisted. And she was allowed to pass and because she 
had an agenda, she passed and went to the extreme end and then came back and tried 
to pass again (Khalil, 2001, cited in D. G. Mohammed, 2001, p. 3). 
Both accounts were linked to a certain ‘stubborn’ female non-Muslim (in the interviewees’ 
words – ‘woman’, ‘girl’) who resisted a practice that had been condoned – the mounting of 
barricade around mosques during Juma’at prayers. Sheikh Sa’id argued that the barricade was 
‘normally put up on such days as a result of the fact that the mosque cannot contain the 
number of people who come for prayers’ (R. Ibrahim, 2001, p. 2, par.12). By barricade, it 
meant that the whole street where the mosque was situated was blocked throughout the 
Juma’at prayers, as a result of which passers-by, motorists and even the residents were 
restricted from moving on the street until the prayers were concluded and the worshippers 
dispersed. What made this practice ‘normal’ was a mere construction of the worshippers 
which was not backed by law (Ishaku, 2012). This might have prompted the action of the 
woman mentioned in both accounts as she allegedly insisted on her right of way. If she 
‘attempted for the past three weeks to pass through that place’ (Khalil, 2001, cited in D. G. 
Mohammed, 2001, p. 3, par.3), and was stopped, as Sheikh Sa’id claimed, then her frustration 
may have resulted in the aggression of that day. She was accused of mobilising non-Muslim 
youths to attack Muslim worshippers at the mosque and the Muslim community in that area. 
Weekly Trust’s second eye-witness, Abdullahi Khalil, confirmed thus: 
The Christians were burning down people’s houses. This I personally saw with my 
naked eyes […]. The house where the mosque was located belongs to one Alhaji 
Tijani Abdullahi and he has five houses and his cars and property were all burnt to 
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ashes. At the opposite, I saw several Muslim houses around the environment that were 
burnt (Khalil, 2001, cited in D. G. Mohammed, 2001, p. 3). 
Based on these narratives, the reporters reinforced the reality which they had embedded in 
their readers. The missing point in this report is the perspective of the ‘other’ – the Christian 
party or the said woman who allegedly caused the conflict. The reporters used ‘media logic’ 
favourable to their religious community which portrayed a violent Christian community that 
organised and carried out the attacks on Muslims. 
The reporters’ lenses focused on Sheikh Al-Hassan Sa’id and Imam Abdullahi Khalil 
(both Muslims), referred to as eye-witnesses, but failed to locate the said woman, referred to 
as the accused, or any Christian in that area who took part in or witnessed the event as it 
unfolded. While the reporters seemed to have adhered to the journalistic principle of 
engaging news sources to testify about the events they witnessed, especially in a conflict 
situation (Pate, 2011), they lost their sense of balance by denying the conflicting party a 
voice. Therefore, objectivity was compromised. Although it may be argued that the woman 
could have been displaced after she committed the ‘crime’, or even killed by those who 
opposed what she stood for, the reporters could have investigated and reported about her.  
Imam Khalil claimed that the woman had paraded herself three times insisting on her right of 
way, and that ‘she lived on the street that the sermon was going on [….]’ (Khalil, cited in D. 
G. Mohammed, 2001, p. 3, par.3). This implies that she was known in the community and 
had family and neighbours who might have given their side of the story if they were 
contacted by the reporters.  
Research has revealed that the woman or girl referred to in the Weekly Trust was one Miss 
Rhoda Haruna Nyam – a Christian woman who was allegedly denied passage to her residence 
on the street where the Congo Rusia mosque was situated. It states: 
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Returning to work after her lunch break, Rhoda stood her ground and insisted on her 
right of way on the closed street. For her efforts, she was beaten black and blue by the 
Yan Agaji (or Aid Group) who usually perform police duties at Islamic gatherings. 
When she ran to her house, they gave her a hot pursuit; they instantly turned riotous 
beating up her father who came out on hearing the commotion outside and smashed 
and burned her mother’s car parked in front of the house. They went further to set the 
entire house on fire (Ishaku, 2012, p. 84) 
This version of the conflict account was not reported by the Weekly Trust. The newspaper 
claimed that the woman/girl triggered the conflict by ‘raining abuses’ and mobilising her 
group to use ‘arrows made of irons’ on the worshippers, some of who had been wounded 
(Sa'id, 2001, cited in R. Ibrahim, 2001, p. 2,par.13). In contrast, Ishaku’s (2012) study 
revealed that the woman insisted on her right of way, as a result of which she was beaten, her 
father assaulted and their property destroyed. By leaving out this part of the narrative, the 
journalists made choice of their frames to produce the Muslim-victim and Christian- 
aggressor reality. Also as a strategy, the Weekly Trust engaged with eye-witnesses who 
described the blocking of roads during Juma’at prayers as a ‘normal’ practice despite its legal 
implications and the inconveniences it had caused the residents and other road users. The 
paper did not inform its readers that the resistance to the blocking of roads along the Congo 
Rusia area, and some parts of the city where it occurred, did not start with the one that was 
said to ignite the 2001 violence. For example, the residents of Congo Rusia had written to the 
Nassarawa Gwong Divisional Police Officer (who supervised the security of Congo Rusia) 
on February 20, 1996, demanding the non-restriction of movement of people in the area 
during Juma’at prayers. They also petitioned the Plateau State Commissioner of Police on 
March 11 and March 20, 1996 over the same matter. Another complaint was sent to the Jos 
Metropolitan Development Board on June 21, 1996 and January 28, 1997 (Ishaku, 2012). All 
this effort yielded no result. 
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The newspaper failed to report that when the Plateau State government realised that 
the blocking of the roads by religious groups had heightened tension in the city, it invoked 
Section 254 of the Panel Code of Northern Nigeria of 1963 to stop the practice. The code 
provides that:  
Whoever voluntarily obstructs any person so as to prevent that person from 
proceeding in any direction, in which that person has the right to proceed, is said to 
restrain that person wrongfully ("The Panel Code," 1963). 
The government banned any form of restriction of movement of persons by all religious 
organisations but the order was resisted by the Muslim community (Plateau Indigenous 
Development Association Network, 2010). Its body, the Jama’atu Nasril Islam (JNI) in Jos 
North Local Government Area had described the government’s order as unconstitutional and 
directed Muslims to maintain the status quo (Ishaku, 2012). JNI’s action may have 
constituted a breach of the law, yet the newspaper was not forthcoming with the information. 
The woman mentioned in the story had protested the unconstitutionality of the blockage of 
the road. Rather than dwell on this, the reporters used media logic driven by their 
membership of religious community to interview eye-witnesses that shared the community’s 
values and goals. This was why the said woman was portrayed in the story as having refused 
to obey the ‘law’ – the ‘normal’ practice of road block.  
Another fundamental issue which the Weekly Trust reported that needs to be unpacked 
is the instruction by Sheikh Al-Hassan Sa’id to some Muslim youths to ‘shield’ the 
worshippers at the mosque when the woman and her group allegedly attacked them. He said, 
‘I asked some young men to shield us while we prayed’ (Sa'id, 2001, cited in R. Ibrahim, 
2001, p. 2, par.13). What could the word ‘shield’ mean in the context of violent conflict? It 
connotes a defence against an attack. But with what were the young men asked to defend the 
worshippers who were said to be surrounded by their perceived enemies? How did they 
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translate the defence order by their superior? Were they told to watch and pray while their 
attackers hit them with stones and ‘arrows made of irons’? Did this ‘holy’ defence inflict any 
injury on the opponents? Apparently, much is embedded in this comment which suggests that 
the reporters’ silence on it was an attempt to exonerate the Muslim group and create an 
impression of self-defence rather than an active role in the conflict.  
Sheikh Al-Hassan Sa’id, as reported by the Weekly Trust’s Rabiu Ibrahim, also 
accused the police of complicity. He alleged that the response of the police to the distress call 
he put across during the purported attacks on Muslim worshippers suggested that the police 
and the Christian community had an agenda, that is, a conspiracy to wipe out the Muslims in 
Jos. The reporter neither gave a voice to the other party in conflict nor sought an explanation 
from the police authorities over Sheikh Sa’id’s claim. Again, it implied a strategy to construct 
in the minds of readers the notion that the Muslim community in Jos was vulnerable and 
defenceless.  
In contrast, there had been allegations that Mr. M.D. Abubakar, the former 
Commissioner of Police in Plateau State during the 2001 Jos conflict was on the side of the 
Muslim community because his activities before, during and after the conflict were said to 
have pointed to that direction (Gofwen & Ishaku, 2006; Ishaku, 2012; Plateau Indigenous 
Development Association Network, 2010). Among others, he was accused of deploying the 
police to secure mosques before the violence erupted while churches were left unprotected. 
This action generated suspicion, especially among non-Muslims who believed the 
Commissioner of Police was not fair to all. However, the Weekly Trust did not draw attention 
of its readers to these allegations which the petitioners brought to the notice of the Niki Tobi-
led commission of enquiry that investigated the 2001 conflict. After a thorough investigation 
into the role of the former Commissioner of Police, the commission resolved as follows: 
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The commission recommends that for his ignoble role during the September 2001 
crisis which led to loss of lives, the former Commissioner of Police, Alhaji M.D 
Abubakar retire from the police force and in the event of his refusal to do so, he 
should be dismissed (Commission of Enquiry Report on 2001 Jos crisis, cited in 
Ishaku, 2012, p. 86). 
Given these allegations and the subsequent indictment of the former Commissioner of Police 
by the probe panel, Weekly Trust reporters ought to have raised the concerns of non-Muslims 
along with those of the Muslim community (as claimed by Sheikh Sa’id) to achieve some 
level of balance. Their refusal to dwell on this alleged complicity suggests that their  news 
framing was non-objective, goal-oriented (Bell, 1996, 1997; Greenwald, 2014).  
7.2.1.1 Evolving issues in the Daily/Weekly Trust – 2001 conflicts 
7.2.1.1.1 Appointment of NAPEP coordinator as cause of the conflict 
A number of studies (e.g., J. D. Galadima, 2010; Kaigama, 2012) have highlighted that the 
Jos conflict was multidimensional. It included factors such as religion, ethnicity, economy 
and politics. The Daily/Weekly Trust reports have focused on the religious and 
ethnic/political dimensions (the Muslim-Christian and settler-indigene identities).  
While a Christian woman was said to have prevailed on her right of way during the 
Muslim Juma’at prayers on September 7, 2001, which purportedly led to the conflict, the 
appointment of a Hausa Fulani Muslim as coordinator of NAPEP was also said to be a 
trigger. The ‘indigenous’ tribes of Afizere, Anaguta and Berom had called on the government 
that appointed a Muslim ‘settler’ to head the Jos North NAPEP to reverse it. They argued that 
the appointee was not an ‘indigene’ of the area. On September 10, 2001, the Daily Trust 
reported that, 
Tension was also said to have heightened as a result of the appointment of Alhaji 
Mohammed Usman, a Muslim Fulani, as the coordinator and chairman of the National 
Poverty Eradication Programme (NAPEP) (B. Bello, Odo, & Kwaru, 2001, p. 2). 
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Sheikh Al-Hassan Sa’id (the cleric who was a key witness that confirmed the alleged attack 
on Muslim worshippers at Congo Rusia), again, told Weekly Trust that Jos belonged to the 
Hausa Fulani, not the Afizere, Anaguta and Berom as it was widely held. He argued, 
This is our land. We set it up and even if ten of us remain, we are ready to defend our 
land […] just because our forefathers came from somewhere to set this place up, and 
because the town is lumped with other groups to make it a state, even without our 
consent […]. We don’t intend to leave. Perhaps, only our corpses can be taken out (R. 
Ibrahim, 2001, p. 4). 
Imam Abdullahi Khalil also concurred: 
To say that Muslims are in the minority in Jos is only propaganda [….] Part of the 
strategy is that they don’t want any Muslim to hold any post […] (Khalil, 2001, cited 
in D. G. Mohammed, 2001, p. 3). 
In the first scenario, the reporter established that not only was the crossing of barricade the 
cause of the September 7, 2001 conflict but also the controversy that trailed the appointment 
of the NAPEP coordinator. By coding the phrase, ‘[…] the appointment of Alhaji 
Mohammed Usman, a Muslim Fulani […]’, the reporter implied that the ‘indigenes’ might 
have rejected his appointment on the basis of his religious (Muslim) and ethnic (Fulani) 
identities. The readers of the newspaper were likely to perceive the ‘indigenes’ as people who 
compromised merit, but honoured religious and ethnic allegiances.  
In the second, the reporter used Sheikh Sa’id’s argument that the ‘settlers’ owned Jos 
to reinforce the Hausa Fulani Muslim clamour for recognition and identity. Giving Sa’id a 
voice that ‘this is our land […] we are ready to defend our land […]’, and ignoring the 
opposing views of the ‘indigenes’ who were likely to defend their claim of the ownership of 
Jos, was the reporter’s strategy of promoting the Hausa Fulani cause. The reporter shared the 
view expressed by Sa’id that the Muslim community (of which the reporter was a part), 
would not leave the city for the ‘indigenes’ to occupy, but remain in the land to defend it. 
Although the statement was credited to Sa’id, the reporter played a role in the Muslim Hausa 
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Fulani identity struggle by reporting and reinforcing it so that this perspective of reality may 
constitute the readers’ perception. This supports previous research that the journalists’ 
national (ethnic) community often overrides their professional community (Zandberg & 
Neiger, 2005). By selecting Sa’id’s version of the conflict account, paying attention to how 
Muslims would defend their cause, the reporter engaged in news framing which aimed at 
shaping the judgments of the newspaper readers. In that situation, the reporter adopted a 
shared-value strategy of reporting – that is, he attached the same meaning to the idea 
expressed by his news source.  
The Weekly Trust’s reporter – Rabiu Ibrahim – tried to persuade his readers by 
advancing an argument which suggested that  the presumed Hausa Fulani ‘settlers’ were the 
actual owners of Jos. He claimed that in 1912, a colonial official had referred to Jos town as a 
Hausa Fulani settlement based on a certain gazette of Plateau province. He wrote that the 
colonial official was said to have declared: 
[…] the Hausa Fulani inhabited what is presently known as Jos before the coming of 
the colonialists and before the Hausas, Jos was an unoccupied virgin land. The Hausas 
have been there since the beginning of the century. No Berom had a house in the 
heartland of Jos […] as close as 1950; there were only 10,207 people in Jos town out 
of which 10,000 were Hausas (Ames, 1912, cited in R. Ibrahim, 2001, p. 2, par.28) 
What could have struck the readers in the above text? The claim that out of 10,207 
inhabitants of Jos, only 207 were non-Hausas may have been coded to reinforce the Hausa 
Fulani position that they had occupied the area before the ‘indigenes’ and other ethnic 
groups. As such, why should those who first settled in an area and became hosts to other 
ethnic groups be regarded as ‘settlers’ in their own land? Why should they be denied their 
rightful place? The reporter’s goal was to lend support to the Hausa Fulani agitation for 
recognition as ‘indigenes’ and to dismiss the claim by the Afizere, Anaguta and Berom 
(AAB) that Jos was their heritage. Yet studies have recognised the AAB as the ‘indigenes’ of 
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Jos (L. Adamu, 2008; Ambe-Uva, 2010; Gofwen & Ishaku, 2006; Krause, 2011). 
Furthermore, the reports of the commissions of enquiry into the Jos conflicts made it clear 
that the Hausa Fulani were not ‘indigenes’ of Jos (Danfulani, 2006). 
Also in this report, Weekly Trust’s Rabiu Ibrahim showed some level of desperation to 
influence his readers’ perception. He held that the chronology of the rulers of Jos indicated 
that most of them were Hausa Fulani (R. Ibrahim, 2001, p. 2, par.29). The reporter made 
reference to the number of electoral wards in Jos, most of which had been identified by 
Hausa names (p.2, par.30). By this he meant that the city was owned and dominated by Hausa 
Fulani. But recent research has argued that the creation of Jos North Local Government Area 
and its electoral wards was weighted in favour of the Hausa Fulani. The study explained that 
it was a grand plan by the Ibrahim Babangida-led military government to grant autonomy to 
the Hausa Fulani community of Jos, and to take possession of the area from their owners 
(Nyam & Ayuba, 2016).  
As the controversy over the appointment of NAPEP coordinator raged on, according 
to the Weekly Trust, ‘indigenes’ allegedly warned that if the government failed to replace the 
appointee with an ‘indigene’, it would be resisted. The report said that some ‘indigenes’ went 
to the extent of threatening Mr. Muhktar not to resume at the NAPEP office. Despite the 
prevailing circumstances in the local government council, the Weekly Trust claimed that it 
made effort to reach the chairman of the council, Mr. Frank Tardy, but it was not successful 
(R. Ibrahim, 2001, p. 2, par.26). From this account, however, it is necessary to interrogate the 
reporter’s claim that the chairman of Jos North LGA (the administrative and chief security 
officer of the area where violence had erupted) chose to ‘remain inconspicuous’ (p. 2, par. 
26). Had he abdicated from discharging his duties as the chairman?  Had he fled the city? 
Neither the chairman nor the woman who allegedly crossed the barricade at the Congo Rusia 
231 
 
mosque could be reached for comments on their roles. Not even the chairman’s aide or the 
woman’s family was identified and interviewed for the story despite the relevance of their 
office and role. 
It would seem that the reporter - a Hausa Fulani – chose to interact with members of 
his ethnic community who could tell the Hausa Fulani story (e.g., Sheikh Al-Hassan Sa’id 
and Imam Abdullahi Khalil). While these Hausa Fulani eye-witnesses were accessible, the 
chairman of Jos North LGA – Mr. Frank Tardy and the woman at the Congo Rusia mosque, 
Miss Rhoda Haruna Nyam (both Christian ‘indigenes’) were said to be ‘inconspicuous’ . This 
suggests that the choice of eye-witnesses was aimed at giving the Muslim Hausa Fulani 
perspective of the Jos conflict narrative, which included the origins of the Jos area said to 
have been inhabited by the Hausas, and the alleged invasion of the mosque by a Christian 
woman. The chairman and the ‘law-abiding’ Christian woman were ignored by the reporter 
because both personalities could have provided an insight into the conflict from a different 
perspective, thereby allowing the readers to make their judgements. Therefore, the framing of 
the news was driven by a goal – the desire to reinforce the Muslim Hausa Fulani identity in 
Jos. 
7.2.1.1.2 Other pointers to the direction of news 
On September 10, 2001, a team of the Daily Trust reporters  (B. Bello et al., 2001) wrote that 
there had been calm in Jos ‘after the violent religious crisis rocked the city over the weekend’ 
(p.1, par.1). The reporters’ description of the conflict as a ‘religious crisis’ may have resulted 
from their observation of how Christian and Muslim residents engaged each other in the 
battle field. Having linked the violence to the controversy over the alleged denial of a 
woman’s right of way during a Juma’at prayer, the reporters pointed out that the leadership of 
a church had issued a communique on August 8 which ‘condemned the blocking of major 
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streets during the Muslim Juma’at prayers, describing it as unacceptable’ (B. Bello et al., 
2001, p. 2).  
This suggests that since the church (an assembly of Christians) had condemned the 
action by Muslims on August 8, prior to September 7 (the day the violence broke out), and 
because it involved a Christian woman who allegedly invaded a Muslim territory, the conflict 
could have been planned and executed by Christians. The reporters’ use of the word 
‘unacceptable’ to describe the decision of the leadership of the church implied that the 
Christians would no longer condone the continued blocking of the streets by the Muslims. It 
meant that the Christians would resist it and could do ‘anything’ (including a possible attack 
on the Muslim worshippers) to ensure that all the residents of Jos had their right of way.  
The reporters, in fairness, also drew the attention of their readers to a claim that the 
Jasawa Development Association had issued a statement, prior to a scheduled local 
government election in Jos North, which called on voters to elect a Muslim Hausa Fulani as 
the chairman of the council (B. Bello et al., 2001, p. 2). But the report exonerated the group 
as its national secretary was said to have denied the allegation. 
Although the reporters seemed to be objective by presenting both sides (the Christian 
woman who allegedly ignited the violence at the mosque and the Muslim Jasawa group that 
purportedly instigated the Muslim voters against their Christian counterparts), the 
information they conveyed was that the Christians were the aggressors because they remained 
indicted while the Muslims offered a defence. The reporters did not give a voice to the 
Christian group to concede or refute the allegation labelled against it as they did to the 
Muslim group. It, therefore, suggests that the reporters’ framing decision was driven by their 
desire to portray an aggressive Christian group against a victimised Muslim group – which 
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was the scenario previously described by Sheikh Al-Hassan Sa’id and Imam Abdullahi 
Khalil.  
7.2.1.1.3 The irony of interreligious dialogue: A message-laden strategy 
The journalists employed the message-laden strategy by constructing frames that were loaded 
with other information. The Daily Trust’s report of September 11, 2001 entitled ‘Muslim 
body urges dialogue over Jos crisis’ signalled an end to the five-day violence in the city. It 
showed that a party in the conflict was ready to initiate and sustain dialogue with the rival 
group in order to restore peace in the area. Given that the call for dialogue was made by a 
renowned Muslim group – the Assembly of Muslims in Nigeria (AMIN) (B. Bello et al., 
2001, p. 3), the initiative may have been perceived by readers as having carried much weight. 
But beyond its lead, the story dwelt on a sensitive issue – the Sharia, an Islamic legal 
system that had been adopted by 12 of the 19 northern states of Nigeria which had generated 
much criticism among some Nigerians, especially non-Muslims of the north. Plateau State, of 
which Jos is its capital, was one of the states that resisted the introduction of the Islamic law 
(Danfulani, 2006; Ishaku, 2012). While AMIN claimed to have supported peace building 
efforts by advocating for dialogue between warring groups, its wake-up call to states yet to 
adopt Sharia to do so was a possible trigger of conflict. Although it did not identify the states 
that were being lured into implementing this law, the embedding of the Sharia component in 
the story on ‘dialogue over Jos crisis’ pointed to the direction that Muslims in Plateau State 
should rise to the occasion to defend their religious rights. AMIN stated in the report: 
We congratulate the states that are implementing the Sharia and call on those in the 
process to double up so that a full scale Sharia could be implemented to cover all 
walks of life (Odo, 2001, p. 3). 
How sincere was AMIN about dialogue between groups that had been engaged in violence 
resulting from religious and ethnic identity crisis, yet it called for ‘full scale Sharia […] to 
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cover all walks of life’? This metaphor suggests that they would stop at nothing in realising 
the goal of the Muslims to introduce Sharia in all the states. As documented in literature, the 
Daily/Weekly Trust emerged to level up the dominance of the ‘Ibadan-Axis’ Christian south 
in the Nigerian media landscape (African Media Development Initiative, 2005). Since Sharia 
adoption was, and still is, a programme of the core northern states where Islam has a strong 
hold, this newspaper tended to facilitate the realisation of that goal. 
7.2.1.1.4 The killing of Muslims: The implanting and reinforcement strategies 
Like the story above in which the less obvious communication on Sharia law was embedded 
in the main component – the interreligious dialogue, the Daily Trust, in a systematic way, 
informed its readers that the people killed in the 2001 Jos conflict were Muslims  (Dan-
Halilu, 2001, p. 4). The headline of the story read: ‘JNI condemns Jos killings’. As the 
headline suggested, a reader was expected to have a grasp of the position of JNI (Jama’atu 
Nasril Islam –an umbrella body of all Islamic organisations) which supposedly condemned 
the killings of humans in Jos – irrespective of race, ethnicity or religion. In contrast, the 
reporter constructed the news in a way that non-Muslim casualties were excluded. The report 
read: 
The Jama’atu Nasril Islam (JNI), has condemned the recent killing of Muslims in Jos, 
Plateau State capital […]. The JNI has in strong terms condemned this unfortunate 
situation where worshippers should be followed to their place of worship and brutally 
killed, maimed and butchered while praying (Dan-Halilu, 2001, p. 4). 
The JNI story above has many implications. First, the headline is deceptive as it portrayed the 
organisation as neutral arbiter concerned about human lives. Yet, in the body of news, it 
claimed that only Muslims were killed. The lead of the story pointed to the direction the JNI 
was heading for – the purported killing of Muslims in Jos. The headline ought to be explicit 
and accurate. The information in the lead suggested the following headline: ‘JNI condemns 
killings of Muslims in Jos’, rather than ‘JNI condemns Jos killings’ which seemed to have 
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included Muslims and non-Muslims. Second, ‘the incidence happening in Jos which resulted 
in large number of people killed’, again, contradicted JNI’s claim that only Muslims were 
killed in the Jos conflict (par.1). The term ‘people’ was used in the succeeding paragraph to 
improve the narrative which side-lined non-Muslim victims at the outset. 
Third, the worshippers being referred to could be said to be Muslims (because JNI, in 
the lead, was categorical about Muslims being killed), even though there was no evidence 
that showed Muslims had been ‘brutally killed, maimed and butchered while praying’ as the 
group alleged (Dan-Halilu, 2001, p. 4, par.3). What was consistent in the report about the 
alleged attack on Muslims during the September 7 ethno-religious violence was the claim by 
Sheikh Al-Hassan Sa’id who was said to have led the Juma’at prayers at the mosque where 
the violence purportedly broke out (R. Ibrahim, 2001, p. 2, par.13). As the Imam of the 
mosque, he claimed to have called for calm despite the alleged attack on his congregation, 
and yet directed a group to ‘shield’ them (par. 13). In his version of the conflict narrative, the 
worshippers were neither ‘killed’ nor ‘butchered’, but that before the Juma’at prayers ended, 
some of them ‘had been wounded already’ (R. Ibrahim, 2001, p. 2, par.13). Fourth, JNI’s call 
for unity was ironical. It drew the attention of Muslims to what it termed as ‘uncalled-for 





 Figure 7.2. 1 The six strategies adopted by the Daily/Weekly Trust journalists during the September 7, 2001 
Jos conflict. 
 
7.2.2 The Punch: September 7, 2001 conflict (September 8-12, 2001) 
At the outset, The Punch adopted a strategy of silence in the coverage of the September 7, 
2001 conflict. Unlike other national dailies that made the outbreak of violence in Jos their 
‘breaking news’ - because it was the first armed conflict in the city (Krause, 2011; Nyam & 
Ayuba, 2016) - The Punch did not report it when it should. It remained silent on September 8, 
a day after the violence broke out; when the day’s paper was expected to report it. But 
whether it was an act of omission – because its reporters were not on the ground and could 
not report it based on hearsay, or commission – because it wanted to achieve a goal, the 
reason may have been unclear to its readers. Phillips (2015) has made the point that the 
decision to report or ignore any event or subject lies with the news media and the journalists. 
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newsworthy because of the Muslim-Christian or ‘indigene-settler’ clash, the purpose for 
which this was conceived was likely to manifest in the contents of the paper as the violence 
spread.  
On September 9, The Punch broke its silence. Festus Owete and Augustine Madu-
West reported that relative peace had returned to the city after violence erupted on September 
7. The reporters dwelt on the reaction of President Olusegun Obasanjo who was said to have 
condemned the violence and described it as a ‘national disgrace’ (Owete & Madu-West, 
2001, p. 1, par.3). They reported that the violence broke out after the Juma’at  prayers (par. 
3), but did not link it to the alleged rift between a Christian woman who demanded her right 
of way, and some Muslim worshippers at the Congo Rusia mosque as it was widely reported 
by the Daily/Weekly Trust (see, for example, R. Ibrahim, 2001; D. G. Mohammed, 2001). The 
Punch report claimed that the fracas was  
[…] between mainly minority Muslim ethnic Hausa youths and people from the 
Christian ethnic Berom indigenous majority, following weeks of simmering tensions 
[...]. The spark for the clashes was the appointment of a minority Hausa man as 
coordinator of a government run Poverty Alleviation Programme, infuriating the 
Berom people (Owete & Madu-West, 2001, pp. 1-5, pars.11-12). 
The report established one side of the lingering argument over indigene-settler dichotomy. It 
identified the Muslim Hausa Fulani as the minority ‘settler’ community and the Christian 
Berom community (which included the Afizere and Anaguta ethnic groups because they were 
often classified as one) as the ‘indigenous’ community. The reporters recognised that the 
‘indigenes’ reserved the rights of ownership of their land hence they needed a voice that 
could make this position known.  This ‘reality’ may have been constructed based on the 
reporters’ religious relationship with the ‘indigenes’. Thus, they employed the strategy that 
tended to ‘put pictures’ in the heads of their readers about the position of the Christian 
indigenes. It was, probably, a well-thought out strategy to, first, inculcate in the readers the 
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idea of the rights of the indigenes in Jos. Since the Jos conflict had just occurred, the 
reporters focused on providing context that would shape the attitudes of their readers. 
Another possibility was that, after introducing the readers to this reality, the strategy that 
followed was to reinforce it. 
Also, the reporters tried to establish the ethnic and religious relationships that seemed 
to have existed among the conflicting parties. Their description of the parties as ‘minority 
Muslim ethnic Hausa youths and people from the Christian ethnic Berom indigenous 
majority’ (par. 11), was another dimension that established these identities. In that sense, the 
Muslim readers who were not Hausa Fulani but professed Islam were likely to express the 
sentiments of the ‘settlers’. Likewise, those who practiced Christianity, and read the report, 
may have shared the views of the ‘indigenes’. Given this analogy, the reporters’ claim that ‘at 
least five churches and one mosque had been burned’ (Owete & Madu-West, 2001, pp. 1-5, 
par.17), may have inflamed passions among the indigenous and non-indigenous Christians 
whose loss was said to be greater.  
The reporters’ implanting strategy also manifested in paragraph 12.They claimed that 
the appointment of a ‘settler’ as co-ordinator of the federal government’s poverty alleviation 
programme in Jos North LGA – the position which was considered the preserve of the 
‘indigenes’ ignited the violence. Their report corroborated one of the versions credited to 
some sources (see, for example, R. Ibrahim, 2001, p. 2; Kwaru, 2001, p. 2). Their choice of 
this account suggested that the indigenes’ rights had been denied, as a result of which conflict 
between the ‘settlers’ and ‘indigenes’ ensued. 
On September 10, The Punch’s Augustine Madu-West, Senan John Murray and Seka 




The immediate cause of the tension was the appointment by the Federal Government 
of a man from the Muslim minority to run a state anti-poverty programme (Madu-
West et al., 2001, pp. 1-5, par.12). 
This position was recounted by the reporters to reinforce the narrative that had been 
constructed about the NAPEP coordinator’s appointment. While the causes of the conflict 
were said to be multidimensional (Kaigama, 2012), the reporters seemed to have ruled out 
other factors. They framed their story in such a way that suggested that the appointment of 
the Hausa Fulani ‘settler’ for the poverty alleviation programme triggered the violence. Their 
report also suggested that the Muslim Hausa Fulani youths were the first to launch an attack 
on the Christian ‘indigenes’ who merely responded to it.  They wrote that by the second day 
of the violence, it had become a reprisal attack in which Christians overpowered their Muslim 
opponents. The report said: 
Investigations indicated that almost all mosques, except the central mosque, have 
been burnt by some Christian youths who were said to be retaliating the previous 
day’s attack on churches (Madu-West et al., 2001, pp. 1-5) 
What the reporter termed as ‘the previous day’s attack on churches’ had been confirmed by 
The Punch when it reported that on the first day of the riots, ‘at least five churches and one 
mosque had been burned’ (Madu-West et al., 2001, pp. 1-5, par.17). It meant that the 
Christian group was provoked by the action of the Muslim group that allegedly started the 
violence. From their report, and that of Owete and Madu-West, the burning down of ‘almost 
all mosques […] in Jos’ by the Christian youths was a reprisal attack on Muslims who had 
burnt ‘at least five churches […]’ when the fighting began. The reporters’ implanting and 
reinforcing strategies may have created and sustained an impression that the violence which 
erupted on September 7 was ignited by the Muslim Hausa Fulani ‘settlers’. It implied that the 
‘settlers’ resorted to violence and resisted any attempt by the ‘indigenes’ to influence the 
federal government on the possible reversal of the appointment of the NAPEP coordinator.  
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As the violence entered its fourth day, The Punch reported that no fewer than 165 
people had been killed. It was the first major casualty figure the paper reported after it 
claimed that five lives were lost on the first day (Owete & Madu-West, 2001, pp. 1-5). The 
report of the 165 deaths was credited to an official of the Nigerian Red Cross whose duty it 
was to evacuate the bodies of the victims and provide support for the injured. The paper 
reported the death toll after it had verified from a competent source whose data included all 
the bodies deposited in various hospitals in Jos (ThePunch, 2001, pp. 1-5, par.3). This 
suggests that the paper ensured that what it reported was accurate and reliable to conform to 
journalistic standard (Wahl-Jorgensen, 2013).  
The Punch’s report on September 12 indicated that normalcy had returned to the city 
but Christian and Muslim communities remained separated for fear of further attack by either 
party. In that report, Gbade Ogunwale, Remi Ladgbolu and Soni Daniel wrote that the deputy 
governor of Plateau State had accused some prominent citizens of the state of unlawful 
possession of arms that were used by the rioters (Ogunwale, Ladigbolu, et al., 2001). The 
report read: 
The Deputy Governor of the state, Chief Michael Botmang, also alleged that 
sophisticated fire-arms were freely used during the riots and raised the suspicion that 
some prominent citizens of the state may have sponsored the riots and provided some 
of the weapons used (Ogunwale, Ladigbolu, et al., 2001, p. 48, par.10). 
The reporters did not make inferences from the remark of the deputy governor about the 
suspected sponsors of the riots. If they did, they might have implied that the suspects could 
have been the masterminds of the burning of ‘at least five churches’ (likely to be Muslims) 
and ‘almost all mosques in Jos’ (likely to be Christians). In the prevailing circumstances, the 
reporters may have used a strategy of disinterestedness by selecting frames such as ‘some 
prominent citizens’ to refer to the suspects who could have been Muslims or Christians, or 
both. They had a choice to name the said sponsors by insinuating that their roles in the 
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conflict did not suggest otherwise. But they reported what was said without attaching a 
different meaning to it which could lead to bias  
On September 13, The Punch reported that fresh violence had erupted in Jos but it did 
not give any casualty figure. However, the reporters - Gbade Ogunwale, Stanley Yakubu and 
Soni Daniel named the affected areas where the attacks were said to have been carried out. 
They included Dogun Dutse, Angwan Rogo and Congo – the areas believed to be dominated 
by the Hausa Fulani Muslims (Aliyu et al., 2012; Ishaku, 2012). The report also alleged that 
the youths attacked some students of the University of Jos in one of their hostels. The 
reporters claimed to have interviewed a student whom they identified as Jacob, and who 
alleged that some students numbering between two and three had been killed. They also 
reported that a resident of Tudun Wada (a Christian-dominated area) allegedly confirmed in a 
telephone interview that there was another outbreak of violence in the area. The reporters 
linked the Jos violence to a similar incident in Kano (a predominantly Hausa Fulani Muslim 
city in Nigeria’s North West) where some Muslim youths were alleged to have attacked some 
churches. They wrote: 
A similar event also occurred in Kano where some Muslim youths, on Tuesday night, 
torched two churches located at Shagari quarters […]. Kano was also on the boil, the 
second within 24 hours, when Muslim youths on Monday razed a church in Brigade 
Quarters […]. The two affected churches: Overcomers Believers Sanctuary Church 
and Holy Trinity Catholic Church (Ogunwale, Yakubu, et al., 2001). 
In that report, two strategies of framing manifested: the message-laden and community-aided 
strategies. While the reporters may have been eager to report the renewed violence that 
erupted in the city after relative peace had been reported, they named three areas of Dogon 
Dutse, Angwan Rogo and Congo as places where the attacks were carried out. Based on the 
research that communities dominated by Christians or Muslims often took advantage of their 
numerical strength to attack minority groups in their domains (Aliyu et al., 2012; Nyam & 
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Ayuba, 2016), the report suggested that the Christian minority in the three areas may have 
been attacked by the Muslim majority. This message-laden strategy was employed to inform 
the readers that there was fresh violence in which Christians were attacked.  
The reporters’ power of ‘the choice of who to speak to’ (Phillips, 2015, p. 41) as 
authoritative news sources was applied in their eye-witness accounts. They named Jacob (a 
Christian) who confirmed the attack on the students, and another, a resident of Tudun Wada 
(a Christian-dominated area) who gave a situation report on the violence. Such interactions 
with only Christian sources who may have testified from the point of view of the Christian 
group, suggested that the reporters adopted a community-aided strategy to construct their 
narrative. This is because the reporters belonged to the Christian religious community. 
Furthermore, their goal of linking the Jos violence to that of Kano where Muslim youths 
purportedly attacked Christians suggested that a similar incident occurred in Jos whereby 
suspected Muslim youths unleashed terror on their Christian neighbours in Dogon Dutse, 









Figure 7.2. 2 The six strategies adopted by The Punch journalists during the September 7, 2001 Jos conflict. 
Source: The researcher. 
7.2.3 Summary of Analysis 
The Daily/Weekly Trust and The Punch reported the September 7, 2001 conflict between the 
Hausa Fulani Muslim community and the ‘indigenous’ ethnic groups. The Daily/Weekly 
Trust gave more attention to the conflict through a variety of contents in which the journalists 
employed six strategies of reporting. They included the implanting strategy, community-
aided strategy, reinforcement strategy, shared-value strategy, message-laden strategy and 
strategy of deception. 
As the first armed conflict in the history of Jos, the journalists’ narratives were aimed 
at introducing the readers to the idea that an attack had been launched on the Hausa Fulani 
‘settler’ community by the Christian ‘indigenes’. They held that the violence was ignited by a 
Christian woman who disrupted a weekly Juma’at prayer at a mosque in Congo Rusia. In 
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many instances, they adopted a community-aided strategy by identifying news sources from 
their ethnic/religious community and obtaining from them information for their news. 
Another strategy was their use of language to reinforce the claim that the attack was targeted 
at the ‘settler’ community. Some reporters of the Daily/Weekly Trust showed, in their 
narratives, some elements which suggested that they shared the view that Jos belonged to the 
Hausa Fulani, not the ‘indigenes’.  Also, in a number of reports, they coded messages that 
were less obvious yet important in achieving set goals (message-laden strategy and the 
strategy of deception). 
For the journalists of The Punch, six strategies also manifested in their contents – the 
strategy of silence, the implanting strategy, reinforcement strategy, the strategy of 
disinterestedness, the message-laden strategy and community-aided strategy. The newspaper 
failed to report the violence in its edition that followed the outbreak. It subsequently broke 
this silence when it gave an update on the incident and tried to influence the readers’ 
perceptions by providing context on the rights of the ‘indigenes’. As part of this implanting 
strategy, the journalists reported that the conflict resulted from the appointment of a ‘settler’ 
as the co-ordinator of the state poverty alleviation programme. It was followed by a 
reinforcement strategy to suggest that the controversy that trailed the appointment of the 
coordinator was responsible for the violence. 
Some reporters showed some degree of disinterestedness in the conflict as they made 
effort not to take side with any conflicting party. Thereafter, the message-laden strategy 
manifested in a number of the reports. For example, the naming of areas where the attacks 
were said to have been carried out - Dogon Dutse, Angwan Rogo and Congo - suggested that 
Christians were the victims in the three Muslim-dominated areas. Like the Daily/Weekly 
Trust, the reporters of The Punch adopted the community-aided strategy by interviewing 
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Christian eye-witnesses as news sources that may have provided the desired data for their 




















Qualitative Content Analysis: The 2008 and 2010 Conflicts 
8.1 Introduction 
This chapter concludes the qualitative content analysis of the Daily/Weekly Trust and The 
Punch focussing on the 2008 and 2010 conflicts. The criteria for selecting the samples of the 
newspapers and the content category (that is, linguistic choices) used in Chapter 7, also, 
applied to this analysis. 
There was another round of violent conflict in 2008. It was said to be a fall-out of the 
disagreement between a political party that was presumed to have won the Jos North Local 
Government Council chairmanship election and a rival party. The major contestants in the 
election included a Christian ‘indigene’ and a Muslim Hausa Fulani ‘settler’. While the 
residents awaited the announcement of the election results, supporters of one of the political 
parties took to the streets protesting alleged irregularities in the electoral process because 
there were indications that the candidate of the rival party was heading for victory (Ishaku, 
2012). 
In analysing the newspaper coverage of the 2008 conflict, the researcher focused on 
how the conflict environment – such as the journalists’ lack of access to conflict areas – had 
impacted their work. This is because the city had been split between Christian and Muslim 
communities and journalists, like other residents, were affected by that segregation. The 
researcher, therefore, examined the journalists’ linguistic choices to understand the framing 
process and establish their role performance in the conflict – whether their reports and 




This chapter concludes with the analysis of the 2010 conflict. That violence was also 
said to have resulted in the death of some residents as the Hausa Fulani Muslims and the 
indigenous Christian ethnic groups clashed along the Nassarawa Gwong area (Ishaku, 2012; 
Nyam & Ayuba, 2016). The Plateau State Commissioner of Police, Mr. Gregory Ayanting, 
had alleged that the hostilities were triggered by some Muslim youths who attacked Christian 
worshippers on their way to church on a Sunday morning. But the report was dismissed by 
the Hausa Fulani community that claimed the conflict began when some Christian youths 
attacked the nearly 200 Muslim youths who allegedly invaded a Christian-dominated area to 
rebuild a house owned by a Muslim which had been destroyed in previous conflict (J. D. 
Galadima, 2010; Ishaku, 2012).  
Like the previous conflict, the newspaper journalists (most of whom were Christians 
or Muslims) were implicated in this controversy. They chose the angles from which they 
constructed news about the conflict. At this stage of the analysis, the researcher examined the 
transition from 2001 to 2010 to know whether the journalists were consistent in their 
approaches to constructing the news and other contents, or their patterns changed as the 
violence became ‘sophisticated’ (Okoro & Chukwuma, 2012). The representations of these 
accounts by the Daily/Weekly Trust and The Punch were at the heart of this analysis. It 
revealed that the reporters/writers employed different strategies to construct the conflict 
narratives. Based on the analysis, a number of the researcher-generated constructs were used 
to explain the conditions which suggested the strategies that manifested in the journalists’ 
conflict narratives. These include the implanting strategy, reinforcement strategy, 
community-aided strategy, message-laden strategy, neutral-to-goal-focused strategy, and 
shared-value strategy, strategy of deception, strategy of disinterestedness, the blame-game 
strategy, and strategy of silence, among others. Some of these strategies manifested in the 
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contents of both publications across the three ‘violent conflict years’ while others emerged as 
the events unfolded. 
8.2 November 28, 2008 conflict (Samples: November 29 – December 3, 2008) 
There was another major outbreak in Jos on November 28, 2008 which was believed to be 
more vicious than the one that occurred in 2001 and others that followed intermittently. It 
was linked to the protests by rival youth groups (especially party faithful) that trailed the 
November 27 local government council elections in Plateau State. 10 editions of the 
Daily/Weekly Trust and The Punch (5 each) (November 29 – December 3, 2008) were 
sampled for analysis. 
8.2.1 The Daily/Weekly Trust 
The headline of the Weekly Trust’s first report on the 2008 Jos violence read: ‘Plateau: Scores 
killed in council polls violence’. Expectedly, the number of casualties was of essence as the 
reporters described it as ‘many’ suggesting that the protests turned violent and a large number 
of people lost their lives. In contrast, the police had put the number of persons killed at four 
which implied that not ‘many’ deaths were recorded as the reporters claimed. But they 
seemed to have understood that in recognising conflict as a news value, their readers would 
be interested in a significant number of deaths (Harcup, 2015; Hartley, 2013). From the four 
deaths reported by the police, they linked another report of 20 deaths to a news agency and 
over 70 to a source who pleaded to be anonymous. The reporters wrote: 
A text message sent to Weekly Trust hotline by a community leader who sought not to 
be identified said he counted 70 dead bodies brought to a place of worship to be 
prepared for burial. He said many of the corpses carried bullet wounds (Agbese, Lalo, 
Mohammed, & Bashir, 2008, p. 2, par.4). 
The transition from the official four deaths to 70 (which was said to have been sent via a text 
message, and from an unidentified source), suggested that the reporters wanted to justify their 
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description of ‘many’ deaths. The huge number of persons killed in the violence was the 
report’s selling point which accounted for the use of the adjective ‘many’ as the first word in 
the story. 
The reporters were desperate to paint a picture of war in Jos by quoting a figure of 70 
deaths which was not attributed to a credible source. It is a possibility that the said 
community leader who allegedly counted the 70 bodies never existed. As such, the reporters 
may have decided that the quoted number was adequate to describe the ‘many’ people killed. 
If the said community leader actually sent a text message, which they regarded as credible to 
attract readership, then their community-aided strategy of reporting may have been 
employed. The source was said to have counted the 70 corpses at a place of worship. Going 
by previous report (R. Ibrahim, 2001), and the reports of other conflicts in which different 
officials allegedly counted corpses of Muslims at the Jos Central Mosque (A. Mohammed, 
2010a, 2010b), the source may have been a leader of the Muslim community who had 
consistently released casualty figures to Daily/Weekly Trust reporters for their news. The 
reporters used a strategy of deception, which involved the framing of non-existing casualty 
figure, or the community-aided strategy that enabled them to obtain the desired casualty 
figure from their ethnic/religious community for their report. 
As the violence entered its second day, the Sunday Trust reported that the death toll 
had risen from 70 (as confirmed in previous report by a source via a text message) to 400. 
The paper wrote: 
Our reporter, Mahmud Lalo, in Jos, yesterday, said he counted close to 400 bodies 
deposited at the Jos Central Mosque [….] Our reporter’s account corresponded with 
that of another reporter for Radio France International (RFI) in Jos, Aminu Manu, 
who told Agence France Presse (AFP) that he personally counted about 378 bodies at 
the mosque (J. N. Musa et al., 2008a, p. 1, pars.4 & 6). 
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The newspaper editors’ craftsmanship manifested in the headline derived from Mahmud 
Lalo’s eye-witness account. It read: ‘Jos mayhem: Death toll hits 400’. The reporter claimed 
to have counted this number of deaths at the Jos Central Mosque. The reporting strategy 
adopted in this narrative is twofold – the strategy of reinforcement and community-aided 
strategy. First, a visit to the Jos Central Mosque to count the corpses of the victims had 
become significant and a routine. Even the famous hospitals with the state-of-the-art 
facilities, where many corpses had been deposited and the injured treated, did not receive the 
attention of the Daily Trust reporters as the Central Mosque. Once violence occurred they 
moved to the mosque and obtained casualty figures which the newspaper often reported as 
the death toll for the entire city. For example, on the first day of the violence, the reporters 
claimed they got a text message from an unidentified source who had counted 70 corpses at a 
certain place of worship. By the second day, the number had increased to 400, also found at a 
place of worship. The journalists did not report about casualty figures in the hospitals where 
the corpses of victims were said to be deposited. It suggests that the bodies found in the 
mosque were those of Muslims who worshipped there. By implication, each time a casualty 
figure emerged from the mosque it represented the number of deaths in the Jos violence. The 
400 bodies allegedly found in the mosque formed the headline and the content of the report. 
By this, the journalists employed the strategy of reinforcement so that the readers may 
continually believe that the Muslims were being killed. Second, the Daily Trust, being the 
voice of the Hausa Fulani Muslims (African Media Development Initiative, 2005) used its 
community to generate and confirm information on the violence. The figure emerged from 
the Central Mosque and the report was corroborated by Aminu Manu, who shared community 
membership with the journalists.  
A portion of the report dedicated to the victims’ experiences of the conflict (J. N. 
Musa et al., 2008b) showed that the reporters maintained their strategy of reinforcement. 
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They dwelt on the plight of the Muslim victims to suggest that the attack was carried out by 
the Christians and targeted at the Muslim communities. Apart from identifying two Christian 
victims – Jennifer and Priscilla – one of who complained of hunger due to the restriction of 
movement in the city (par.13), and the other who allegedly escaped being killed (par.19), the 
journalists, in the 27-paragraph report, narrated how Muslims in their hundreds were 
allegedly killed or attacked. They wrote: 
One of the most pronounced of the victims of the violence in Jos was the killing of 
one Alhaji Mohammadu Mai Gwanjo and 20 members of his family, who were said to 
have been burnt to death inside their house in Rikkos, Jos (J. N. Musa et al., 2008b, p. 
4, par.1) 
Another source, a former councillor in Jos, told our reporter in a telephone interview 
that over 150 dead bodies were yesterday evening brought to the Jos Central Mosque 
from Rikkos, Dutse Uku, Dogon Dutse (J. N. Musa et al., 2008b, p. 4, par.4). 
The two paragraphs quoted above pointed to the direction that Muslims were heavily attacked 
in the two-day orgy of violence. The reporters were immersed in their report because, rather 
than present their story to allow the readers make their judgment on the intensity of the 
attack, they described Alhaji Mai Gwanjo’s experience as ‘one of the most pronounced’. 
Paragraph 4 suggested that 150 corpses were taken to the Central Mosque from Christian-
dominated areas where the Muslims were killed in cold blood. 
On December 1, 2008, the Daily Trust reported that a mass burial for victims of the 
attack whose corpses had been assembled at the Jos Central Mosque took place. The paper 
held that by November 30, when the burial rites were performed, the number had risen to 
426. The reporters’ narrative suggested that all the victims were Muslims. They were said to 
have been taken to Rusau Muslim cemetery after a large number of Muslim faithful 
congregated to pray for their deceased brothers and sisters, and to pay their last respects. In 
that report entitled, ‘426 victims get mass burial’, the reporters – Mahmud Lalo and Ahmed 
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Mohammed – wrote that an official of the Jama’atu Nasril Islam, Alhaji Sabo Shuaibu, had 
told them that, 
[…] the burial could not be held immediately because the Muslim community was 
waiting for all the corpses of victims to be gathered [….] 424 corpses had been 
washed, dressed and lined up for burial but that as they were digging the mass grave 
at Rusau, some Fulani men brought in two more corpses of their brothers that were 
killed on Saturday which raised the toll to 426 (Lalo & Mohammed, 2008c, p. 1, pars 
5 & 7). 
Between November 28 and 30, when the violence broke out and the burial of the 426 victims 
took place, the Daily Trust reporters were blind to the losses suffered by the ‘indigenes’ or 
the Christian communities with whom the Muslims clashed. They did not report any attack 
allegedly perpetrated by the Muslim or the Hausa Fulani group. The journalistic principle of 
reporting ‘both sides’ (Blaagaard, 2013) did not guide their practice. The reporters’ 
ethnic/religious community influenced their decision to concentrate on the Muslims’ 
wellbeing. In that sense, their media logic meant a call for attention that would attract 
sympathy for the Muslims who were said to have suffered from the alleged attack by 
Christians. 
The reporters applied this logic by employing the strategies of deception and 
reinforcement. The deceptive strategy pertained to how they constructed a one-sided narrative 
that portrayed the Muslims as non-participants in the violence, and that the alleged attackers 
did not suffer any loss. All the deaths recorded in their story involved Muslims whose bodies 
were said to have been brought to the Central Mosque for funeral prayer. Based on their 
account, funeral rites for victims of the violence may not have taken place in churches across 
the city. Yet studies have revealed that Christians recorded higher casualties in areas 
dominated by Muslims and vice versa (Gofwen & Ishaku, 2006; Ishaku, 2012; Krause, 2011). 
Mahmud Lalo and Ahmed Mohammed focused on Muslim casualty in order to reinforce the 
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alleged Muslim onslaught. This was sustained through a confirmatory narrative and head-
count of the victims by community leaders and officials of the Jama’atu Nasril Islam. 
Four days after the violence broke out; the Daily Trust sampled the opinions of some 
residents on how it started. For the first time, on December 2, the paper reported what it 
called the ‘two sides’  (A. Mohammed, Lalo, & Jimoh, 2008, p. 1), suggesting that its 
reporters’ deceptive and reinforcement strategies which characterised previous reports would 
give way for objectivity. Based on the new approach to reporting the ‘other side’ the Daily 
Trust’s Andrew Agbese reported that Christians in Plateau State were unhappy with the way 
individuals and groups were announcing unverified casualty figures to inflame passions. He 
quoted the state chairman of the Christian Association of Nigeria (CAN), Most Rev. Ignatius 
Kaigama as saying: 
I am quite upset by the kind of figures being bundled about as the number of 
casualties; this can only fuel the crisis and cannot help in the search for lasting 
solution to the problem. So we refused to be dragged into the issues of casualties for 
now, but would wait till all the necessary work had been done by the relevant 
agencies before we can comment (Agbese, 2008, p. 3, par.4). 
Although the CAN report may have indicted the Daily Trust reporters and their sources, 
because they had consistently reported casualty figures since the conflict began, it expressed 
the view of Christians who had been silenced in the newspaper. But despite the clarity of the 
statement by the CAN chairman – that CAN was opposed to the arbitrary and unauthorised 
release of casualty figures because ‘nobody can say for certain how many people lost their 
lives in the Jos crisis’ (Agbese, 2008, p. 3, par.1), the report was manipulated. The editors 
adopted a message-laden strategy in the writing of the headline. The headline read: ‘We are 
still compiling figures, says CAN’. It did not suggest the story. Rather, another ‘message’ 
was embedded in the headline which implied that CAN’s casualty figures were merely being 
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delayed (perhaps, due to factors such as inefficiency, poor record keeping) and would be 
released when the problems were remedied.   
The Daily Trust reporters suspended the strategies of deception and reinforcement to 
create an impression that they recognised ‘two sides’ of a story. The strategies were 
reintroduced in the reporting of two stories: ‘1000 cars burnt on Zaria road’, and ‘Five 
students killed in Albayan Secondary School’. Mahmud Lalo and Ahmed Mohammed 
‘deceived’ their readers that ‘over 1000 brand new cars in various shops were burnt down by 
rioters along Zaria road in Jos’ (Lalo & Mohammed, 2008a, p. 3, par.1). In contrast, there 
were no shops or warehouses in which ‘brand new cars’ had been assembled for sale along 
Zaria road as alleged. What existed were units of used cars that were displayed for sale, most 
of which went up in flames during the violence. The reporters decided on a figure of 1000 
cars to suggest that members of the Hausa Fulani community, among who were the owners of 
the burnt cars, had lost many lives and property in the violence.  
While the killing of five students of Albayan Secondary School may have been 
carried out by a group of rioters as reported (Lalo & Mohammed, 2008b, p. 3), the 
journalists’ narrative suggested that the perpetrators were Christians because they were at war 
with the Muslims. The report also alleged that the rioters had set ablaze another school owned 
by a Muslim, Al’ Imam Primary and Secondary School within the vicinity. The report 
focused on the alleged attack of Muslims by the Christians. 
Again, the Daily Trust of December 3, 2008 contained reports that articulated the 
position of the Hausa Fulani ‘settler’ communities that they be recognised as ‘indigenes’ of 
Jos. (see, for example, DailyTrust, 2008; Haruna, 2008). From the newspaper editorial on the 
front page, to Mohammed Haruna’s Wednesday Column on the back page, the writers were 
unanimous on what they believed was an attempt by the Christian ‘indigenes’ and the 
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government of Plateau State to oust the Hausa Fulani Muslims. These articles, and two news 
reports (including the lead story) accused Governor Jonah Jang of poor handling of the 
conflict and for aiding and abetting the alleged attack on the ‘settlers’. The lead story, 
‘Yar’Adua refuses to see Jang’ (Olajide, 2008, pp. 1-5), and the other, ‘Jos mayhem: Cleric 
wants Jang sanctioned’ (L. Ibrahim, 2008, p. 9), alleged that the governor and his government 
were complicit, an action which the reporters believed accounted for the president’s refusal to 
see him when the governor called on him. In the first instance, the writers and the reporters 
employed the blame-game strategy of framing to make the point that the governor and other 
accomplices were behind the attack. Also, the strategy was adopted to confirm earlier reports 
by the Daily Trust that 426 Muslims had been killed within two days of the violence (Lalo & 
Mohammed, 2008c, pp. 1-5), and over 1000 ‘brand new cars’ which belonged to some 
‘settlers’ were burnt by Christian rioters (Lalo & Mohammed, 2008a, p. 3). 
But the Daily Trust previously reported that the governor had said ‘the crisis started at 
Ali- Kazaure in Jos North Local Government Area, where there was a pre-planned move to 
disrupt the peaceful conduct of the election […] some people started attacking shops, places 
of worship and innocent citizens’ (A. Mohammed et al., 2008, pp. 1-5, par.2). Based on the 
governor’s account, he was not to blame. For him, the government, which he led, had put in 
place machinery that would check any eventual breach of the peace before, during and after 
the local government council elections. Where the violence started did not quite matter but 
the motive behind it. The governor’s concept of ‘some people’ is implied. It suggested that a 
group of individuals was responsible for the attack. These individuals could have been 
politicians  - because the issue pertained to the conduct of elections, or the Hausa Fulani 
‘settlers’ or the ‘indigenes’ – who had clashed in 2001 and were ready to confront each other 
once there was any form of provocation.  
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One of the versions that stood out in the ‘two sides’ report by Ahmed Mohammed, 
Mahmud Lalo and Abbas Jimoh was credited to an agent of the Hausa Fulani/Muslim-
dominated All Nigerian People’s Party (ANPP). The agent held that: 
After the election, we were at the ward collation centre in Gada Biyu counting the 
votes. When the electoral officers saw that the ANPP candidate passed the PDP 
candidate with over 30,000 votes, they said they will wait for another result from 
some wards that will be brought in before they will announce the result. This led to 
argument between the party agents and the electoral officials, because there were 
hundreds of youths waiting to protect the votes (A. Mohammed et al., 2008, p. 1, 
par.4). 
The reporters’ reinforcement strategy was introduced in their narrative as they presented the 
ANPP agent’s account which faulted the electoral process and claimed that the party’s 
candidate was leading in the vote count. Neither the PDP agent nor its official was 
interviewed by the reporters to get the side of the party that was a major actor in the conflict. 
The reporters had claimed that the state chairman and secretary of the PDP could not be 
reached for comments. Were other party officials at the local government level, and the 
party’s agents at the ward collation centre where the ANPP agent was interviewed, not 
noticed by the reporters? 
A different version of how the 2008 conflict began has been documented in literature. It 
stated: 
[…] things took an ugly turn in Jos North in the early hours of November 28, when 
information emerging from the collation centre suggested that the candidate of the 
People’s Democratic Party (PDP), Barrister Timothy Gyang Buba, was heading for a 
decisive victory over the candidate for the All Nigerian People’s Party, Alhaji Baba, 
the candidate supported by the Muslim Hausa Fulani settlers [….] As rumours of 
Baba’s defeat made the rounds in the small hours of the day, mobs of Muslim youths 
began a violent protest attacking Christian homes and churches (Ishaku, 2012, p. 90) 
Based on the version of the ANPP agent and that of Ishaku as quoted above,  Governor 
Jang’s earlier analogy of ‘some people’ may have included the  ‘hundreds of youths waiting 
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outside the collation centre to protect the votes’(A. Mohammed et al., 2008, p. 1, par.4). To 
put it simply, Ishaku (2012) described them as ‘mobs of Muslim youths [who] began a 
violent protest attacking Christian homes and churches’ (par. 90). The allegations emerging 
from the two sides suggested that the ANPP had mobilised hundreds of youths to stage a 
violent protest should its candidate lose the Jos North chairmanship seat (Ishaku, 2012). 
Likewise, the PDP was bent on rigging the election results as the party was alleged to have 
connived with the electoral officers to turn out more results from polling wards that were 
non-existent (A. Mohammed et al., 2008). The contest meant a lot for both the Hausa Fulani 
‘settler’ community and the ‘indigenes’ because it was a test of their political might (Nyam & 
Ayuba, 2016). The victory of the ANPP was assumed to be victory for the Hausa Fulani 
Muslims hence their status as ‘indigenes’ was no longer to be contested. The ‘indigenes’, on 
their part, wanted the PDP candidate to emerge as an evidence of their identity as the owners 
of Jos. 
Despite this controversy, the Daily Trust took a position. Its position corroborated that 
of the Hausa Fulani ‘settlers’ who preferred to be recognised as ‘indigenes’ and to be 
accorded all political rights and privileges in the state. In its editorial of December 3, 2008, 
the newspaper wrote: 
There is an unhealthy feeling in many parts of Plateau State that a Christian-majority 
state’s prized capital city is numerically dominated by a Hausa Muslim community, 
known in Nigerian parlance as ‘settlers’ [….] A desire to oust any community, no 
matter its perceived faults from any part of Nigeria or to deny it some political rights 
cannot be the agenda of any responsible, patriotic and law-abiding politician or public 
officer. Unfortunately, there is reason to suspect that some officials of the Plateau 
State government harbour such an agenda as evidenced by the crude effort to rig 
election results (DailyTrust, 2008, p. 56). 
The Daily Trust’s strategy of reinforcement has manifested in the above editorial. First, the 
paper informed its readers that Jos was largely occupied by the Hausa Fulani Muslims yet 
they were being regarded as ‘settlers’.  This suggests that there was no rationale for the 
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minority ethnic groups to deny the Hausa Fulani majority community the right to 
‘indigeneship’.  However, research has shown that previous census figures of Jos indicated 
that the Christian population was higher compared to that of the Muslims (Danfulani, 2006). 
Second, it took the side of the ANPP (the party of the Hausa Fulani Muslim candidate) that 
the PDP, the Jang-led government of Plateau State and the electoral officers had collaborated 
to rig the election results in favour of the ‘indigenous’ Christian candidate. It did not 
interrogate the action of the hundreds of ANPP supporters who had invaded the collation 
centre to ‘protect the votes’ of their candidate while the counting was in progress. The 
editorial did not also ask how the youths protected the votes when the alleged attempt to rig 
the election results was discovered. This suggests, therefore, that the goal of the newspaper 
was to demonstrate that the Hausa Fulani cause was legitimate and just.  
Figure 8.2. 1 The five strategies adopted by the Daily/Weekly Trust journalists during the November 28, 2008 
Jos conflict. Source: The researcher. 
1
• Strategy of 'inventing' casualty figures
•Many people were killed
•426 victims got mass burial
2
• Community-aided strategy
•Community leader confirmed 70 deaths via text message
•Counting of corpses of victims at the Jos Central Mosque
•Christian victims had minority voice
3
• Strategy of deception
•Anonymous community leader may be non-existent
•1000 cars burnt on Zaria road
•'Jos is numerically dominated by Hausa Fulani
4
• Strategy of reinforcement
•70; 400; 426 suspected Muslims killed within two days of violence
5
• The blame-game strategy
•President Yar'Adua refused to see Governor Jang over his role in conflict
•Muslim cleric wants Jang sanctioned 
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8.2.2 The Punch 
The Saturday Punch on November 29, 2008, broke the news about the violence that resulted 
from a protest by youths alleging an attempt by some persons and groups to rig the November 
27 local government election in Jos North. In the beginning, the report by Jude Owuamanam 
focused on the state government’s response in the wake of the violence which was the 
imposition of a dusk-to-dawn curfew on the city.  
The reporter paid attention to the experiences of victims such as the shooting of some 
army generals and the killing of eight students of the University of Jos. He put the casualty 
figure at 50 but this number was not verified as there was no evidence that supported his 
claim. The making-up of figures of casualty by conflict journalists was confirmed by some 
reporters and editors who were interviewed for this research (see, for example, IP 3 – IEG, 
p.118; IP 9, p.130). 
Jude Owuamanam maintained a neutral position by describing the protesters as 
‘youths’ who took to the streets, and that over ‘50 people’ were reportedly killed – no 
identification of casualty with a certain ethnic or religious group. But there was a sudden 
departure from the framing of this narrative. He wrote: 
As early as 5. 30 am, the ANPP supporters had allegedly poured onto the streets 
chanting war songs. In the ensuing confusion, churches were burnt around Sarkin 
Mangu, close to old Jos North Local Government secretariat (Owuamanam, 2008b, p. 
7, par.9) 
As the riot spread, Igbo traders, especially those carrying out their business around 
Massalacin Juma’a, poured onto the streets to defend their shops. They also mobilised 
to defend the St. Augustine’s Major Seminary in Katako and Our Lady of Fatima 
Church, around Alikazaure area (par.13).   
Having established that some youth groups were involved in the protest, the reporter soon 
identified the ANPP supporters as the protesters. Since their protest was against the presumed 
victory of their opponent – the Christian candidate and an ‘indigene’ – those who participated 
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in it may have been Hausa Fulani Muslims. It implied that Muslims took to the streets 
‘chanting war songs’ and attacking Christians wherever they were found. This data supports 
the claim by Ishaku (2012, p. 90) that before the results of the elections were announced , 
‘mobs of Muslim youths began a violent protest attacking Christian homes and churches’. 
Ishaku also pointed out that ‘soon enough, Christian youths picked up the gauntlet and, by 
afternoon, total anarchy reigned in the city’ (2012, p. 90). They were said to have put up a 
self-defence which neither Ishaku nor Owuamanam could define.  For example, Owuamanam 
(2008b, p. 7) admitted that Christians, especially Igbos, ‘mobilised to defend’ their 
investments and their churches which were allegedly under attack. What was the Christians’ 
understanding of defence at warfare? Were they expected to watch and pray while some form 
of divine protection accompanied them? This could not have been the case. The Christians 
may have responded in the manner they were confronted, or worse.  
Jude Owuamanam’s neutral-to-goal-focused strategy enabled him to attract readership 
in the first instance because he attempted to describe the event rather than those involved. 
Soon after, he exposed the alleged culprits thereby exonerating the Christian community to 
which he belonged. 
On the second day of the violence, the death toll, according to The Punch of 
November 30, had risen to 300 (Owuamanam, 2008c, p. 8). The newspaper had reported that 
over 50 people were killed when the violence erupted. Unlike the Daily Trust’s reporters who 
either claimed to have counted the bodies of victims (mostly at the Jos Central Mosque), or 
relied on officials of the Jama’atu Nasril Islam for casualty figures, the reporter of The Punch 
did not attribute his source. Although he seemed to have made his discovery at the various 
hospitals and the Jos Central Mosque, as named in the report, the figures remained 
contestable because how they were arrived at was unknown. 
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Another report on the Jos conflict in the November 30 edition of The Punch was the press 
conference by the leadership of the Christian Association of Nigeria (CAN). In that report, 
CAN was said to have condemned the attack and called for its investigation. Jude 
Owuamanam employed the reinforcement strategy of framing to explain the position of CAN 
on the spates of violence in the city. He drew the attention of the readers to the concern by 
CAN that Christians had become the target of attack. The lead-in paragraphs expressed this 
concern as the reporter quoted the state chairman of CAN, Most Rev. Ignatius Kaigama. 
CAN said: 
We were greatly taken aback by the turn of events in Jos. We thought it was a 
political issue, but from all indications, it is not so. We were surprised at the way 
some of our churches were attacked and some of our faithful and clergy killed. The 
attacks were carefully planned and executed [….] why were churches and clergies 
attacked and killed? (Owuamanam, 2008a, p. 9, pars. 3-4) 
From the remark of the CAN chairman, which may have contained other issues, the reporter 
selected a portion on which he laid emphasis in the report to support the claim that Christians 
were under attack. He assembled what may be regarded as the message that was intended for 
the readers, which was beyond the condemnation of violence as suggested in the headline. 
Having reported the position of CAN (the condemnation of attack) in the lead, Jude 
Owuamanam did not substantiate it in the proceeding paragraphs. Rather, he moved to the 
‘issue’ – ‘[…] the way some of our churches were attacked and some of our faithful and 
clergy killed’ (p.9, par. 3). The reporter combined a message-laden strategy (communication 
that is loaded with other information – that is, ‘condemnation of violence’ and the ‘alleged 
attack on Christians’) with the reinforcement strategy (laying emphasis on the alleged attack 
on Christians to remind the readers that what was claimed might be true). This suggests that 
the reporter’s framing was driven by a Christian solidarity.  
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The reporter further demonstrated bias in paragraph 8 when he reinforced the alleged 
attack. After the press conference which had been addressed by the CAN chairman, he also 
interviewed the youth leader of the association who said that ‘the whole riot was a well-
orchestrated plan by the Muslims to bring about the Hausa Fulani hegemony’ (Owuamanam, 
2008a, p. 9, par. 8). In the end, the readers may have decoded the message that the violence, 
which was perceived to be political because of the protests that followed the local 
government elections in Jos North, was an attempt by the Hausa Fulani Muslims to attack 
Christians. 
By Monday, December 1, the violence was said to have taken another dimension as 
the arrest of some suspected terrorists was made (Owuamanam & Olatunji, 2008, p. 2). In 
that report, Jude Owuamanam and Segun Olatunji wrote that the Chief of Army Staff and a 
set of military troops had been deployed to the city to contain the situation. Although the 
reporters gave an account of the renewed violence, the dimension of ‘mercenaries’ that 
invaded the city suggested that a jihad (an Islamic term for ‘holy’ war), was soon to come.  
The Punch’s report of December 2 may have made an impression on the readers about 
the turn of events in the restive city of Jos. Despite the heavy presence of the military led by 
the Chief of Army Staff, the paper reported that the deputy speaker of the Plateau State 
House of Assembly was almost lynched by some angry youths at the Jos Central Mosque 
where a former minister and a federal lawmaker were said to be taking refuge (Obe, 
Owuamanam, & Chiedozie, 2008, p. 2). The reporters’ reinforcement strategy was applied to 
create an impression of Jos as a ‘war zone’. This is because if a high profile politician could 
escape an attack and a former minister could take refuge in a mosque for fear of attack on his 
residence, then the city may have been unsafe for habitation. This kind of report may have 
accounted for the widespread rumour that the residents of Jos had fled and the city had 
become a shadow itself (Aliyu et al., 2012). Such news may have led to the threat to 
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withdraw from Jos all the graduates who were undertaking the mandatory National Youth 
Service Corps programme and the indigenes of some states to their places of origin (see, for 
example, Owuamanam & Olatunji, 2010b).   
The Punch, on December 3, like the Daily Trust, reported Governor Jonah Jang’s lack 
of access to President Yar’Adua when the former visited the Aso Rock villa to brief the 
president on the violence that had erupted in Jos. The Daily Trust had alleged that the 
president ‘refused to see Jang’ because he was said to have been angered by the role Jang 
played in the Jos conflict (Olajide, 2008, p. 1). The Daily Trust’s report suggested that Jang 
was ridiculed by the president because of the former’s action. It said while Jang’s colleagues 
from Imo and Kaduna states – Ikedi Ohakim and Namadi Sambo took turns to see the 
president, Jang was denied access to him on the same day.   
The Daily Trust’s allegation suggested that President Yar’Adua, like the Hausa Fulani 
‘settler’ community, was disappointed with Jang because he may have been the mastermind 
of the alleged Hausa Fulani Muslim onslaught in Jos. The reporter chose to use the word 
‘refused’ to suggest that Yar’Adua did not want to see Jang, which was an indication that the 
president had endorsed the Hausa Fulani’s allegation against Jang. The reporter’s strategy of 
reinforcement was to confirm the allegation of complicity levelled against Jang. The Punch’s 
report provided a perspective which the Daily Trust silenced in its narrative. The Punch wrote 
that Jang 
[…] arrived in the villa when Yar’Adua was presenting the 2009 budget at the 
National Assembly, but waited until he returned […].The governor could not see the 
president as he was directed to confer with Vice President Goodluck Jonathan 
(Chiedozie, Olatunji, Owuamanam, Falola, & Affe, 2008, p. 8, pars. 2-3). 
The Punch explained the circumstances which led to Jang’s inability to see the president. 
First, if the president was not discharging another official function (the presentation of 
budget) at the National Assembly, Jang might have gained access to him. Second, the 
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president may have had a long day after the presentation of the budget, and decided to 
delegate his responsibility to the vice president which suggested that Jang was attended to. 
The reporters of The Punch did not see the president’s action as a refusal to see the governor 
but a placement of national priority above the state, and/or a delegation of office. 
 
Figure 8.2. 2 The four strategies adopted by The Punch journalists during the November 28, Jos conflict. 
Source: The researcher. 
8.2.3 Summary of Analysis 
The Daily Trust and The Punch newspapers reported the 2008 violence which was said to 
have claimed many lives. The death toll attracted much attention of both newspapers. The 
reporters ‘invented’ casualty figures without authentication because they seemed to have 
realised that their readers would be interested in the number of deaths. The Daily Trust 
claimed that 70 lives were lost on the first day, and when the violence entered its third day, a 
total of 426 bodies had been assembled for mass burial. The Punch, on the other hand, 
alleged that 50 deaths were recorded on the first day. Thereafter, the paper maintained a 300-
casualty figure. These figures were either ‘invented’ by sources linked to their religious 
communities or reporters who produced them by a simple estimation. 
Strategy of ‘inventing’ casualty 
figures
50 and 300 unconfirmed deaths
Neutral-to-goal-focused strategy
From description of protesters as 
‘youths’ to ANPP supporters’ who 
are mostly Hausa Fulani Muslims
Strategy of reinforcement
“Some of our churches were 
attacked and some of our faithful 
and clergy killed"
Message-laden strategy
CAN’s condemnation of violence 
produced 'new' information – the 




Some of the reports of the Daily Trust showed that the reporters adopted the 
community-aided strategy and the strategy of deception. In the first instance, the death toll of 
70 emerged from an anonymous community leader via a text message. The second number, 
400, and the third, 426, were released by sources at the Jos Central Mosque. At various times 
when interviews were conducted among the victims, the Christians had a minority voice. 
There were some elements of deception in the narratives. For example, the said anonymous 
community leader may not have existed hence the casualty figure that was said to emerge 
from that leader could have been false. The 1000 ‘brand new cars’ allegedly burnt along 
Zaria road was not substantiated. That Jos was ‘numerically dominated by Hausa Fulani 
community’ was a contradiction of previous census figures (see, for example, Danfulani, 
2006). 
The Daily Trust reporters, in some reports, used the reinforcement strategy and the 
blame-game strategy. The reports suggested that the hundreds of deaths comprised of Hausa 
Fulani Muslims implying that the attack was planned and executed by Christians. The blame-
game strategists either accused the governor and his government of complicity or blamed the 
conflict on the ‘indigenes’ and Christians who resisted the emergence of a Hausa Fulani 
Muslim as the chairman of Jos North Local Government Area.  
The Punch adopted the neutral-to-goal-focused strategy in one of its reports. The 
reporter described the protesters as ‘youths’ who resisted an attempt to rig the local council 
election in Jos North, but his goal of identifying the alleged culprits later manifested in the 
story. He named the protesters as the supporters of the ANPP (a party dominated by the 
Hausa Fulani Muslims). This means that the neutral term ‘youths’ referred to ‘Muslim 
youths’ (goal-focused) who allegedly ignited the violence. By this construction, his Christian 
community that dominated the opposition party was exonerated. Some reporters of The 
Punch also maintained a reinforcement strategy which either exonerated Christians from the 
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alleged conspiracy against Muslims or portrayed them as victims of the attack. For example, 
a report emphasised CAN’s claim that ‘some of our churches were attacked and some of our 
faithful and clergy killed’.  
The message-laden strategy was employed by The Punch’s journalist who reported 
CAN’s position on the violence. He used a story to tell another story. CAN’s condemnation 
of violence (as contained in the lead) produced ‘new’ information – the alleged attack on 
Christians.  
8.3 January 17, 2010 Conflict (Samples: January 18 -23) 
In 2010, another round of violence erupted in Jos on January 17. The newspaper samples 
included January 18 – 23. The sample day was extended to January 23 because both papers, 
on that day, reported the violence with greater depth. The papers revealed the untold story by 
engaging with actors linked to the violence. 
8.3.1 The Punch  
The Punch’s story on the January 17 violence showed that the reporters – Jude Owuamanam 
and Olusola Fabiyi – adopted the conflict sensitive reporting strategy theorised by Ross 
Howard which requires journalists to tell the story without identifying those responsible for, 
or are victims of the conflict to avert further violence (Howard, 2009, 2015; Singh, 2013). In 
their report, they alleged that 20 people had been killed in the renewed hostilities but did not 
name the group that suffered the loss (Owuamanam & Fabiyi, 2010, p. 2). They narrated the 
causes of the conflict thus: 
In the first instance, the crisis was said to have started after a disagreement between 
some youths involved in a football match in the Dutse Uku area of Nassarawa Gwong 
in Jos North. The disagreement was said to have escalated and attracted rival youth 
gangs. It eventually snowballed into a full-blown crisis as all sorts of weapons were 
allegedly used. The youths thereafter went into rampage, alleging killing and burning 
houses (Owuamanam & Fabiyi, 2010, p. 2, pars. 9-10). 
267 
 
The story continued: 
Another report said there had been simmering crises in the area over the refusal of 
either religious sect to allow each other to reconstruct the houses destroyed during the 
November 28, 2008 crisis in the area (p. 2, par. 12). 
The reporters seemed to be ‘sensitive’ to the situation at hand as they frequently coded words 
that neither identified the aggressors nor the victims of the conflict. The use of phrases such 
as ‘some youths’, ‘rival youth gangs’, ‘the youths […] went on rampage’ suggests that the 
reporters preferred to construct frames that would tell the story about the renewed violence in 
the area without referring to the actors as Muslim or Christian youths, even though they were 
aware that young Muslims and Christians were involved. In that sense, all the conflicting 
parties allegedly went on rampage and took part in the violence which led to loss of lives and 
property. This confirms the interview data in this research that some journalists – reporters 
and editors – chose to withhold the identity of aggressors and victims of the Jos conflict to 
reduce the escalation of violence (see, for example, IP 22). 
In the first version, the reporters informed their readers that there was a breakdown of law 
and order in a certain area in Jos North – Dutse Uku. They held that a football match in which 
youths were involved was the factor that generated a heated debate leading to a violent 
pitching of camps. In the violence, 20 people were reportedly killed, who could either be 
members of one of the rival groups or both. The readers, who might have comprised of 
Muslims and Christians, or even non-believers, were not likely to respond to the violence in 
Dutse Uku in a violent manner as no group was reported as having recorded greater loss than 
the other. The reporters wrote that ‘the area […] is populated by Christians and Muslims’ 
(Owuamanam & Fabiyi, 2010, p. 2, par. 11), so that Christians elsewhere would not assume 
that their members had been overpowered by the Muslim majority in that community, or vice 
versa, thereby inflaming passions.  The reporters’ framing of the above phrase was intended 
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to console the readers that both sides had suffered loss. It suggests that all parties in the 
conflict were affected.  
The same strategy was adopted in the second narrative. Rather than state in 
categorical terms that a particular religious group had resisted the rebuilding of houses of 
members of a rival group, the reporters alleged that both parties in the conflict had exhibited 
the same attitude towards each other hence none was exonerated. The report said the violence 
broke out because of ‘[…] the refusal of either religious sect to allow each other to 
reconstruct the houses destroyed […] in the area’ (p. 2, par.12). It stated further, ‘[…] if a 
Christian wanted to rebuild his house, the Muslim youths would mobilise to stop him, and 
vice versa’ (p. 2, par. 13). By this expression, both groups were indicted. The reporters, most 
likely, constructed this narrative as another strategy to avoid heating up the already tense 
situation. But while these reporters had a way with words suggesting that they were ‘neutral’ 
and acting in the public interest, they showed allegiance to their Christian religious 
community in the latter part of the report. They wrote that, 
[…] the problem was said to have reached a boiling point when one Alhaji Kabiru 
was disallowed from embarking on the reconstruction of his house in Dutse Uku. The 
Muslim youths were said to have mobilised and attacked everybody they saw (p. 2, 
par. 14). In the free-for-all machetes and all types of weapons were allegedly used (p. 
2, par. 15). 
In the above narrative, what ignited the conflict was the refusal of Alhaji Kabiru to rebuild 
his house. The reporters mentioned in passing that the said Alhaji ‘was disallowed […]’, but 
by whom? Since their earlier account revealed that both the Christian and Muslim youths had 
consistently resisted the rebuilding of the houses of their opponents in Dutse Uku, and given 
that one Alhaji (a title conferred on a Muslim man who performed hajj) was denied this right, 
it suggests that the action to stop him was carried out by the Christian youths. The reporters’ 
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frames did not include the identity of the group that stopped the reconstruction. Their media 
logic, driven by their religious community, was used to shield the Christian youths. 
Rather than name the Christian youths as the first aggressors (for stopping Alhaji 
from reconstructing his house, an action which could have been resisted by Muslim youths), 
the report alleged that the ‘Muslim youths mobilised and attacked everyone they saw’ (p.2, 
par. 13). By implication, the Muslim youths purportedly ignited the violence. The reporters 
also silenced the views of Muslims in their report but devoted significant portions to the 
‘facts’ that emerged from Christians who belonged to their religious community. For 
example, they reported that the Plateau State Commissioner of Police, Mr. Gregory 
Anyanting –a Christian, had, in a statement, alleged that, 
Just this morning, there was the breach of the peace when some Muslim youths in the 
early hours of the morning, without any provocation whatsoever, started attacking 
some worshippers in Nassarawa Gwong area, especially around St. Michael’s 
Catholic Church (p. 2, par. 28).  
The report concluded with another allegation by a group – the Plateau State Christian Elders’ 
Consultative Forum. It said,  
In very strong terms, we hereby condemn today’s attack on Christians in Jos […] in 
which several persons have been reported injured or dead. The attack coming in 
today, Sunday, January 17, 2010, after the normal Christian services in churches was 
premeditated, wicked, deliberate and terrifying (p. 2. Pars. 31-32).  
How the story began and ended is complex.  The journalists’ reporting strategies 
characterised by ‘media logic’ showed a transition from somewhat ‘objective’ to ‘non-
objective’ or goal-focused practice. At the outset, the reporters were concerned about 
supporting peace building efforts by avoiding the blame-game theory which dominates 
conflict reporting. Thereafter, they made their way into the realm of journalism of attachment 
(Bell, 1996, 1997; Greenwald, 2014). They tried to ‘garnish’ their report with tales 
favourable to the Christians. Both the statements credited to the Police Commissioner and the 
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Plateau State Christian Elders’ Forum suggested that the Muslims organised and carried out 
the attack on Christians. The reporters’ news framing showed that the Christians were 
innocent and the Muslims guilty. 
In a separate report on January 19, The Punch’s Jude Owuamanam and Segun 
Olatunji wrote about the threat by the National Youth Service Corps (NYSC) to withdraw 
graduates posted to Plateau State for the mandatory national service if the government failed 
to provide security for them. The corps members had been evacuated from areas that were 
believed to be prone to violence and lodged in ‘safe’ areas. As they did in their previous story 
where they reported that the Christian Elders’ Consultative Forum claimed that Christians 
had been attacked, Owuamanam and Olatunji incorporated the views of two Muslim groups 
into the NYSC report. Both the Jama’atu Nasril Islam and the Jos North Muslim Umma 
dismissed an earlier claim by the Commissioner of Police, Mr. Gregory Anyanting, that the 
violence was ignited by some Muslim youths. The report stated that the Muslim Umma had 
declared that ‘Muslims had lost confidence in the ability of the commissioner to protect them’ 
(Owuamanam & Olatunji, 2010b, p. 6, par. 14). Here, it would seem that the reporters 
realised that Christian views dominated their first report on the violence in Dutse Uku hence 
they reported the Muslim’s side of the story. Perhaps, the intention of the writers was to 
project a self-image that suggested they were fair to all the conflicting parties. 
On January 20, a casualty figure began to emerge. As at Wednesday, three days after 
the violence erupted, Jos had been ‘grounded’ as The Punch’s headline captured 
(Owuamanam et al., 2010). The newspaper reported that an agency report had quoted the 
Chief Imam of the Jos Central Mosque, Alhaji Balarabe Dawud as saying: ‘We received 156 
dead bodies this morning and another 36 this afternoon, in total, we have 192 dead bodies’  
(Owuamanam et al., 2010, p. 2, par. 23). The reporters’ inclusion of the agency report, again 
suggested that they desired to construct a balanced narrative which is the hallmark of 
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journalistic objectivity (Maras, 2013). The claim by Alhaji Dawud, though not substantiated, 
suggested that the 192 deaths did not include Christians because by counting scores of deaths 
assembled at the Central Mosque, they might have been identified as Muslims killed in the 
attack. This is because a Weekly Trust report had alleged that ‘tears freely flowed on the faces 
of the Muslim community who had brought the corpses on a trailer after painstaking hours 
had been spent washing the dead bodies at the Jos Central Mosque’ (R. Ibrahim, 2001, p. 1, 
par.2). 
In the same edition of The Punch (January 20), the reporters – Olusola Fabiyi and 
Jude Owuamanam – reintroduced a reporting strategy of connecting somewhat related 
information of distinct dimensions on the Jos conflict. Their report, ‘PDP asks Jang to tackle 
problem’ opened with the expression of concern by the People’s Democratic Party (PDP) 
over the continued violence in Jos. The party, to which Governor David Jang of Plateau State 
belonged, had urged him to find a lasting solution to the problem. It seemed like a party affair 
that had no link with readers who were non-party members. However, the reporters 
‘imported’ into the story an earlier call by the president of the Pentecostal Fellowship of 
Nigeria (PFN) that, 
Christian community in the North should always defend themselves in the event of 
any unwanted violent attack by opponents of the religion (Fabiyi & Owuamanam, 
2010, p. 8, par. 16). 
The reporters imported this component of the story to reinforce the belief that Christians 
could put up a defence whenever they were attacked by their opponents. Like Sheikh Al-
Hassan Sa’id who had ordered some Muslim youths to ‘shield’ the worshippers while they 
prayed at the Congo Russia mosque (R. Ibrahim, 2001, p. 2, par.13), this concept of defence 
implied that they could fight their opponents and, possibly, use arms to defend themselves. 
Rather than stand aloof, they were told to ‘do something’ in self-defence. But with what were 
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they asked to defend themselves? The action of reinforcing the culture of self-defence in the 
readers showed that the reporters were ‘doing something’ to shape the attitudes of their 
readers, particularly Christians, towards the Jos conflict. It, therefore, suggests the 
mediatisation of conflict (Cottle, 2006). The same strategy was employed by The Punch’s 
John Ameh in his report entitled, ‘Reps intervene after Onovo’s, SSS’ briefings’ (Ameh, 
2010). In the 13-paragragh report, having informed his readers that the House of 
Representatives had resolved to intervene in the Jos conflict, concluded that the House 
Committee which investigated the conflict was alleged to have taken side with the Muslim 
community. The report added that,  
A member of the House from Plateau State, Mr. Bitrus Kaze, had also accused the 
committee of exhibiting bias by allegedly visiting and commiserating with Muslim 
communities  and avoiding Christian victims (Ameh, 2010, p. 8, par.12). 
The implication of the inclusion of this allegation in the report was to influence the readers’ 
perception about the lawmakers’ response to the conflict, which was likely to make the 
readers cast doubts on the integrity of the committee that would intervene in the conflict. 
Letting the ‘facts’ bare, that is, the alleged committee’s solidarity with the Muslim 
community was a possible influence on Christian readers who were likely to boycott the 
committee’s intervention programme due to lack of trust in the political leadership that 
constituted it (Ishaku, 2012). Again, the lead of the story provided some disturbing 
information about the composition of the House Committee which was headed by the Deputy 
Speaker, Alhaji Usman Nafada – a Muslim. The order in which the facts were assembled, 
from the identification of the team leader – who was not a Christian – to the alleged 
committee’s alliance with the Muslim community, it suggested that the reporters’ framing of 
the story was to achieve a certain goal. 
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In the heat of the conflict, The Punch’s reporters identified three personalities whom 
they regarded as ‘prominent indigenes of Plateau State’ (Owuamanam & Olatunji, 2010a, p. 
12, par. 1). They included a former head of state, Gen. Yakubu Gowon and two former 
governors, Chief Joshua Dariye and Ambassador Fidelis Tapgun. In separate interviews, they 
condemned the renewed violence in Jos. Their prominence in the state was not contestable, 
given that they occupied senior public offices at different times, but their recognition as 
‘indigenes’ may have been received with condescension by the Hausa Fulani because the 
reporters’ categorization of ‘indigenes’ did not include them. Those mentioned in the report 
belonged to the ethnic groups that were regarded as ‘indigenes’ – a position which the Hausa 
Fulani community had contested over the years (Crisis Group Africa Report, 2012; 
Danfulani, 2006; Krause, 2011). The three ‘indigenes’ were also Christians. The exclusion of 
the Hausa Fulani Muslims in the report which identified ‘prominent indigenes of Plateau 
State’ was the reporters’ affirmation that they (Hausa Fulani Muslims) were ‘settlers’ as 
documented in literature (Ambe-Uva, 2010; Shedrack Gaya Best & Rakodi, 2011; Plateau 
Indigenous Development Association Network, 2010). The controversy over the non-
inclusion of the Hausa Fulani in the political realm of the state and their settler status in Jos 
had been, and still is, a major cause of the Jos conflict (A. O. Musa & Ferguson, 2013; Nyam 
& Ayuba, 2016; Rasaq, 2012). 
The selection of three ‘prominent indigenes’ for an opinion poll suggested an 
endorsement of the native/foreigner dichotomy that prevailed in the state. If a certain Mallam 
(a title associated with Hausa Fulani) was named as one of the samples for the poll, and the 
four persons regarded as ‘prominent indigenes’, then the reporters may have recognised the 
Hausa Fulani as ‘indigenes’. In that sense, The Punch helped in reinforcing the argument that 




Furthermore, in a two-page story entitled, ‘Plateau: The war this time’, Jude Owuamanam 
made a description of the recurring violence in Plateau State and how the issue of ‘indigenes’ 
and ‘settlers’ had remained a problem. He wrote that, 
Since September 7, 2001, when an ethno-religious crisis erupted between the 
indigenes and the Hausa/Fulani settler communities, a state popularly referred to as 
Home of Peace and Tourism has known no peace [….] At the centre of these crises is 
the desire of the largely Hausa/Fulani settler community to be accorded full rights as 
indigenes of Plateau State (Owuamanam, 2010b, p. 48, pars. 1-2). 
Owuamanam, in the above introduction, was blunt on the issue in contention. He 
distinguished between ‘the indigenes and the Hausa/Fulani settler communities’, and claimed 
that the conflict had persisted because the latter wanted ‘to be accorded full rights as 
indigenes of Plateau State’. He meant that the Hausa Fulani were not ‘indigenes’ but desired 
to be recognised as such. The reporter wanted to inform his readers that the conflict in Jos 
was triggered by the Hausa Fulani who refused to recognise their status as ‘settlers’, like 
other settler groups, and were bent on having a share of what they never possessed. The rights 
and privileges accorded the ‘indigenes’ are contained in the Nigerian Federal Character 
policy document. It recognises the local communities from where Nigerians originate (Alubo, 
2009; Egwu, 2001, 2015), as a result of which they (indigenes) enjoy certain privileges such 
as political appointments, admissions into universities and colleges, while others outside 
these communities (settlers) are exempted (Danfulani, 2006). 
Given the reporter’s definition of the context – the ‘indigenes’ versus the Hausa 
Fulani ‘settlers’ – the readers were likely to think along the path that the ‘settlers’ had 
invaded the land rightfully owned by the ‘indigenes’. The implication is that unless the 
‘settlers’ stopped their agitation and recognised that Jos belonged to the ‘indigenes’, the 
conflict would persist. 
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On Saturday, January 23, The Punch published an interview which it conducted with 
one Alhaji Kabiru Mohammed who had been named in previous reports as the man allegedly 
stopped from reconstructing his house in Dutse Uku. The paper also featured one Michael 
Atsi Izang, the village head of Agadang Izar in the Dutse Uku area in the report. The 
reporter’s goal, it would seem, was to get different perspectives of the conflict accounts as 
both interviewees were linked to each ethnic/religious community in conflict. Kabiru, a 
Muslim, belonged to the Hausa Fulani ‘settler’ group while Michael was a Christian 
‘indigene’. The idea of reporting all the parties in dispute is at the heart of journalistic 
objectivity research (Cunningham, 2003; Muñoz-Torres, 2012; Wahl-Jorgensen, 2013). The 
reporter began his narrative with Kabiru’s account. He (Kabiru) held that: 
By weekend, I had reached the level where I was going to do the decking. The 
residents of my area had earlier volunteered to help me when I would come to do the 
decking. Therefore, yesterday (Sunday) some people came to the site to help in doing 
the decking [….] Before I knew it, a mob had gathered at the site where I was 
renovating my house and demanded that we should stop work [….] They said that 
they didn’t want any Muslim to come back to that area again (Owuamanam, 2010a, 
pp. 8-9). 
From this account, Kabiru tried to prove his innocence which, probably, met the expectations 
of the reporter, especially in a conflict situation where the person interviewed was said to be 
the accused. The reporter then chose to lay it bare. The said Kabiru suddenly realised that the 
house he was rebuilding had reached a level that would require a large number of persons to 
mobilise to site. Those in his neighbourhood, that is, ‘the residents of my (his) area had 
volunteered to help me (him)’. Perhaps, all the neighbours, or a fraction of them, volunteered 
to join Kabiru at the site – a place outside the neighbourhood.  A group of persons (suspected 
to be non-Muslims) later appeared and insisted that the work be stopped because they would 




I was in the church when I heard people shouting near my house. It was later that I 
heard that one Hausa man came to reconstruct his house. I asked whether there were 
many people. They said that they were more than 150 [….] If a man comes on a 
Sunday with such number of people to reconstruct a three-bedroom bungalow and not 
a church as BBC reported, then something must be wrong (Owuamanam, 2010a, p. 9). 
Michael did not witness the initial clash between the Muslim and the Christian youths but he 
claimed to have been briefed by eye-witnesses after he left the church where he had joined 
other worshippers at a Sunday service. His subjects (for he was a village head) who witnessed 
the incident had confirmed to him that a Hausa man led about 150 people to invade the area. 
He wondered why the man would mobilise such a huge crowd to reconstruct a three-bedroom 
bungalow on a Sunday when Christians were in their churches praying. He reasoned that if 
Kabiru and his group of ‘volunteers’ chose a Sunday on which to resume work on a building 
that had been destroyed in the wake of previous conflict, given that many residents would be 
in their churches, portended a threat to the area. It suggested that they had not come to 
reconstruct the house as claimed but to attack those who lived in that area. 
The two accounts that emerged from Kabiru and Michael have established that the 
reconstruction of a house in Dutse Uku triggered the conflict between rival youth groups. In 
these narratives, the reporter-involvement was less obvious as he tried to overcome the 
dilemma confronting some journalists who often give a voice to one party while they silence 
the other. He could have interviewed one group and left the other, or devoted much space to 
one and a little space to the other. He brought to the fore the opinions of both parties so that 




Figure 8.3. 1 The three strategies adopted by The Punch journalists during the January 17, 2010 Jos conflict. 
Source: The researcher. 
 
8.3.2 The Weekly/Daily Trust - (Samples: January 18 -23) 
The Daily Trust’s reporters – Andrew Agbese, Mahmud Lalo and Mishahu Bashir – 
corroborated the report of The Punch that the January 17 violence occurred as a result of 
disagreement between rival groups over house reconstruction.  While The Punch recounted 
that the disagreement began during a football match in Dutse Uku area, and later at the site 
where Alhaji Kabiru was said to have mobilised some youths to rebuild his house, the Daily 
Trust focused on the latter.  The Punch had alleged that before the incident involving Alhaji 
Kabiru, there had been ‘the refusal of either religious sect to allow each other to reconstruct 
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the houses destroyed during the November 28, 2008 crisis in the area’ (Owuamanam & 
Fabiyi, 2010, p. 2, par.13). The Daily Trust also confirmed that it happened ‘after an 
argument on the rebuilding of homes destroyed in the November 28 clashes’ (Agbese, Lalo, 
& Bashir, 2010, p. 1, par.3). The Daily Trust reporters provided additional information 
(which was not contained in The Punch report) about the state of the Alhaji when a group 
allegedly stopped him from rebuilding his house. They wrote: 
The Alhaji was allegedly beaten by the youths. This drew the attention of some rival 
youths who came over, leading to a fight between Christian and Muslim youths [….] 
(Agbese, Lalo, et al., 2010, p. 5, par.7) 
In all the accounts reported by The Punch there was no mention of physical assault on Alhaji 
Kabiru. What was reported –including the interview he granted – was the stoppage of the 
reconstruction of his house (Owuamanam, 2010a, pp. 8-9), which resulted in a clash between 
Christian and Muslim youths (Agbese, Lalo, et al., 2010; Owuamanam & Fabiyi, 2010). The 
reporters narrated their story in a way that would make the readers to believe that the 
Christian youths did not only stop the Alhaji’s work but assaulted him physically. It showed 
the youths’ seeming desperation to stop any Muslim from returning to Dutse Uku as alleged 
by Alhaji Kabiru (Owuamanam, 2010a, pp. 8-9).  
In the Daily Trust report, Agbese, Lalo, et al. (2010, p. 1, par.4) introduced casualty 
figures which were credited to an official of the Jama’atu Nasril Islam (JNI), Hajiya Khadija 
Gambo Hawaja. She claimed that ‘there were 10 corpses lying at the Central Mosque, and 16 
people were taken to the hospital with gunshot wounds […,] over 20 corpses lying at 
Anguwan Duala’. The reporters used the casualty figures given by an official of a Muslim 
group (JNI), who was not the custodian of information on violent conflict instead of the army 
or the police, the Red Cross or persons directly engaged with the conflict actors. They also 
wrote in paragraph 5 that ‘a correspondent for the Reuters news agency counted 12 bodies at 
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the Jos University Teaching Hospital and the Central Mosque […]’. Paragraphs 14 -15 stated 
that, 
At the Murna hospital, our reporter saw some casualties receiving treatment, among 
them seven-year –old Ibrahim Abdullaziz who was wounded in the eye [….] A 
number of corpses were also seen on the ground in the hospital (Agbese, Lalo, et al., 
2010, pp. 1-5, pars.14-15). 
There could be two dimensions to this reporting technique. First, the reporters chased up on 
news sources that could quote number of deaths in Muslim enclaves to create an impression 
that Muslims were killed by their opponents – Christians. For example, ‘10 corpses […] at 
the Central Mosque’ and ‘over 20 corpses […] at Anguwan Duala’ were said to have been 
recorded by a JNI official. Were Christians not killed in the violence? Who among the 
reporters contacted an official of the Christian Association of Nigeria - the corresponding 
body for the Christian community - to verify the number of deaths they recorded from the 
Christian side (if such an official had information as the JNI source claimed)? Even an 
agency reporter was said to have counted a dozen corpses at the Jos University Teaching 
Hospital and the Central Mosque. Had the mosque become a mortuary? Who identified the 
Muslim corpses and assembled them in the mosque? Were the bodies taken to the mosque for 
a farewell session or burial? Why were the reporters not at major Christian centres such as the 
COCIN headquarters, ECWA headquarters and the Bishops’ courts to establish the conditions 
of the perceived Christian victims who may have taken refuge there, or whose bodies may 
have been deposited there? 
Second, the Daily Trust reporters did not visit the famous Christian health centres in 
Jos – the Our Lady of Apostles’ Hospital, Bingham University Teaching Hospital and the 
Vom Christian Hospital, where they could ascertain the number of victims who sustained 
different degrees of injury as a result of the violence. What struck the reporters most was the 
plight of a seven-year-old Ibrahim Abdullaziz (a Muslim) whose eye was allegedly wounded. 
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The boy and other injured persons – who were likely to be Muslims because they were 
receiving treatment at a hospital owned by a Muslim – caught their attention beyond the 
plight of the victims in other hospitals. 
The reporters had set a goal which tended to serve the interests of their owners – the 
Hausa Fulani Muslim cause (African Media Development Initiative, 2005). By focusing on 
Muslim casualties rather than all those who were affected, they aligned with their 
religious/ethnic community. As such, the headline of their report, ‘Many killed in Jos 
violence’, suggested that the term ‘many’ described a large number of Muslims. It did not 
include Christians with whom they clashed. 
By Tuesday, January 19, the Daily Trust was assertive on the immediate causes of the 
violence in Dutse Uku area. The paper narrated how the conflict began and, for the first time, 
it identified one Alhaji  Kabiru Mohammed as the man at the heart of the controversy. In that 
report, Mahmud Lalo and Mishahu Bashir wrote this lead: 
The crisis that engulfed the Plateau State capital of Jos on Sunday started at Dutse 
Uku […] when Christian youths tried to stop a Muslim man from renovating his 
house that was destroyed in the November 2008 riot, according to Alhaji Kabiru 
Mohammed, the man at the centre of the storm (Lalo & Bashir, 2010, p. 1, par.1) 
The reporters in this narrative made a distinction between the ‘bad guys’ from the ‘good 
guys’ (Ruigrok, 2008). They claimed that the ‘Christian youths tried to stop a Muslim man 
[…]’ which suggested that Christian youths (the aggressors), without any provocation, 
interfered with the affairs of the Muslim man (the victim) whose religious community was on 
hand to defend his rights. The reporters declared that the action of the Christian youths 
ignited the violence. They did not employ The Punch’s strategy of moderation such as ‘the 
disagreement […] attracted rival youth gangs’ (Owuamanam & Fabiyi, 2010, p. 2, par.10). 
Neither the Christian nor Muslim group was named as the aggressor. Although the reporters 
of the Daily Trust seemed to have adopted the theory of ‘telling it as it is’ (Bell, 1997; 
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Blaagaard, 2013), in order to separate good from evil , their framing which indicted Christian 
youths was likely driven by personal bias. Like most reports in their preliminary stages, the 
reporters used the term ‘alleged’ to describe the roles of conflict actors because the initial 
causes of the conflict were in the realm of conjecture. The absence of such legal 
terminologies in the lead of the Daily Trust report suggested that the reporters had a goal – 
that is, to portray the Hausa man and his group as the ‘good guys’.  
Evidently, two reports of the Daily Trust (January 19, 2010) were used for the 
purpose of achieving balance. In one, ‘JNI says 27 dead, 300 in hospital’, Ahmed 
Mohammed reported that the Jos North chapter of the Jama’atu Nasril Islam (JNI) claimed 
that 26 Muslims (not 27 as captured in the headline) died in Dutse Uku violence while over 
300 of them sustained different degrees of injury (A. Mohammed, 2010b, p. 2). In another, 
‘Christian elders condemn Jos crisis’, Abbas Jimoh wrote that a group known as the Plateau 
State Christian Elders’ Consultative Forum had condemned […] the attack on churches by 
some Muslim youths in Jos, describing it as an act of terrorism’ (A. Jimoh, 2010, p. 5). The 
first report which emerged from the Muslim bloc focused on Muslim casualty and the second 
report indicted Muslim youths for attack on churches.  
The newspaper tried to provide a level playing ground for conflicting parties as it 
offered them the platform on which they expressed their frustrations. JNI’s alleged 27 deaths 
comprised of Muslims who were presumed to have been killed by Christians (because 
Christians were their opponents). In that report, no government agency, the police or official 
of the Red Cross confirmed the casualty figure released by the JNI. The reporter relied on JNI 
for information on casualty which the group may have come up with in order to attract 
sympathy for the Muslims. The strategy was employed by the reporter to instigate the 




For a newspaper that had been accused of ‘Islamising’ its contents through its reports, 
editorials and commentaries (J. D. Galadima, 2010), it was, perhaps, uncommon to read 
about allegations of attack on Christians by the Muslims in Jos. For example, the Christian 
Elders’ Consultative Forum stated in the report, 
In very strong terms, we hereby condemn Sunday’s attack on Christians in Jos, the 
capital of Plateau State in which several persons have been reported injured or dead. 
Our fellow brothers and sisters were just coming out of churches in Nassarawa area of 
Jos when some Muslim youths pounced on them with cutlasses and other dangerous 
weapons [….] We call on our Muslim brothers and sisters to see this as the last of 
such provocation on the Christians in the state. Enough is enough (A. Jimoh, 2010, p. 
5, pars.3-5).  
Although Daily Trust did not give prominence to the story as it occupied a single column on 
the top right corner of the page, compared to the report on 27 deaths alleged by JNI which ran 
across four columns and placed in the centre of the page, the paper ensured that both parties 
were given a voice. This suggests that by placing the stories side-by-side, Daily Trust 
employed a strategy which created the impression that it was an inclusive and balanced 
newspaper.  
A similar technique manifested in two other stories on Page 2 (January 19, 2010). 
Both headlines - ‘Jos crisis: Imam, deputy speaker appeal for calm’ and ‘CAN, ACF 
condemn crisis’ shared a common goal. In the first story, Andrew Agbese reported that the 
Chief Imam of the Jos Central Mosque and deputy speaker of the Plateau State House of 
Assembly urged Muslims to remain law abiding. In the second report, Ibraheem Musa and 
Ismail Mudashir wrote that the Christian Association of Nigeria and the Arewa Consultative 
Forum sued for peace among religious groups. This, again, was an indication that conflicting 
groups could be reported in the newspaper.   
The lead story of the Daily Trust on January 20, 2010 was entitled, ‘Black day in Jos: 
Scores killed in new fighting’. In a simple language, Mahmud Lalo gave an account of the 
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recurring violence for which he neither accused the Muslims nor Christians.  The renewed 
hostilities were said to have emerged from the violence that erupted in Dutse Uku area the 
previous day. Mahmud Lalo wrote: 
It was not clear as to what caused yesterday’s brutal escalation, though some sources 
said it may have been caused by some communities’ anger at the losses in lives and 
property that they suffered during the crisis’ first round on Sunday (Lalo, 2010, pp. 1-
5, par.3). 
The reporter implied that communities (including Christians and Muslims) suffered losses, as 
a result of which they vented their anger by engaging in fresh violence. He realised that it was 
not his responsibility to recount the losses suffered by either party, or to quote casualty 
figures from unauthorised sources as some reporters had done. This strategy is what conflict 
sensitive journalists and responsible conflict reporters have advocated (see Howard, 2009, 
2015; Singh, 2013). The reporter’s narrative could be perceived as neutral because the fact 
that fresh violence occurred and all parties were affected had been established. This was the 
reporter’s understanding of media logic – mediatisation. His strategy of news framing was 
driven by this logic.  
The Jama’atu Nasril Islam (JNI) took the second head-count of Muslim casualties on 
January 20. Ahmed Mohammed who reported in previous edition that 27 Muslims had been 
killed, again, told his readers that JNI confirmed 138 deaths between January 17 and 19. The 
reporter continued to liaise with JNI for an update on the death toll of Muslims. All the 
figures were released by those he identified as officials of the JNI, Malam Danjuma Khalid 
and Hajiya Gambo Hawaja – who was said to be the chairperson of the Women Welfare 
Committee of the group (A. Mohammed, 2010a, p. 2). The reporter held that he contacted the 
programme coordinator of the Christian Stefanus Foundation, Engr. Mark Lipdo who said 
‘they were not able to count the number of the dead as at Monday because it was too early to 
do so’ (A. Mohammed, 2010a, p. 2, par.3). From Sunday to Tuesday (as at press time), no 
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official casualty figure had emerged from the government or the police except the JNI. JNI’s 
patronage by the reporter may have been influenced by his commitment to ethnic/religious 
community. The counting was mostly reported at the Jos Central Mosque where Muslim 
corpses had allegedly piled up. The reporter’s strategy was to reinforce the notion that the 
alleged attack on the ‘settler’ Hausa Fulani community was premeditated. 
In the same edition of the Daily Trust (January 20, 2010), while there seemed to be a 
blend of reports in which Christian and Muslim leaders and organisations implored the 
citizens to live in peace, and the ones that appeared inciting, a column which was almost 
devoted to the Jos conflict introduced the readers to a fairly new argument. Unlike Yahaya 
Ibrahim who wrote that a bishop (head of a Christian bloc) had called on religious leaders to 
guard against hate messages in their sermons (Y. Ibrahim, 2010, p. 2), Mohammed Haruna’s 
report may have provoked the ‘indigenous’ Christians, the governor and the government of 
Plateau State. The headline of his 18-paragraph story, ‘Jang, the media and the genocide on 
the Plateau this time’ was a reflection of its content. He accused Governor Jang and the 
indigenous ethnic groups, the security and some sections of the media of complicity. He 
wrote this about them:  
This time, however, they seemed hell bent on finishing what they started on 
November 28, 2008. As at the time of this writing hundreds of so-called settlers have 
been murdered in cold blood in many cases allegedly by the police who are supposed 
to put out the fire. Thousands more have had to take refuge in army barracks and 
police stations [….] As usual, the so-called settlers have been blamed by the 
preponderance of the media for starting it all (H. Mohammed, 2010, p. 64, par.9)    
The pronoun ‘they’, as used in the writer’s text, comprised of all people and institutions that 
allegedly planned and carried out the attack on the ‘settler’ communities. At the outset, he 
claimed that the governor was the mastermind of the attack, and that he, along with his 
accomplices, carried out ‘the genocide that has been perpetrated against Muslims in Jos and 
its environs [….]’ (H. Mohammed, 2010, p. 64, par.7). But there was no judicial process 
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instituted against the governor and, to date, neither him nor an official of his government has 
been tried for genocide (Ishaku, 2012). Perhaps, the writer’s allegation against the governor 
was because he belonged to the ‘wrong’ religion and ethnic group. The governor was a 
Christian and an ‘indigene’, which implied that he was, by virtue of his faith and ethnic 
extraction, a perceived enemy of the Hausa Fulani ‘settler’/Muslim community of which 
Mohammed Haruna was a member. 
The writer meant that his kith and kin had been killed in their hundreds since 2008. 
His allegations were weighty yet they occupied the newspaper’s back page. The writer’s 
strategy of framing seemed to have stemmed from his belief and understanding of the issues 
at stake, or his loyalty to ethnic/religious community. But importantly, the newspaper editors 
may have shared the writer’s view by a mere endorsement of the story and giving it a place of 
prominence. The column became the paper’s selling point. The data which emerged from the 
interviews conducted in this research showed that some readers had consistently accused 
newspapers of using their columns to inflame the Jos conflict (IP 12 – HFS). It means that the 
strategy which the editors employed was to engage reporters who were dedicated to such war 
of words, especially on matters that pertained to faith and social order. 
The Daily Trust reports of January 22 contained embedded elements which conveyed 
certain information not coded in the headlines. The lead of each story expressed the thrust of 
the news but its body carried with it another message. In one of the reports, ‘Jos crisis caused 
by impunity – Atiku’, the reporter used the inverted pyramid news writing style in which the 
ideas were organised in descending order beginning with the most important to the least 
element (Harcup, 2013, 2015; Wheeler, 2005). Atiku, a former vice president of Nigeria, 
blamed the recurring Jos violence on its poor handling by those in authority of power. But in 
paragraph 4, the reporter drew the attention of his readers to a statement credited to the 
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former vice president which may have reinforced the resolve of the Hausa Fulani ‘settler’ 
community to defend their rights over Jos territory. He wrote: 
Atiku also condemned the indigene-settler dichotomy in the state saying, ‘all 
Nigerians must feel at home wherever they are in the country. Indigene-stranger 
dichotomy is alien to the constitution’ (Olaniyi, 2010, p. 8, par.4). 
Muideen Olaniyi chose to use Atiku’s statement which dismissed the ‘indigene-settler’ 
tradition of the natives but upheld the Hausa Fulani agitation for membership of Jos 
community thereby signalling victory for the ‘settlers’. The reporter’s narrative suggested 
that Jos, like other cities in Nigeria, belonged to all people who desired to live there. As such, 
there was no basis for separating ‘indigenes’ from ‘settlers’. As the former vice president was 
quoted as saying the ‘indigene-stranger dichotomy is alien to the constitution’ of Nigeria, the 
reporter failed to point out that every Nigerian is, first and foremost, a member of a local 
community and, second, a citizen of Nigeria (Alubo, 2009; Egwu, 2015). Those who are not 
part of that community are often regarded as ‘outsiders’, ‘foreigners’ or ‘strangers’. Muideen 
Olaniyi’s implanting strategy tended to encourage the Hausa Fulani readers to sustain their 
struggle for recognition as full members of Jos community, not strangers as the ‘indigenes’ 
had labelled them. The reporter’s role performance was, therefore, non-objective.  
A headline of another story on January 22 read, ‘Jos: Jonathan orders army into crisis-
prone areas’. The reporter, Habeeb Pindiga, informed Daily Trust readers, in the first 
instance, that the army had been ordered by the vice president to take over the security of Jos 
following the spates of violence there. He said the violence had recorded over 400 deaths in 
one week, yet there was no evidence of this. Of the 14 paragraphs, 12 contained the text of 
the vice president’s speech. One paragraph, the first, contained the declaration of the vice 




Rather than summarise the two or three causes of the conflict which had been reported 
since it occurred on January 17, Habeeb Pindigaa recognised only one, perhaps, to influence 
the readers’ perception. Both The Punch and Daily Trust had given the different versions 
based on eye-witnesses’ accounts. They included a disagreement between rival groups during 
a football march, the attack on Christian worshippers by some Muslim youths in the 
Nassarawa Gwong area as alleged by the Commissioner of Police, and the stoppage of a 
Hausa man to rebuild his house by some youths (Agbese, Lalo, et al., 2010; Owuamanam & 
Fabiyi, 2010). In paragraph 3, Habeeb Pindiga wrote: 
[…] violence between Muslims and Christians broke out in Jos on Sunday, when a 
group of Christian youths allegedly tried to stop a Muslim man from rebuilding his 
home that was destroyed in the November 28 clashes (Pindiga, 2010, p. 8, par.3).  
Like Muideen Olaniyi who used Atiku’s story to introduce the issue of the constitution on the 
full rights of the citizens living in all parts of Nigeria, Habeeb Pindiga embedded the ‘Muslim 
man’s version’ which suggested an endorsement of it over other accounts. The second 
component of the report – that seemed essential in the framing process – rode on the main 
story from which the headline emerged. The reporter used the phrase, ‘[…] a group of 
Christian youths allegedly tried to stop a Muslim man […]’, to show an action of aggression 
perpetrated by the Christian group. His strategy of framing produced two components of 
reality: the vice president’s order to the army to take over security in Jos and the alleged 
attack on the Hausa man as the trigger of the conflict. It also suggested that he was interested 
in identifying the Christian youths as the aggressors. 
The back page of the Daily Trust of January 22 contained a story by Adamu Adamu 
in which he accused Governor Jonah Jang and the Plateau State Commissioner of Police of 
complicity. He, particularly, dismissed the claim by the commissioner that some Muslim 
youths attacked Christian worshippers in Nassarawa Gwong area. He wrote that, 
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[…] since Christians don’t go to church armed, the commissioner of police may wish 
to tell the nation where they got the guns with which they defended themselves to 
account for the bullet wounds on the bodies found. Or, is he insinuating that the arms 
used have all this while been hidden in the church? (A. Adamu, 2010, p. 56, par.3). 
The writer reasoned that if the Christian worshippers whom the commissioner had exonerated 
from the attack were innocent as claimed, and were simply caught up in it, they would not 
have been in possession of arms with which they defended themselves against the militant 
Muslim youths. What remained unclear was whether the worshippers were seen with and 
used such weapons for self-defence. As far as the writer was concerned, if bullet wounds 
were found on the bodies of the victims resulting from the purported attack by Christians then 
the victims could have been Muslims. This is because Christians who allegedly used weapons 
might have utilised them on their opponents. Adamu Adamu portrayed the Commissioner of 
Police as a partial law enforcement officer because his comment after the first round of 
violence suggested it. But a number of citizens, apart from the Hausa Fulani who refuted the 
allegation because they were accused of launching the attack, regarded the commissioner’s 
report as authentic having ordered a preliminary investigation into it (J. D. Galadima, 2010; 
Ishaku, 2012). Furthermore, it was the commissioner’s statutory duty to make an official 
statement on any breach of security within the state police command. His report did not augur 
well with the Muslim community as its members petitioned the Inspector General of Police 
demanding his dismissal from the service. Ishaku (2012) wrote that instead of rewarding the 
commissioner for his resilience and courage, the police headquarters ordered his deployment 
and subsequent retirement. The action by the police authorities suggested that the Muslim 
community might have influenced it. 
In his writing, Adamu Adamu handed down a warning to those who were ‘playing 
with fire’ (a reflection of the title of his article). He implied that the alleged attack on 
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Muslims and the ‘settler’ community must stop; otherwise there would be resistance and a 
reprisal.  For example, he wrote: 
In the absence of government or faced with the inaction of government or a 
government of inaction , it is to be feared that the ethnic and religious kith and kin of 
Plateau Muslims in neighbouring states may attempt to mount a revenge attack. This 
is no longer a possibility; it is a probability now (A. Adamu, 2010, p. 56, par.14). 
The writer might have expressed the views of the editors to put in check the activities of the 
government and the indigenous communities, as well as some security operatives who were 
allegedly conspiring to eliminate Muslims and the Hausa Fulani in Jos. The editors’ strategy 
of engaging columnists of the Hausa Fulani extraction, and of the Muslim bloc, may have 
been the case here. Adamu Adamu’s article was a build-up on Mohammed Haruna’s.  Both 
writers wrote from the point of view of the Hausa Fulani Muslims (their ethnic/religious 
community) who had been allegedly oppressed by the ‘indigenes’, and had sought a means to 
be heard.  
There was a slightly different approach to reporting as the conflict entered the sixth 
day. In the Weekly Trust of January 23, 2010, three journalists who had previously reported 
the violence as it spread to nearly all parts of the city, did not seem to be in a hurry for 
breaking news. Unlike their earlier accounts that silenced possible causes of the violence 
other than the one believed to have involved a Hausa man (Kabiru Mohammed) and some 
youths, the reporters informed their readers that the causes were multidimensional. They did 
not also describe it as an attack on the Muslims and the Hausa Fulani community whose 
death toll was said to have increased by the day. The somewhat provocative contents that 
dominated previous reports were absent. Perhaps, the reporters became more sensible than 
they were because new facts emerged beyond the halting of the rebuilding of a house. They 
accommodated other versions in their feature article. The reporters – Andrew Agbese, Ahmed 
Mohammed and Mahmud Lalo – recognised, first, the version which held that the conflict 
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started during a football match between a Christian-dominated team and a Muslim-dominated 
team. Second, they said it may have erupted when some youths allegedly attacked Kabiru 
Mohammed and those who volunteered to rebuild his house. Third, that Kabiru took 
advantage of the absence of the Christian neighbour by encroaching into the neighbour’s 
land. Fourth, that some Muslim youths, without provocation, launched an attack on Christian 
worshippers in Nassarawa Gwong. 
The reporters realised that they had the obligation to let their readers know what the 
possible causes of the violence were since the incident was still being investigated. This 
approach had been theorised by D’Angelo and Kuypers (2010) who argued that the audiences 
could determine their reality by making judgment on what might constitute reality, especially 
when faced with many accounts. But what constituted the reporters’ reality soon manifested. 
They used a strategy of framing that suggested to their readers that the violence erupted as a 
result of the halting of the reconstruction of Kabiru Mohammed’s house in Dutse Uku area. 
Having enumerated the possible causes as they were widely held, the reporters further 
narrated how they undertook their investigations: 
Efforts to locate the scene of the football match and those who participated by our 
correspondents failed as none of the persons interviewed was able to point at a 
particular field or the location where the match was said to have been played. In the 
version that attributed the crisis to efforts to rebuild a house, our correspondent was 
able to identify and speak with one of the major characters, Malam Kabiru who 
confirmed that indeed the crisis emanated from his effort to rebuild his house [….] 
Efforts by our correspondent to identify the Jarawa man however failed as even 
Malam Kabiru does not know his name (Agbese, Mohammed, & Lalo, 2010, p. 2, 
pars.10-11). 
From the above narrative, the reporters intended to dismiss the claim that linked the conflict 
to a football match. The location of the field of the football match could have been traced as 
previous reports (e.g., Owuamanam & Fabiyi, 2010, p. 2, par.9) and some people believed to 
be residents of Dutse Uku, had given a clue on where the match was said to have held. If the 
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reporters wanted to initiate an investigative process to determine the veracity or otherwise of 
this account, they could have moved into the area, identified some residents and interacted 
with them to know whether a football match of some sort had taken place. It was expected, 
notwithstanding, that no player or ‘those who participated’ in the match would be found on 
the field of play or anywhere near it given the circumstances that prevailed. Perhaps, those 
whom the reporters claimed to have interviewed were likely the wrong samples as a number 
of them may have been hand-picked to provide the responses desired by the reporters. 
In the second scenario, Daily Trust’s correspondent ‘was able to identify and speak 
with one of the major characters, Malam Kabiru’. Again, it was a strategy to reinforce the 
belief that the Christian youths who allegedly stopped Malam Kabiru and his fellow Muslims 
from rebuilding a house led to the clash. In that sense, the Christian youths were to blame for 
igniting the religious violence. To put simply, Christians organised and launched an attack on 
the Muslims in Jos. All the ‘efforts’ made by Daily Trust’s reporters to get the ‘other side’ of 
the story were unsuccessful. Thus, they suppressed the views of those who could have 
affirmed or dispelled the claim that an argument ensued at a football match. The second 
character in the house reconstruction story, the Jarawa man (also known as Bajari), a 
Christian and an indigene, was also invisible. Yet, he was said to have lived in the 
community and allegedly mobilised the Christian youths in that community to resist any 
attempt by Muslim residents to return to the area (Lalo & Bashir, 2010, p. 5; Owuamanam, 
2010a, p. 8). Who could believe that his whereabouts were unknown yet he exerted such an 
influence on the youths who allegedly carried out the attack on their perceived enemies? Was 
there no one in the area who could comment on the role played by the Jarawa man in the 
event where he was not found? These questions suggest that the journalists were ‘doing 
something’ with the conflict narratives (Cottle, 2006). Their strategies were goal-oriented. 
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Finally, the reporters tried to dismiss the official report by the Commissioner of Police 
which alleged that some Muslim youths had attacked Christian worshippers in Nassarawa 
Gwong area. They interviewed an official of the youth wing of the Jama’atu Nasril Islam, 
Ahmed Garba, who claimed that ‘it was the statement by the commissioner that escalated the 
crisis saying it on one side alarmed those who thought they would find neutrality in the 
intervention by the security agencies’ (Agbese, Mohammed, et al., 2010, p. 2, par.18). The 
reporters used Garba’s statement in their report to create an impression that the Police 
Commissioner was biased despite his claim that what he had reported was based on the 
preliminary investigation by the state police command. The framing of this narrative 




- Additional information that Alhaji Kabiru
was beaten by Christian youths.
- ‘Many’ (Muslims) killed in Jos violence.
Community-aided 
strategy
- JNI, Muslim Umma as news 
source
- Efforts to speak with the ‘other 
side’ failed.
Implanting strategy
- Indigene-stranger dichotomy 
is alien to the constitution
Neutral-to-goal-focused 
strategy
- It was not clear what caused 
yesterday’s brutal escalation.
- The genocide that has been perpetrated 
against Muslims in Jos 
Blame-game strategy
- Christian youths tried to stop a 
Muslim man




Figure 8.3. 2 The five strategies adopted by the Daily/Weekly Trust journalists during the January 17, 2010 
Jos conflict. Source: The researcher. 
8.4 Summary of Analysis 
The analysis shows that the newspapers’ coverage of the January 2010 Jos conflict was 
adequate. Both papers reported the violence on the first day after it erupted on January 17, 
giving an update on the Christian-Muslim or the ‘indigene-settler’ clash as the days went by. 
The papers were unanimous on where the conflicting groups had the initial clash – Dutse –
Uku area of Jos. But their narratives varied as the journalists employed different strategies to 
unravel the causes of violence and the roles which the conflict actors performed. 
The Punch reporters adopted a tripartite system – the neutral-to-goal-focused strategy, 
the implanting strategy and the reinforcement strategy. As shown in Figure 8.3.1, these 
strategies were employed at different levels. First, some reporters used words/phrases to 
establish the context – that violence in which Christians and Muslims were involved took 
place in Dutse Uku. In the first instance, they hid the identities of the aggressors and the 
victims, and attempted to maintain a neutral position by reporting the possible causes of the 
conflict. Thereafter, there was a transition from ‘neutrality’ to a ‘goal-focused’ framing which 
pointed to the direction that the violence was ignited by Muslims. The reporters had a goal 
that manifested. In those narratives, they reported that ‘Muslim youths were said to have 
mobilised and attacked everybody they saw’, ‘Muslim youths started attacking Christian 
worshippers’ 
Some of the reporters used the implanting strategy (e.g., the reports on PDP, House of 
Reps) in which different subjects were ‘implanted’ into the advertised stories. In the PDP 
report, readers were reminded about an earlier call on Christians in the North to defend 
themselves against the opponents of their faith. The House of Representatives’ story showed 
how a previous committee had ‘visited and commiserated with Muslims and avoided 
294 
 
Christians’. These were the reporters’ strategy of inciting Christians against the Muslims. 
There was the strategy of reinforcement. The Punch reporters, in some instances, showed the 
distinction between Christian indigenes and the Muslim settler communities to reinforce the 
belief that the ‘settlers’ were not owners of Jos. 
For Daily Trust, the reporters employed five strategies. These include: The message-
laden strategy, community-aided strategy, the blame-game strategy, the implanting strategy 
and neutral-to-goal-focused strategy (see Figure 8.3.2). In the message-laden technique, the 
reporters loaded their stories with additional information which emerged to show that the 
Muslims were attacked. For example, in all the accounts, it was only in the Daily Trust report 
that Alhaji Kabiru Mohammed was said to have been beaten by Christian youths. Also, the 
use of language that ‘many were killed in Jos violence’ referred to ‘many Muslims’ who lost 
their lives in the attack. 
Some reporters adopted the community-aided strategy. They used members of their 
ethnic and religious community (e.g., the officials of the JNI, Muslim Umma) as news 
sources. These sources produced ‘up-to-date’ casualty figures of Muslims which the 
journalists used for their reports. Furthermore, the reporters claimed, in some instances, that 
effort to speak with sources from the ‘other side’ failed. Others consistently blamed 
Christians for the violence while some reported that Christian elders accused Muslims of 
carrying out the attack. It was a blame-game situation. The Daily Trust reporters also adopted 
the neutral-to-goal-focused strategy. After a sustained narrative about the conflict actors, they 
took a position on those whom they believed were the aggressors. For example, while a 
report claimed that ‘it was not clear what caused yesterday’s brutal escalation’ (neutral 
position), another described the violence as ‘the genocide that has been perpetrated against 
Muslims in Jos’ (goal-focused). 
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Like The Punch, they also incorporated other subjects in their reports. For example, 
the Atiku report carried with it the subject of ‘indigenes’ and ‘settlers’. The reporters wanted 
to re-echo the former vice president’s remark that ‘indigene-stranger dichotomy is alien to the 
constitution’ – which was the position of the Hausa Fulani ‘settlers’. 
8.5 Conclusion 
The analysis shows that the journalists employed different strategies that produced the 
narratives which constituted the readers’ reality. During the sampled years – 2001, 2008 and 
2010 – when the conflicts were said to be vicious – the dominant features included the role 
performance of the reporters/writers which identified them as ‘Christian’ or ‘Muslim’ 
journalists. All the strategies used in the framing of the contents showed a reporter-
involvement in the conflict which suggested that they were participants.  
In all, the Daily/Weekly Trust paid more attention to the conflict by the volume of its 
reports and the interests they served. Nearly all the reporters/writers were Muslims and their 
goal driven by the support for a change of identity from a Hausa Fulani ‘settler’ community 
to an ‘indigenous’ one. The Punch, also dominated by Christian reporters, was inconsistent. It 
created an impression of neutrality in some of its reports but pursued its goal of reinforcing 
the identity of the Christian ethnic groups of Afizere, Anaguta and Berom as the ‘indigenes’ 












As a starting point, this research recognised that journalists demonstrated professional 
ineptitude by taking sides with social groups in the Jos conflict (J. D. Galadima, 2010; A. O. 
Musa & Ferguson, 2013; Rasaq, 2012). It was based on these previous studies, which have 
been frequently cited in this research, that conflict reporting in Jos was considered 
problematic. This subject could not be ignored as the goal of this research was to expand the 
literature by addressing the problem through an extensive study of the journalists’ strategies 
of framing aimed at understanding how the Jos conflict narratives emerged. While journalists 
are generally believed to adopt various strategies of framing conflict narratives (D. Barker, 
2007; Cottle, 2006; Seib, 2013), there is no research showing how these journalistic strategies 
were employed in the Jos conflict. Thus, the current study emerged to fill this gap in 
literature.  
What the researcher perceived as the highest standard of practice – reporting the news 
as the journalist observed it – a tradition which had been entrenched in journalism (Maras, 
2013; Schudson, 2001; Schulz et al., 2012), was contestable. The researcher’s experience as a 
reporter – how he observed the newsroom routines during the early years of the Jos conflict - 
showed that many journalists were not objective as they claimed.  
In many respects, this study set out to advance journalistic strategies research 
focusing on the re-orientation of journalists in Jos and, by extension, other parts of Nigeria 
ravaged by ethnic and/or religious violence. Since this area of scholarship had been ignored, 
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it was important to explore it. There was a commitment to conduct the research thoroughly by 
interacting with the journalists about their experiences of the conflict, and analysing their 
stories in selected newspapers that gained prominence across the North and South regions 
over the years. The study was drawn on the five factors that underpin social research – crisis, 
gap filling, importance, commitment and depth (Shank et al., 2014). Although these factors 
have manifested in this research, the focus was on depth and gap filling (the analytical depth 
of journalistic strategies research and gap filling of existing literature). This has helped to 
define the research objectives.  
Based on the rationale for conducting this research as outlined above, there was the 
need to  investigate how journalists took sides with conflicting parties in Jos, as established 
by J. D. Galadima (2010), A. O. Musa and Ferguson (2013) and (Rasaq, 2012),  in relation to 
the most cited violent conflict in Jos which occurred in 2001, 2008 and 2010. The research 
was aimed at identifying and understanding the linguistic choices of the journalists and the 
interests they served. In the light of this, the following research objectives emerged: 
• To examine the factors that influenced the practices of journalists who reported the 
violent conflict in Jos; 
• To establish the extent to which journalists’ exposure to violence influenced their 
framing of news on the conflict; 
• To explore the strategies journalists employed in the framing of news on the conflict; 
• To recommend ways by which journalists can contribute to peacebuilding efforts in 
Jos 
The first, second, and third objectives were achieved by formulating three research questions 
which reflected the key thematic elements (factors that influenced journalistic practices, 
effects of journalists’ exposure to violence on news framing, and the journalists’ strategies of 
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reporting the Jos conflict). The questions were answered through interview and qualitative 
content analysis methods and the correlation of both data sets. The fourth objective, in 
particular, was achieved by analysing the findings of the data sets from which a new thinking 
towards a solutions – review journalism evolved. In Section 9.2 of this chapter, the findings 
have been discussed in connected stages showing how the research questions were answered 
and the objectives of the research were achieved.  
This chapter has also highlighted the limitations of the research, the experience and 
the lessons learnt. It provided the summary of the thesis and made some recommendations.   
9.2 Discussion of the Findings  
The analysis of data in chapters 6, 7 and 8 (the interview data analysis and the qualitative 
content analysis) was aimed at explaining the journalists’ perceptions about their experiences 
of reporting conflict and what manifested in their conflict narratives. The analysis of both 
data sets produced answers to the research questions posed by the researcher. As explained in 
Chapter 5 (see p. 103), the interview and qualitative content analysis methods were employed 
for the purpose of complementarity (Schreier, 2012) – the former focussing on the 
perceptions of the journalists and the latter examining their reports with greater depth 
(Denscombe, 2010; Silverman, 2013). Throughout the analysis, the researcher provided the 
step-by-step approaches to identifying the data sets and the meanings ascribed to them – a 
process recognised by Goldberg and Allen (2015) as an ‘analytical journey’ (p.10). For the 
interview data analysis, the researcher adopted the framework developed by Saldana (2016) 
which required the investigator to pay attention to relevant portions of the data that would 
respond to the research questions. In qualitative content analysis, the focus was on the 
linguistic choices of journalists pertaining to the framing of news headlines, leads and the 
body of text, and how these choices constitute ‘explicit’ and ‘inferred’ communication (Hsieh 
& Shannon, 2005). 
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In this section, the researcher endeavoured to correlate the findings in order to show 
how they responded to the research questions. Qualitative researchers tend to agree that this 
process is critical in qualitative data management (Frost et al., 2010; Saldana, 2015, 2016). In 
that regard, the findings of this study have been integrated as recommended by Saldana 
(2016) who described the process as code weaving – allowing the researcher to identify 
outcomes that interrelate or differ so that the phenomena being studied may be understood. In 
doing this, Saldana (2016) urges the qualitative researcher to ‘search for evidence in the data 
that supports […] summary statements, and/or disconfirming evidence that suggests a 
revision of those statements’ (p.276). This section establishes this correlation focussing on 
evidences in the interview and content analysis data.   
9.2.1 RQ1: What factors influenced the practices of journalists who reported the violent 
conflict in Jos? 
At the outset, the researcher recognised that probing the participants’ strategies of reporting 
conflict required the formulation of ‘what’ and ‘how’ questions to gain a deeper 
understanding about their attitudes (Goldberg & Allen, 2015). The ‘what’ in RQ1, 
interrogated the factors that influenced the practices of the conflict journalists. The response 
to this question was located in the interview and QCA data. The journalists identified three 
main factors that inhibited their practice: the residential segregation in their work 
environment (‘indigenous’ Christian ethnic groups on one side and the ‘settler’ Hausa Fulani 
Muslims on the other), pressure from conflict actors, editors and news sources (those who 
interfered with editorial independence), and the constant witness to violence (everyday 
encounter with violence which made journalists vulnerable or participants in the conflict 
rather than disinterested observers). The data showed that many journalists took side with 
conflicting parties that belonged to their ethnic and/or religious communities, either because 
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such communities harboured them, or the media they worked for, and their news sources, 
prevailed on them to report the conflict in a particular way.  
It revealed that their membership of ethnic/religious community had greater influence 
on them over their membership of professional community. That is, they were, first and 
foremost, Hausa Fulani Muslims and indigenous Christians, and then journalists. These 
identities influenced their role performance – what journalists actually did (e.g., their news 
construction about ‘us’ and ‘them’), rather than what they thought they could do (Thomas 
Hanitzsch & Vos, 2017; Hellmueller & Mellado, 2015; Phillips, 2015). Based on the 
interview data as shown in Figure 6.3 – the NVivo Word Tree depicting participants’ views 
about the factors that influenced their work – and how these manifested in the contents of the 
Daily/Weekly Trust and The Punch (see, for example, Dan-Halilu, 2001, p. 4; Madu-West et 
al., 2001, pp. 1-5, par.17), it is evident that the journalists’ role conception and role 
performance were influenced by their ethnic/religious community. This correlation of data, 
used as a methodological strategy (Saldana, 2015, 2016) established the journalists’ role 
conception (what they claimed to have influenced their work – the interview data) and their 
role performance (what they actually produced – the QCA data) with corresponding 
outcomes. Particularly, in the data, the journalists’ reliance on ethnic and/or religious 
community for news interfered with their editorial independence. Their membership of this 
community defined their news tastes as manifested in their conflict narratives.  
Although studies have revealed that people who perpetually observed violence were 
likely to be traumatised and their actions were being influenced by that exposure to violence 
(Keats & Buchanan, 2013; Obilom & Thacher, 2008; Rasaq, 2012), the manner in which Jos 
had been split between Muslim ‘settlers’ and Christian ‘indigenes’ had a greater influence on 
reporting. The residential segregation of Jos has been studied (Aliyu et al., 2012; Nyam & 
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Ayuba, 2016) but its influence on conflict reporting in the area has emerged from this 
research. Since borders had been created between ‘them’ and ‘others’ and the journalists were 
required to report about the conflict across the city, including ‘unsafe’ areas, they resorted to 
writing of false reports alleging attacks on members of their affiliate groups in territories 
dominated by ‘others’. This was to portray their perceived enemies as the aggressors (see, for 
example, IP 5; IP 12- HFS; IP 13; IP 14; IP 26 on residential segregation). This also 
manifested in some reports which were analysed as the reporters did not provide evidence 
about their claims other than identifying news sources within their ethnic/religious 
community (see, for example, R. Ibrahim, 2001; Lalo & Mohammed, 2008c; Owuamanam & 
Olatunji, 2008).  
By describing their work as challenging, the journalists recognised that there was 
pressure from their ethnic and/or religious community in which they found safety to make 
them support the community’s goal of reinforcing and/or dispelling the indigene-settler 
dichotomy.  As cited earlier, IP 19 stated that ‘if you are a Muslim, your coverage begins and 
ends in your community and mosques. If you are a Christian, you are confined to Christian-
dominated areas and churches. Again, you are either an indigene or a foreigner. This is how 
we have played along’. The QCA data confirmed how they ‘played along’. For example, 
there was pressure from the Imams and Sheikhs as well as the Jama’atu Nasril Islam which 
manifested in the Daily/Weekly Trust reports that portrayed the Christian ‘indigenes’ as cruel 
and uncivil (see, for example, R. Ibrahim, 2001; D. G. Mohammed, 2001). 
The data showed that hundreds of bodies of victims were regularly brought to the 
central mosque after which they were given a mass burial. The report was consistent with the 
Daily/Weekly Trust because its reporters (mostly Hausa Fulani Muslims) made the Jos 
Central Mosque their news beat, or a hub, where they produced casualty figures of presumed 
Muslim victims. The indigenous Christian journalists could not go to the central mosque to 
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count the bodies of the victims as doing so was endangering their lives. Therefore, casualty 
figures were manipulated by reporters at the central mosque giving a false picture of the 
violence. 
Likewise, The Punch reported the position of the Christian Elders’ Consultative 
Forum that ‘we condemn today’s attack on Christians in Jos […] in which several persons 
have been reported injured and dead’ (Owuamanam & Fabiyi, 2010, p. 2, par.11). This 
constituted news for The Punch audiences because the reporters, like their Daily /Weekly 
Trust counterparts, wanted to emphasise the claim that their fellow Christians in Jos had been 
attacked. Since the alleged attack on Christians was frequently linked to Hausa Fulani 
Muslims, the readers could easily identify the aggressors as the Muslims.   
From the foregoing, the interview and QCA data answered Research Question 1, 
which interrogated the factors that influenced the practices of conflict journalists in Jos. The 
factors included the residential segregation of Jos (the main finding), the pressure from the 
media themselves and their sources, and journalists’ continued encounter with violence. The 
journalists were often ‘outside’ the conflict region of the ‘other’ group (the community which 





Figure 9. 1 Factors that influenced journalists who reported the Jos conflict.  Source: The researcher 
 
9.2.2 RQ2: How have journalists’ experiences of violence affected their framing of news 
on the conflict? 
Based on the analysis of the interview and QCA data sets, the journalists’ lack of access to 
information due to residential segregation and the pressure from their organisations and news 
sources had impacted on their work. The communities in which the journalists lived and the 
pressure they faced within and outside their organisations largely influenced the way they 
constructed their conflict narratives. 
The analysis of data on their experiences of violence was twofold: the ‘fieldwork’ and 
‘newsroom’ experiences. The first referred to how they witnessed acts of violence (the clash 
between rival groups), while the second pertained to the actual news construction –how they 
made choices of words and organised them to describe what they witnessed. The interview 
data supported the data in literature that conflict sensitive reporting remained crucial in 
preventing and managing conflict (Howard, 2009, 2015; Lynch & Galtung, 2010; Singh, 










escalate violence or heighten tension among the communities (see, for example, IP 5; IP 6; IP 
22). 
A major challenge associated with journalists’ fieldwork experiences was the fear of 
attack on them by some conflict actors who often felt that the journalists would be biased in 
their reports by portraying them in a bad light. Whenever the journalists were identified at 
conflict scenes – by the way they dressed because it said a lot about their cultures and faiths, 
or if they were heavily accented speakers who could be ‘indigenes’ or ‘settlers’ - they would 
not be spared (see, IP I3; IP 26). They believed that the journalists' reports on the conflict 
might not be objective hence the attack. A certain rival group of a particular ethnic or 
religious identity could express this frustration by physically attacking the journalists whose 
personal and organisational identities might have suggested that they belonged to the ‘other’ 
group (IP 9; IP 12 – HFS; IP 13; IP 20 –FBM). Another experience of the fieldwork was the 
trauma inherent in reporting the violence as some of the participants lamented the human 
cruelty which they had to contend (IP 1; IP 11). This data has confirmed existing research 
that constant witness to violence could lead to trauma (Keats & Buchanan, 2013; Obilom & 
Thacher, 2008; B. Zelizer & Allan, 2011).  
The analysis of both data sets revealed that the fieldwork experience and newsroom 
experience were interrelated – the former ‘midwifed’ the latter, and both had a great impact 
on news contents.  Having observed violence in which ‘their own’ ethnic/religious 
communities were participants (fieldwork), many journalists disregarded their much 
acclaimed standard of objectivity during news construction (newsroom activity). They were 
non-objective. They pursued the goals of their communities. In their newsrooms, the 
journalists identified news angles from which they wrote their stories focussing on the 
meaning they attached to the fieldwork. As documented in literature that ‘truth can change’ 
(Stolley, 2010, p. 267), the narratives which emerged from the newsroom often changed the 
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‘truth’ obtained from fieldwork. For example, when constructing conflict narratives, IP 8 –
FBC, IP 10 and IP 22 endeavoured to ‘moderate’ the contents in order to achieve certain 
goals – one of which was to prevent further spread of the violence. Another goal was to 
attract the audience through the portrayal of an aggressive settler community and a victimised 
indigenous group, or vice versa. 
In the QCA data, the journalists’ fieldwork - which involved the observation of the 
clash between the ‘settler’ community and the ‘indigenes’ - provided the platform on which 
they framed the news. They ascribed different meanings to their observations and chose to 
report the conflict based on shared values with their communities; as a result of which truth 
about the conflict was produced ‘in layers’ or ‘wrapped in rhetoric’ (Stolley, 2010, p. 267). 
The fieldwork of the Daily/Weekly Trust journalists focused on the plight of the Hausa Fulani 
Muslims as they consistently observed how the bodies of Muslim victims were brought to the 
Jos Central Mosque (Agbese, Mohammed, et al., 2010; R. Ibrahim, 2001; J. N. Musa et al., 
2008a, 2008b). In this ‘field’ where they allegedly counted a number of Muslim deaths, they 
relied on the Jama’atu Nasril Islam, the Imams and Sheikhs for information about ongoing 
attacks on Muslims from which they framed their news (R. Ibrahim, 2001; A. Mohammed, 
2010a, 2010b; A. Mohammed et al., 2008). Likewise, the lenses of The Punch journalists 
captured, mainly, the burning of Christian churches and shops by alleged Muslim attackers 
(Owuamanam, 2008a, 2008b). In their reports emerging from field observation, they 
considered Christians’ role in the conflict as a mere reaction to Muslims’ attacks which they 
(Christians) carried out in self-defence (Madu-West et al., 2001; Owuamanam, 2010a). By 
framing the conflict narratives ‘in layers’ - each of which portrayed one rival group as the 
aggressor, and the other as the victim - the journalists failed to translate their standard of 
objectivity in practice.  
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It means that the journalists’ encounter with violence – what they observed at the 
scene of the Muslim/Christian or indigene/settler clash and their allegiance to 
ethnic/religious/professional community under which they gained protection - determined the 
way news on the conflict was framed. Framing as a journalistic system of inclusion and 
exclusion of the elements of news (Entman, 1993; Phillips, 2015; Ryan, Carragee, & 
Meinhofer, 2001), was shaped by these factors. They adopted various strategies of framing to 
present the multifaceted conflict accounts which may have formed their audiences’ 
perceptions. Framing, based on this data, is a journalistic decision that is non-objective, and it 
is influenced by an interest. The frames are derived from a variety of ideas for the purpose of 
achieving a goal. This confirms the central argument around framing theory (as discussed in 
Chapter 4), which involves a deliberate choice of words to construct reality (Hong, 2013; 
Vincze, 2014; Yoon & Gwangho, 2002). As such, this study argues that framing is the 






    
Figure 9. 2 How journalists’ experience of violence affected their framing of news. Source: The researcher 
 
As shown in Figure 9.2, the journalists’ experiences comprised of fieldwork and 
newsroom engagements. In the field, they observed violence involving their communities, 
and were faced with pressure from internal (editors, proprietors) and external (social groups) 
actors. Their experience in the newsroom involved framing – ascribing meaning to what they 
observed in the field and choosing angles of news which described the intended message 
derived from the field experience. From the analysis of the data sets, ‘truth’ about the conflict 
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9.2.3 RQ3: What strategies did journalists employ in reporting the Jos conflict? 
A key objective of this research was to discover how the Jos conflict narratives evolved from 
journalistic strategies. As discussed in Chapter 1 (p.6), journalists have unique ways of 
engaging with conflict narratives (D. Barker, 2007; Magen, 2015; Perrin, 2011; Robinson, 
2015). This research question was, therefore, formulated to probe the practices of journalists 
who reported the conflict.  
The interview data showed that many journalists (e.g., IP 4; IP 6; IP 22) employed the 
strategy of moderation which implied that certain portions of their reports that seemed to 
indict some social groups in conflict, or pose a threat to peace in the city were reassessed, 
modified or eliminated. They believed that doing so would reduce human suffering resulting 
from the violence. Their view is grounded in conflict sensitive reporting literature which 
argues that journalists should demonstrate restraint by ensuring that media contents on 
conflicts were safe for consumption by their audiences (S. T. Lee, 2010; Pintak, 2014; Singh, 
2013). It means that journalists were required to be sensitive to their society by reporting 
responsibly.  
This strategy of moderation, for some participants, had contributed to the escalation of 
violence because, rather than expose the culprits of violence so that sanctions may be meted 
out to them they were being shielded under journalistic moderation. Like Shaw (2016) who 
proposed a human rights journalism which identifies with the victims of conflict, the 
journalists said whenever they reported the Jos conflict, they ensured that the perpetrators 
were exposed. For example, IP 15 revealed that ‘in my writings, I condemn people who know 
that this place is not theirs but they are still fighting over it’. IP 22 concurred, ‘I am fully 
attached to the story I write […]. There is no doubt that I take side with the indigenes who 
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have suffered in the hands of their visitors’. These participants named the alleged culprits – 
‘settlers’, and identified the ‘indigenes’ as the victims. 
From the QCA data, a number of journalistic strategies emerged which entailed 
moderation of some sort suggesting the journalists’ neutrality, or support for a certain social 
group in conflict. The analysis showed that the journalists’ affiliation with ethnic and/or 
religious communities, influenced by residential segregation and other factors, made them to 
adopt strategies which produced conflict narratives that supported the goals of these 
communities.  
First, there was an implanting strategy which they used whenever violent conflict 
occurred. Their aim was to introduce the readers to the conflict environment and draw their 
attention to what they perceived as the causes of the conflict so that their readers may think 
alike and act based on that orientation. This was crucial for the attainment of the goals set by 
the conflicting parties as they grappled with identity crisis in Jos. During the first armed 
conflict in 2001, the Daily/Weekly Trust ‘implanted’ in its readers the notion that the 
September 7 violence was caused by a Christian woman who invaded a Muslim territory 
when worshippers had congregated for the Juma’at prayer  (Dan-Halilu, 2001; R. Ibrahim, 
2001). This suggested that the Christian community of which the said woman shared 
membership might have planned and carried out the alleged attack on Muslims. On the other 
side of the divide, The Punch preferred its readers to know that the violence was a fall-out of 
the protest by the ‘indigenes’ who demanded the reversal of the appointment of a ‘settler’ as 
the coordinator of the Federal Government poverty alleviation programme (Madu-West et al., 
2001). It meant that the government failed to recognise the rights of the ‘indigenes’ who, by 
all standards, merited the office of coordinator, not the ‘settler’ whom it appointed. The 




Second, a community-aided strategy was introduced. In order to substantiate their 
claims and earn readers’ confidence, the journalists identified news sources who shared 
community membership with them. These individuals and groups provided the information 
which the journalists relied upon for their news. As  Phillips (2015) argued that the choice of 
news sources rested on the journalists, they interacted with eye-witnesses that endorsed what 
they set out to achieve. The Daily/Weekly Trust used the Hausa Fulani Muslims and Islamic 
groups as its news sources (see, for example, Agbese, 2010; Agbese, Lalo, et al., 2010; B. 
Bello et al., 2001; Dan-Halilu, 2001; H. Mohammed, 2010). The Punch, on the other hand, 
engaged Christian eye-witnesses (see, for example, Madu-West et al., 2001; Owete & Madu-
West, 2001; Owuamanam & Fabiyi, 2010; Owuamanam & Olatunji, 2010a). 
The third strategy pertained to reinforcement. Throughout the 2001conflict, the 
journalists maintained two positions. The Daily/Weekly Trust blamed the violence on the 
Christian community through the crossing of the barricade at a mosque by a Christian 
woman. For The Punch, it insisted that the Hausa Fulani Muslims were responsible for the 
violence because they failed to recognise their status as ‘settlers’ who lacked political rights 
and privileges enjoyed by the natives. By 2008 and 2010 when there were spates of violence, 
the journalists reinforced these causes to make their readers believe that, on the one hand, 
Christian ‘indigenes’ were the aggressors and, on the other, the Muslim ‘settlers’ were to 
blame for attempting to take possession of what was not theirs. The Daily/Weekly Trust 
reported how Muslims were purportedly killed and their bodies assembled at the central 
mosque (e.g., Agbese et al., 2008; J. N. Musa et al., 2008a). The Punch reported that leaders 
of Christian community had decried the incessant attacks on their churches, the clergy and 
members (Owuamanam & Fabiyi, 2010; Owuamanam & Olatunji, 2010b). This strategy of 
reinforcement was adopted so that the readers may be in agreement with what the journalists 
perceived to be the reality of the conflict. 
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Fourth, the message-laden strategy was also employed by the journalists of both 
newspapers. This strategy allowed the journalists to construct the conflict narratives that 
conveyed less obvious information intended to give meaning to the readers. Thus, the less 
obvious message was embedded in the lead message. For example, the Daily/Weekly Trust 
introduced this strategy in the story on ‘Muslim body urges dialogue over Jos crisis’ (Odo, 
2001). While the issue of dialogue between conflicting parties might have attracted readers 
who supposedly yearned for peace, the story concluded that the Muslim group advocating for 
dialogue urged Muslims to implement Sharia law in all states – a move which had long been 
resisted by the indigenous Christians in Jos. It meant that the call for the adoption of the 
Sharia law was a less obvious message but important to the journalist who framed and ‘tied’ 
it to the main story on dialogue. In the same manner, The Punch reported a story in which the 
leadership  of the Christian Association of Nigeria (CAN) condemned the Jos violence but it 
alleged that Christians had been attacked (Owuamanam, 2008c). The news was twofold: the 
condemnation of attack (the main message) and the alleged attack on Christians (the 
embedded message).   
The fifth strategy of framing emerged – the strategy of ‘inventing’ casualty figures. 
As documented in literature that the conditions of victims of conflict often attract media 
audiences (Naanlang Godfrey Danaan, 2016; Harcup, 2015; Harcup & O'Neill, 2001; 
Hartley, 2013), the journalists reported huge numbers of deaths without sufficient evidence to 
show how certain ethnic/religious groups had been attacked. For example, about 400 persons 
were reportedly killed (J. N. Musa et al., 2008a), and 300 deaths were also recorded 
(Owuamanam, 2008c). This invention was borne out of the journalists’ desperation to attract 
readership and reinforce the notion that certain groups were the targets of the attacks. 
This study also discovered what it termed as the neutral-to-goal-focused strategy of 
framing which manifested, mainly, in the QCA data. It is double-edged. The journalists, first 
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and foremost, endeared their readers by a seeming neutral disposition which is grounded in 
objectivity theory (Blaagaard, 2013; Muñoz-Torres, 2012; Rosen, 1993; Tong, 2015). They 
showed capacity to ensure ‘fair’ news judgment and to sustain it throughout the reporting 
process. From being neutral they moved to being non-objective and goal-focused thereby 
providing contexts which they intended for their readers. They tried to attract and sustain 
their readers’ interests by coding words/phrases that did not suggest support for any group in 
the first instance. The journalists’ self-imposed image of neutrality was meant to earn 
readers’ confidence as they (readers) were not likely to recognise any transition in the conflict 
narratives that would occur. The journalists believed that once their readers were blinded by 
the initial ‘fair’ outlook of the story, such readers would fail to see the elements of bias that 
evolved hence the neutral-to-goal-focused framing. In the end, the actual message which was 
intended to achieve a goal sufficed.  
Some reports in which the neutral-to-goal-focused strategy manifested included the 
2008 conflict. It was reported to have been caused by some ‘youths’ (neutral) who protested 
the anticipated victory of the Jos North Local Government chairmanship election by a rival 
political party (Owuamanam, 2008b). The reporter hid the identity of the protesters in the 
lead but, subsequently, described them as ‘ANPP supporters’ (p.7, par.9). The latter part of 
the narrative suggested that the protest by the Hausa Fulani Muslim-dominated ANPP ignited 
the violence. This was the goal which the reporter intended to achieve. Similarly, in one of its 
editions, the Daily/Weekly Trust reported that ‘it was not clear as to what caused yesterday’s 
brutal escalation ‘ (Lalo, 2010, pp. 1-5, par.3) (neutral), but later decried the ‘genocide that 
has been perpetrated against Muslims in Jos and its environs’ (H. Mohammed, 2010, p. 64, 
par.7). Although the paper did not blame the violence on any group in the beginning, it 
accused non-Muslims of attacking Muslims – which was the ultimate goal of the reporter.  
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The blame-game strategy also manifested in the QCA data. The Daily/Weekly Trust 
either blamed the governor and his government for aiding and abetting the purported attack 
on the settler community, or the Christian tribes of Jos and the police of complexity (A. 
Adamu, 2010; R. Ibrahim, 2001; H. Mohammed, 2010; Pindiga, 2010). Other strategies 
employed by some journalists included the strategy of disinterestedness (Ogunwale, 
Ladigbolu, et al., 2001) and the strategy of deception (R. Ibrahim, 2001; Lalo & Mohammed, 
2008a). 
9.3 Contribution of the Study  
9.3.1 First journalistic strategies research on Jos conflict 
The contribution of this study is twofold. First, the study provides a contextual narrative of 
journalistic strategies employed in the Jos conflict to address the growing poverty of 
literature on the subject. It is the first research that interrogates journalistic practices in the 
study area from an analytical point of view paying attention to the less obvious but important 
strategies utilised by journalists in constructing conflict narratives. The research recognises 
that substantial part of previous studies focused on the socio-cultural, political, religious and 
historical dimensions of the conflict (e.g., Adebanwi, 2004; S. G. Best & Hoomlong, 2011; 
Shedrack Gaya Best & Rakodi, 2011; Danfulani, 2006; Gofwen & Ishaku, 2006; J. Jimoh, 
2011; Krause, 2011; Okidu, 2011; Ostien, 2009). Others examined the relationship between 
media and conflict (e.g., L. Adamu, 2008; Ambe-Uva, 2010; J. D. Galadima, 2010; A. O. 
Musa & Ferguson, 2013; Rasaq, 2012). These studies have ignored the critical aspect of 
framing – journalistic strategies (journalists’ approaches to news construction) – the basis on 
which the authors ought to have established how journalists’ selection of frames or their 
linguistic choices ignited violence in Jos.  As such, this study attempts to fill this gap in 
literature implying that an addition to existing work on journalistic strategies, or framing 
research, is crucial to sustaining academic exploits in conflict journalism in Jos. 
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One way to measure the impact of research, as M. S. Reed (2016) argues, is by 
identifying people or institutions that would benefit from it. Reed points out that while 
research output could be useful to unidentified publics because it is accessible, its specific 
users or beneficiaries should be identified. In this regard, the beneficiaries of this study shall 
include undergraduate and postgraduate researchers in the universities and colleges, and 
scholars generally, who may be desirous of advancing conflict reporting research as the 
current study is the first empirical work done on journalistic strategies in Jos. Others are the 
journalists themselves and those who control the media. On the basis of the findings of this 
research and its recommendations, journalists and media owners may understand their role in 
ethnic/religious conflict and strive to work for peace.  
Although this study examines journalistic strategies in the Jos conflict, its output 
could be explained in a wider context (which includes other parts of Nigeria), in the sense 
that journalists – like other citizens who are identified by ethnic and/or religious community - 
report conflict under similar circumstances. Studies reveal that ethnicity and religion are the 
major factors that define the identity of most Nigerians (Alubo, 2009; Danfulani, 2006; 
Egwu, 2001, 2015). As such, since these factors manifested in the current research, its 
contribution can help to explain journalistic strategies in conflict across the country.   
Therefore, this research heralds a new perspective in journalistic parlance of handling 
conflict in Nigeria as it provides an insight into how conflict narratives evolve. It includes the 
strategies journalists employ in reporting conflict which have tended to shape the perceptions 
of people about conflict in Nigeria. Studies have revealed that the media have contributed to 
the escalation of conflict in Nigeria (Albert, 2002; H. S. Galadima, 2011; J. D. Galadima, 
2010; Golwa, 2011; Golwa & Ochogwu, 2011; E. Ojo, 2003; Pate, 2011; Tejumaiye & 
Adelabu, 2011). Thus, the journalists and proprietors of media organisations in Jos – 
especially radio and television stations, and the bureau chiefs of the chains of local, regional, 
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national and faith-based newspapers – will benefit from this research. It will be a source of 
data on improving conflict reporting. The study examines the influence media owners have 
on the journalists because the owners’ interests in conflict often lead to outright cancellation 
or exaggeration of reports by editors on the directive of proprietors. It, therefore, explains 
how their actions can endanger the lives of journalists and impede the efforts of those who 
work for peace in Jos. 
9.3.2 Rethinking mediatisation and solutions journalism 
The second component of the contribution of this study is the evidence it provides to explain 
the perspectives of ongoing debates on mediatisation and solutions journalism. While these 
topics continue to generate arguments among media scholars, the findings of this research 
show that they can help to explain journalistic practices in relation to conflict.  In essence, 
this contribution includes new dimensions to understanding the mediatised conflict discourse, 
and the shift towards solutions journalism emerging to support efforts at reducing violent 
conflict. The first, known as the neutral-to-goal-focused/pyramid strategy, is characterised by 
media logics while the other is the solutions-review journalism that focuses on the solution-
based process.  
9.3.2.1 Advancing the ‘mediatised conflict’ research 
This study makes a significant contribution to the growing research on mediatisation, 
particularly, ‘mediatised conflict’ (Cottle, 2006), and explains how enemy frames on the Jos 
conflict (documented in J. D. Galadima, 2010; A. O. Musa & Ferguson, 2013; Rasaq, 2012) 
have evolved from journalistic strategies. 
What constitutes mediatisation remains complex despite ongoing efforts by scholars 
to find a common ground. The debates by Deacon and Stanyer (2015) and Hepp et al. (2015), 
as discussed in Chapter 4, have been revisited by Lunt and Livingstone (2016) who proposed 
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a new thinking that recognises mediatisation as a ‘research programme’ (p.468). They argued 
that as a research programme, mediatisation provides the framework for testing theories 
through empirical methods rather than a stand-alone theory. However, they did not dismiss 
existing scholarship which recognises mediatisation as a ‘high-level societal meta-process 
concerned with the […] appropriation of media logics by institutions and cultural practices 
across diverse domains of society’ (p. 466). Although Lunt and Livingstone criticised the 
manner in which media logics are applied to many studies, they referred to these logics as 
‘affordances, codes, articulations or modalities’ (p.466). In the context of current research, 
these logics are synonymous with journalistic strategies.  
The ambiguity surrounding mediatisation has also evoked another thinking as recent 
research sought to establish whether transformations within phenomena (e.g., conflict, 
religion, commerce) emerged from media logics which involved ‘media as an indispensable 
part’ (Ekström et al., 2016, p. 1102), or through ‘non-mediacentric’ systems (p.1091). In the 
end, the authors concurred that what constitutes mediatisation is the meaning the researcher 
ascribes to media logics.  
Journalistic strategies are, therefore, understood in this research as the ‘appropriation 
of media logics’ (Lunt & Livingstone, 2016, p. 466) which demonstrates the systematic 
choices of frames and the functions of these frames in the conflict narrative process. Beyond 
the findings of previous studies (J. D. Galadima, 2010; A. O. Musa & Ferguson, 2013; Rasaq, 
2012) – which show that the conflict narratives were characterised by enemy frames – the 
understanding of media logics as manifested in the emergent strategies of the journalists is a 
contribution to the mediatised conflict literature. A key strategy that advances knowledge in 
this discipline is the Neutral-to-goal-focused strategy. It may be understood in the light of 
what Maras (2013) described as the ‘invisible frame’ (p.14), which portrays the journalist as a 
neutral arbiter, in the first instance, and then a biased judge whose intent is expressed in a 
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systematic manner. It means that the journalist is ‘doing something’ (Cottle, 2006) to achieve 
a certain goal – a process which suggests that media logics have prevailed. 
Thus, mediatisation literature is expanded by this variety of neutral-to-goal-focused 
logic, or what is described in this study as the pyramid strategy (see Figure 9.3). Unlike the 
inverted pyramid news style in which the most important elements of the news occupy the 
first and succeeding paragraphs (Wheeler, 2005), the pyramid strategy involves building a 
narrative of less important details in the lead, and expanding the sequence with the important 
elements. The audience does not have the capacity to recognise this process because it is the 
writer who knows the crux of the story and attaches value to the codes. 
 
Figure 9. 3 Neutral-to- goal-focused/Pyramid strategy. Source: The researcher. 
As illustrated above, the substance of the story is at the bottom of the pyramid. It does 
not function in the form of the delayed lead associated with the writing of feature articles 
because the goal is not to create suspense in order to sustain readership interest. The pyramid 









Ekström et al. (2016) have identified five categories of mediatisation scholars, two of which 
underpin this study – ‘the highly committed mediatisation researchers’ and ‘those who 
occasionally apply a theoretically informed version of the concept in empirical analyses’ 
(p.1093). As a ‘highly committed’ mediatisation study, it is examined through mediatisation 
lenses situating media logics at the heart of the research. Based on this reasoning, the 
strategies of conflict journalists have been interpreted within the mediatisation frames – the 
appropriation of media logics. In the second category, the mediatisation theory (as discussed 
in Chapter 4), helped to fashion a framework on which the data was analysed.  
While the debates on mediatisation continue among scholars in media studies, and 
across disciplines – especially in the domains of politics, religion, education, and so on, 
where media logics are said to transform everyday life – the neutral-to-goal-focused strategy 
of reporting conflict provides the framework for understanding this journalistic process. 
Existing literature on journalists’ framing of hazardous events in Jos (e.g., J. D. Galadima, 
2010; A. O. Musa & Ferguson, 2013; Rasaq, 2012), and elsewhere (e.g., Daye, 2014; Hove, 
Paek, & Jwa, 2015) has not made this discovery. A new perspective on mediatised conflict 
has evolved from this study.  
9.3.2.2 Conceptualising solutions-review journalism (SRJ) 
Drawn on the data analysed in this study which demonstrates large scale participation by 
journalists in the conflict resulting in the escalation of violence in Jos, the solutions-review 
journalism (SRJ) has emerged. It is a modification of solutions journalism which was 
believed to have started in the 1990s to make journalism problem-solving (Benesch, 1998). 
By participating in the conflict through a variety of strategies, the journalists were not mere 
onlookers, bystanders or disinterested fact finders. They immersed themselves in the conflict 
and, driven by alliance with social groups, produced conflict narratives that pitched one 
social group against the other. They assumed the positions of the parties on both sides of the 
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divide, and chose to portray the aggressors as victims of the conflict and vice versa. This data 
confirms the findings in literature that journalists contributed to the escalation of violence in 
Jos (J. D. Galadima, 2010; A. O. Musa & Ferguson, 2013; Rasaq, 2012). Johan Galtung’s 
peace journalism – which is opposed to the negative narratives of conflict in the media, but 
lays emphasis on how journalists can contribute to peace building efforts, or work towards 
achieving ‘positive peace’ (Galtung, 1996, cited in Lynch, 2013a) – is considered as the 
option for the journalists in the prevailing circumstances. This is because their reports have 
triggered the rapid response that would proffer ‘solutions’ to the conflict. As discussed in 
Chapter 4, peace journalism is a solutions-based approach to social problems (Curry & 
Hammonds, 2014; Wenzel et al., 2016). 
Solutions journalism scholars think beyond reporting the facts; they are concerned 
about addressing the issues being reported. They do not merely report about social problems 
as the journalistic objectivity standard demands; they come up with ways by which such 
problems could be tackled. Solutions journalism emerged because many people realised that 
what the news media publish or broadcast leaves the audience confused as it does not suggest 
how phenomena should be understood. For example, a focus group participant (cited in 
Wenzel et al., 2016, p. 5) claimed that ‘[…] the only thing they report on are bad things, only 
negative things […]. They are not showing us how to change the community’. In the current 
study, both the interview and QCA data sets showed that many journalists – under the guise 
of objectivity – demonstrated this practice. They allowed their audiences to form opinions 
about what they read, heard or viewed even though a critical analysis of their reports showed 
that the ‘actual information’ was embedded in those articles. Their linguistic choices did not 
suggest solutions to the conflict. Their strategies ranged from neutral-to-goal, implanting and 
reinforcement, to community aided approach.  
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While it may be argued that the strategies employed by journalists in reporting the Jos 
conflict neither contributed to peace nor offered solutions to the conflict, this study holds that 
the conflict requires solutions-based journalism.  The study moves from the divisive role of 
the journalists to a progressive one that supports efforts at entrenching and sustaining peace. 
It means that the programme of ‘entrenching and sustaining peace’ in communities where 
such is lacking is engineered by the journalists thereby providing solutions to the conflict. 
Curry and Hammonds (2014) have stated that ‘solutions journalism is a form of explanatory 
journalism that may serve as a form of watchdog reporting, highlighting effective response to 
problems in order to spur reform in areas where people or organisations are failing to respond 
adequately, particularly when better options are available’ (p.6). It stimulates development by 
a sustained engineering programme which entails the framing of stories that show how to 
solve social problems.  
In order to demonstrate how solutions journalism was practiced at its inception, Benesch 
(1998) reported some narratives of the US News, two of which have been cited below: 
College athletes can be better educated if they are given academic scholarships to 
study after they finish playing on their school teams (p.36) 
If fatty foods were taxed like alcohol and cigarettes, people might consume less of 
them (p.36) 
In the first and second scenarios, the non-solution versions of the reports (which are not 
captured above) might suggest that the education of college athletes do not go beyond a 
certain level; and people consume a lot of fatty foods which is a harmful health practice. 
Thus, ‘if they are given academic scholarships to study […]’ and ‘if fatty foods were taxed 
like alcohol and cigarettes […]’, the problem identified would be solved. The latter 
statements are the solution versions of the US News reports.  
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What remains crucial to the solutions journalism practice is its ability to influence 
public response to social problems (Bornstein, 2011). Although the Solutions Journalism 
Network (SJN) has undertaken the study of the influence of this practice on the US citizens 
(Curry & Hammonds, 2014), and introduced solutions journalism courses in the universities 
during the 2015/2016 session (Thier, 2016), it is still unclear how the solutions proffered for 
the social problems can be measured to establish their effectiveness. 
The current research, therefore, has filled this gap by proposing solutions–review 
journalism that is not only solution-based but evaluation-driven. It believes in the efficacy of 
evaluation, or review, a phase in the solutions journalism process that is crucial to the 
achievement of its goals, and yet ignored. Existing literature on solutions journalism (e.g., 
Bornstein, 2011; Curry & Hammonds, 2014; Thier, 2016; Wenzel et al., 2016) has not 
articulated the role of review in the process. However, this research argues that solutions-
based reporting functions on three levels: non-solution, solution and solution review. The 
journalist’s frames should include a definite social problem as a strategy to attract the 
audience (which underpins the traditional journalism). It is followed by solutions that work, 
and then a review of what constitutes solutions.  
One of the early contributors to solutions journalism scholarship wrote that ‘news 
people often just point to problems and walk away. Lately they’ve been trying to find what 
works’  (Benesch, 1998, p. 36). The writer implied that journalists had realised that by mere 
telling the story without concern for how it could lead to positive change, they were 
abdicating their social responsibility. Nearly two decades after this declaration, the focus of 
the solutions journalism scholars has remained on ‘what works’. But what works involves 
‘why and how solutions work’ (Thier, 2016, p. 330) . It means that this journalistic practice 
requires a review process to know how the solutions work. 
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This essential review domain is not captured in the solutions journalism framework 
(see Chapter 3). At the heart of the framework is the pre (solution) activity rather than its post 
(review) process. It dwells on the elements that distinguish solutions journalism frames, such 
as the causes of the social problem and the selling point of the solutions, among others (Curry 








Figure 9. 4 The Solutions-review journalism framework. Source: The researcher 
 
The new thinking in this study broadens the solutions journalism research and makes 
it even more relevant to conflict reporting. Since the goal of this brand of journalism is to 
contribute towards solving a problem, the process must be evaluated to know the level of 
success it has made. Farrell and McDonagh (2012, p. 108) have noted that evaluation, or any 
form of review, ‘assesses the extent to which actual results can be ascribed to the policy or 
programme’. They argued that ‘the success of a programme is determined by the level of 
impact the programme has by way of participation and how it changes people’s attitudes, 
behaviour and/or benefits society in other ways’ (p.108). As such, if the solutions programme 
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Therefore, in this study, the solutions-review journalism has emerged to measure 
outcomes of solutions-based framing of conflict. As a framework for this practice, the 
journalist must ensure that: 
• There is evidence of non-violence or reduction in violence in communities ravaged by 
conflict as the people’s response to solutions stories. The most valuable ingredient of 
the SRJ model is non-violence. The journalist does not simply bombard the audience 
with solution contents and walk away; he/she must establish that the violence has 
reduced to the barest minimum, or it is completely eradicated as a result of the SRJ 
programme. The stories create some degree of impact on the audience in that the 
violence ceases and the parties in conflict find a common ground.  
• There is increased participatory response by solutions audiences – individuals/groups 
seeking dialogue and reconciliation. There should be concrete evidence that the 
solutions audiences have embraced dialogue as a means to end the conflict, and are 
resolved to sustain peacebuilding efforts. When they initiate and get involved in 
activities that unite them, as a response to solutions stories, it would be clear to the 
solutions – review journalist that solutions to the lingering conflict have been 
proffered.  
• Solutions stories advocating for tolerance/peaceful coexistence, for example, 
influence attitudes resulting in confidence building among parties on both sides of the 
divide. The solutions stories should rekindle trust in all the conflicting parties in that 
the parties become sensitive to the feelings, beliefs and the general wellbeing of 
others. There must be evidence that the aggressive attitudes of the solutions audiences 
have given way to dialogue, peace and reconciliation.  
• Perceptions of solutions audiences change in favour of the solutions proffered. This is 
achievable through research after the advocacy programme. It involves the evaluation 
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of the solutions programme in terms of its impact on the solutions audiences. A 
perceptions study is conducted to know if solutions stories have changed the attitudes 
of solutions audiences. 
• They (solutions-review journalists) are willing to employ new solutions strategies if 
the current outcomes fail to meet set targets. The essence of the review process is to 
establish the effectiveness or otherwise of the solutions programme. Revisiting the 
process with a view to fashioning out ways of entrenching peace in the conflict area is 
crucial to the overall success of the SRJ programme. 
This five-point framework does not interfere with SJN’s solutions journalism framework 
outlined in Chapter 4. The latter begins where the former stops, as this is an expansion of the 
existing model. It is a vital segment of solutions journalism. The essential ingredient for 
solutions-based practice is peace journalism (Galtung, 1973). Its objective of seeking peace 
among conflicting parties will provide solutions to the protracted ethnic and religious conflict 
in Jos and, indeed, global conflicts 
As this new thinking is emerging at the time of renewed interests in solutions 
journalism research – especially the introduction of solutions journalism courses in the US 
academic programme to advance knowledge in the field – the research community in Nigeria 
and other developing countries will benefit from it.  Based on the solutions review journalism 
framework, a curriculum might be developed by researchers seeking an end to the 
multidimensional conflicts ravaging Africa through media interventions. 
9.4 Limitations of the Study 
9.4.1 Focus on the three years’ conflict 
The research was limited to the Jos conflict which occurred in 2001, 2008 and 2010. The 
findings provided evidence on journalistic strategies across the three years covered by this 
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research which implied that the results represented only a fraction of the Jos conflict. But to 
some extent, the findings can be generalised because the entire conflict (which includes 
violence that occurred intermittently) is linked to ethnicity and religion - the basis on which 
the journalists’ strategies of reporting the three years’ conflict were examined. While it may 
be argued that the outcome of the current research provided an insight into the strategies of 
journalists who reported the Jos conflict in a holistic sense because of its inherent features 
(identifiable in the strings of conflict), it produced evidence on three out of many 
occurrences. This means that new strategies might be discovered in future research that might 
explore the topic in relation to other conflict scenarios, including cases that go beyond 
Nigeria.  
Furthermore, the research was not based on the chronology of the conflict but its 
magnitude and impact. Despite the focus on the three years’ conflict regarded as the most 
violent (Ishaku, 2012; Krause, 2011; Nyam & Ayuba, 2016; Taft & Haken, 2015), only a 
particular conflict scenario was investigated extensively in each year. Other incidences that 
predated or followed the ones sampled were not included to avoid the accumulation of a large 
volume of data. Although the selection of the cases (the three years’ conflict) followed the 
logic that qualitative research data is value-laden rather than numerical (Denscombe, 2010; 
Gelling, 2015), the non-inclusion of the series of conflict limited the study to only the cases 
cited. 
9.4.2 Lack of archival materials/ broadcast recordings 
The non-availability of archival materials, especially recorded news broadcast, on the conflict 
of 2001, 2008 and 2010 was one of the limitations of this study. The researcher visited all the 
radio and television stations in Jos that existed before 2001, and not later than 2010, to obtain 
news recordings or raw footages on the conflict for this study but found none. After several 
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attempts had been made through letters to the managements of the organisations and personal 
contacts, the researcher was unable to access such materials due to poor archival culture in 
Nigeria. In some of the organisations visited, some officials claimed that, as a policy, their 
recorded materials were often withdrawn after five years, an indication that only the records 
on the 2010 conflict were likely to be found because this research was conducted in 2015. 
Yet there were no such records in their libraries – not even the ones on the conflict between 
farmers and the Fulani herdsmen that had occurred in some parts of Jos while the research 
was going on.  
The researcher had envisaged that the recorded news broadcast would be included in 
the news contents to be analysed in order to understand how broadcast journalists made their 
linguistic choices. While the interview participants were drawn from the print and broadcast 
media as well as the News Agency of Nigeria (NAN) who reported the three years’ conflict, 
the non-availability of the recorded news broadcast on the conflict necessitated the selection 
of the two newspapers for the study. The samples of the newspapers were found but not 
without difficulty, again, due to poor record management. The researcher spent much time 
travelling across the North and South (covering approximately 2,500 Kilometres) in search of 
missing samples of the newspapers.  
Despite the contacts the researcher made with some of the librarians across the 
country (through telephone calls and emails) prior to the fieldwork, with the aim of obtaining 
the newspaper samples, it did not yield a positive result. The researcher flicked through the 
heaps of ‘dumped’ papers in the respective library stores (not on the shelves) and recovered a 
few. Thereafter he continued the search in the private libraries of some politicians and 
individuals where he found the missing samples.  In the light of this, the poor attitude to data 
management had led to the exclusion of the broadcast news contents for analysis. 
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Furthermore, the absence of the online versions of newspapers on the three years’ conflict 
made the research cumbersome and frustrating. 
9.4.3 Scant attention to interview questions by some participants due to pressure of deadlines 
The third limitation of this research is that some journalists did not keep to their interview 
appointments as they had been assigned to report the clash between local farmers and Fulani 
herdsmen which occurred in the suburbs of Jos during this research. In some cases, they 
cancelled such appointments and withdrew from participating in the research due to the 
pressure of deadline. In other instances, interviews were rescheduled and when they 
eventually held, the journalists did not pay adequate attention to details as they preferred to 
summarise their responses in order to perform their routine editorial duties.  
The cancellation or rescheduling of appointments affected this study in two ways. 
First, the participants who cancelled their appointments and withdrew from the research had 
been purposely selected to share their experiences based on their unique characteristics and 
roles. It means that the information that could have been generated from them and, possibly, 
produced useful data for the research was missed out. Although the researcher used the same 
selection criteria for the replacement of the participants, their perspectives remained 
unknown. Second, those who rescheduled their appointments but gave scant attention to 
details because they had editorial commitments did not contribute much to the research. They 
did not address some of the issues despite attempts by the researcher to probe the topic. 
Nonetheless, these limitations did not affect the research findings because some insightful 
interviews and the newspaper reports on the three years covered were obtained.  
9.5 The Research Experience and the Lessons Learnt  
When the researcher set out to conduct the study, he envisaged that he would gain experience 
that would help him in future research. He recognised that the research journey would offer 
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him the opportunity to acquire knowledge beyond the PhD. It began with the study of a wide 
range of methodology literature to guide the research process. The knowledge gained enabled 
the researcher to situate the study within philosophical, theoretical and methodological 
realms. In all this, he drew a number of lessons from the experience which could be deployed 
in future research.  
First and foremost, the researcher knew that he was on a mission to discover 
information that touched on the sensitivity of reporting conflict involving two ethnic and 
religious groups with divergent interests. The mission required some bit of caution to engage 
with the journalists, many of whom had been separated along the divides. Expectedly, the 
researcher assumed that some of the participants might not open up on their strategies of 
news construction for fear of being blamed for the escalation of violence in Jos as shown in 
previous studies (J. D. Galadima, 2010; A. O. Musa & Ferguson, 2013; Rasaq, 2012). More 
so, such strategies may have been perceived as the journalists’ mastery of the art which they 
were unlikely to share. Also, the researcher was not unmindful of the tendency of some 
journalists who professed a certain faith, or belonged to a particular ethnic group other than 
his, to show a lack of confidence in his ability to conduct the research creditably and 
objectively.  
However, having established rapport with journalists over the years, the researcher 
was recognised as a member of their professional community because he had previously 
worked as a journalist in Jos. They believed he was familiar with the subject he was studying; 
as such, there was nothing to hide, and they felt the need to share with their ‘trusted 
colleague’ on how their conflict narratives evolved. During the interviews, most of the 
journalists explained how and why they took certain reporting decisions. Some of them cited 
cases in which their strategies of reporting were employed as they frequently ‘reminded’ the 
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researcher that the information they shared was familiar to him having been a journalist. 
Although the researcher gave the impression that he had followed the trends in journalism 
suggesting that it was a familiar terrain, so that he may gain their confidence, he probed 
further to know their strategies in great detail.  
For the purpose of confidence building in the researcher, two journalists from both 
sides of the divide (a Muslim ‘settler’ and a Christian ‘indigene’) were engaged as research 
assistants. They comprised of journalists who exerted some degree of influence on their 
respective religious groups. They led the researcher to the participants and helped to dissipate 
the suspicion that could have arisen. Whenever they accompanied the researcher to the field, 
the participants were encouraged to talk about their experiences of the conflict and their 
strategies of news framing. Some of them were so open that they delved into issues 
unconnected with the topic. Aware that a good introduction of the research interview helps to 
sustain the dialogue (M. Davies & Hughes, 2014; Morris, 2015; Roulston, 2014), the 
researcher recognised the positive role journalists performed in nation building and explained 
the rationale for investigating their role in the conflict.  
The lesson learnt from this experience is to think about potential risks to research and 
how to overcome them before and/or when they occur. The researcher can also take 
advantage of opportunities to achieve research goals. For example, in this study, the 
researcher’s recognition as the participants’ professional colleague earned him their 
confidence thereby enabling him to obtain relevant data from them.   
It is also important to engage people about whom the participants have a favourable 
impression to help build researcher confidence. They could be acquaintances of the 
participants who are believed to be transparent and credible (Holliday, 2016). The two 
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research assistants in this study provided the support which sustained the cooperation 
between the researcher and the participants.  
Second, in the design of the semi-structured interview guide, the researcher 
formulated a set of questions knowing that follow-up questions would emerge from the face-
to-face interaction. This was to ensure that the research questions were addressed by the 
interview participants (Morris, 2015; Walliman, 2016). Based on this logic, the interview 
guide for this research contained 17 questions, all of which were posed to the 26 participants. 
The researcher did not realise that fewer questions were required to guide the 25-30 minute 
dialogue which would be sustained by a sequence of follow-up questions. Given the large 
number of questions and the participants, each interview lasted between 60 and 90 minutes. 
The follow-up questions for the researcher meant that there would be simple probes that 
would require straight-to-the-point answers, or short sentences to clarify ambiguous 
narratives. But they turned out to be what Bolderston (2012) termed as ‘planned follow-up 
questions’ and ‘spontaneous follow-up questions’ (p.70). The planned follow-up questions 
pertained to enquiries that were well thought-out, which did not reflect in the interview guide 
but were posed to the participants during the interview as a build-up on the main questions. 
The spontaneous follow-up questions emerged from the responses of the participants. Both 
‘follow-ups’ featured in all the interviews as a result of which the interviews were long and a 
large volume of data emerged.  
This posed a challenge to the researcher as he grappled with the transcription, 
organisation and analysis of the large data. Also, the time spent on each interview extended 
the time allotted to it which implied that it caused the journalists some level of inconvenience 
because they ought to have rounded off the interviews within 25-30 minutes and resumed 
their routine duties. The lesson learnt is to reduce interview questions to their essence and 
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moderate the dialogue by restricting the participants to the specific details that address the 
research problem.  
Another experience of the research was the difficulty of getting some editors to 
participate in the research. They were willing to be interviewed but seemed to be busy all 
day. Each time the researcher visited, they were seen performing editorial and administrative 
roles in their organisations making it difficult to engage them. It took about a week for the 
researcher to interview a single editor. The lesson is that sufficient time should be given to 
fieldwork so that delayed interviews could be accommodated. Also, in future research, 
editors could be approached at the start of work when there is less pressure; that is, before the 
reporters return from their news beats to file in the day’s reports.      
9.6 Conclusion 
This study is a more robust analysis of reporting conflict in Jos for which journalists have 
been culpable (J. D. Galadima, 2010; A. O. Musa & Ferguson, 2013; Rasaq, 2012). It 
interrogated the less obvious strategies employed by the journalists during the city’s most 
cited years of violence (Ishaku, 2012; Krause, 2011; Taft & Haken, 2015). The research was 
advanced through a series of steps propounded by Saunders et al. (2012), known as the 
‘Research Onion’ paradigm. This process enabled the researcher to examine the strategies of 
conflict journalists through philosophical lenses (constructivist epistemology, idealist 
ontology and value-laden axiology). Drawing from these philosophical stances, the 
qualitative methodology was adopted to help establish how and why journalists employed 
different strategies in news reporting. In order to achieve this objective, in-depth semi-
structured interviews were conducted among 26 print and broadcast journalists who reported 
the conflict between the Muslim-dominated ‘settlers’ and the Christian-dominated 
‘indigenes’. This was to understand their role in the conflict and the brand of journalism they 
adopted while carrying out this role. This data was complemented with the one obtained from 
332 
 
the analysis of two widely read newspapers in Nigeria’s Muslim-dominated North ( The 
Daily Trust) and Christian-dominated  South (The Punch) which were purposefully selected 
aimed at understanding the ‘inferred communication’ in both publications (Hsieh & Shannon, 
2005).  
Based on the findings, the study concludes that journalists participated in the Jos 
conflict by utilising a number of strategies in their reports to achieve set goals. These 
strategies manifested in the journalists’ linguistic choices, the main being the implanting 
strategy, the strategy of reinforcement, community-aided strategy, message-laded strategy 
and the neutral-to-goal-focused/pyramid strategy. They were influenced by the segregation of 
the Muslim and Christian residents, pressure (internal and external) and the cumulative 
trauma which resulted from constant witness to violence. As shown in the thesis, the research 
made two significant contributions to knowledge: It is the first empirical work on which 
journalistic strategies research on the Jos conflict can be built; it broadened the mediatised 
conflict discourse and proposed a solutions-review journalism that is problem-solving aimed 
at reducing human suffering caused by violence. 
 
9.7 Recommendations  
Although this study has explored the strategies of journalists in the Jos conflict (being the 
first empirical work undertaken on this topic) and provided perspectives on the mediatisation 
of conflict and solutions journalism, the following recommendations have been made to 
guide future research and/or policy formulation.  
1. Each of the journalistic strategies discovered by this study is a potential topic for 
future research. While the current research has established that a number of strategies 
were used by journalists in constructing the narratives of the three years’ conflict, 
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further investigation; for example, audience research to understand how these 
strategies have impacted on Jos residents or mass media audiences across Nigeria 
could be conducted. The research results can be compared with the findings of this 
research in order to have a general understanding of the role of journalists in the 
conflict. For example, if a researcher is interested in investigating audience 
perceptions about the community-aided strategy established by this study, he/she 
might understand the extent to which the audiences know that the journalists’ news 
sources comprised of people with whom they share a membership of ethnic or 
religious community. The outcome might provide evidence on the adoption of the 
community-aided strategy by the journalists.  
2. There should be a progression from the current research which focused on the three 
years’ conflict generally regarded as the most violent (Ishaku, 2012; Krause, 2011; 
Nyam & Ayuba, 2016; Taft & Haken, 2015) to other years that were seemingly less 
violent. Since factors (which may include journalistic strategies) could have 
influenced the severity of the conflict, there might be variations in the findings of the 
study of the different cases. For example, the strategies of journalists in the conflict 
that occurred intermittently which were not covered by this research might reveal 
some new data when investigated. Some of the conflict scenarios may include the 
alleged ethnic cleansing in Dogon Nahawa and Kuru Karama villages; the bombings 
of the Jos ultra-modern market, the Terminus market, COCIN headquarters church 
and St. Finbarr’s church. 
3. In the future, the multidimensional contexts of the Jos conflict (e.g., economic, 
cultural and political factors which have influenced the conflict) could be considered 
in researching journalistic strategies. As studies have shown that the conflict is 
swayed by many factors (Ambe-Uva, 2010; Kaigama, 2012; Nyam & Ayuba, 2016), 
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it might be worth investigating the topic beyond the ethnic and religious contexts of 
this research. For example, if the research hypothesis is that economy and politics are 
a driving force in the conflict, the journalistic strategies researcher could investigate 
the role conception and role performance of the journalists in relation to these 
variables. This might enhance a deeper exploration of the topic in the areas not 
addressed by this study.   
4. Having established a firm foundation on which journalistic strategies research can be 
built in relation to the Jos conflict, this study invites researchers of quantitative and 
mixed methods traditions to investigate journalistic strategies through their 
methodological lenses. This could be done for the purpose of correlating the findings 
of the quantitative and mixed methods research with the qualitative results obtained 
from this study. The topic could also be explored using other qualitative data 
collection methods (e.g., documents review, observation), or even a different research 
philosophy (e.g., the positivist epistemology, realist ontology and value-free axiology) 
in order to identify the points of convergence and divergence in the studies.  
5. As the search for remedies to the world’s conflicts is gaining momentum across 
disciplines, journalism and mass communication educators should design 
curricula/syllabi on the framework of the solutions-review journalism proposed by 
this study, which they can use to teach would-be journalists this improved tradition of 
problem-solving journalism. This effort will help to build or rekindle in them the 









Appendix 2: Participant Interview Guide/Questions 
 
1. What factors influenced the practices of journalists who have reported the conflict in 
Jos? 
2. What sources of pressure have journalists faced in reporting conflict in Jos? 
3. In what ways have journalists overcome the pressure faced in reporting the conflict? 
4. How would you describe your experience of reporting the conflict? 
5. To what extent has your experience of conflicts influenced the way you report the 
conflict? 
6. Do you think that framing the news on the conflict has invariably shaped the 
perceptions of the audience? 
7. How would you explain your role as an ‘umpire’ in reporting the conflict between the 
‘indigenes’ and ‘settlers’ or ‘Muslims’ and ‘Christians’ in Jos? 
8. How have you applied the journalistic standard of objectivity in your news coverage 
of Jos conflict? 
9. In what critical circumstances are you likely to compromise journalistic objectivity? 
10. Have you engaged in unprofessional practices ‘behind the scene’ during the Jos 
conflict? 
11. In what ways can journalists de-escalate violence or promote peace building 
initiatives in Jos? 
12. How would journalists reporting the Jos conflict uphold professional honour? 
13. Should regulatory institutions (for example, Nigerian Press Council and the National 
Broadcasting Commission) develop punitive measures to check the activities of 
journalists who align with warring groups in Jos? 
14. Do media owners and news managers interfere with your duty of reporting the Jos 
conflict? 
15. What level of journalism training have you attained? 
16. How did you become a conflict journalist? 







Appendix 3: Interview Participant Information Sheet 
Interview Participant Information Sheet  
Analysing Strategies of Journalists Reporting Conflicts in Jos 
Who I am, my mission 
I am a PhD student of the University of Salford, Manchester, United 
Kingdom. I am conducting research on Journalists’ Exposure to 
Violence: A Critical Analysis of the Strategies of Reporting Ethno-
Religious Conflicts in Jos. It has been endorsed by the University Ethics 
Committee. My aim is to understand how narratives of the conflicts are produced, and the 
interests they serve. This effort is a modest contribution to the global research community by 
providing authentic data on this journalistic process. 
I would like to interview you in your work environment to share with me your approach to 
the construction of the news in view of your experience of reporting the conflicts. I am, 
particularly, interested in the way you report the conflicts on ‘indigenes’ and ‘settlers’ or 
‘Muslims and ‘Christians’ in the city of Jos. 
Will I disclose your identity? 
No. I will uphold academic integrity by using the information for this purpose and keeping it 
confidential. Some portions of the data will be used to establish actuality of analysis in my 
research. I will not identify you by name in any reports using information obtained from this 
interview, and that your confidentiality as a participant in this study will remain secure. 
However, where the interviews are not problematic, I would take advantage to get a couple of 
photographs (e,g., Ariel or rear view) of the subjects and other related images in their 
environment. 
The data will be protected by preserving in the archives (stored electronically via the 
University of Salford USIR platform) and no one else will have access. Its use will be subject 
to standard data use policies which protect the anonymity of individuals and institutions. 
Who is organising this research? 
It is my research leading to the award of the degree of Doctor of Philosophy (PhD) of the 
University of Salford, Manchester. 
How many journalists are participating? 
The participants include 14 reporters (each representing a media organisation in Jos), 4 
television cameramen (2 each representing private and public television stations) and 8 
editors (distributed across 4 print media and 4 broadcast media) who cover the Jos conflicts. 
How long will this interview last? 
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It will take between 25/30 minutes. I won’t engage you again unless situation arising from the 
exercise (for example, clarification of information) warrants it.  
Who will conduct the interview? 
I will personally interview you if you kindly accept to participate in it. 
What if you choose to withdraw? 
You are free to take this decision at any stage of the study. It is not mandatory for you to 
participate. 
My contact details:Name: Godfrey Danaan; Email: g.danaan@edu.salford.ac.uk; Mobile: 
























Appendix 4: Interview Participant Invitation Letter 
 
Interview Participant Invitation Letter 
I would like to interview you about your experience of conflict reporting in Jos for the 
purpose of scholarship. You have been selected in view of your mastery of the art – the 
construction of news on the conflicts. 
I am a PhD student of the University of Salford, Manchester, conducting this research to 
contribute to knowledge. 
I will uphold academic integrity by using the information for this purpose and keeping it 
confidential. I will not identify you by name in any reports using information obtained from 
this interview, and that your confidentiality as a participant in this study will remain secure. 
However, where the interviews are not problematic, I would take advantage to get a couple of 
photographs (e,g., Ariel or rear view) of the subjects and other related images in their 
environment. 
The data will be protected by preserving in the archives (stored electronically via the 
University of Salford USIR platform) and no one else will have access. Its use will be subject 
to standard data use policies which protect the anonymity of individuals and institutions. 
In view of this important exercise, I invite you to voluntarily participate in it. 
You may contact me on my mobile: +2348035871991 (Nigeria), +447459489030 (United 












Appendix 5: Organisation’s Consent Form 
 
 
The Manager,  
....................................... 
Participation of Journalists in the Research on the Analysis of Strategies of Reporting 
Ethno-religious Conflicts in Jos 
I would like to seek the kind support of your management/editorial board to encourage a 
journalist in your organisation who is familiar with conflict reporting to voluntarily 
participate in an academic research on the Jos conflicts. 
I am a PhD student of the University of Salford, Manchester, United Kingdom. The research, 
which I am conducting to understand how narratives of the conflicts are produced and the 
‘interests’ they serve, is entitled: ‘Journalists’ Exposure to Violence: A Critical Analysis of 
the Strategies of Reporting Ethno-Religious Conflicts in Jos’. 
I would like to interact with the journalist in a - 25/30 minute interview in order to learn 
about his/her conflict reporting experience for the advancement of knowledge. 
I will uphold academic integrity by using the information for this purpose and keeping it 
confidential. I will not identify the journalist by name in any reports using information 
obtained from this interview, and that his/her confidentiality as a participant in this study will 
remain secure. However, where the interviews are not problematic, I would take advantage to 
get a couple of photographs (e,g., Ariel or rear view) of the subjects and other related images 
in their environment. 
The data will be protected by preserving in the archives (stored electronically via the 
University of Salford USIR platform) and no one else will have access. Its use will be subject 
to standard data use policies which protect the anonymity of individuals and institutions. 
In view of this important exercise, I humbly request that you identify a suitable journalist in 
your organisation (involved in conflict reporting) and ask if he/she is willing to participate. 
You may contact me on my mobile: +2348035871991 (Nigeria), +447459489030 (United 







Appendix 6: Interview Participant Consent Form A 
 
 
Interview Participant Consent Form 
I, the undersigned, confirm that: 
1. I have read and understood the information about the research as provided in the 
information sheet, and that it is an academic work conducted by Godfrey Danaan, a 
PhD student of the University of Salford, Manchester.  
2. I volunteer to participate in this research as one of approximately 26 participants 
being interviewed for the research. 
3. I understand that I can withdraw at any time without giving reasons and without 
penalty. 
4. I understand that the researcher will not identify me by name in any reports using 
information obtained from this interview, and that my confidentiality as a participant 
in this study will remain secure.  
5. The use of records and data will be subject to standard data use policies which protect 
the anonymity of individuals and institutions. 
6. I, along with the researcher, agree to sign and date this informed consent form 
7. I have been given my copy of this informed consent form. 
Participant 
....................................................       ......................................     ........................................ 
Name of Participant                                  Signature                                            Date 
 
Researcher                                                  
.....................................................    .........................................     ........................................... 






Appendix 7: Interview Participant Consent Form B 
 
Interview Participant Consent Form  
1. I want the data destroyed after the research has been concluded. 
2. I agree that researchers who may be interested in the data are free to use 
it. 
3. I want my name mentioned in this research. 
4. I want my photograph used in this research. 
 
Participant 
....................................................       ......................................     ........................................ 
Name of Participant                                  Signature                                            Date 
 
Researcher      
.....................................................    .........................................     ........................................... 
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